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Abstract 
 
Writing a thesis is like writing a story book, this book is a story of the 17-year-old 
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). It serves as a case-study of inter-regionalism, one of 
the newest cooperative mechanism in today’s international arena. Among a variety of 
cooperative frameworks, namely, multilateral global governance, effective 
multilateralism, regionalism, regionalisation, inter-regionalism is much less explored. 
This research determines how the rise of inter-regionalism influences the actors in the 
international arena and vice-versa. The key actors in inter-regionalism and their 
interaction are explored. 
Existing studies in the field of inter-regionalism in general and on the ASEM process 
in particular have been theory-led. There is a significant deficit of empirically-driven 
research in the field. In order to comprehensively understand inter-regionalism and 
the ASEM process, this research incorporates a substantial empirical focus. An 
unprecedented array of primary data is used. A variety of quantitative and qualitative 
data collection and analysis methods are employed to generate this unique and 
comprehensive empirical analysis of ASEM. 
Ultimately, this thesis demonstrates the persistent state-centrism and lack of actorness 
of regions and regional organisations as independent actors in the ASEM process. 
Nation-state remains the primary actor in inter-regionalism; yet, they turn to 
bilateralism when more concrete cooperation or affairs have to be handled. The 
proliferation of sideline meetings, although as by-product, becomes one of ASEM’s 
key added-value to international relations. The empirical analysis also finds that 
inter-regional fora like ASEM offer participants regular information and views 
updates and promote socialisation among government officials in the official track 
and among the involved individual from civil society in the unofficial track. 
1 
 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1. Research focus and research questions 
Today, interdependence flourishes among different places all over the world. 
Incidents such as global financial crises, nuclear threats, transnational terrorism, 
cross-border crimes, epidemic diseases and climate change are threatening the world 
as a whole. None of them can be tackled by any individual nation-states alone. 
Meanwhile, the development of communication and transportation technologies 
enables people from all around the world to connect with each other on a global scale. 
State governments no longer monopolise the means to act trans-nationally. 
Coincidently, many non-state actors, namely international organisations, regional 
organisations, multinational corporations, media, trade and labour unions, and 
different civil society organisations, have recently emerged in the field of 
international relations. In response, International Relations (IR) scholarship in the 
past few decades has examined the loss of power of the nation-state and 
denationalisation. 
While some IR scholars and practitioners underscore the growing need for 
cooperation between states,
1
 some other argued that nation-state has already lost its 
                                           
1
 For examples: Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: 
Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics 38, no.1 (1985): 226-54; Gareth A. Richards and Colin 
Kirkpatrick, “Reorienting Interregional Cooperation in the Global Political Economy: Europe’s East 
Asian Policy,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 37, no.4 (1999): 686-7; Maryann K. Cusimano, ed, 
Beyond sovereignty: issues for a global agenda, (Boston: Bedford/St.Martin’s, 2000); Robert Keohane 
and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Forth Edition (New 
York/London: Longman, 2001); Pascal Lamy, “Asia-Europe relation: a joint partnership,” Asia Europe 
Journal 1 (2003): 3-8; Rüland, “Interregionalism and the Crisis of Multilateralism: How to Keep the 
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Relevant,” 2006: 45-7. 
2 
 
centrality in the international arena and the role as effective lead players on the 
international stage.
2
 It is argued that nation-states alone can no longer control what is 
happening in the world; they need to share their burden as well as their power with 
non-state actors. Bretherton and Vogler stated that today’s IR could not be fully 
understood from a state-centric perspective but has become a mutli-actor global 
system.
3
 This doctoral research determines whether today’s international relations 
remain state-centric or multi-actor. 
Concerning international cooperation, various possible cooperative frameworks have 
emerged such as multilateral global governance, effective multilateralism, 
regionalism, regionalisation and inter-regionalism. Among them, inter-regionalism is 
newer and much less explored. It represents a potential new layer of multi-level 
global governance. Therefore, this research focuses on the types of actors as well as 
their interactions in inter-regional cooperation.   
The existing works on inter-regionalism have presented the possible configuration, 
nature and functions of inter-regional cooperative framework from a theoretical 
deductive approach.
4
 In this research, theoretical and empirical approaches are 
                                           
2
 Luk Van Langehove and Ana-Cristina Costea, “Inter-regionalism and the Future of Multilateralism,” 
UNU-CRIS Occasional Paper 0-2005/12 (2005): 9-10; Hadi Soesastro and Jusuf Wanandi, “Towards 
an Asia-Europe partnership: A perspective from Asia,” The Indonesian Quarterly 24, no. 1 (1995): 
39-58; Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies (New York: Free 
Press, 1995); Gareth A. Richards, “Challenging Asia-Europe relations from below?: Civil society and 
the politics of inclusion and opposition,” Journal of Asia Pacific Economy 4, no.1 (1999): 148; 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004); Jürgen 
Rüland, “Interregionalism and the Crisis of Multilateralism: How to Keep the Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM) Relevant,” European Foreign Affairs Review 11 (2006): 45-47. 
3
 Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, Second Edition (New 
York: Routledge, 2006), 13. 
4
 For example: Heiner Hänggi, “Interregionalism: empirical and theoretical perspectives” (paper 
prepared for workshop Dollar, Democracy and Trade: External Influence on Economic Integration in 
the Americas, Los Angeles, CA, 18 May 2000); Jürgen Rüland, “Interregionalism in International 
Relations” (conference summary, Aronld-Bergstraesser-Institute, Freiburg, Germany, 31 January-1 
3 
 
incorporated and the Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM) is used as a case-study. 
Inductive approach is applied to determine what inter-regionalism can truly offer to 
international relations. The empirically data applied here is a unique set in the studies 
of ASEM and inter-regionalism. Details about the empirical findings are explained in 
Chapter 3.  
While the international stage is becoming increasingly crowded and intricate, one 
major research question of this dissertation is ‘who are the key actors in 
inter-regionalism?’ The central question asked, then, is ‘how does the rise of 
inter-regionalism influence the actors in the international arena and vice-versa?’ Here, 
inter-regionalism is assumed to be both dependent variable and independent variable 
in contemporary international relations: existing international actors affect the 
formation and development of inter-regional cooperative frameworks and, 
inter-regionalism change the interaction and even power balance between 
international actors; it may even give rise to new international actor. In the existing 
studies on inter-regionalism, none of these questions has been addressed. 
Applying to the case-study, a list of subsidiary questions are generated: how do the 
actors manage their relations with each other in the ASEM process; is it a struggle for 
power, a fair division of power or something between the two? Has ASEM fostered 
                                                                                                                         
February 2002); Jürgen Rüland, “Inter- and Trans-regionalism: Remarks on the State of the Art of a New 
Research Agenda” (National Europe Centre Paper no.35, workshop paper on Asia-Pacific Studies in 
Australia and Europe: A Research Agenda for the Future, Australia National University, 5-6 July 2002); 
Heiner Hänggi, Ralf Roloff and Jürgen Rüland eds, Interregionalism and International Relations: A 
Stepping Stone to Global Governance? (London: Routledge, 2006); Rüland, “Interregionalism and the 
Crisis of Multilateralism: How to Keep the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Relevant?” (2006): 45-62; 
Jürgen Rüland and Cornelia Storz, “Interregionalism and Interregional Cooperation: The Case of 
Asia-Europe Relations”, in Jürgen Rüland, Gunter Schubert, Günter Schucher, and Cornelia Storz eds, 
Asia-Europe Relations: Building Block or Stumbling Block for Global Governance? (London/New York: 
Routledge, 2008), 3-31; Mathew Doidge, The European Union and Interregionalism - Patterns of 
Engagement (Surrey: Ashgate, 2011). 
4 
 
the role of the nation-states or given rise to the emergence of other types of 
international actors? Has ASEM contributed to a redistribution of power between 
state and non-state actors? Has ASEM simplified the way in which international 
actors interact or has it complicated the situation? Could the founding states of the 
ASEM process determine the development and evolution of the process? Can ASEM 
itself become an independent international actor?  
Although this research focuses on the ASEM case, its conclusions are expected to be 
nomothetic, that is applicable to wider contexts of international relations. 
Understanding the mechanisms of ASEM promotes understanding of similar 
cooperative frameworks in today’s international arena. This research provides a 
snapshot of contemporary international relations and shows how international actors 
deal with each other. Partners in ASEM also actively participate in other international 
regimes such as G20, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the United 
Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Their behaviours in the 
ASEM process can reflect what happens in other cooperative frameworks. In this 
light, a multifaceted study of the ASEM process can add to a more comprehensive 
study of wider international relations. In order to generate a complete picture of 
ASEM, this dissertation covers the whole ASEM process instead of looking into great 
depth in one pillar or one particular issue area. 
Conceptually, this research explores whether the existing IR theories are able to 
sufficiently explain the ASEM framework. In this regard, the dissertation aims to 
contribute to the debates among different schools of IR theories (namely, realism, 
liberal-institutionalism and social constructivism) on the IR actors and their 
behaviour. 
5 
 
1.2. The choice of ASEM as case-study 
From the existing inter-regional frameworks,
5
 ASEM is chosen as case-study for a 
number of reasons. First, ASEM is one of the most advanced models of 
inter-regionalism.
6
 It involves the world’s two most active regional organisations in 
the establishment of inter-regionalism, the European Union (EU) and the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
7
 Furthermore, ASEM brings actors from Asia 
and Europe together in a regular, high-level and large scale contact which had not 
happened before. It is also the first arrangement in history which brings Asia and 
Europe together on equal footing. Whilst the period between the sixteenth century and 
the nineteenth century were called the European-Centuries, the twenty-first Century is 
now widely referred to as the Asian or Asian-Pacific Century.
8
 ASEM is a forum 
where the ‘old’ and ‘new’ world powers meet. 
Until 2011, ASEM’s forty-six countries represent 50% of the world GDP, 58% of the 
                                           
5
 Others include namely the Forum for East Asia Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC), EU/Latin 
America and Caribbean Summit, as well as EU’s relations with the South African Development Council 
(SADC), ASEAN, the Mercosur (Mercado Común del Sur, and South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC). 
6
 Gareth A. Richards and Colin Kirkpatrick, “Reorienting Interregional Co-operation in the Global 
Political Economy: Europe’s East Asian Policy,” Journal of Common Market Studies 38, no.4 (1999): 
684; Julie Gilson, Asia Meets Europe: Inter-regionalism and the Asia-Europe Meeting (UK, 
Northampton/ MA, USA: Chelteham/Edward Elgar, 2002); Christopher M. Dent, “The Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM) and Interregionalism: Towards a Theory of Multilateral Utility,” Asian Survey 44, no.2 
(2004): 213-28; Julie Gilson, “New Interregionalism? The EU and East Asia,” European Integration 27, 
no.3 (2005): 307-26; Rüland, “Interregionalism and the Crisis of Multilateralism: How to Keep the 
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Relevant” (2006): 45-62; Bersick Sebastian, “EU-Asia Relations: The 
Role of Civil Society in the ASEM Process,” in New pathways in international development: gender and 
civil society in EU policy, Marjorie Lister and Maurizio Carbone eds. (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006), 188. 
7
 Hänggi, “Interregionalism: empirical and theoretical perspectives” (2000): 4. 
8
 For example, Australian Government’s Australia in the Asian Century White Paper 
(http://asiancentury.dpmc.gov.au/); Asia Development Bank, Asia 2050: Realizing the Asian Century 
(2011, available at http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/asia2050-executive-summary.pdf); Nicholas 
Kitchen edited, Europe in an Asian Century (London: London School of Economics and Political 
Science, 2012). 
6 
 
world’s population and 60% of the world total trade.9 When act together, ASEM 
partners have the critical mass to bring global change. ASEM members comprises of 
numerous big or emerging big powers, namely the EU, China, India, Japan, Indonesia 
and Russia. The membership also embraces four out of the five permanent members 
of the Security Council of the UN, and three members of the BRICS group.
10
 
Moreover, twelve out of the twenty leading world economies in G20 are members of 
ASEM. The ASEM process, which embraces interactions between many of the world 
most active players, provides representative snapshots of wider international relations. 
Noteworthy, ASEM is one of the very few international fora which exclude the US. 
While many studies already focused on the domination of the US in international 
affairs, this study aims to cover other actors in the arena.  
In ASEM’s various levels and tracks of interaction (including the summit, bilateral 
state-to-state relations, bilateral relations between a state and a regional organisation, 
intra-regional relations, government-to-business relations, government-to-civil 
society relations, inter-regional business-to-business relations and inter-regional 
relations among civil society), a wide variety of actors are embraced. Non-state actors 
namely transnational companies, trade unions, civil society organisations, universities 
and think tanks can all be found in the ASEM process. ASEM member states do not 
only interact with each other but also with non-state actors who are not conventional 
actors in IR. Furthermore, the European Commission and ASEAN Secretariat have 
their own memberships in ASEM. Independent membership of these regional 
                                           
9
 Chairman’s Statement of the 8th ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in the Hamburger Abendblatt 
(28-29 May 2007). See also http://eeas.europa.eu/asem/index_en.htm (accessed 4 March 2011). 
10
 The group began with ‘BRIC’, with a meeting among the foreign ministers’ of Brazil, Russia, India 
and China, in September 2006. It upgraded into summit level in June 2009. South Africa joined the third 
summit in Sanya (14
th
 April 2011), adding the ‘S’ to the former ‘BRIC’.  
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institutions makes ASEM an even more comprehensive case-study, as it serves as a 
testing ground for the co-existence of regional organisations and their constituent 
members as individual participants in the same cooperative framework. The 
representativeness of these two institutions is particularly interesting since a 
significant number of ASEM partners are in fact not member of either of them. In 
addition, ASEM itself has the potential to become an individual actor on the 
international stage. The involvement of such a wide range of actors distinguishes 
ASEM from other multilateral fora like G8, G20 and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 
which comprise mainly of nation-states. 
Back in the mid-1990s, ASEM was an attempt among its founding partners from the 
EU and Asia to establish a new way to interact. It demonstrates the choice of the 
founding members, which consists of nation-states and regional organisations, when 
having an opportunity to create a new cooperative framework. Moreover, ASEM’s 
informality makes it an alternative to the legally binding and result-oriented 
international cooperation, which is promoted in the liberal international order built by 
the US and Western European powers after the Second World War. ASEM’s 
informality represents a new foreign diplomacy approach. Meanwhile, this research 
addresses also whether new fora like ASEM are changing such US/Europe-led liberal 
international order. 
1.3. The existing studies and some gaps 
Inter-regionalism is not a brand new concept in IR study, yet, the scholarly attention 
emerged only in the mid-1990s when inter-regional frameworks such as ASEM, 
8 
 
Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC),
11
 EU-LAC Summit 
(between the EU and states in Latin American and the Caribbean),
12
 and the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (or Barcelona Process)
13
 began. The majority of 
existing studies on inter-regionalism focus on its potential functions, especially the 
contribution as a new layer of global governance. A few scholars tried to define the 
new phenomenon. Some scholars discussed the reasons behind the proliferation of 
inter-regionalism in the 1990s. They summarised three main causes: the new wave of 
regionalism in the 1980s, end of the bi-polar world order after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and globalisation.
14
 For those studies which included case-study, the 
ASEM case was often used and referred to as the most advanced model for 
inter-regional cooperation.
15
 
Being the highest-level interaction between Asia and the EU in such large scale, 
ASEM has attracted high scholarly attention since 1994, when the idea of its creation 
                                           
11
 Its inaugural meeting was the Senior Official Meeting in Singapore in September 1999. Its official 
website is <www.feclac.org>. 
12
 Its first head-of-state-and-government-level summit took place in June 1999 in Rio de Janeiro. Its 
official website is <eulacfoundation.org>. 
13
 Its initial meeting was the first Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in November 1995. 
No official website is found. Information available at EEAS’s official website, 
<eeas.europa.eu/euromed/index_en.htm> (accessed 6 May 2011). 
14
 Heiner Hänggi, “ASEM and the Construction of the new Triad,” Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 
4, no.1 (1999): 56-80; Björn Hettne, “Regional Governance and Global Order,” in Paths to 
Regionalisatin: Comparing Experiences in East Asia and Europe, ed. Sophie Boisseau du Rocher and 
Bertrand Fort (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2005), 104-27; Weiqing Song, 
“Regionalisation, inter-regional cooperation and global governance,” Asia Europe Journal 5 (2007): 70; 
Mattew Doidge, “Joined at the Hip: Regionalism and Interregionalism,” Journal of European 
Integration 29, no.2 (2007): 220-48; Heiner Hänggi, Ralf Roloff and Jürgen Rüland, “Interregionalism: 
A new phenomenon in international relations,” in Interregionalism and International Relations, Hänggi 
et al. eds. (2006): 3-6; Rüland, “Interregionalism and the Crisis of Multilateralism: How to Keep the 
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Relevant” (2006): 47; Jürgen Rüland, “Balancer, Multilateral Utilities or 
Regional Identity Builder? International Relations and the Study of Interregionalism,” Journal of 
European Public Policy 17, no.8 (2010): 1275-6. 
15
 See footnote 6. 
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first arose. However, after a decade, a bottle-neck appeared. A few points are found 
repeated in many works: the raison d’être behind the creation of ASEM; the seven 
potential functions of ASEM deduced from various IR theories; the development (or 
lack of development) of the process in the first decade; and a lack of deliveries 
produced from ASEM.
16
 In addition, the point that ASEM was established to 
complete the missing link in the triadic Europe-North America-East Asia relation has 
been repeatedly mentioned. Furthermore, some work became competition among 
scholars to coin jargons; subsequently, lost touch with the reality. This research aims 
to be substantial and to clarify misunderstandings and unrealistic expectations created 
thus far. 
Regarding the content, many researches on ASEM were not comprehensive. They 
concentrated only on the summitry and neglected meetings at other levels and 
activities in other tracks of the process. This research demonstrates that the ASEM 
process has developed into much more than the biennial summitry (discussed in 
details in Chapter 6, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8). Moreover, the timeframe covered in 
this research is longer than other studies which focused on ASEM’s earlier years. 
This research sets a much longer timeframe which covers from the first summit in 
1996 to the ninth summit in 2012.  
                                           
16
 A few exceptions were two papers about the US’s views on the establishment of ASEM (David 
Bobrow, “The US and ASEM: why the hegemon didn’t bark,” The Pacific Review 12, no.1 (1999): 
103-28; Bernhard May, “Trilateral Relations in a Globalising World. ASEM and the United States,” Asia 
Europe Journal 3 (2005): 37-47) and the few studies which looked at the similarities and differences 
between ASEM, APEC and National Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Jacques Pelkmans and Shinkai 
Hiroko, “The Promise of ASEM,” in ASEM: How promising a partnership?, Jacques Pelkmans and 
Shinkai Hiroko eds. (Brussels: European Institute for Asian Studies, 1997), 1-20; Hanns W. Maull and 
Nuria Okfen, “Inter-regionalism in international relations: Comparing APEC and ASEM,” Asia Europe 
Journal 1 (2003): 237-48; Vinod K. Aggarwal and Min Gyo Koo, “The Evolution of APEC and ASEM: 
Implications of the New East Asian Bilateralism,” European Journal of East Asian Studies 46, no.2 
(2005): 233–262; Zhimin Chen, “NATO, APEC and ASEM: Triadic Inter-regionalism and Global order,” 
Asia Europe Journal 3, no.3 (2005): 361-78. 
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In terms of actors, many existing works on ASEM and inter-regionalism have treated 
regions and regional institutions as independent actors. They highlighted the concept 
of regionness (the level of coherence and commonness among actors from a 
particular region, or the ability of a regional institution or grouping to take action as 
one single entity).
17
 Song argued that the ‘de facto system of regions’ or ‘era of 
regions’ made it necessary for regions to construct inter-regional connections with 
each other.
18
 Doidge researched on how regionalism and inter-regionalism mutually 
reinforced each other. He argued that the regionness of the constituent regional actors 
would determine the functions of an inter-regional forum and vice versa.
19
 
Nevertheless, the focus on regionness becomes increasingly inapplicable in the 
understanding of ASEM as its membership expands and the regionness of the 
constituent regional groups dilutes. The role of other actors than regions in the ASEM 
process were often overlooked. This research fills these gaps by identifying all types 
of actors, both states and non-state actors, and their role in ASEM, hence in 
inter-regionalism.  
Some observers attempted to assess ASEM’s achievements, especially in 2006 when 
ASEM’s tenth anniversary was celebrated. The assessments concentrated on several 
                                           
17
 The term ‘regionness’ was first used by Björn Hettne in “Neo-Mercantilism: The Pursuit of 
Regionness,” Cooperation and Conflict 28, no.3 (1993): 211-32. See also: Thomas D. Steiner, “Europe 
Meets Asia: ‘Old’ vs. ‘New’ Inter-regional Cooperation and ASEM’s Prospects” (Working Paper no.22, 
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2000); Julie Gilson, “Defining Inter-Regionalism: the 
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)” (Electronic Working Papers, School of East Asia Studies, vol.1, no.1, 
University of Sheffield, 2002, <213.207.94.236/files/gilson_DefiningInterRegionalism.pdf>, accessed 
4 March 2008); Doidge, “Joined at the Hip: Regionalism and Interregionalism” (2007): 220-48. 
18
 Song, “Regionalisation, inter-regional cooperation and global governance” (2007): 67-8. 
19
 Doidge, “Joined at the Hip: Regionalism and Interregionalism” (2007): 220-48; Doidge, The 
European Union and Interregionalism - Patterns of Engagement (2011), 48-52; see also Jürgen Rüland, 
“The EU as an Inter- and Transregional Actors: Lessons for Global Governance from Europe’s Relations 
with Asia” (Paper presented in Conference on the EU in International Affairs, National Europe Centre, 
Australian National University, 3-4 July, 2002): 1-2. 
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theoretically-deduced functions, namely balancing (both power and institution), 
rationalising of international cooperation/governance and agenda-setting for 
multilateral regime. Due to the difficulty in measuring abstract conditions such as the 
increase in regionness or in trust between actors, assessment of functions like 
regional identity building and bandwagon was not available. These assessments 
reached similar conclusion: ASEM was a mere talk-shop, unable to delivery anything 
tangible and had missed the opportunity to make contribution.
20
 Interestingly, no 
reason was given to explain why ASEM still attracts new members or still gains 
support from its partners.  
In order to understand what ASEM can truly offer to its partners and the wider world, 
this dissertation suggests, to first identify the actual actors in the process, in which 
region is presumed not as a key one. Empirical data are applied; subsequently, this 
research illustrates what ASEM can offer as well as the reasons for new comers to 
join the process.  
Furthermore, the existing studies on ASEM have discussed the correlations between 
ASEM with other IR processes. The birth of ASEM was attributed to globalisation, 
regionalism, regionalisation and the rise of the Triadic regions.
21
 On the other hand, 
                                           
20
 Christopher M. Dent, “ASEM and the ‘Cinderella Complex’ of EU-East Asia Economic Relations,” 
Pacific Affairs 74, no.1 (2001): 41; Lay Hwee Yeo, “Dimension of Asia-Europe cooperation,” Asia 
Europe Journal 2 (2004): 21-8; University of Helsinki Network for European Studies, ASEM in its 
Tenth Year: Looking Back, Looking Forward, An evaluation of ASEM in its first decade and an 
exploration of its future possibilities (European Background Study, 2006), 10-11; “Crisis upgrades 
Asia-Europe Meeting”, Bangkok Post, 23 October 2008; “Opportunity to unite or a talking shop?”, 
South China Morning Post, 24 October 2008; “Time for new rules to guide world economy”, Strait 
Times, 26 October 2008; Lay Hwee Yeo, “Summary of Roundtable Discussions,” in The Asia-Europe 
Meeting, Engagement, Enlargement and Expectations, Lay Hwee Yeo and Wilhelm Hofmeister eds. 
(EU Centre in Singapore and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2010), 109. 
21
 Hänggi, “Interregionalism: empirical and theoretical perspectives,” (2000): 11-12; Jürgen Rüland, 
“ASEAN and the European Union: a Bumpy Interregional Relationship” (ZEI Discussion Papers: 2001, 
C95): 5; Rüland, “Inter- and Trans-regionalism: Remarks on the State of the Art of a New Research 
Agenda” (2002): 3; Rüland, “The EU as an Inter- and Trans-regional Actor: Lessons for Global 
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ASEM was expected to be a catalyst for regionalism and multilateralism.
22
 Several 
scholars argued that ASEM would help preventing unilateralism of the US.
23
 
However, the correlation between bilateral state-to-state interaction and 
inter-regionalism was largely overlooked. Chapter 7 specifically fills this gap and 
illustrates the significance of bilateral state-to-state relations in the ASEM process. 
This dissertation analyses the co-existence of bilateralism and inter-regionalism in 
ASEM partners’ toolbox of external relations. 
1.4.  Definition of key concepts 
The concept of inter-regionalism is largely derived from regionalism and 
regionalisation. Therefore, to understand the former, relevant concepts like 
regionalism, regionalisation, global governance, institutionalisation, international 
                                                                                                                         
Governance from Europe’s Relations with Asia” (2002): 1; Rüland, “Interregionalism in International 
Relations” (2002): 2; Christopher M. Dent, “From inter-regionalism to trans-regionalism? Future 
challenges for ASEM,” Asia Europe Journal 1 (2003): 227; Michael Reiterer, “The new regionalism and 
regional identity building: a lesson from the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)” (CHIR Conference on 
Regional Integration and Cooperation, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 17 September 2004); Dent, 
“The Asia-Europe Meeting: Toward a Theory of Multilateral Utility” (2004): 213-28; Fredrik 
Söderbaum and Luk van Langenhove, “Introduction: The EU as an Global Actor and the Role of 
Interregionalism,” in The EU as a Global Player: The Politics of Interregionalism, Fredrik Söderbaum 
and Luk van Langenhove eds. (London: Routledge, 2006), 8-9; Heiner Hänggi, “Inter-regionalism as a 
multifaceted phenomenon: In search for a typology,” in Interregionalism and International Relations, 
Hänggi et al. eds. (2006), 31.  
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multilateral governance, in Dent, “The Asia-Europe Meeting and Inter-regionalism: Toward a Theory of 
Multilateral Utility” (2004): 213-28. See also Vinod K. Aggarwal and Edward Fogarty, “Explaining 
Trends in EU Interregionalism,” in European Union Trade Strategies: Between Globalism and 
Regionalism, Vinod K. Aggarwal and Edward Fogarty eds. (London: Palgrave, 2004), 339-93; Chen, 
“NATO, APEC and ASEM: Triadic Inter-regionalism and Global order” (2005): 375. 
23
 Gerald Segal, “Thinking strategically about ASEM: the subsidiarity question,” The Pacific Review 
10, no.1 (1997): 127-8; Rüland, “Inter- and Trans-regionalism: Remarks on the State of the Art of a 
New Research Agenda” (2002): 12; Dent, “From inter-regionalism to trans-regionalism? Future 
challenges for ASEM” (2003): 230, 233; Dent, “ASEM and Inter-regionalism: Toward a Theory of 
Multilateral Utility” (2004): 222-3; Aggarwal and Fogarty, “Explaining Trends in EU Inter-regionalism” 
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Relations and the Study of Interregionalism,” (2010): 1274. 
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actors, actorness of international actors and the level of international actors have to be 
clarified. 
1.4.1 Region, regionalism and regionalisation Compared to inter-regionalism, 
regionalism and regionalisation are much older and better defined concepts in IR 
study. Nye defined region as ‘a limited number of states linked by a geographical 
relationship by a degree of mutual interdependence’,24 while Hänggi et al. defined 
region as a ‘geographical area consisting of independent states which pursue shared 
economic, social and political values and objectives.’25 Accordingly, regionalism can 
be understood as the process in which a group of independent states within the same 
region intentionally integrate with political will behind. Regionalisation, on the other 
hand, refers to the process in which a number of independent states within the same 
region unintentionally integrate, mainly as a result of intensive economic interactions.  
1.4.2. Global governance Like other research on inter-regionalism, this 
dissertation mentions frequently the term ‘global governance’. It is understood as ‘a 
system interlocking institutions, which regulate the behaviour of states and other 
international actors in different issue areas of world politics’, as suggested by 
Rittberger and Bruhle.
26
 
1.4.3. Institutionalisation Similar to global governance, the term 
‘institutionalisation’ is mentioned frequently in this dissertation. It comes from the 
                                           
24
 Joseph Nye, International Regionalism (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1968), vii. 
25
 Hänggi et al., “Interregionalism: A new phenomenon in international relations” (2006), 4. 
26
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term ‘institution’. After reviewing the definitions of ‘institution’ in economics, 
political science and sociology, Nelson and Sampat highlighted the concepts 
‘widespread habits of action’ suggested by Veblen as well as ‘the way the game is 
played’ proposed by Schotter.27 They added that institution ought to ‘have a certain 
flexibility so as to be applicable in a range of specific context and meet a variety of 
specific needs’, then, they suggested that ‘institutions are “rules of the game” when 
these are regarded as defining relatively closely what people do when they play the 
game.’28 Following this definition, this research takes ‘institutionalisation’ as ‘a 
process to develop common rules to govern behaviours of the actors involved in an 
interactive framework’. 
1.4.4. Inter-regionalism There have been numerous attempts to define 
inter-regionalism.
29
 Some scholars provided simple definitions to inter-regionalism. 
Söderbaum and van Langenhove used ‘the condition or process whereby two regions 
interact as regions’;30 whereas Reiterer stated that ‘inter-regionalism refers to an 
arrangement between two regionalisms, either contractual or de facto’.31 Yeo defined 
                                           
27
 Richard R. Nelson and Bhaven N. Sampat, “Making sense of institutions as a factor shaping 
economic performance,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 44 (2001): 40. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Hänggi, “Interregionalism: empirical and theoretical perspectives” (2000): 3-8; Rüland, 
“Interregionalism in International Relations” (2002): 2; Dent, ‘Form inter-regionalism to 
trans-regionalism? Future challenges of ASEM’ (2003): 223-235; Gilson, “New Interregionalism? The 
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 Söderbaum and van Langenhove, “Introduction: The EU as an Global Actor and the Role of 
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 Michael Reiterer, “Inter-regionalism: A New Diplomatic Tool, the European Experience with East 
Asia” (paper presented at the Third Conference of the European Union Studies Association Asia-Pacific, 
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inter-regionalism as ‘institutionalise relations between two regions’. 32To Roloff, 
inter-regionalism is ‘a process of widening and deepening political, economic, and 
societal interactions between international regions.’33 These definitions pre-assumed 
regions as international actors. In contrast, Chen defined inter-regionalism as 
‘institutions or organisations which promote dialogue and cooperation between 
countries in different regions’, seeing countries, instead of region, as the basic acting 
unit.
34
 
Hänggi’s five-type categorisation of inter-regional relations basing on the types of 
actors involved has been the most detailed and well-developed. His typology covers 
all possible forms of inter-regionalism mentioned in existing works: Type 1 was 
relation between a regional organisation/group and a third country; Type 2 was 
relation between two regional organisations; Type 3 referred to relation between a 
regional organisation and a regional group; Type 4 was relation between two regional 
groups; and Type 5 was relation among groups of states from more than two core 
groups.
35
 Relations between two regional organisations, Type 2, represented the ideal 
case. Type 1 and Type 5 referred to the borderline cases, hence were only counted as 
inter-regional relations in the wider sense. Hänggi also called Type 1 and Type 5 
‘quasi-inter-regionalism’ and ‘mega-regionalism’ respectively.36 His Type 2, Type3 
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 Lay Hwee Yeo, “The Inter-regional Dimension of EU-Asia Relations: EU-ASEAN and the 
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and Type 4 covered what most other scholars called inter-regionalism or pure 
inter-regionalism. His Type 5 corresponds to what some others called 
trans-regionalism. Noteworthy, most scholars did not agree with Hänggi on 
recognising relations between a regional grouping and a single power as 
inter-regionalism.
37
 
Moreover, Hänggi introduced the classification of ‘old’ and ‘new’ inter-regionalism. 
While the old ones centre the EU, new inter-regional relations are no longer 
EU-centric but include all regions in the world.
38
 He argued further that old 
inter-regionalism was ‘actor-centred’ (that is dominated by a few regional 
organisations especially the then European Community) while the new one was 
‘system-centred’ (that is inter-regionalism became part of the international system and 
all countries in the world, regardless whether they are part of a regional organisation 
or not, could take part).
39
 Hänggi saw that ‘system-centred’ inter-regionalism was a 
result of the systemic changes of the international relations, namely globalisation and 
regionalisation after the end of bi-polar world order. Generally, new inter-regional 
links would be informal, weakly institutionalised with diffuse membership and 
multi-layered which brought state and non-state actors together.  
Similarly, Rüland divided the interactions between regions into ‘older bilateral 
                                           
37
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inter-regionalism’ and ‘nascent forms of trans-regionalism’.40 The former referred to 
those inter-regional institutions established in the 1970s which were mostly pure 
‘group-to-group dialogues with more or less regular meetings centring around 
exchanges of information and cooperation in specific policy fields.’41 These links 
were only weakly institutionalised. The relation between the European Community 
and the ASEAN was named as one example. In contrast, nascent form of 
trans-regionalism referred to those frameworks that had a more diffuse membership, 
which emerged in the 1990s. Rüland saw the potential in these trans-regional 
institutions to develop their independent organisational infrastructure and hence 
independent actorness, he named APEC and ASEM as examples.
42
 
Dent agreed with the differentiation between inter-regionalism and trans-regionalism. 
He defined inter-regionalism as the ‘relationship between two distinct, separate 
regions’, distinguishing it from trans-regionalism which he referred to as an 
‘establishment of common “spaces” between and across regions in which constituent 
agents operate and have close associative ties with each other.’43  
Highlighting the differences between inter-regionalism and trans-regionalism, Gilson 
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described the former as ‘explicitly sets one region in dialogue (or potentially a 
conflict) with an “other”’ and the later as a ‘structural attempt to combine a range of 
states within a coherent unified framework.’44 
To Yeo, trans-regionalism was one form of inter-regionalism which she termed as 
‘hybrid inter-regionalism’, in which ‘two “regions” that relate to each other may not 
be clearly defined, membership is more diffuse and may not coincide neatly with [any] 
regional organisations.’ 45  On the other end of the spectrum stood ‘pure 
inter-regionalism’ in which ‘two defined regional entities interact with each other’.46 
The most recent attempt to define inter-regionalism was a research of Rignér and 
Söderbaum, which devoted to ‘map’ the EU-related inter-regionalism. 47  They 
distinguished between ‘pure-inter-regionalism’ (an institutional framework between 
two clearly identifiable regions), ‘hybrid inter-regionalism’ (where one organised 
region negotiated with a group of countries from another unorganised or dispersed 
region), and ‘trans-regionalism’ (region-to-region relations where both regions were 
dispersed and had weak actorship).
48
 
In sum, the acting unit and the level of institutionalisation appeared as two crucial 
factors in the definition of inter-regionalism. A majority of works considered 
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interaction involving a united regional group in one side as inter-regionalism, whereas 
interaction between two groups without clear regionness was defined as 
trans-regionalism. Trans-regionalism involves a higher level of institutionalisation 
than inter-regionalism. As underscored by the aforementioned scholars, 
trans-regionalism often included establishment of an independent institutional 
framework while inter-regional did not. Table 1.1 lists the different definitions of 
inter-regional and trans-regional interactions by different scholars. 
Table 1.1: Summary of definitions of interaction among regions or actors from 
different regions (‘╳’ means ‘nothing was mentioned by the particular scholar’.) 
 RO-RO RO-RG RG-RG 
States form 2 or more 
regions 
RO/RG- 
state 
Dent 
Inter-regionalism between two 
distinct regions 
Trans-regionalism 
╳ 
Söderbaum 
& van 
Langenhove 
region-to-region relations ╳ 
Gilson Interactions between two regions Trans-regionalism 
Reiterer Relations between two regionalisms ╳ 
Rüland 
Old bilateral inter-regionalism 
or called ‘bi-regionalism’ 
New trans-regionalism 
Yeo Pure inter-regionalism Hybrid inter-regionalism 
Rignér & 
Söderbaum 
Pure 
inter-regio
nalism 
Hybrid 
inter-regional
ism 
Trans-regionalism ╳ 
Hänggi 
Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5 Type 1 
Ideal case Inter-regional Mega-regional 
Quasi-inte
r-regional 
Covered by old 
inter-regionalism 
Not 
covered 
Covered by old inter-regionalism 
Covered by new inter-regionalism 
This 
dissertation 
Pure inter-regionalism 
Inter-regionalism in 
loose sense (two 
indistinct regions) 
Asymmetr
ic 
bilateralis
m 
After consulting the works of various scholars, this dissertation follows the majority 
and considers relations between two regional organisations (RO-RO), between a 
regional organisation and a distinct regional group (RO-RG), and between two 
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distinct regional groups (RG-RG) as ‘pure inter-regionalism’. Interaction between 
actors from two indistinct regions would be referred to as inter-regionalism in loose 
sense. The relations with a regional group/organisation on one side and a single state 
on the other (e.g. EU-Japan or ASEAN-China) are not considered as inter-regionalism 
but ‘asymmetric bilateral relation’.49  
1.4.5. Defining ASEM While many existing studies on ASEM defined it as 
inter-regionalism or simply took ASEM as an example of inter-regionalism for 
granted,
50
 some research considered it as trans-regionalism or multilateralism. Yeo 
preferred the term ‘hybrid inter-regionalism’. 51  Ponjaert defined ASEM as 
‘heterogeneous inter-regionalism’, which referred to a regional organisation (the EU) 
dealing with a regional group (the East Asian countries).
52
 Rüland, Doidge and 
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 The term is coined by Camroux, see David Camroux, “The Rise and Decline of the Asia-Europe 
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européens de Sciences Po 4 (2006). 
50
 Pelkmans and Hiroko, “The Promise of ASEM” (1997), 1-20; Christopher M. Dent, “The ASEM: 
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Philippe Régnier eds. (London: Routledge, 2003), 197-219; César de Prado Yepes, “The effect of 
ASEM on European foreign Policies,” Asia Europe Journal 3 (2005): 25-35; Chen, “NATO, APEC 
and ASEM: Triadic Inter-regionalism and Global order” (2005): 372; Gilson, “New Interregionalism? 
The EU and East Asia” (2005): 307-26; Hänggi, “Inter-regionalism as a multifaceted phenomenon” 
(2006): 31-62; Juha Jokela and Bart Gaens, “Interregional relations and legitimacy in global 
governance: the EU in ASEM,” Asia Europe Journal 10 (2012): 145-64. 
51
 Yeo, “The Inter-regional Dimension of EU-Asia Relations: EU-ASEAN and the Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM) Process” (2007): 175. 
52
 Frederik Ponjaert, “Cross-regional Dynamics: Their Specific Role and Contribution to Global 
Governance Efforts within the International System”, in European Union and Asia. A Dialogue on 
Regionalism and Interregional Cooperation, Reimund Seidelmann and Vasilache Andreas eds. 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008), 177-96. 
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Loewen classified ASEM as trans-regionalism.
53
 In this dissertation, when ASEM 
first began with the EU (a regional organisation) on one side and a group of states 
from East Asia (a regional group, known as ASEAN+3) on the other, it was classified 
as a pure inter-regionalism. 
The categorisation of ASEM became even more difficult after its four rounds of 
enlargement. On the Asian side, the enlargement to six non-ASEAN+3 countries 
(India, Pakistan, Mongolia, Australia, New Zealand and Russia) diluted the 
distinctiveness of the Asian partners as a single group. Noteworthy, Russia, Australia 
and New Zealand first applied to join the European side of ASEM but were rejected. 
They finally joined as ‘Temporary Third Category’ in 2010; then in 2012, they were 
accepted into ASEM’s Asian group. Geographically, Russia sits on both Asia and 
Europe whereas Australia and New Zealand locate in the Pacific between East Asia 
and the Atlantic. In terms of culture, language and value, Australia and New Zealand 
share much more similarities with European countries, especially the UK, than with 
Asian countries like China, Mongolia or Thailand. The case of Russia is even more 
complicated as it historically and culturally ties with both Europe and Asia. Still, 
Western Russia which locates in Europe has been more developed and populated then 
the Eastern part of Russia in Asia. The regional identity of these three countries is 
unclear (or flexible viewing from a positive angle). To further complicate the 
situation, Norway and Switzerland, who are not part of the EU, became full ASEM 
European members in the ninth summit. Subsequently, the regionness of the 
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 Rüland, “Inter- and Trans-regionalism: Remarks on the State of the Art of a New Research Agenda” 
(2002): 3; Rüland, “The EU as an Inter- and Transregional Actor: Lessons for Global Governance from 
Europe’s Relations with Asia” (2002): 3; Howard Loewen, “ASEM’s Enlargement- state-to-state or 
region-to-region dialogue?”, in The Asia-Europe Meeting, Engagement, Enlargement and Expectations, 
Yeo and Hofmeister eds. (2010), 25; Doidge, The European Union and Interregionalism - Patterns of 
Engagement (2011), 113-43. 
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European side may also be diluted. 
The expansion to non-ASEAN+3 and non-EU European countries blurred the 
inter-regional feature of ASEM. Consequently, this dissertation suggests that ASEM 
is shifting away from pure inter-regionalism to loser form of inter-regionalism or 
even to trans-regionalism. Chapter 4 to Chapter 9 explore this shift in more details as 
well as the type(s) of interaction(s) which ASEM embraces. 
1.4.6. Actorness of international actor Another concept defined here is the 
actorness of international actor. In his study of external role of the European 
Community (former EU), Sjöstedt suggested that an international actor needed to 
fulfil three basic conditions – discernible from others and its environment; 
autonomous; and structurally able to act at international level.
54
 He used the term 
actorness as a synonym of ‘actor capability’.55  
Bretherton and Vogler explored the criteria for a global actor by examining the 
development of the EU’s role in global politics.56 To them, an actor implied ‘an 
entity that exhibits a degree of autonomy from its external environment, and indeed 
from its internal constituents, and which is capable of volition or purposes.’57 They 
highlighted that the state-centric approach in IR study failed to understand the 
uniqueness of the EU as an individual actor in global politics. Hence, they suggested 
applying the social constructivist approach to explain the ‘multi-actor global system’. 
                                           
54
 Gunnar Sjöstedt, The External Role of the European Community (Farnborough: Saxon House, 1977), 
15. 
55
 Ibid., 16. 
56
 Bretherton and Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, (2006). 
57
 Ibid: 15. 
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Accordingly they argued that a global actor required ‘domestic legitimation of 
decision processes and priorities relating to external policy’, ‘ability to identify 
priorities and formulate policies’ as well as ‘availability of and capacity to utilise, 
policy instruments’. 58  They equated actorness with ‘actor capability’, 59  hence 
defined actorness as the extent to which a global actor can ‘exploit opportunity’, 
‘capitalise its presence’ as well as ‘formulate and implement external policy’.60 
While studying the role of regional organisations in world politics, Rüland defined 
actorness as ‘the capacities of regional organisations to become identifiable, to 
aggregate interests, formulate goals and policies, make and implement decisions.’61 
He underlined that the degree of supranationality was not directly proportional to the 
actorness of a regional or international organisation.
62
  
In their study of the role of the EU in global environmental governance, Vogler and 
Stephen defined a global actor as one who possessed ‘pre-existing presence’ in the 
international system as well as the ability ‘to make policy, to interact formally and 
informally with other actors in the international system and to exert influence in 
various ways including the use of policy instruments.’63 
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 Rüland, “Inter- and Trans-regionalism: Remarks on the State of the Art of a New Research Agenda” 
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 Jürgen Rüland, “Interregionalism: An unfinished agenda?”, in Interregionalism and International 
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This dissertation combines the strength of the aforementioned studies and defines 
actorness of an international actor as the capability of an actor to (i) identify itself 
from the others; (ii) make independent decisions and (iii) take actions which exert 
influence globally. The actions taken and influence exerted should reach out to other 
regions in order to be considered international instead of regional.  
1.4.7. Level of actor Nye suggested a functionally three-dimensional chess game 
to identify different ‘levels’ in world politics – unipolar military relations among 
states were on the top board, where the US had been the only superpower with ‘global 
reach’; the middle board were multipolar economic relations with the EU, the US and 
other big national powers; the bottom board was transnational relations outside the 
control of national governments (namely drugs, infectious diseases, climate changes 
and terrorism), in which power was ‘chaotically distributed among non-state actors’ 
and close civilian cooperation was crucial.
64
 
Camroux developed a four-level game paradigm from the two-level games (domestic 
and international politics) of Putnam as well as three-level game (domestic, 
intra-regional and international politics) of Patterson.
65
 The fourth level added by 
Camroux was inter-regional relations. Rüland and Yeo preferred a five-level model of 
policy-making in the ‘multilayered system of global governance’ – global; inter- and 
trans-regional; regional; sub-regional; and bilateral state-to-state relations.
66
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Combining the efforts of the aforementioned work, this research identifies five levels 
(or layers) of international relations to categorise various international actors (Table 
1.2). The top is the international layer with intergovernmental organisations such as 
the UN and its agencies, followed by the inter-regional level where cooperative 
frameworks such as ASEM and East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC) 
locate. Then, there are regional organisations at the regional level and the 
nation-states at national level. On the base, domestic level is added to cover the actors 
such as local business, local civil society organisations and the domestic public. 
Owing to the conceptual ambiguity between ‘region’ and ‘sub-region’, this study 
excludes the sub-regional level.  
Table 1.2: Five levels of international relations where the actors originate 
Levels International actors Examples 
International 
International organisations UN, WTO 
Multinational corporations McDonald’s, Royal Dutch Shell 
International NGOs Green Peace, Red Cross 
Terrorists the Taliban, Al Qaeda 
Inter/trans-regional Inter/trans-regional for a ASEM, APEC 
Regional Regional organisations EU, ASEAN, SAARC 
National Nation-states China, India, Belgium, New Zealand 
Domestic 
Media 
CNN, BBC, Daily Yomiuri, le Monde, 
China Daily, Strait Times 
National public Chinese public, Indian public 
Community organisations
67
, academic and research institutions, local 
companies 
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Apart from these five levels of actors’ origin, this research also distinguishes between 
states and non-state actors. State here refers to a territorial entity whose government 
has supreme power to create and regulate its own laws and affairs; in the international 
arena state enjoys unchallenged recognition of governing power over its own territory 
(or called sovereignty).
68
 The emergence of the concept of sovereign states dated 
back to the sixteenth century.
69
 Indicated by how it is named, non-state actors are 
actors who are not sovereign states.  
1.5. Constraints 
As a doctoral project, this research faces constraints in terms of finance, time and 
experience. First, this research is willing to incorporate more existing inter-regional 
fora as case-study in order to add a comparative element. After considering the time 
required to familiar with one inter-regional fora and the depth of the analysis, this 
research remained to focus on ASEM, one of the most advance models of 
inter-regionalism. ASEM is a comprehensive case-study with its vast and diverse 
membership, multi-track and multi-dimensional approaches. This research explores 
ASEM comprehensively instead concentrating to a single issue area. Although 
time-consuming, this approach is preferred because ASEM itself is a 
multi-dimensional dialogue. If there would be more time and resource available, this 
research could extend to include other inter-regional and trans-regional cooperative 
frameworks, namely APEC, FEALAC and EU/Latin America and Caribbean Summit 
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(EU-LAC) and establish a comparative study. 
Second, this dissertation focuses mainly on endogenous factors which affect an 
inter-regional cooperative framework, namely the types and roles of actors involved 
in the ASEM process and ASEM’s institutional design. The roles of exogenous factors 
(such as influence from a third party or changes happen in wider international 
relations) and of domestic factors (namely how domestic politics affect the 
preferences and ability of a government in handling external relations) are only 
briefly touched upon. This research serves as a starting point for the development of a 
broader model to cover all endogenous, exogenous and domestic factors on 
inter-regionalism. Further studies can build upon its results. 
To strengthen the validity of this research, a variety of data collection and analysis 
methods are applied (a detailed explanation of the methodology is in Chapter 3). The 
application of statistics to understand social science does not mean that this research 
complies with positivism. Instead, it follows post-positivism, that is, this research 
recognises the essentiality of scientific reasoning while being aware of the possible 
errors resulted from biased of the author’s choice of samples, world views, cultural 
background and so on. In order to reduce subjectivity, this research includes as many 
data collection and analysis methods as possible. Random sampling is also adopted. 
In addition, as much works by other scholars on inter-regionalism and ASEM are 
consulted as possible. 
1.6. Structure and content of the research 
Thus far, several issues are repeatedly addressed in the existing studies of 
inter-regionalism, whilst other aspects have been overlooked: the involvement of 
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non-state actors, the types of interaction between partners, the interaction between 
actors at different levels, as well as the actual achievements of inter-regional fora are 
a few to name. They are explored in details in this research. Furthermore, existing 
studies of ASEM sometimes create confusion or misunderstanding about the process, 
for example, viewing ASEM just as a collection of summits, requesting ASEM to 
perform as a delivery mechanism, or calling ASEM a pure inter-regionalism. This 
research clarifies ASEM’s original objectives and true characteristics. 
The research questions posed are: ‘which actors are involved in inter-regionalism’; 
‘how do the actors manage their relations in an inter-regional forum?’; ‘how would 
the founding states’ design of ASEM impact on the distribution of power between 
state and non-state actors?’; ‘what ASEM can offer to the wider international 
relations?’; ‘Can ASEM create new types of international actors?’; and eventually 
‘how does the rise of inter-regionalism influence the actors in the international arena 
and vice-versa?’ 
These questions are addressed in the following eight chapters. Chapter 2 first 
overviews the IR theories used in the existing studies on inter-regionalism and ASEM, 
then introduces the theoretical framework developed by this research. Chapter 3 
explains the methodology of data collection and data analysis, as well as the 
uniqueness and originality of such methodology. Chapter 4 consists of an overview of 
the historical background which led to the creation of ASEM as well as a brief 
summary of the highs and lows between ASEM1 and ASEM9. 
Entering the empirical part, Chapter 5 analyses in depth the institutional design of 
ASEM. Chapter 6, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 examine what has happened in different 
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tracks (both official and unofficial) of the ASEM process from 1996 to 2012. These 
three chapters explore also the interactions between the key actors in the process and 
whether ASEM can become an independent international actor on its own. The final 
chapter concludes the findings of the research, provides detailed answers to the 
research questions and elaborates how these findings contribute to the theories of IR. 
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Chapter Two 
Theoretical frameworks in the study of inter-regionalism 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In the mid-1990s, the proliferation of inter-regional fora stimulated theoretical 
discussions on inter-regionalism. Among the established inter-regional interactions, 
ASEM which is seen as one of the most advanced examples, has received significant 
academic attention.
70
 This chapter first overviews the International Relations theories 
typically used in the studies of inter-regionalism and of the ASEM process. In 
particular, this chapter illustrates how the three main IR theories ‒ realism, 
liberal-institutionalism and social constructivism ‒ have been used to analyse 
inter-regional interactions. A few other theoretical approaches which were applied by 
individual scholars are also covered. 
For decades, scholars and students of IR have been busy building, understanding, 
criticising and defending various theories. Different schools of thoughts focus on 
various issues, from the nature of international relations to the role of material 
interests versus that of ideas, to the goals and behaviours of individual actors. None of 
the aforementioned paradigms has gained universal support. This research examines 
the validity of the three main IR theories by examining their explanatory power 
regarding the ASEM case. 
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2.2. Overview of three main IR theories and their views on international actors 
The existing studies on inter-regionalism covered a variety of elements including the 
definition, raison d’êtres, motivation behind the participation of individual partners, 
structure, operational mechanisms and the potential functions. In the ASEM case, the 
raison d’êtres, potential functions, operation mechanism and assessment have 
received more academic attention. In general, three main IR schools of thought were 
more frequently used: realism, liberal institutionalism and social constructivism. 
However, these existing theoretical discussions focused extensively on the potential 
functions of the ASEM process. 
Each of these three major IR theories has its distinct view and definition of actors in 
the international arena. In particular, the on-going debate between realism and 
liberalism has yet found a consensus on what constitute the basic units (or the primary 
actors) of international relations. The main points of contention are: will state be 
eternally classified as dominant actor on the international stage; can international and 
regional institutions become main players; and whether changes of international 
identity and reality can eventually create new agents in international relations. Below 
is a brief summary of the key arguments of each of the three main schools of thought. 
2.2.1. Realism
71
 Realists see international politics, unlike the domestic politics inside 
one state, as in anarchy that there is no superior power above states to control their 
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interactions. Under such anarchy, nation-states are the main actors in the international 
arena. They inevitably distrust each other. The realist school places emphasis on the 
balance of power among sovereign-states who are deemed to be rational as well as 
unitary actors. All states are seen as identical in function, but different in terms of 
their material capacity to fulfil those functions. ‘Rational’ implies that states would 
use any reasonable means to maximise their national interests, as well as their 
power.
72
 ‘Unitary’ assumes that each state is a single actor with a united voice 
whereas sub-national actors, namely private corporations and civil society groups play 
only minimal roles in international politics.
73
 To realists, all non-state actors, such as 
international and regional institutions, trans-national corporations and civil society 
organisations, play merely supplementary roles in IR. These non-state actors are seen 
as unable to change the basic power structure in international relations. 
According to realism, the ultimate and most crucial national interests of every 
nation-state are security and survival, which would never change. Hence, states must 
be constantly prepared for conflicts by equipping themselves well economically and 
militarily. In realists’ terms, security and survival are ‘zero-sum games’ (one side 
gains at the cost of the other side’s loss, an opposite concept to ‘positive-sum 
games’),74 therefore each state has to maximise national interests and acquire power 
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to survive. In a zero-sum game, realists calculate relative gains rather than absolute 
gains; consequently, sovereign-states worry about how the gains from cooperation are 
distributed and persistently fear unequal distribution. As a result, they distrust one 
another and only opt for cooperation when it suits national interests. Cooperation, 
including inter-regional cooperation, is deemed to be in an ad-hoc manner and 
short-term. In other words, realists do not believe that any international, trans-national 
or regional organisations can establish an independent long existence. Scholars such 
as Strange see international organisations just as an instrument for nation-states to act 
in pursuit of their national interests.
75
 
2.2.2. Liberal institutionalism76 The second school of IR theory that appears 
frequently in the literature of inter-regionalism is liberal institutionalism (LI). 
Generally, liberalism underscores the complex interdependence between actors in the 
international arena.
77
 A consequence of this complex interdependence is that when 
problems arise, they are often too complicated and large for any single state to tackle 
alone. Hence, states increasingly look for cooperation, either actively or passively, 
while inter-regional cooperation serves as one option. Through cooperation within 
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institutional frameworks, states can broaden their interests or solve problems which 
require collaborative action from other actors on the international stage.  
In cooperation, liberalism focuses on absolute collective gains instead of relative ones. 
Thus, cooperation which brings joint-benefit, enhances the welfare of people and 
minimises violent conflict is preferred over competition. Cooperation among 
nation-states and the building of trans-national regimes are made possible once 
common interests and mutual goals are recognised. Due to the high cost of 
construction and even higher cost for re-construction, once created, an international 
institution tends to persist and last for a long time, although changes are inevitable 
during the development. 
It is assumed that a multilateral institution formed will be more than the sum of its 
constituent parties, and need to be treated as an individual actor. The role of 
international and regional institutions in global politics is crucial in liberalism. LI 
emphasises the role of cooperative institutions to make cooperation possible. These 
institutions provide members with information, opportunity for reciprocal treatments 
and mechanism to punish the actors who fail to fulfil the agreement. Cooperative 
institutions also serve as a framework that shape states’ expectations. Gradually, a 
sense of continuity in cooperative arrangements is built, and eventually participants 
are willing to resolve conflicts without violence. However, the expansion and 
proliferation of multilateral institutions may lead to the diminishing roles of 
nation-states. 
In contrast to realism, the liberal school argues that states are not necessarily rational 
and unitary. Some components of a state can act trans-nationally which make 
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national-borders blurred and hamper the effectiveness of nation-state ruling. 
Liberalism also recognises the independence and significance of non-state actors – 
international and regional institutions, civil society organisations, lobbying groups, 
multinational corporations (MNCs) as well as individuals‒ in the international realm. 
In particular, the significance of international institutions in fostering inter-state 
cooperation is highlighted. Yet, the importance of nation-states is not totally denied. A 
liberalist international system is one in which states and non-state actors co-exist.  
Instead of power, culture and the domestic society structure determine the behaviours 
of actors; for instance, liberalism believes that democratic and capitalist states tend to 
be more peaceful and seldom fight with one another.
78
 Concerning states’ interactions, 
liberalism views economic and cultural fields as significant as the traditional high 
politics which comprise political and security fields.  
During the constructions of the web-like trade and investment relations globally, 
actors including nation-states find themselves increasingly dependent on one another. 
This also implies high vulnerabilities which largely reduce the tendency of states to 
start a war. In particular, institutions which facilitate state-to-state cooperation are 
seen as crucial elements in managing international relations. In order to manage the 
complex interdependence between actors, cooperative effort is required in all policy 
fields. 
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2.2.3. Social constructivism79 While the fight between realism and liberalism 
lasted decades, social constructivism only joined the debate in the 1990s. The 
constructivist school emphasises the mutual constituting characteristic between agents 
and structures. Ideas play a crucial role in constructivism: ideas comprise goals, 
threats, fears, identities and any perception which affects the actors in the 
international system. It challenges the realist and liberal-institutionalist perspectives 
which ignore the ideational factors, and suggests that both normative and material 
structures play a role.  
Social constructivism shares some assumptions with the realist school, namely the 
existence of anarchy and the central role of nation-states in the international system. 
Yet, actors who exert influence on the construction of identity are also relevant. 
Unlike realism, which focuses purely on material powers, social constructivism 
emphasises the importance of both material and normative structures, especially the 
later. Particularly, the notion of ‘identity’– which is believed to be shaped by both 
ideas and material structures, informs the interests and thus actions of actors – 
occupies central role.
80
 Social constructivists argue that the identity of the agents 
informs their behaviour in international relations, including inter-regional ones. 
Norms play a significant additional role. 
Based upon intersubjectivity, the identity of agents and structure of the international 
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realm are formed and reformed continuously. Yet, due to an absence of complete 
information and lack of rationality of states as actors, social constructivists argue that 
the evaluation of costs and benefits rests substantially on cognitive factors. In other 
words, past experience and ideas shape perceptions of costs and benefits.  
Regarding cooperation, including the inter-regional ones, constructivists believe that 
communication and social learning contribute to growing collectiveness, thus, making 
cooperation more feasible. Notably, constructivism introduces the idea of 
socialisation into international relations, in which agents learn to socialise during 
interaction with others. This learning process then shapes and reshapes the identity 
and interests of the agents, and eventually brings changes to the international system. 
Unlike realism and liberalism, social constructivism does not pay much attention on the 
types of actors. Any relevant entity, or agent, is counted in the formation and 
reformation of themselves as well as the structure of international relations. Yet, it is 
commonly assumed that state-actors weigh more heavily than other actors due to their 
richer possession of material resources for actions.  
Although several other theories have been pursued by certain scholars when studying 
inter-regionalism, the aforementioned three main IR theories dominate the 
mainstream studies. This dissertation, then, explores whether these conventional IR 
theories are able to explain inter-regionalism as a new development in the 
international realm. Also, it determines whether it is feasible and necessary to 
combine two or more of these theories to explain a single phenomenon. 
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2.3.  Application of IR theories in the study of inter-regionalism and ASEM 
When analysing inter-regionalism in general and the ASEM process in particular, 
scholars have applied different theories: while some of them insisted on a single 
school, others applied two in parallel; and there were even several scholars who 
combined three or more schools of thought. On the other hand, there are other 
scholars, such as Robles,
81
 who denied the applicability of existing IR theories to 
analyse ASEM and inter-regionalism. Generally, the existing literature demonstrates a 
popular trend of combining a few selected theories, especially neo-realism, 
liberal-institutionalism and social constructivism, to explain inter-regional interactions 
including the ASEM process. 
Song was one of the scholars who concentrated his focus on a single IR theory. He 
argued that LI was the most suitable theoretical approach to examine 
inter-regionalism, since it highlighted the necessity of cooperation between regions 
which realism denied. In addition, he criticised social constructivist studies for 
limiting to intra-regional level.
82
 To Song, social constructivism had the potential to 
explain ASEM but not the present case because ASEM’s ‘effects of norm 
harmonisation on [the] participatory actors still takes time to observe’.83 He went 
further to analyse ASEM through this single-theory approach, arguing that the ASEM 
process was the ‘ideal case’ of a rationally designed inter-regional cooperation to 
solve common problems. Another scholar, Gilson, preferred social constructivism and 
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concentrated on the potential influence of inter-regionalism on the intra-regional 
identities of the constituent agents through looking at the regionalism in East Asia in 
the ASEM process.
84
 Richards, on the other hand, in his study of the role of civil 
society in ASEM, applied various branches of the liberal school namely 
neo-liberalism, liberal-pluralism and critical liberalism.
85
 
Other scholars, like Hänggi
86
 and Roloff,
87
 attempted to examine inter-regionalism 
by combining two IR theories (realism and LI), while others advocated a combination 
of the three dominant theoretical schools. From a post-positivist perspective, these 
scholars believed that no single theory alone could fully explain a complex 
phenomenon such as inter-regionalism and the case of ASEM.
88
 Smith and 
Vichitsorasatra argued that the material (realism), ideational (social constructivism) 
and institutional (institutionalism) theoretical approaches were deeply intertwined.
89
 
Aggarwal et al
90
 as well as Rüland
91
 combined the three aforementioned IR theories 
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to understand why inter-regional relations were established. Yeo and Rüland used the 
combination approach when studying ASEM.
92
 
Noteworthy, Muall and Okfen argued that theoretical insights were solely applicable 
to analyse the initiating motivations of an inter-regional institution but failed to 
account for its further development.
93
 Their research illustrated the differences 
between the theoretically-deduced functions and the actual achievements of two 
inter-regional fora, APEC and ASEM. Consequently, they argued that none of the 
three conventional IR theories could explain the continuous support the participating 
partners gave to APEC and ASEM amid these fora had failed to achieve the expected 
functions. They suggested future studies to consider inter-regionalism as a ‘distinctive 
form of international diplomacy’ and to treat APEC and ASEM as ‘vehicles for soft 
politics’, then to ‘rethink the outcome-oriented theories of international 
cooperation’.94 
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There are a few scholars who refused to study inter-regionalism by applying any of 
the three conventional IR theories. Farrell criticised realism for failing to explain why 
nation-states gave up their sovereignty during cooperation.
95
 She disagreed with the 
liberal-institutionalist view which treated international institutions as apolitical actors 
without self-interests. Subsequently, Farrell recommended the ‘cooperative hegemon 
approach’ which was introduced by Pedersen96  to examine why the EU, as a 
collective entity, has engaged itself in inter-regional cooperation. She claimed that the 
cooperative hegemony approach was complementary to existing theoretical 
perspectives to account the EU’s engagement in inter-regionalism, as such approach 
involved ‘the use of soft power through engagement in cooperative arrangements 
linked to a long-term strategy.’97 The existence of a hegemon, who ought to be a 
large national (or maybe regional) power with leadership skills, willing to commit in 
cooperation and share power with smaller states, were the crucial preconditions.
98
 
Once established, such cooperation would bring the whole community collective 
benefits, which were more attractive than the advantages that the constituent states 
could obtain individually. She listed the EU-ASEAN, EU-Latin America, EU-ACP 
inter-regional relationships as empirical evidences to demonstrate that the EU, as a 
global actor with ‘soft power’, has been employing a cooperative hegemony strategy. 
Subsequently, she argued that this approach was best used to explain the behaviour of 
hegemons in inter-regionalism. According to Farrel, the EU as a hegemon chose to 
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build a partnership and share power with its Asian partners in ASEM so as to 
counter-balance APEC and to reduce Asia’s dependence on the US.99 She added that 
the EU aimed at using ASEM to spread its institutional model to Asia as well as 
getting the Asian states to support its position in multilateral fora, namely the UN and 
the WTO. 
Robles argued that the realist assumption of nation-state as unitary actor was in 
contradiction with inter-regionalism which involved supranational and international 
actors.
100
 While seeing inter-regionalism as a facilitator of cooperation, he pointed 
out that realists denied cooperation as a possible solution for conflicts and the 
capability of states to socialise or learn. Furthermore, Robles argued that the regime 
theory, which is associated with LI, was self-contradicting and hence redundant to any 
analysis. Moreover, he named theoretical imprecision, the neglect of structural and 
material factors as well as the inability to explain the majority of functions of 
inter-regionalism as theoretical weaknesses of social constructivism. Subsequently, 
Robles denied the validity of social constructivism.  
Another example was Cammack, who applied ‘new materialism’ which was Marxist 
in orientation, to assess the achievements of the ASEM process. He viewed ASEM as 
a managerial and problem-solving institution to resolve tensions generated from 
regional and global capitalism.
101
 The new materialist approach suggests that 
‘capitalist-oriented states seek collectively to preserve and constantly [to] extend the 
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general conditions for capital accumulation through multilateral institutions and other 
mechanisms of international and interregional coordination.’ 102  Yet, these 
capitalist-oriented states vary from each other in terms of development, domestic 
configuration, spatial location and hence interests. Cammack argued that ASEM was 
utilised by its member states to control global capitalist development on one hand, and 
to impose specific policies on their domestic societies on the other hand. He further 
suggested that instead of being displaced as key actor, states actually advanced their 
power through the creation of regional and interregional institutions.
103
 
Richards and Kirkpatrick studied the ASEM process as part of Europe’s East Asia 
policy by combining neo-liberalism and economic rationalism.
104
 They claimed that 
the roles of nation-states in the international political economy were weakening and 
being replaced by regional institutions and multi-national corporations. However, 
their research had several limitations: first, it was conducted in 1999; second, it only 
covered the initial motivations behind the creation of ASEM; also, it only examined 
ASEM from the European perspective.  
When examining what motivated the EU and its member states to join ASEM, Forster 
preferred to apply the ‘negotiated order approach’, which was developed by Smith in 
1998.
105
 The negotiated order approach hypothesises that each ‘world’ gives rise to a 
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characteristic form of negotiation and there co-exist different worlds of negotiation.
106
 
Accordingly, Forster argued that the dysfunction of ASEM was a result of the 
co-existence of various ‘worlds’. Each actor inside the EU, including the 
supranational institutions, individual member states and the EU itself, had its 
preferred partner region, fields of negotiation and means of interaction. In the ASEM 
case, Foster blamed the divergence of interests and divisions of power inside the EU 
for the impossibility in reaching any coherent policy.
107
 Similar to Richards and 
Kirkpatrick’s research, Forster’s study of ASEM solely presented the European 
perspective. 
In a recent work on the functions of inter-regional forum, Rüland introduced the 
‘forum shopping’ paradigm, which was developed by Forman and Segaar, as well as 
‘hedging’ which was coined by Kuik.108 ‘Forum shopping’ denotes ‘a process by 
which actors pick and choose among the mechanisms that best fit their individual 
political agenda.’109 ‘Hedging’ refers to the ‘two-pronged strategy simultaneously 
pursuing cooperative accommodation (engagement) and (soft military) balancing 
(containment).’110 By applying ‘forum shopping’ and ‘hedging’, Rüland concluded 
that institutional balancing as the principal function of inter-regional forum.
111
 
Nevertheless, Rüland only mentioned the two new paradigms briefly; application of 
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‘forum shopping’ or of ‘hedging’ was limited to the institutional balancing function of 
inter-regional fora. 
There were a few attempts to develop new theories to explain inter-regionalism. Dent 
developed the theory of ‘multilateral utility’ (proactive contributions of interregional 
framework to foster stability, peace, prosperity and equality in the global system, in 
partnership with multilateral institutions)
112
 and used it alongside neo-realism as well 
as social constructivism to analyse the potential functions of inter-regionalism.
113
 He 
attempted to illustrate the contributions of inter-regional frameworks to the global 
system. He argued that inter-regional frameworks could pro-actively connect 
nation-states and contribute to existing multilateral institutions. Eventually, 
inter-regional frameworks could further develop the multilateral orders or even 
develop new areas of governance. Dent explored also the preconditions and 
counter-conditions for multilateral utility.
114
 He then explored the multilateral utility 
of ASEM by addressing ‘what ASEM can intentionally contribute to the development 
of global society?’ and ‘what factors determine the multilateral utility of ASEM?’ 115 
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In sum, the majority of the existing literature about inter-regionalism applied at least 
one of the three conventional IR theories. Some of these works tried to demonstrate 
that the existing theories offered certain compelling visions and were able to predict 
the future. The majority applied the IR theories to deduce the potential functions of 
inter-regionalism and the motivations behind participants’ joining. These works, 
however, largely neglected other aspects like the actual achievements and the growth, 
both in lifespan and membership, of the existing inter-regional fora. 
Importantly, the existing inter-regionalism research which has applied realism has 
ignored certain key elements of the theory, particularly the identity of actors. They 
included all type of actors, ranging from international organisations to regional 
institutions, MNCs to sub-national community organisations. Also, the ‘zero-sum 
game’ paradigm is rarely mentioned. Furthermore, there is hardly any realist-inspired 
research that attempts to explain the continuation and expansion of many 
inter-regional institutions or the growing number of such arrangements. These aspects 
require further inquiry. 
2.4. Actors in inter-regionalism deduced from the three IR theories 
Realism limits the criteria for a relevant actor in international relations; accordingly, 
central actors are nation-states who inevitably compete over powers for 
national-interests and survival. Many existing realist analysis on inter-regionalism 
focuses on how the nation-states involved use inter-regional fora as vehicles to 
advance their respective interests, hence, enhance their power in the pursuit of relative 
gains over others in the international system. In particular, the neo-realists stress the 
use of inter-regionalism by a few strong national powers to strengthen their relative 
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national gains over others. It is assumed that states would only mandate a 
supranational institution when their national sovereignty is at threat. From a realist 
perspective, inter-regional relations would ‘simply reflect the state’s interests in an 
unstable interstate system.’116  
On the other hand, liberalism admits non-states actors’ role in the international system, 
and treats them as independent global actors. In particular, institutions which facilitate 
state-to-state cooperation are seen as a crucial element in managing international 
relations. Scholars like Song, Aggarwal and Fogarty analysed ASEM from a LI 
perspective,
117
 seeing non-states actors such as regional organisations/groups as 
crucial actors in inter-regional fora. Rössler suggested that ‘relations between Asia 
and Europe are dominated by various regional actors, mainly EU and ASEAN.’118 
Smith and Vichitsorasatra commented, ‘institutions are important in themselves, 
partly because they can shape processes and outcomes in both materialist and 
ideational perspectives…institutions can act as powerful expressions of norms and 
values and as shapers of patterns of communication and discourse.’119 Apart from the 
international and regional institutions, LI also recognises the significance of other 
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non-state actors like civil society organisations and MNCs as independent actors in 
inter-regionalism.
120
 
As discussed above, Social constructivism is flexible with actors’ type. Regarding 
inter-regionalism, constructivists focus mainly on how regional and inter-regional 
identities are created. Any actor, or agent, who takes part in the shaping of the world 
order is seen relevant. Still, regional organisations and their constituent member states 
have been more prominent actors in the existing works which pursued a constructivist 
approach. For instance, Gilson’s research on inter-regionalism concentrated on the 
functional role of regions as actor in the management of global changes.
121
 
After identifying the relevant actors in each theoretical approach, next session 
explores how these actors utilise inter-regionalism.  
2.5. Functions of ASEM deduced from the three IR theories 
Although ASEM has been continuously criticised as a mere ‘talk shop’,122 academic 
research thus far has accumulated a list of functions which ASEM is expected to fulfil. 
As mentioned before, existing studies on the ASEM process and inter-regionalism 
have devoted considerable attention to function-study, i.e. what can an inter-regional 
forum or grouping like ASEM offer to international relations. From the theoretical 
perspective, ASEM was described as ‘multifunctional’ and much more than 
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mere-talking and photo-opportunities. Seven theoretically-deduced functions are 
widely discussed – three of those are deduced from realism (power balancing, 
institutional balancing among groupings/institutions created by nation-states and 
bandwagon among national powers); three from LI (institution-building of the 
multilateral regime, rationalising of international cooperation/governance and 
agenda-setting for multilateral regimes); identity-building for the constituting regions 
is the only function deduced from social constructivism.  
The above functions have been explored in different studies and in different 
combinations. Some scholars concentrated on just one function, while others 
considered two or more. Rüland has consolidated these potential functions into a 
list.
123
 Apart from these seven theoretically-deduced functions, a few other potential 
functions of ASEM have been mentioned sporadically. The section below explores 
these theoretically-deduced functions in greater detail. 
2.5.1. Realism Existing realist analysis focuses on how nation-states interact and 
use inter-regional fora as vehicles to advance their respective interests, hence, enhance 
their power in the pursuit of relative gains (mainly material gains) over others in the 
international system. Realists believe that states would cooperate and even mandate a 
supranational institution to handle situations which would threaten their national 
sovereignty. In particular, the neo-realists stress the use of inter-regionalism by a few 
strong national powers to strengthen their relative national gains over others.  
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Generally from the realist perspective, inter-regionalism is a tool of its constituent 
states for balancing against other states or for bandwagon. The balancing function can 
be further divided into power balancing and institution balancing. Power balancing 
refers to the development of inter-regional links so as to restrict the abuse of power by 
a third parties (can be one states or a group of nation-states). Accordingly, 
inter-regionalism is one approach for individual states to cooperate together and 
balance against a superior power or threatening alliance in the international realm. For 
instance, it is argued that states like China, France and Germany join together under 
the ASEM framework to counterbalance the US.
124
 
Some scholars have extended the balancing idea to the regional level, arguing 
inter-regional fora like ASEM are used by regional powers to balance against each 
other. For example, Hänggi argued that the EU and East Asia aimed at checking the 
power of the US by creating ASEM.
125
 He said ‘ASEM’s major purpose is to 
complete the uneven triangle of the macro-regions’ (North America, Asia and Europe) 
so as to ‘reduce the gap between the ideal of an equilateral triangle and the reality of a 
clearly uneven triangle.’126 In Dent’s expectation, ‘fortifying the Eurasian axis’ 
would ‘side East Asia and Europe together to potentially counter any perceived US 
hegemonic misbehaviour in international affairs.’127 
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Furthermore, Hänggi argued that the Asians and the Europeans sought to diversify 
their foreign relations by using ASEM to strength their footing for ‘diplomatic 
manoeuvre vis-à-vis North America’, against the background of a US propensity for 
unilateralism.
128
 According to him, ASEM also served Asia to shield from potential 
US domination in APEC. This view is shared by other scholars who added that 
ASEM, by bringing the EU and East Asia closer, could serve as a tool for the EU and 
the Asians to reduce American influence (economically, politically as well as 
militarily) in East Asia.
129
 Yang wrote that ASEM was a tool for ASEAN to ‘keep a 
check on the US and its unilateral policy approach, and on US-led APEC.’130 
Significantly, the argument of power balancing between regions happens to be 
inconsistent to the state-centrism of realism. Many studies took the EU, the European 
side of ASEM and the Asian side of ASEM as unitary actors, which contradicts 
realism’s state-centrism. This issue is discussed in more detailed in Chapter 9. 
Looking at the results, a few observers commented that ASEM has failed to balance 
the power among the Triads.
131
 Maull and Okfen argued that fora like ASEM and 
APEC could not influence the power balancing in international security as the ‘critical 
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fault lines in terms of power and security’ are either intra-regional or trans-national 
but not inter-regional.
132
 Dent blamed ‘the hesitancy of the Eurasian partnership to 
co-manage the post-hegemonic world order to persisting structural constraints in the 
Triadic political economy.’133 Reiterer noted that the EU would not have the means 
to restrain the US presence in Asia, hence, ASEM could only ‘retain a predictable and 
stable US presence in Asia’ instead of balancing US’s role by a stronger EU’s 
presence.
134
 
While classical realism chiefly concentrates on military power, neo-realism focuses at 
economic power. Neo-realism believes that military power has become less important 
due to globalisation, while economic strength has become more and more important 
to a nation-state.
135
 It is argued that territory, population and military strength matter 
little in the contemporary IR, whilst economic and trade strengths are crucial in power 
calculation. Accordingly, one key function of inter-regionalism is assumed to be 
balancing the economic power and the control of global market among actors in the 
international economic arena, especially among the Triad regions.
136
 Therefore, 
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ASEM is viewed as a balancer against the US’s and Japan’s dominance in East Asian 
trade and investment markets by increasing the EU’s share.137 
The second type of balancing, institution balancing, refers to the use of inter-regional 
links to balance regionalism in and inter-regionalism between other regions. Many 
observers see ASEM as a means to provide the missing link between Asia and Europe 
in the Triadic context. Hänggi named this ‘a game of checks and balances’ in 
‘regional blocs’ scenario’.138 Noted in many existing literature, both the Asian and 
EU sides were worried about each other’s coalition-building with the US. Therefore, 
‘ASEM was seen by the EU as a welcome means to link up with the majority of 
APEC’s Asian members and thereby offset its exclusion from APEC.’139 For East 
Asia, ASEM was seen as a ‘device to compensate for the traditional close link 
between America and Europe and as a guarantee against a possible strengthening of 
the transatlantic ties.’140 In Gilson’s words, ASEM is ‘a structural necessity to 
develop the “third side of the [EU-US-Asia] triangle”.’141  
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Rüland illustrated the institution balancing function of inter-regionalism with 
empirical evidence.
142
 He argued that APEC was a response to the European Single 
Market and Canadian-US FTA, whereas ASEM was created as a reaction to APEC. 
Such view has been widely accepted by other scholars.
143
 Godement and Jacquet 
called ASEM ‘the best response to APEC’.144 Moreover, Rüland saw ASEAN’s 
strong push behind ASEM as an attempt to counter the EU’s efforts in establishing 
free trade agreements with other regional powers, namely the Mercosur and South 
Africa.
145
  
Nonetheless, in the assessment of achievements in the first decade, ASEM was 
marked ‘failed’ in balancing the triadic relations.146 In 2007, Yeo assessed ASEM’s 
work in institution balancing and concluded that ‘ASEM’s ability to balance APEC or 
to strengthen the Asia-Europe link vis-a-vis the Asia-Pacific link is unproven.’147 
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The last function of inter-regionalism deduced from realism is bandwagon, which 
depicts the action of actors (usually small or weak states) to establish linkages with 
others out of the fear of being marginalised in international relations. Rüland, for 
instance, commented that ASEM could act as a bargaining power amplifier for the EU 
and East Asia in the global arena.
148
 He saw the EU’s acceptance to join ASEM as an 
attempt to bandwagon East Asia, a dynamic economic centre and huge market, as 
well as to prevent marginalisation in a ‘Pacific Century’.149 Hänggi stated that joining 
ASEM could ‘upgrade the international status of East Asia’ and ‘ensure its 
recognition as one of the Triad regions, at least by Europe.’150 
Observing the rapid development in Asia in the 1990s, Yeo commented that ‘Europe 
has no choice but to engage the Asians if it wants a more enriching and peaceful 
co-existence.’151 Moreover, Hänggi and Gilson remarked that ASEM could help Asia 
to lower the risk of the EU and North America from pursuing ‘closed regionalism’.152 
Similarly, Richards and Kirkpatrick thought that the EU used ASEM to prevent East 
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Asia from ‘close regionalism’.153 Yeo added that open economy of the Triads could 
contribute to global stability and prosperity.
154
  
Furthermore, Yeo saw Singapore’s active push for the creation of an inter-regional 
forum between the EU and East Asia as an attempt of bandwagon.
155
 As a small 
city-state in Southeast Asia, it was in Singapore’s national interests to keep the US's 
continuous engagement in the region. Also due to its size, Singapore always prefers 
multilateralism and wishes to prevent the US from unilateralism by provoking 
awareness and concern of the US through creating ASEM. Yeo stated that Singapore 
wanted to prove its capability as a significant political and diplomatic player in Asia 
so as to maximise its chances of survival.
156
 
Similarly, Gilson described ASEM as a chance for the ASEAN to ‘garner leverage in 
the face of the globalisation’ as it offered ASEAN ‘the opportunity to play a central 
role in a new international framework.’157 This view was shared by Yang, who stated 
that ‘ASEAN showed a strong political will to independently determine its own future’ 
through playing an active role in ASEM.
158
 For Yang as well as Hänggi, ASEAN 
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sought to increase its bargaining power against the EU by inviting the ‘Plus Three’ 
countries from Northeast Asia to ASEM.
159
 
Apart from balancing and bandwagon, a few other functions which were mentioned 
sporadically were also deduced from realism. Yeo argued that South Korea joined 
ASEM for material interests (such as gaining industrial experience and new 
technologies from more advanced EU countries and Japan).
160
 To her, ASEM 
participants sought concrete material interests especially in trade, investments, capital 
and advanced technology.
161
 Focusing on the security pursuit of nation-states, 
Camroux argued that Britain and France sought to sustain their individual roles in 
Asian security via ASEM.
162
 
In sum, through the realist lens, inter-regionalism is a pragmatic and flexible response 
of players ‘directed against others’.163 Applying to the triadic context, scholars see 
inter-regionalism as a tool for the Triads to maintain equilibrium among themselves, 
whereas the non-Triadic regions follow and establish their own inter-regional 
relations to adjust to the dynamics of the Triad.
164
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Noteworthy, many of the aforementioned studies have applied realism to explain the 
balancing and bandwagon actions of regions, which are, however, not the basic unit of 
international relations under realism. In these cases, regional groups and organisations 
were referred to as independent and holistic entities instead of agents of the 
constituting member-states. This links back to the question regarding the applicability 
of realism in the study of inter-regionalism. Robles repeatedly raised this question, 
emphasising the absence of any independent role of regions in realism.
165
 On the 
other hand, these studies are rather consistent with the assumptions of realism that 
non-state actors like the business community, civil society organisation and 
international organisations are not significant. The applicability of realism to the 
studies of inter-regionalism and ASEM will be assessed later in this dissertation. 
2.5.2. Liberal-institutionalism LI has also been applied to deduce the potential 
functions of inter-regionalism.
166
 In sum, the theory denotes that inter-regional 
cooperation and coordination help managing complex interdependence in a multipolar 
world. It is believed that all international institutions, including the inter-regional ones, 
are able to reduce the transaction costs for cooperation and to facilitate 
communication. This is because the building of common institutions increases the 
predictability of members’ behaviour and legalises international relations. The 
institutionalisation of an inter-regional relation helps trust-building and creates a 
platform for socialisation among the participants.  
                                           
165
 Robles, The ASEM: The Theory and Practice of Interregionalism (2008), 11-17. 
166
 Yeo, Asia and Europe: The Development and Different dimensions of ASEM (2003), 123-54; Song, 
“Regionalisation, inter-regional cooperation and global governance” (2007): 69; Lluc López I Vidal, 
“The Theoretical Contribution of the Study of Regionalism and Interregionalism in the ASEM Process”, 
in Regionalism and Interregionalism in the ASEM Context- Current Dynamics and Theoretical 
Approaches, Yeo & I Vidal eds. (2008), 51-52; Rüland, “Balancer, Multilateral Utilities or Regional 
Identity Builder? International Relations and the Study of Interregionalism” (2010): 1275-8. 
59 
 
Rüland identified three levels of institution-building which inter-regionalism could 
facilitate.
167
 First, inter-regionalism would institutionalise relations between the 
regions, thus would contribute to a new layer between global and regional levels of 
global governance. In Rüland’s words, ‘inter-regionalism serves as an intermediary of 
multilayered system of global governance with global institutions, regional 
organisations and nation-states as nodal point.’168 Similarly, Aggarwal and Fogarty 
labelled inter-regionalism an ‘indispensable element’ of the multi-level governance 
system.
169
 Chen proposed that ‘a regional or inter-regional arrangement which is 
broader than bilateral and narrower than the multilateral arrangement may fill the 
governance gap.’170  
Following such logic, Lim argued that ASEM could serve as an institution allowing 
leaders of the two regions to meet regularly and talk frankly.
171
 Trust and confidence 
would gradually be built up, especially among the leaders personally. Eventually, past 
unhappy memories and suspicion from the Asian side, as former colonies of the 
European powers, would be replaced by mutual trust. However, Lim remarked that 
this would be a lengthy process. Rüland echoed this point by emphasised that ‘the 
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colonial humiliation is still deeply ingrained in Asia’s collective memory, as is the 
often arrogant and insensitive donor attitude of Europeans up to 1990s.’172 
Second, under LI, inter-regionalism is expected to accelerate the institutionalisation of 
intra-regional cooperation by increasing the demand for internal coordination, 
especially for the less organised side. In the ASEM case, however, the theoretical 
discussions focused on the EU intra-regional institutionalisation. Yeo and Reiterer 
believed that the EU intended to legitimise itself and foster its competency on 
common foreign policy through engaging with the ASEAN+3 group as well as 
insisting on having political dialogues in the summits.
173
 Engagement in 
inter-regionalism is believed to intensify intra-regional communication, hence, 
accelerate the intra-regional institutional building.
174
 
Third, several scholars saw the establishment of ASEM as significant to integrate 
China and Japan (two potential hegemons in Asia) into regional as well as multilateral 
cooperative frameworks.
175
 Many others assigned ASEM the role of keeping the US 
(the current hegemon) honest to multilateral cooperation.
176
 In other words, 
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inter-regionalism is expected to promote institutionalisation of global cooperation. 
Thus far, the feasibility of engaging the hegemons into cooperative multilateralism 
remains in doubt since scholars have yet to find any empirical evidence to support 
such an argument.
177
 Although Chen pointed out the potential of inter-regional fora, 
with a fairly large membership, to serve to solve problems and to manage relations at 
regional and global levels; he concluded that the actual contribution of ASEM to 
global governance in its first decade was merely ‘symbolism’.178 In a more recent 
study, Rüland also raised doubts about the actual ability of inter-regionalism in 
supporting international institution-building.
179
 
In addition, according to LI, inter-regionalism can be a ‘rationaliser’ for multilateral 
fora. As today’s multilateral fora continue to grow in complexity and membership (for 
example the growth from G7 to G8 to G20), the interests of participants become 
increasingly diverse. This slows down, and sometimes even jeopardises, the 
decision-making of a forum. As a result, efficiency will be hampered which can lower 
the legitimacy of the forum. Inter-regionalism can divide negotiations into a staggered 
bottom-up process, streamline the overburdened agenda, and help remove any 
bottlenecks at the top level of the international system.  
The ideal situation is that a consensus is reached in inter-regional fora and then the 
participants bring their common position to multilateral fora, where they then speak in 
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one voice.
180
 To Reiterer, ASEM could facilitate multilateral fora by ‘pre-discussion 
or even pre-negotiation of issues to be taken up in multilateral setting’.181 He called 
inter-regionalism ‘a stepping stone to global governance’.182 Nevertheless, existing 
research has provided little support to such ASEM achievements so far.
183
 Loewen 
ascribed this failure of ASEM to the clash of cooperation cultures and of material 
interests among partners who had different economic and political interests.
184
  
A number of scholars have named the instances when ASEM members failed to 
achieve any common stand before meetings of the WTO or the UN.
185
 Dent blamed 
the EU for missing opportunity to improve the international multilateral financial 
governance through ASEM after the 1997/8 Asian Financial Crisis. Yeo highlighted 
that ASEM members ‘have not been effective in using the ASEM framework to either 
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shape agenda in WTO or push for reform in multilateral institutions.’186 She added 
that with the current institutional setting, ASEM would not be able to rationalise or 
facilitate multilateral governance, neither in security nor trade and monetary areas.
187
 
In addition, Yeo pointed out that against the background of a ‘backlash against 
globalisation’ and ‘revival of nationalism’, fora like ASEM were important for Asia 
and Europe to ‘civilise globalisation’.188 Yet, to her, ASEM has only been ‘a modest 
tool in the whole plethora of regional and international policy measures, instruments 
and institutions to manage international consultation and cooperation.’189 
Apart from rationalising multilateral negotiations, inter-regionalism is expected to 
rationalise international relations. This refers to the fact that an actor, no matter 
national or regional, can deal with many other actors in one forum. Consequently, 
transaction costs for managing foreign relations will be reduced.
190
 Gilson described 
ASEM as one mechanism for the EU to manage economic and political relations with 
a ‘growing yet disparate’ Asia. 191  Lai’s empirical research demonstrated that 
inter-regional meetings like ASEM provided participants with the opportunities to 
meet bilaterally on the sidelines.
192
 Some observers saw this function especially 
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helpful to small states as unique opportunities were offered to small states to meet a 
large number of other states in one forum.
193
 Compare with big states, small states 
lack the attractiveness, human and financial resources to build bilateral relations with 
a large number of states. Additionally, small states can form alliances when 
bargaining with larger powers so that their voice will no longer be neglected. 
Also deduced from LI, agenda-setting refers to the efforts made in inter-regional fora 
to agree on an agenda of common concerns and then to put it on the agenda of 
multilateral fora. Again, there was little evidence to support such an argument, as 
suggested by Rüland.
194
 Song totally denied such function of inter-regionalism.
195
 
Yeo suggested that ASEM would never be able to ‘influence the global agenda’ or 
‘strengthen multilateralism’ with its informal and non-legally binding institution.196 
Similarly, Farrel argued that ASEM ‘could not facilitate agreements on common 
positions nor agenda-setting for the global institutions’ mainly due to the ideationally 
difference between Asia and Europe in terms of value.
197
 
As shown above, the liberal-institutionalist school emphasises the importance of 
inter-regional cooperation under complex interdependence. In order to facilitate 
cooperation, the formation of a common institution will be crucial: an inter-regional 
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regime like ASEM is one option. LI assumes that inter-regional institutions can 
contribute to a new layer between global and regional levels of global governance, 
accelerate institutionalisation of intra-regional cooperation, bind hegemons into 
multilateralism, rationalise negotiation and set agenda in multilateral fora, rationalise 
international relations, help small nation-states managing foreign relations and build 
confidence among players in international arena. Nevertheless, ASEM’s ability to 
fulfil most of these functions has been disproved or doubted in existing studies. 
2.5.3. Social constructivism Among various theoretically-deduced functions of 
inter-regionalism, the enhancement of regional identity has received the most 
academic attention.
198
 From the cognitive perspective, nation-states and/or regional 
organisations from different regions interact with each other and gain experiences. 
Through these interactions, identity of ‘self’ and ‘the other’ is continually formed and 
reformed (or reshaped, redefined and recreated in Gilson’s word199). Actors from the 
same regions are expected to become more coherent as a result of repetitive collective 
participation in an inter-regional forum. Regional identities enhance when states from 
two distinct regions interact under an inter-regional approach as differences between 
‘self’ and ‘other’ are sharpened. Accordingly, social constructivists see 
inter-regionalism as a tool to form or foster regional identity, especially for 
heterogeneous and newly formed regional groupings. Eventually, the constituent 
                                           
198
 Hänggi, “ASEM and the Construction of the New Triad” (1999): 56-80; Gilson, Asia Meets Europe: 
Inter-regionalism and the Asia-Europe Meeting (2002); Hänggi, “Regionalism through interregionalism: 
East Asia and ASEM” (2003): 197-219; Maull and Okfen, “Inter-regionalism in international relations” 
(2003): 237-49; Dent, “The Asia-Europe Meeting and Inter-regionalism” (2004); Gilson, “New 
Interregionalism? The EU and East Asia” (2005): 307-26; Reiterer, “Inter-regionalism: A New 
Diplomatic Tool, the European Experience with East Asia” (2005): 5-6, 16; Chen, “NATO, APEC and 
ASEM: Triadic Inter-regionalism and Global order” (2005): 372; Rössler, “Eurasia: re-emergence of two 
world regions-the effects of inter-regionalism on regional integration” (2009): 313-26. 
199
 Gilson, Asia Meets Europe: Inter-regionalism and the Asia-Europe Meeting (2002), 13-14. 
66 
 
regions of an inter-regional forum are expected to develop into independent actors in 
international relations, either intentionally or unintentionally. 
Gilson proposed the notion of ‘double regional project’, arguing that when members 
of a regional group pooled resources together to deal with another regional group, the 
stronger (or only existing) regional group would trigger regionalism in the partner 
region.
200
 In this situation, the more advanced regional group appeared as a 
significant ‘other’, and became what Rüland and Gaens called ‘external federator’.201 
The external federator drove the less developed regional group towards its own model 
of integration. In return, it would benefit from the advancement in regionalism of its 
counterpart as the legitimacy of its regional integration increased.
202
  
The term ‘regional integrator’ is used as well.203 Gilson called ASEM as ‘regional 
integrator’ for ASEM Asian members.204 She argued that ASEM brought a group of 
East Asian countries to meet face-to-face with a united EU, who acted as a significant 
other. Through repetitive interactions with the EU, the East Asia states would 
gradually get used to acting as a region, thus, a regional identity would form. 
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Consequently, ASEM led to enhanced collaborations in East Asia and 
‘self-identification’ of East Asia as a region by ‘providing a functional structure and a 
cognitive backdrop for new forms of collective behaviour.’205 Gilson stated that the 
acceptance of the ‘ASEM Asia’ as a regional group by the EU further confirmed such 
an identity, constituting the ‘mirror effect’.206 Nevertheless, she warned that the EU 
risked becoming an ‘anti-model’ for regionalism to its Asian counterparts in ASEM as 
a result of the EU’s ceaseless attempts to intervene the political-economic regulations, 
human rights and democratisation in East Asian countries.
207
 From her observation 
between ASEM1 and ASEM5, Gilson claimed that a regional identity among the 
ASEM Asian states became tangible and growing.
208
  
Empirically, Gilson illustrated how ‘the agents and structures form and reform 
mutually’ using the case of Japan in ASEM.209 She said that Japan first joined the 
ASEM process with caution as the US was excluded from the new forum and it was 
the ASEAN in the driver seat. After attending several meetings as part of the ‘Asian 
group’, Japan was brought closer to its Asian neighbours as ASEM’s structure 
allowed Japanese officials to meet their Asian counterparts more regularly and 
frequently on both bilateral and regional formats.
210
 The fact that the EU as well as 
other Asian states perceived Japan as a regional power in Asia also contributed to 
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Japan’s increasing sense of belonging to Asia. Subsequently, Gilson argued that Japan 
has become more Asia-oriented and more active in ASEM. Meanwhile, the 
‘Asianisation’ on the ASEM’s Asian side was strengthened.211 
Hänggi applied the same logic to the case of China, stating that ASEM helped China’s 
neighbours to engage the giant in East Asian region-building.
212
 He concluded that 
one of ASEM’s key impacts was ‘the promotion of intra-regional cooperation in East 
Asia, namely bridging the “missing link” between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia 
and involving China in a “learning process” of regional cooperation.’213 In other 
words, inter-regionalism is assumed to provide a process of socialisation for 
hegemons and hopefully engages them into cooperation so as to prevent unilateralism.  
Yeo saw ASEM as a catalyst for the formation of the ASEAN+3 group in 1997.
214
 
Yet, she underscored that the ASEAN+3 group had to be treated as an independent 
entity which possessed its own life, rather than dependent on ASEM. Indeed, there 
were other crucial factors influencing the regionalisation in East Asia apart from 
ASEM.
215
 Yeo pointed out that the discourse and activities generated by intellectuals 
and think tanks were particular important in creating a sense of necessity for 
regionalisation in East Asia.
216
 She observed a growing sense of ‘shared interest and 
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joint responsibility’ among the political, business and intellectual leaders in East Asia 
in building a regional community to secure a stable regional order. However, Yeo 
found that the actual process of regionalism in East Asia was rather slow and on an 
unclear path.
217
 Yeo concluded that ASEM could only be credited for facilitating East 
Asian regionalism indirectly. Reiterer was even more pessimistic and labelled the East 
Asian cohesion as ‘limited’.218 
Rüland and Dent highlighted the feasibility of a collective identity of an inter-regional 
grouping to emerge or enhance after continuous socialisations and interactions.
219
 As 
such, ASEM partners would develop a common identity; eventually, ASEM would 
become an individual global actor. They underlined that the building of this 
inter-regional identity had to take a long time before bearing any fruits. In 2006, Yeo 
observed that no ASEM common identity had been established in ASEM first 
decade.
220
 She attributed this to ASEM’s inexact self-definition; complicated 
relations with other bilateral, regional or multilateral frameworks; low visibility and 
public profile. 
Another function of ASEM through the lens of social constructivism relates to the 
communication and learning opportunities it offers. When actors communicate and 
socialise with each other, the mutual perception change; then, their relationships 
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change accordingly.
221
 Richards and Kirkpatrick expected ASEM to bring developing 
and developed member states to communicate with and understand each other better, 
which could eventually reduce the ‘North-South’ division.222 Cammack and Richards 
argued that the communication between former European colonial-rulers and their 
Asian ex-colonies through ASEM would ‘replace any lingering residue of still 
remembered colonialism with a relationship based on equality.’223 Several other 
scholars asserted that the cultural, political and information bias between Asia and 
Europe would be eliminated by increased mutual communication and understanding 
via ASEM; subsequently, trade and investment barriers would also diminish.
224
 Yeo 
wrote that ASEM’s meetings and initiatives would lead to networking and 
confidence-building among participants.
225
 Hänggi argued that ASEM allowed China 
and Japan to socialise with each other so as to alleviate mutual distrust.
226
 
In general, the existing research focused on one function of inter-regionalism deduced 
from social constructivism – regional identity building. Rüland and Gilson have both 
mentioned a largely ignored function of inter-regionalism – the export of values and 
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concepts to other regions.
227
 They considered ASEM as a vehicle of the EU to 
propagate concepts such as good governance, rule of law, human rights, democracy 
and market economy to Asia. Nevertheless, the discussions of such function have 
been very brief. 
A notable challenge facing the social constructivist view is the difficulty in gauging 
its impact. For instance, the sense of belonging to a region and the degree of mutual 
trust are too abstract to be measured. There are also many other intervening factors 
like external crisis and shared histories influencing the integration process of a region. 
Furthermore, how would the entry of non-ASEAN+3 Asian states impact on the 
cohesion in ASEM’s Asian side has not been explored either. 
In sum, existing studies have introduced more than ten theoretically deduced 
functions of inter-regionalism and ASEM (summarised in Table 2.1), demonstrating a 
trend among scholars to combine various IR theories. Remarkably, it is observed that 
different theoretical approach could indeed lead to the same end: different theories are 
used to deduce the same functions of ASEM. For instance, intra-regional regime 
building could be a result of intra-regional institution-building under LI, regional 
identity building under social constructivism or bandwagon under realism. Both 
realism and LI see inter-regionalism as a tool to prevent unilateralism of hegemons. 
Increased inter-regional trade and investment could be an outcome from 
institution-balancing or bandwagon under realism, or a change of mutual 
understanding under constructivism. To better understand the similarities and 
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differences between various IR theories, next section explores the functions of 
inter-regional fora and ASEM as deduced from other theories. 
Table 2.1: Theoretical-deduced functions of inter-regionalism, by theories 
 
2.5.4.   Other theoretical approaches As mentioned earlier, Dent has developed 
the multilateral utility thesis to analyse the functions of inter-regionalism. He 
identified three functions of inter-regional fora like ASEM. The first and most crucial 
function was to connect the regional regimes with the one at global levels, which 
corresponded to the aforementioned institution-building function. Dent’s second 
multilateral utility was the ‘clearing houses for decision-making bottlenecks in global 
multilateral forum’ which corresponded to the ‘rationalisation of multilateral 
negotiation’ function deduced from LI. Dent labelled this ‘pre-negotiation/ 
pre-debating over global issues’ and ‘pre-cooked pluri-lateral accords signed at 
Realism 
Power-balancing  
Institution-
balancing 
Bandwagon 
Gaining material 
interests 
Liberal-institutionalism 
Institution-building 
i) a layer of multi-level 
governance 
ii) intra-regional instiution 
iii) engage hegemon in global 
multilateralism  
Rationalising multilateral 
fora/cooperation 
Rationalising international 
relations 
Agenda setting for 
multilateral institutions 
Social 
Constructivism 
Regional identity 
building 
Improve mutual 
understanding 
and/or trust of 
actors 
Norms and 
concepts 
exporting 
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inter-regional level’. 228  The third multilateral utility of inter-regionalism was 
‘multilateral community building and multilateral citizenship development among its 
member states’ as consequences of deepening socialisation at micro-networking as 
well as macro-networking levels.
229
 This corresponded to the ‘regional identity 
building’ function proposed by Gilson. Yet, Dent emphasised that the results yielded 
by micro-networking and macro-networking would took a long time to be mature. 
Moreover, he stated that ASEM was uniquely equipped with the utility to 
counter-balance the US’s hegemonic unilateralism.  
Cammack suggested new materialism as a better approach to assess the ASEM 
process.
230
 Applying the new materialist paradigm, he argued that the domestic 
problems an individual state faced would affect the state’s ability to engage at 
regional, inter-regional and global levels. In other words, the higher the support a state 
obtained from its domestic society on an external policy, the easier the state can 
establish cooperation with other actors outside its national borders. Individual states 
would pursue national goals through participating in regional or inter-regional fora. 
Reversely, Cammack suggested that the states would utilise regional and 
inter-regional fora to impose policies or transmit disciplines to their domestic society. 
He argued that European leaders could exploit ASEM to impose ‘Asian values’ (such 
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as prioritising communal interest of the society to individual interest) back home to 
discipline the European population.
231
 
Apart from determining what could be the potential functions, some studies went 
further to assess whether ASEM has fulfilled these functions. Yet, these assessments 
were often not supported by empirical evidence. Besides, the assessment of the 
functions deduced from social constructivism is rare due to the difficulty in gauging 
abstract concepts like identity and perception. Table 2.2 summarises the assessment of 
ASEM available thus far. Instead of following the theoretical-deductive approach to 
access the functions (or add-value) of inter-regionalism, this research explores the 
empirical evidence, and then identify what an inter-regional forum such as ASEM can 
offer to its partners as well as to the international relations (in Chapter 6, Chapter 7 
and Chapter 8). 
Generally, all the aforementioned studies treated ASEM as a tool of its members 
instead of as an individual actor that could act independently. ASEM has not been 
entitled with any individual actorness. Its constituent parts (no matter nation-states or 
regional organisations) were said to utilise ASEM to fulfil their own national/regional 
goals. Not only ASEM as an independent actor, but also non-state actors like civil 
society organisations and the general public were hardly mentioned in these studies of 
ASEM’s potential functions. 
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Table 2.2: Theoretical-deduced functions of ASEM listed in existing studies 
The
ory 
Deduced functions of ASEM Scholars disagree 
R
ea
li
sm
 
For states from Asia and Europe to join together to balance 
the US 
Muall & Okfen, 
Dent, Reiterer, Yeo 
For Asia to diversify its external relations so as to decrease 
the dependence on the US, and that on Japan economically 
Reiterer 
For EU to establish links with East Asia to balance APEC 
Yeo, ASEM 
evaluation 2006 
For Asia to establish links with the EU to balance the 
transatlantic links 
Yeo, ASEM 
evaluation 2006 
For ASEAN to balance the inter-regional FTAs between 
the EU and other regional organisations 
n/a 
For Asia and Europe to join together to increase their 
bargaining powers in international relations 
n/a 
For the EU to prevent being marginalised in the ‘Pacific 
Century’ 
n/a 
For Asian states to keep the US engaged in the region n/a 
For states to increase the chance of survival by showing 
their importance via participation in ASEM 
n/a 
For ASEAN to increase its role in international relations by 
grouping together with the EU and Northeast Asia 
n/a 
For states to pursue material gains like trade and 
technology 
n/a 
L
ib
er
al
-i
n
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
is
m
 
To serve as a layer in the multi-level governance 
Rüland, Dent, 
Robles 
To foster intra-regional building in the constituent regions n/a 
To help socialise large powers, such as the US and China, 
into multilateralism 
Rüland, Muall & 
Okfen 
To coordinate positions between the EU and East Asia 
before multilateral fora like the WTO and the UN 
Loewen, Yeo, 
Rüland, Muall & 
Okfen, Segel, Farrel 
For the EU to manage relations with a large group of Asian 
countries at the same time 
n/a 
To facilitate bilateral relations among partners n/a 
To facilitate small states to expand external relations n/a 
To help multilateral fora to set agenda Yeo, Rüland, Farrel 
To build trust and confidence among partners especially 
between past rivals 
n/a 
S
o
ci
al
 
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
is
m
 To build regional-identity among East Asian participants Reiterer 
To give rise to a new actor, ASEM itself, in international 
arena 
n/a 
To increase communication among participants so as to 
reduce mutual rivalry or hatred  
n/a 
For the EU to export its norms and value to East Asia Rüland 
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2.6.  Contribution to IR theories 
The foregoing analysis covered various theoretical approaches which have been 
applied in the study of inter-regionalism. Through the lens of various schools of 
thought, inter-regionalism is perceived differently. As each scholar has his/her own 
preference of theoretical frameworks, the resulted pictures about what 
inter-regionalism can be and can achieve vary. Through an in-depth examination of 
the Asia-Europe Meeting process as a case-study, this research inductively tests the 
validity of the three major IR theories.  
Regarding actors in international relations, the centrality of nation-state which realists 
strongly assert, will be questioned. The question ‘is ASEM a forum only for 
nation-states?’ is addressed. The significance of non-state actors, especially the 
regional and international institutions, advocated by LI, is investigated. Moreover, this 
research tests the existence of mutual construction and re-construction between the 
agents and the structure authored by social constructivists. The ultimate goal of this 
dissertation is to identify the IR theory or theories which is/are the most appropriate in 
explaining the current international relations. Before this conceptual and empirical 
analysis is undertaken, the following chapter describes the methodology underpinning 
this doctoral research. 
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Chapter Three 
Methodologies 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter elaborates the methods selected for data collection and data analysis in 
the examination of the actors and their interactions in the ASEM process, the selected 
case-study of inter-regionalism. As pointed out in previous chapters, literature on 
inter-regionalism in general and on the ASEM process in particular has been 
theory-led: existing IR theories have typically been employed to explain the 
development and the functions of inter-regionalism as a new phenomenon in 
international relations.
232
 There is a significant deficit of empirically-driven research 
in the field. With the exception of the special report on attitudes and perceptions of 
Chinese university students and elites towards the ASEM process (published in 
2006
233
), other ASEM-oriented research has included limited empirical evidence. 
In order to comprehensively understand inter-regionalism and the ASEM process as a 
case-study of it, this research incorporates a substantial empirical study using an 
unprecedented array of primary data. It explores the awareness of the ASEM process 
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among the general public in selected ASEM member countries in both Asia and 
Europe; the views and attitudes of national decision-makers on ASEM Asia; the 
opinions of key ASEM informants; and, all available ASEM official documents. This 
empirical analysis combines various data collection and data analysis methods: 
content analysis on news media, public opinion surveys, elite interviews, participant 
observations and archival research. This combination of methodological approaches is 
unique in the existing body of research on ASEM.  
This dissertation seeks to expand the range of information and data used to examine 
ASEM, by incorporating the news media and public opinion, two aspects that are 
totally new in the study of ASEM and of inter-regionalism. Moreover, participant 
observation and key informant interviews are data collection methods which have 
seldom been applied in the examination of the ASEM process. Such empirically-rich 
data allows this research to go beyond current studies which are often theory-based. 
The majority of research applied theories without reference to empirical evidence, 
which has led to a discrepancy between the theoretically-deduced models of ASEM 
and what the process is really about. Entrusting the news media as a source of factual 
information and the interviewed key informants as source of insider information, this 
research attempts to unveil the reality.  
In particular, the news reportage of ASEM is identified as a complementary source of 
information that provides factual information (such as who attends the meetings and 
what they do in the sidelines of the plenary sessions) which is not available in the 
scholarly literature or the official documents. Noteworthy, the official documents 
which are available (e.g. Chairmen’s Statements after the summits and ministerial 
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meetings) are always carefully tailored and sometimes revised word for word,
234
 as 
they have to be approved in consensus by the ASEM partners. It is presumed that the 
media views and writes about the ASEM process from a different perspective. Except 
those state-owned ones or those under censorship, it is assumed that the media outlets 
would practice professional journalism and hence are more critical than the ASEM 
partner governments. Subsequently, information which is absent in the official 
documents may be found in the news reports. 
Although the ASEM official discourses repeatedly refer to the general public as a 
‘key component’ and ‘key stakeholder’ of the process,235 there has yet been any study 
on the actual involvement of the public in the process thus far. Nor has there been any 
research on public opinion on ASEM. This research is the first to examine the public 
awareness and opinion on ASEM using original primary public survey data. 
Consequently, the actual engagement of the general public in ASEM can be better 
understood. 
Each research method has its methodological strengths and limitations, they are 
discussed in detailed below. Taking a post-positivist perspective, this research is well 
aware that different data collection methods produce different types of method effect, 
therefore, the corresponding strategies to overcome such effects are proposed and 
discussed below. 
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3.2. Archival analysis 
One key source of information of this research is the official documents issued under 
the ASEM framework, normally after the summits and other official meetings. These 
documents are found in the official document archives managed by some ASEM 
partners’ foreign ministries, the ASEM Infoboard (www.aseminfoboard.org, the 
official website of the ASEM process managed by the Asia-Europe Foundation 
(ASEF)),
236
 as well as the official website of ASEF. These official documents 
(available free of charge) serve as a primary source of official information about the 
ASEM process. 
The main advantage of archival analysis is its unobtrusive nature, that is, it seldom 
exerts effect on the subjects of the study as the content under analysis has already 
been finalised. However, as depicted by Burnham et al., they are ‘dry and 
sanitised’, 237  offering researchers ‘unwieldy’ or ‘little’ original contribution to 
generate to the discipline.
238
 Another challenge is the sheer size and complexity of 
the archives. Conversely, there are some archives which do not provide access to all 
needed documents.  
ASEM, being a relatively young institution, has not yet generated a massive amount 
of official documents. Therefore, it is manageable to include all of them from the 
inception of the process to the most recent summit. However, the existing documents 
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have not been systematically published by a single party nor have they been regularly 
made available for the public. One reason is the absence of a secretariat or 
administrative body to manage a single office which collects a complete set of ASEM 
official documents. Thus, the type of documents as well as their content and style vary 
when they are published by different ASEM partners’ governments. In addition, the 
records of some senior official meetings are not published. The availability of 
ASEM-related documents published by individual partners varies greatly. While some 
(namely Japan, South Korea and the European Commission) provide a great number 
of official documents related to ASEM in English, other partners neither offer the 
documents in English nor build any public archive. These limitations notwithstanding, 
the available documents do supply sufficient information for this research. 
The documents analysed include the following: 
 the Asia-Europe Cooperation Framework 2000 (AECF2000, the unofficial 
handbook of the process) and its precedent AECF1998; 
 Chairmen’s Statements of the nine ASEM summits; 
 all special issue-based statements or declarations issued by the summits;  
 Chairmen’s Statements of all ASEM ministerial meetings (MMs); 
 Chairmen’s Statements of ASEM Senior Officials Meeting on Trade and 
Investment (SOMTI);  
 Chairmen’s Statements of other ASEM senior officials meetings (SOMs) 
which are made available to the public (only about half of the SOMs do so);  
 official documents related to ASEM published by individual ASEM partner 
governments (such as the press conference reports and press releases);  
 public speeches made by the ASEM leaders during ASEM meetings; and,  
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 official documents published by the European Commission from the 
mid-1990s in regard to the EU’s relations with Asia.239 
The unit of analysis in the content analysis of the aforementioned documents is a 
proposition which contains subject and action. Employing a qualitative approach, this 
research uses this data to illustrate the ruling principles, institutional design and the 
roles assigned for different actors of the ASEM process. The findings are elaborated 
in Chapter 5. The relevant propositions also inform on the content of ASEM’s Track 1 
and Track 2 meetings (the results are elaborated in Chapters 6 and 8 respectively). 
Employing a quantitative approach, the data is used to assess the significance of 
different actors in the process. This is done by comparing the number of proposition 
in which each type of actor is mentioned. In addition, this research studies the 
available press conference reports issued by the ASEM partners. These reports supply 
information of the sideline meetings which took place on the margins of the past 
ASEM summits (the data is utilised in Chapter 7). 
Public accessibility of ASEM’s Track1 meetings is strictly limited, especially the 
summits (in order to encourage free and frank interactions among the Heads of 
State/Government, no advisers or ministers are allowed in the meeting room, doors 
are strictly closed to journalists and academics), the official documents issued after 
the meetings are valuable sources which are available. An analysis of these official 
documents provides valid insights into the official positions of the ASEM partners. 
                                           
239
 Commission of the European Communities, Towards a New Asia Strategy (Communication from 
the Commission to the European Council and to the European Parliament, COM (94) 314 final, 
Brussels, 1994); European Commission, Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced 
Partnerships (Communication from the Commission to the Council, Brussels, 2001); European 
Commission, Vademecum: Modalities for Future ASEM Dialogue Taking the Process Forward, 
(Brussels, 2001); European Commission, Regional Programming for Asia: Strategy Document 
2007-2013 (Brussels, 2007). 
83 
 
However, they represent merely one research perspective. In order to enrich the 
source of information, this research extends its interest to the views of ASEM through 
the eyes of the participants. A number of writings on ASEM produced by officials 
who had attended any ASEM meeting are collected and analysed.
240
 These written 
publications offer extra information and insights alongside those from the official 
documents. Moreover, other possible sources of data collection, namely observation, 
content analysis, interviews and survey, are applied in this research so as to generate a 
more comprehensive understanding of the ASEM process. 
3.3.  Participant observation 
Participant observation refers to the first-hand observation and data collection when 
the researcher becomes part of the events under study.
241
 Lofland et al. defined the 
method as ‘the process in which an investigator establishes and sustains a many-sided 
and situationally appropriate relationship with a human association in its natural 
setting for the purpose of developing a social scientific understanding of that 
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association.’242 In practice, the researcher observes and records the behaviour of the 
people in the natural social setting. At the same time, researchers gain first-hand 
experience of the situation in the manner in which its subjects are experiencing. 
Lofland and Lofland highlighted the opportunities for collecting additional evidence 
through formal or informal interviews and the collection of documentary materials 
when the researcher is undertaking direct observation.
243
 
The author of this dissertation visited Brussels between July and October 2010 and 
participated as a member of the academia, think tanks or media in numerous 
ASEM8-related events. These events ranged from seminars and conferences 
organised by think tanks, academic institutions and the European Commission, to the 
eighth Asia-Europe People’s Forum. In this case, the data collection approach was 
obtrusive as the researcher explicitly informed the organisers and fellow-participants 
in the ASEM-related events about her research role. In order to minimise the obtrusive 
nature of the observation process, the researcher managed to build trusting 
relationships with the observation subjects, which were the key in the debriefing of 
research observations.  
As Manheim and Rich point out, participant observation is not a common research 
method in political science because many of the subjects are ‘too large a scale to 
allow direct observation’.244 Moreover, the researchers usually have limited access to 
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governmental meetings and activities; the high cost in time and money also challenge 
participant observation.
245
 Additionally, researchers have to avoid losing objectivity 
while they get closer and more familiar with the subjects in study.  
Due to the limitation in access to the governmental events, the author only gained 
access to the unofficial-track activities which included the ASEM Public Conference 
on Europe-Asia Inter-regional Relations organised by the European Commission on 
12-13 July 2010, which gathered academic, think tankers, public policy experts, civil 
society organisations, media professionals and government representatives from 
ASEM countries;
246
 the 4
th
 Connecting Civil Societies in Asia and Europe 
Conference and the 5
th
 Editors’ Roundtable on 2-3 October 2010, both organised by 
ASEF in parallel to the 8
th
 ASEM summit. On Track 3, the author became one of the 
volunteer helpers to the Organising Committee of AEPF8 during the few days before 
the occurrence of the forum. Then, the author attended the second half of the AEPF8 
on 4-5 October 2010 (the whole AEPF8 lasted between 2 and 5 October 2010). 
Participation in these events provided this research with access to interview different 
types of the actors, from government officials to think tanks, academia, news makers 
and representatives of various civil society organisations.  
In addition, in 2006 author of this dissertation was recruited as a researcher by an 
ASEF-funded transnational research project, the EU in the eyes of Asia-Pacific. 
Subsequently, she did not only gain first-hand experience to work with the Intellectual 
Department of ASEF, but also the opportunities to participate in a number of public 
events and academic seminars organised by ASEF. 
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Observation and information obtained provided valuable and useful insights for this 
research, especially regarding the types of actors and the coordination of the 
ASEM-related activities. This rich data was used mainly to contextualise the whole 
research rather than being applied in a particular chapter. Three other types of data 
collection methods whose usages are more chapter-specific are discussed below. 
3.4.  Content analysis of news media 
In order to embrace a diversity of perspectives, this research employs also content 
analysis of the news reportage of ASEM in selected Asian countries. Such unique 
dataset provides a perspective complementary to the governmental sources.  
Manheim and Rich defined content analysis as ‘the systematic counting, assessing, 
and interpreting of the form and substance of communication.’247 Berger referred it to 
‘a nonintrusive methodology in which the researcher examines particular elements in 
a text or collection of texts to quantify them and use them for statistical analysis.’248 
The unit of analysis in this research is a news item referencing ‘Asia-Europe 
Meeting’/ ‘Asia-Europe Summit’ / ‘ASEM’. Apart from being unobtrusive, content 
analysis is a reliable research method in which errors can be identified and corrected. 
As Babbie suggested ‘the concreteness of materials studied in content analysis 
strengthens the likelihood of reliability. You can always code and recode and even 
recode again if you want, making certain that the coding is consistent.’249 In contrast, 
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errors in a survey or experiment cost more time and money to amend, whereas some 
are not amendable at all. Moreover, longitudinal study is possible as long as the raw 
data is available. Content analysis is inexpensive as no special equipment is needed. 
Concerning news media analysis, many physical or electronic news archives charge a 
small subscription fee or simply open to users for free. However, the reliance of the 
availability of the raw data indeed constitutes a disadvantage of this research tool. 
In order to conduct a longitudinal study, this research collected and analysed the news 
items which featured ASEM from 1996 (ASEM1) to 2012 (ASEM9). Six 
English-language dailies each from a different location on the ASEM Asian side were 
chosen to be monitored. Different press outlets are included to diversify the source of 
information as well as to facilitate cross-national comparisons. The choice of the 
newspapers followed that of an existing trans-national research ‘Public, Elite and 
Media Perceptions of the EU in the Asia-Pacific Region’ (the EU in the eyes of 
Asia-Pacific). While the central focus of the EU in the eyes of Asia-Pacific project is 
the EU, the ASEM process as the highest diplomatic interaction between the EU and 
Asia is also studied. How the EU and the ASEM are conceived in Asia-Pacific is 
investigated.
250
 The author of this dissertation has been a researcher of this project 
since 2006 and has benefited from the access to the primary data.  
Between 2004 and 2008,
251
 the media analysis of the EU in the eyes of Asia-Pacific 
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studied the most widely circulated dailies, the most widely circulated 
English-language dailies, the most popular business dailies and the leading 
prime-time television news bulletins with the highest audience rating in eight Asian 
ASEM countries (China (including mainland China and Hong Kong SAR), Indonesia, 
Japan, the Philippines, South Korean, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, all of whom 
were ASEM members when the study took place). To overcome the multiple 
language challenges involved in the dataset, this research only looks at the 
English-language dailies, namely: China Daily, South China Morning Post, Jakarta 
Post, Japan Times, Manila Bulletin, Korean Herald, Strait Times, Bangkok Post and 
Vietnam News. 
This research is well aware of the pitfalls of the dependence on the English-language 
papers, which are not the most widely circulated in Asian countries as English is not 
the native language. Also, their target readership may not be the local community as 
the local newspapers do. Nevertheless, owing to language limitation, this research can 
only rely on English-language newspapers in order to generate a cross-country dataset 
for comparison. As two sides of the same coin, there are strengths of the 
English-language dailies. 
In the monitored locations, English-language dailies are typically read by local leaders, 
educated elites (including students) and foreigners (either residing in an Asian 
location, or following local events from abroad). These English-language dailies are 
also read by media professionals from outside the locality as a guide for external 
newsmakers in reporting domestic current events. Such newspapers tend to employ 
                                                                                                                         
media analysis. The project expanded in 2009 to cover Malaysia, India and the Macau SAR; in 2011 it 
added also Russia to the list. However, as these two phases were conducted after the major part of 
media analysis of this research was completed these four locations were excluded in this research. 
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both local and foreign journalists and editors with proficiency in English as well as 
extensive international experiences. Due to the profile of their readership and staff, 
English-language dailies in the Asian locations create a unique forum to exchange 
ideas on regional and international developments. As a window between the local 
Asian societies and the international arena, the English-language press tends to feature 
more international events and their impacts, ASEM included. Additionally, most of 
these chosen papers are the longest-established and most prestigious English-language 
newspaper in the selected locations as identified by the respective native researchers 
employed by the EU in the eyes of Asia-Pacific project. 
Regarding data collection, this study originally planned to extract the ASEM-related 
news items directly from the EU in the eyes of Asia-Pacific 2006 dataset and search 
for other news items from an online news archive, FACTIVA.
252
 FACTIVA was 
chosen because of its massive collection of sources,
253
 user friendliness and the free 
access provided by the University of Canterbury’s Library.  
However, it was found that the reportage from several of the abovementioned news 
outlets were not available. News published by Japan Times before 2002 was not 
available on FACTIVA, nor did the daily’s official online archive provide a complete 
collection of the publication. Similarly, news items published before February 2002 
on Manila Bulletin were not available in FACTIVA. The paper’s online archive only 
provides news written since 2009. In the Vietnamese case, data from Vietnam News 
was not accessible from FACTIVA: nor is there any official online archive for 
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Vietnam News. Two other online news archive, Press Display and Wise News, were 
also checked. However, news from Japan Times, Manila Bulletin and Vietnam News 
between 1996 and 2012 were still not available. Consequently, these three dailies 
have been excluded from this research. In addition, news from the Korea Herald 
published before 1998 was not available on FACTIVA, while the paper’s official 
online archive is not available in English. Thus, the analysis of the Korea Herald 
excludes coverage of ASEM1. In the light of these limitations, this research based the 
media portrayal analysis of ASEM on six English-language dailies, three from 
Northeast Asia and three from Southeast Asia, as listed in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Information of the monitored English-language dailies 
Locations Dailies chosen 
Found-
ed 
Circulation 
Time- 
frame 
no. of ASEM 
news collected 
Sources of 
news 
Mainland 
China 
China Daily 1981 800 000
254
 
ASEM1- 
ASEM9 
83 
the EU in the 
eyes of 
Asia-Pacific 
for ASEM6; 
FACTIVA 
for other 
periods 
Hong Kong, 
China 
South China 
Morning Post 
1903 107 080
255
 88 
South Korea Korea Herald 1953 
50% market 
share
256
 
ASEM2 
- ASEM9 
216 
Singapore Strait Times 1845 365 800
257
 
ASEM1 
- 
ASEM9 
191 
Thailand Bangkok Post 1946 65 000
258
 246 
Indonesia Jakarta Post 1983 50 000
259
 80 
FACTIVA 
only 
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Importantly, observations on the ASEM6-news from the EU in the eyes of 
Asia-Pacific showed that the news media’s attention on the process concentrated 
overwhelmingly around the few weeks when the official summit took place. Hence, a 
new expanded dataset concentrated on the ‘peak’ periods in ASEM’s media 
coverage – one month before the ASEM summit took place to one week after the 
two-day summit had been held. Based on this methodology, a total of 904 news items 
were collected and analysed.  
Table 3.2: ‘Periods’ of the media data collection  
Summit Period for news analysis No. of news items found 
ASEM1 1 February – 9 March 1996 212 
ASEM2 3 March – 11 April 1998 122 
ASEM3 20 September – 28 October 2000 207 
ASEM4 23 August – 1 October 2002 53 
ASEM5 8 September – 16 October 2004 57 
ASEM6 10 August – 18 September 2006 52 
ASEM7 24 September – 1 November 2008 104 
ASEM8 4 September – 12 October 2010 35 
ASEM9 5 October – 13 November 2012 62 
 
The EU in the eyes of Asia-Pacific used local researchers in each location who were 
trained to collect and analyse the EU or ASEM-related news items using an identical 
methodology. Taking a news item as the unit of analysis, trained researchers were 
responsible for coding various aspects of each news report including: centrality 
(whether ASEM is the main, secondary or minor focus of the news); evaluation 
(whether ASEM is reported positively, neutrally or negatively); the actors (individual 
countries, national leaders, regional organisations or non-state actors) and the relevant 
actions mentioned (political, economic, social, environmental or development). The 
coding was recorded on a standardised Excel template. As this doctoral research is 
interested mainly in the actors and actions reported in the ASEM-related news, the 
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relevant data from these news analysis were extracted and exported to a modified 
Excel template for further study. The key focus is placed on the actions taken place 
during the ASEM summits and on their sidelines. 
To expand this existing dataset, this research sourced news items referencing ‘Asia 
Europe Meeting’, ‘ASEM’ and ‘Asia Europe Summit’ (these are the search terms 
used in the EU in the eyes of Asia-Pacific) for different ASEM years using 
FACTIVA’s search function. The news items identified by the search engine were 
downloaded, analysed, coded using the same protocols, and then entered into the 
Excel template mentioned above.  
All news items collected were analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively. The 
analysis includes the systematic recording of the length of each news item (number of 
words), source of information (whether written by employed journalists, editors, or 
sourced from news agencies, etc), and coded for centrality (major, secondary or 
minor), thematic focus (summary of what the news story is about), ASEM relevant 
actions and evaluation (positive, negative or neutral). In addition, two special 
categories - ‘sideline meetings’ and ‘official visits’– were introduced to record all the 
sideline meetings and official state visits of ASEM partners which took place on the 
margins of the official summits. The content of these sideline meetings, when 
reported, are also analysed. Consequently, this dataset contains: information on the 
number of pieces of news featuring ASEM; the frequency of appearance of each 
ASEM partner; and, information on sideline meetings that took place on the fringe of 
the official summits and the ASEM partners involved. This data is elaborated in 
Chapters 7 and 8. 
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Remarkably, this research is the first attempt to include systematic media analysis on 
ASEM-related reportage. Rather than attempting to cover all ASEM partner countries, 
it realistically concentrates on the Asian media outlets which are found available. Due 
to the different media environment and the coverage of the EU in the eyes of 
Asia-Pacific project, no English-language daily from the European countries is 
included. If the constraint in time and language can be overcome, future research 
should examine the news coverage of ASEM in European news media. To 
complement the unique media insight in this research, it employed also primary data 
generated by several public opinion surveys to illustrate how the general public 
receive and conceive the establishment and development of the ASEM process.  
3.5.  Public opinion survey 
Public opinion survey here refers to the collection of opinion on a large scale among a 
randomly selected sample from the general public.
260
 Various methods are available 
to administer a survey, namely mail, telephone, internet or face-to-face. As it is 
impossible to talk to every individual in the population, a representative sample of the 
population can be utilised by researchers to make generalisations about the whole 
population. During the survey, all respondents are asked to answer identical questions, 
in identical order and are given identical options to choose from. As a result, the 
findings can be standardised and analysed with the aid of statistical tools. Manheim 
and Rich defined survey research as ‘a method of data collection in which information 
is obtained directly from individual persons who are selected so as to provide a basis 
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for making inferences about some larger populations’.261 Accordingly, surveys reveal 
perceptions, opinions, attitude, and behavioural reports of the respondents. In public 
surveys, the unit of analysis is an individual from the general public. The results 
provide an ‘accurate snapshot of conditions or opinions at the time the survey was 
carried out.’262 
As stated by Babbie, surveys were particularly useful in describing the characteristics 
of a large population,
 
as the large number of cases covered favour descriptive and 
explanatory analyses.
263 He argued that ‘survey research goes a long way toward 
eliminating unreliability in observations made by the researcher.’264 However, public 
opinion surveying is expensive and time consuming, which normally constitutes a 
methodology beyond the scope of a single researcher. Owing to the rigid structure 
(identical questionnaire), surveying has to sacrifice the richness of the data. In 
Babbie’s term, ‘standardised questionnaire items often represent the least common 
denominator in assessing people’s attitude, orientations, circumstances, and 
experiences’, 265  the responses collected can only be regarded as ‘approximate 
indicators’.266 Besides, unlike archival research and content analysis, surveys are not 
unobtrusive, for instance, a respondent may not have heard of a topic before being 
interviewed. 
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Normally, the high costs involved in a survey mean that it is impossible for an 
individual researcher (particularly students) to conduct a large-scale public opinion 
survey. Fortunately, this research has access to the primary findings from two 
comparative projects, the EU in the eyes of Asia-Pacific and its ‘mirror’ project Asia 
in the eyes of Europe,
267
 both incorporated public opinion survey components. Each 
survey had two questions related to the perceptions of ASEM; the responses to these 
questions constitute the primary data used in this doctoral research.  
Since launched in 2002, the on-going the EU in the eyes of Asia-Pacific project has 
modified its questionnaire several times. To ensure comparability, the public survey 
data used in this research are limited to the surveys conducted in 2008 (in Indonesia, 
the Philippines and Vietnam), 2010 (in India, Macau and Malaysia) and 2012 
(mainland China, India, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand), where 
identical questionnaires were used. A professional social research company was hired 
to conduct these surveys. The sample size in 2008 and 2010 phases was set at 400 
respondents per location, sustaining the margin of error at ±4.9% at a confidence level 
of 95%. The sample size for 2012 increased to 1000 respondents in each location, 
sustaining the margin of error at ±3% with the same confidence level of 95%. In total, 
the dataset included 9448 completed surveys (Table 3.3).  
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Table 3.3: Sample sizes of the Asian public survey in 2008, 2010 and 2012 
Locations Date No. of respondents 
Indonesia 
November 2008 
405 
The Philippines 400 
Vietnam 400 
India 
February 2010 
403 
Macau, China 400 
Malaysia 400 
Mainland China 
March 2012 
1009 
India 1028 
Japan 1000 
South Korea 1002 
Malaysia 1000 
Singapore 1000 
Thailand 1001 
Total 9448 
The surveys conducted in 2008 and 2010 employed telephone-based structured 
interviews, with one exception - Indonesia - which required face-to-face interviews 
due to limited telephone accessibility in the country. Although telephone-interview 
demands more time and money compared with other methodologies such as online 
surveys or mailing, it offers a higher guarantee for each interview to be completed. 
Compared with face-to-face interviews, it minimises financial and human resources.  
In the 2012 survey, an online-panel was employed: this method (like mailing or 
emailing respondents a self-administered survey) is one of the cheapest, fastest and 
most convenient ways to administer surveys. However, there are shortcomings 
including the inability to guarantee the completion of all questions and the possible 
under-representativeness of the online panel for certain groups in the population (older 
generations and poor typically), especially in places where internet penetration of low. 
Two questions from the EU in the eyes of Asia-Pacific survey informed this study:  
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 Question 9: Are you aware of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Process?  
 Question 10: Which of the EU countries do you have personal or professional 
connections/ties with?  
The ‘mirror’ project Asia in the Eyes of Europe covered eight EU member states 
(Australia, Belgium,
268
 Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Romania and the UK). Its 
public opinion survey was completed in February 2011 and used online-panel 
structured interviews. Again, the project hired a professional social research company 
to conduct the survey, with sample sizes varying from country to country to reflect the 
population composition of the EU (Table 3.4). The margin of error ranged from ±3% 
to ±7% at a confidence level of 95%. In total, the dataset profiled 6155 completed 
interviews.  
Table 3.4: Public opinion sample in eight EU member states 
EU member states Population in 2011
269
 No. of respondents 
Austria 8.40 million 496 
Belgium (French-speaking area) 
10.95 million 
224 
Belgium (Flemish-speaking area) 368 
Denmark 5.56 million 293 
France 65.05 million 906 
Germany 81.75 million 1033 
Italy 60.63 million 930 
Romania 21.41 million 451 
UK 62.44 million 1454 
Total - 6155 
 
Identical questions were posed to the respondents in the respective native language of 
each location. Two questions from Asia in the eyes of Europe survey were extracted in 
this research: 
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> (accessed 3 January 2012). 
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 Question 6a: How familiar are you with the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 
(options: not familiar at all, not very familiar, quite familiar or very familiar)?  
 Question 7: With which of the following countries (ASEM Asian countries 
were listed) do you have personal or professional links with?  
Although the questions in the two surveys seem similar, the findings are not deemed 
as comparable. The concepts of ‘being aware of ASEM’ and ‘being familiar with 
ASEM’ are treated as two different aspects in this research. The respective findings 
are discussed in Chapter 8 with regard to the engagement of the ASEM process to the 
general public. 
Apart from these two projects, this study also explored the conclusions published by 
the Asia-Europe Meeting Research Team of the European Studies Centre, China 
Foreign Affairs University in their public opinion survey conducted in 2006.
270
 This 
particular research fixed its interest on ASEM. Its public survey collected 970 
questionnaires completed by students from four prestigious universities in Beijing 
(Tsinghua University, Peking University, Renmin University of China and China 
Foreign Affairs University). The results are used for secondary data analysis in this 
research.  
Secondary analysis here refers to the re-use and re-analysis of data collected and 
processed by other researchers, usually with a different purpose.
271
 In the 
eighteen-question survey, the Chinese students were first tested on their knowledge on 
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ASEM, then their general perceptions on the process were explored. The study 
concluded that the Chinese university students had minimal knowledge on ASEM, but 
their views on ASEM and the role of Chinese in the process were positive. In 
particular, data generated by the question ‘Do you know ASEM? (options: don’t know, 
not familiar, familiar and know well)’ will be used in Chapter 8 in parallel to the 
public opinion data generated by the projects the EU in the eyes of Asia-Pacific. 
To date, the survey conducted by the Asia-Europe Meeting Research Team of the 
European Studies Centre in 2006 is the only known attempt at conducting a 
large-scale survey focusing on ASEM. However, the results were limited to one 
particular cohort (university students) in one country (China), indeed in one city 
(Beijing). By bringing together existing public opinion data from different ASEM 
countries and projects for comparison, this research significantly advances the 
empirical study of ASEM. 
As mentioned above, the rigidly structured nature of public survey restricts the 
richness and vividness of responses collected. As Manheim and Rich pointed out, this 
confines ‘the researcher’s opportunities to learn what respondents consider relevant or 
important and to gain new theoretical insights.’272 To complement this shortcoming, 
this research also includes data from semi-structured and non-structured face-to-face 
interviews with decision-makers and key informants. 
3.6. In-depth interviews 
In-depth interviewing is one commonly used method of data collection in political 
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science and social science. A targeted respondent is invited for a fixed-topic 
conservation with the interviewer(s).
273
 It can be semi-structured or unstructured, 
depending on the protocol prepared by the interviewer and the degree of control the 
interviewer exerts on the conversation. The interview set-up and organisation is an 
elaborate process entailing designing a questionnaire or protocol, identifying and 
accessing the target sample, conducting actual interviews, transcribing the responses 
and analysing the data. Due to the high costs both in time and money (for recording 
equipment, transportation of interviewees or interviewers, and staff employment), the 
number of interviewees is usually limited. Moreover, securing interview with 
particular informants, especially elites who are typically time-poor, is a difficult task. 
Persistency and personal contacts offer some possible resolutions. Selected 
interviewees are typically experts, key informants or decision makers, whose 
responses then become the unit of analysis.  
This research involved unstructured interviews with four key informants who worked 
for various ASEM pillars and activities. They were able to provide unique insider 
information. A key informant here refers to a member of the particular group who 
possess direct information about the group.  
Additionally, the responses from the 242 national elite interviews conducted in the 
course of the EU in the eyes of Asia-Pacific project are also used. Elites are usually 
‘in privileged position as far as knowledge is concerned’274 and ‘have gained their 
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knowledge by virtue of their position and experience in the community, their 
established networks of relationships, their ability to express themselves orally, and 
their broad understanding of their community’275 They are believed to be more 
influential on decision-making process for a society than the general public. Burnham 
et al. argued that since ‘many political decisions are taken by small groups of highly 
qualified and knowledgeable individuals’; elite interview ‘remains the most 
appropriate technique to explore this private world’. 276 
Among various interviewing techniques, an in-depth interview is the most informative 
and direct. This type of interview with elites or key informants provides crucial 
information which would otherwise be unavailable. These insiders’ knowledge and 
shared special expertise are insightful for researchers. Burnham et al. saw elite 
interviewing as bridge bringing together the practitioner and the academic for 
‘hopefully fruitful mutual dialogue’.277  
On the negative side, the representativeness and validity of the findings are always 
challenged as the elite interview sample is usually small, especially compared with 
the public opinion survey which gather hundreds or thousands of responses. Besides, 
the key informants are deeply involved in the respective areas and may possess very 
specific, if not highly-specialised (and thus narrow) views. To overcome these 
shortcomings, Manheim and Rich advised against taking what interviewees says as 
factual data, relying on a single interviewee on one issue, or using information 
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obtained from elite interviews without verification.
278
 
After taking into account time, financial resources and access opportunities, this 
research incorporates data from first-hand interviews with four key informants whose 
work was either highly connected to or was involved closely in the ASEM process. 
An unstructured style was chosen: the conversations were guided by a general 
objective and the questions posed were not fixed beforehand. As stated by Manheim 
and Rich, this approach offers great opportunity for the researcher to ‘learn from 
respondents and acquire unexpected information that can lead to truly new ways of 
understanding the events being studied’.279 However, an eight-question questionnaire 
was pretested and prepared as a protocol and approved by the Human Ethics 
Committee of University of Canterbury before any interviews were scheduled 
(attached in the Appendix).     
During the actual interviews, this questionnaire acted as a guiding protocol. In each 
interview, according to the expertise of the particular interviewee, a different 
combination of questions was asked, in a different sequence. Owing to the preferences 
indicated by the four informants, the interviews were not recorded. Information given 
by the interviewees was noted by hand by the author during the course of the 
interviews. The responses were long and informative, and as such were unsuitable for 
structured coding and summarise. Instead, qualitative and interpretative analysis was 
applied. 
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The first interview, on 8 September 2010, was with one of the two junior experts 
(Miss Wei Nian) in the Technical Support team for the ASEM process set up by the 
European Commission between 1 January and 31 December 2010. The key objectives 
of this special team were to support ASEM coordination, improve ASEM 
transparency and visibility, as well as facilitate and monitor the implementation of 
ASEM initiatives.
280
 The interview concentrated on the role of the European 
Commission in the ASEM process and the dissimilarity in commitment between 
different ASEM partners. Five questions (numbers 1, 2, 6, 7 and 8) from the 
questionnaire were posed. The Information about the changes of ASEM’s 
coordination mechanism obtained was compared with that from the official sources 
for verification, and is used in Chapter 5 (related to ASEM’s institutional design). The 
comments about the role of the European Commission and the activeness of other 
ASEM partners are incorporated into the section about different degrees of 
engagement by ASEM partners in Chapter 6. 
The second interview was with Ambassador Bertrand de Crombrugghe, the head of 
the ASEM8 Task Force which was created by the Belgian Government for the 
preparation of ASEM8 in Brussels. Owing to his busy-schedule, the interview, on 16 
September 2010 in Brussels immediately after an ASEM8 public seminar, was rather 
brief and informal. It lasted for about ten minutes and no special protocol or 
questionnaire was used. The interview concentrated on the ASEM8 Task Force’s 
preparation on the Brussels summit as well as the accession of Australia, New 
Zealand and Russia. The information shared by Ambassador de Crombrugghe, 
entrusted as official facts, is used in the explanation of the regional coordination 
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system (Chapter 5) and the influence of the Lisbon Treaty on the EU side 
participation in ASEM (Chapter 6). 
The third key informant interview was undertaken in July 2011, with a senior official 
from the European Commission with extensive ASEM experience who requested 
anonymity. In the one-hour unstructured interview, he was asked to talk about his 
ASEM-related work experience. The informant provided the author with invaluable 
insider information about the evolution of the ASEM process, the conflicting views 
between ASEM partners and the role of the European Commission in the process. 
Such information serves as unique insights to the in-depth understanding of ASEM. 
Although the interviewee requested that no direct quotes be used, this special 
contribution was helpful and provided complementary information and ideas for this 
research to develop arguments about the different degree of engagement of ASEM 
partners (Chapter 6) and the participation of civil society actors (Chapter 8). 
In contrast with the face-to-face context of the first three interviews, the fourth was 
conducted via internet audio conferencing because the interviewee and interviewer 
could not physically meet. The key informant was the former Director of the 
Intellectual Exchange Department of Asia-Europe Foundation, Miss Sol Iglesias, 
interviewed on 12 December 2011. The interview lasted for forty-five minutes and the 
questions posed to her concentrated on the role of different groups of civil society 
actors in ASEM’s unofficial track and the role of ASEF as a bridge between different 
types of ASEM stakeholders (including a modified version of Question 7). This 
insider information from the sole official institution of the ASEM process was 
especially helpful for the examination of different kinds of actors involved in ASEM 
in this research (Chapter 8). 
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In addition to these interview data collected by the author, primary interview data 
from two questions of the EU in the eyes of Asia-Pacific project are also used. The two 
selected questions in the semi-structured stakeholder interviews are the ones focused 
on the ASEM process:  
 Q11: How would you describe the impact of the ASEM process on 
interactions between the EU and your country?  
 Q12: Last year/two years ago, there was an ASEM meeting in 
Helsinki/Beijing/Brussels in September/October. How would you describe the 
effect of that meeting on your country?  
In order to draw comparable and parallel insights with the public opinion survey data, 
these stakeholder interviews are drawn from the 2008, 2010 and 2011/2012 studies.
281
 
The 2011/2012 round offered this research the latest insights into the awareness of and 
views on the ASEM process among Asian stakeholders. In total, findings from 413 
completed interviews are analysed and utilised in this dissertation (Table 3.5).
282
 
The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured, face-to-face format with national 
elites from four distinct cohorts (civil society, business, media and 
political/governmental) in the selected ASEM Asian countries. Local pre-trained 
researchers identified, contacted and interviewed the national elites in the respective 
local languages. It is believed that such an approach encourages a comprehensive and 
informative response from the interviewees. On average, the interviews lasted between 
forty and forty-five minutes. The questionnaires used were approved by the Human 
Ethic Committee of University of Canterbury, and pretested in the pilot stage of the 
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project. 
Table 3.5: The number of elites interviewed in the six Asian locations. 
Locations Date 
No. of interviewed elites in each cohort 
Political Business 
Civil 
society 
Media Total 
The Philippines May-September 
2008 
9 7 8 7 31 
Vietnam 8 8 9 8 33 
India 
February-June 
2010 
8 10 10 10 38 
Macau, China 12 8 10 10 40 
Malaysia 14 7 9 10 40 
Mainland China April-July 2011 15 18 13 14 60 
India October 2011- 
March 2012 
8 6 10 10 34 
Japan 10 10 10 10 40 
Singapore 7 9 8 6 30 
South Korea 10 10 10 10 40 
Thailand 6 4 9 8 27 
Total - 107 97 106 103 413 
 
The sample per country ranged between thirty and sixty (Table 3.5). After the 
interviews, the interviewers were also responsible for transcribing and translating the 
interviews into English and entering the data into a standard Excel template, with each 
interviewee representing a data point. Having the same researcher to conduct, 
transcribe and translate the interview further assures the quality of the data, because 
he/she has first-hand memory and understanding of the course the actual interview. 
It should be noted that the responses to the two ASEM-focused questions were not as 
informative as expected; many interviewees confessed that they had no knowledge 
about the ASEM process hence could not comment on it. Consequently, this study 
attempted to use these data quantitatively to reveal the pre-existing level of ASEM 
awareness among national elites. To further understand the engagement of elites in the 
Asia-EU relations, findings from two other questions are analysed:  
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 Q1: Could you describe the nature of your professional involvement with the 
EU?  
 Q16: Do you have personal contacts within Europe (friends, business, family, 
travel)? If yes, which countries?  
The responses were also used quantitatively to distinguish between those elites who 
had ties with the EU from those who did not. These quantitative results inform the 
exploration of non-state actors’ involvement in ASEM (Chapter 8). Importantly, the 
elite and key informant interviews provide this research with a unique and substantive 
set of qualitative and quantitative data.  
3.7. Conclusion 
In order to comprehensively understand the ASEM process, a combination of various 
data collection and data analysis methods are employed in this research. Data 
collection methods from low- to high-control (exercised by the researcher) levels 
were used, namely archival method, media content analysis, unstructured interviews, 
semi-structured interviews, participant observation and survey. They generate a 
unique set of empirically rich data, offering both inside-out and outside-in views on 
the ASEM process. Viewpoints from the official documents to key informants 
working on ASEM, ASEM countries’ national decision-makers, ASEM countries’ 
general public as well the news media are encompassed. Such diversity of data 
sources and variety of data collection techniques ensure the credibility and validity of 
this research. In addition, this dissertation combines qualitative and quantitative 
analysis, while the two mutually complementing each other. Thus, this research does 
not only add to the existing work on ASEM – which is based mainly on indirect 
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observations and theoretical deductions – but also presents the most comprehensive 
set of empirical findings on ASEM ever collected. The application of these data is 
demonstrated in Chapters 5-8.  
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Chapter Four 
The Creation of ASEM: Historical Background 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The past plays a fundamental role in the formation of the present; many thinkers and 
scholars stressed the importance to study history in order to understand the present 
and the future. George Santayana wrote that ‘those who cannot remember the past are 
condemned to repeat it.’ Thomas Hobbes stated ‘no man can have in his mind a 
conception of the future, for the future is not yet. But of our conceptions of the past, 
we make a future; or rather, call past, future relatively.’283 Moreover, Gilbert and 
Stearns suggest that understanding history is crucial to the study of current 
international affairs.
284
 Therefore, in order to understand the relations between Asia 
and Europe at present, this research first overviews the history of the interactions 
between the two continents.  
The historical review in this chapter comprises two parts. The first one provides a 
brief overview of the historical background of interaction between Asia and Europe 
after the Second World War which gave rise to the current Asia-Europe relations as 
well as the creation of the ASEM process. The second part recalls the highs and lows 
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of the ASEM process from the first Summit in Bangkok to the most recent Vientiane 
Summit. 
Taking into account that either ‘Asia’ or ‘Europe’ have an universally agreed 
definition, this chapter makes no attempt to fix such a definition. Instead, the chapter 
focuses on the groupings in the inaugural ASEM process. ‘Europe’ consists of the 
fifteen EU member states, while ‘Asia’ comprises the seven ASEAN member states in 
1996 plus China, Japan, and South Korea (the ‘+3 countries’). Interestingly, while the 
name ‘Europe’ was found originated from ancient Greek mythology, the idea of ‘Asia’ 
is not coined in Asian but came from Europe. As reiterated in other studies, the ideas 
of continental divisions as well as the naming of different regions were inventions of 
ancient Greece.
285
 In ancient Greece, ‘Asia’ originated from the notion ‘Oriental 
land’.286 The notions ‘Europe’, ‘Asia’ and other regions like ‘Africa’ were artificially 
created to define the ‘we’ and ‘the others’. Thereby, Asia and the Asian have been 
understood as ‘the other’ to the Europeans, and vice-versa. The following section 
provides a concise summary of the contemporary history of interactions between 
these two regions. 
4.2.  Historical Background behind the birth of ASEM 
4.2.1. Colonisation and decolonisation Balme and Bridges remarked, ‘in a long-term 
perspective, Europe and Asia did not primarily interact as regions, but as states, 
missions, trade ventures and even individuals pursuing imperial and colonial 
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projects.’287 The initial relations between Asia and Europe were established by 
conquest and trade expansion in Ancient Times.
288
 These were followed by trade and 
exploration during the medieval period in which European explorers travelled to the 
East on diplomatic, trade, and/or religious mission. From the fifteenth to the 
nineteenth centuries, another form of interaction was introduced by the European 
powers – Imperialism, started by the Portuguese Empire.289  
Driven by the quest for natural resources, Asian goods (namely silk, porcelain and 
textile), overseas markets and power, other major European powers (the Spanish, 
British, French, and Dutch) soon joined the endeavour and claimed colonies in Asia 
as well as other continents (Africa, America and Australasia). The Portuguese 
domination continued until the seventeenth century after which the Dutch and British 
began to gain more leverage through the establishment of East India Companies and 
the opium trade.
290
 Eventually, the majority of countries in Asia were colonised by 
European imperial powers,
291
 with the exception of Thailand, Japan, the two Koreas 
and most regions of Mainland China. The Portuguese colonised India, Macau, and 
East Timor. The Spanish ruled the Philippines. The British occupied Brunei, Hong 
Kong, India, Myanmar, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore and Sri Lanka. The French 
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ruled Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. The Dutch colonised India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Sri Lanka and Taiwan. The Age of Imperialism marked an imbalance of power as 
well as antagonistic relations between the dominating European colonial rulers and 
their Asian subjects. Eventually, these relations entered a stage of reflux when 
colonisation came to a halt towards the end of the nineteenth century.  
By the mid-twentieth century, after the two devastating World Wars, the European 
powers were too preoccupied by internal politics and financial burdens to further 
sustain their colonies. Meanwhile, nationalism and anti-colonial sentiments among the 
colonies grew. The post-World Wars international community also opposed 
imperialism. Consequently, decolonisation started. The process varied in each Asian 
colony. While some had to fight long and hard for independence (namely India, 
Indonesia and Vietnam), others’ roads to autonomy were not so gruelling (such as 
Cambodia and the two Special Administrative Regions of China). Eventually, the 
Philippines obtained independence in 1946; Myanmar in 1947; India in 1948; 
Indonesia in 1949; Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam in 1954; Malaysia in 1957; 
Singapore in 1965; Timor in 1974; and Brunei in 1984. Sovereignties of Hong Kong 
and Macau were returned to China in 1997 and 1999 respectively.
292
   
In the second half of the twentieth century, the newly established Asian countries 
were immersed in state-building. Meanwhile, the European countries concentrated on 
reconstruction at home and peace-keeping within their own regions. Apart from 
interactions between the newly formed sovereignties and their former European rulers, 
                                           
292
 Balme and Bridges, “Introducing Asia, Europe and the Challenges of Globalization”, (2008) 3; 
Preston Peter W., National Past in Europe and East Asia, (New York: Routledge, 2010): 154-5. 
113 
 
direct interactions between Asian and European states diminished. Asia-Europe 
relations waned.   
The withdrawal of the Europeans provided room for the two new superpowers, the 
United States of America and the former Soviet Union, to engage with Asia. Under 
the Cold War bipolarism, non-communist countries like Japan, South Korea and the 
Philippines became strategic allies of the US. The US army built military bases in 
these countries. On the other hand, communist governments including those in China 
and Vietnam aligned themselves with the former Soviet Union. Because of the 
communist link, many of the Central and Eastern European countries also developed 
relationships with the communist states in Asia. These political alliances extended into 
the economic field. Apart from intra-regional trade, Asian countries focused on trade 
with either the US or the former Soviet Union.  
4.2.2. Regionalism and inter-regionalism since 1950s Since the 1950s Western 
European countries have devoted much time and effort on regional integration. The 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was founded in 1952, which became the 
European Economic Community (EEC or European Community, EC) in 1957, and 
finally, the European Union in 1993. The project of regionalism was necessary for a 
number of reasons: first, to prevent a third war within Europe (the reconciliation 
between France and Germany was especially important in this regard); second, to 
increase and manage the interdependence among member states by fostering 
intra-regional trade; third, to allow the recovery of Europe from the destruction of the 
wars; and fourth, to expand Eastward and counter Communism from the East. 
Subsequently, members of the EU inevitably became inward-looking. Regarding its 
external relations, Western European states mainly focused on their ties with the US 
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and their former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific (the so-called the ACP 
region).
293
 As pointed out by Murray, in the past few decades ‘Asia has often been off 
the EU radar screen.’294 
On the Asian side, a few regional integration projects also emerged. During the early 
post-colonial era, inter-state relations within Southeast Asia were unstable, marred by 
territorial disputes, religious conflicts and economic competition. In 1967, five 
Southeast Asian nations (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) 
sought regional peace and stability by creating a regional institution – ASEAN. The 
association later expanded to include Brunei Darussalam in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, 
Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. It was not until much later (1985) 
that the South Asia Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was founded by 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, and later joined 
by Afghanistan in 2007. One key objective was to foster intra-regional cooperation so 
as to accelerate the economic and social development of the participating South Asian 
countries. Notably, no similar attempt has been made among Northeast Asian 
countries to build regionalism. 
The European Community sought to establish ties with these two regional 
organisations in Asia. Motivated by economic and political interests, the EC and 
ASEAN began the informal EC-ASEAN ministerial dialogue in 1972. It was later 
replaced by the ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting (AEMM) in 1978. The Cooperation 
                                           
293
 Bridges, Europe and the Challenge of the Asia Pacific: Change, Continuity and Crisis (1999), 147-9; 
Rüland, “ASEAN and the European Union: a Bumpy Interregional Relationship: (2001): 16; Gilson, 
“Trade relations between Europe and East Asia” (2004): 186; Timo Kivimäki, “ASEM, Multilateralism, 
and the Security Agenda”, in Europe-Asia Inter-regional Relations, Gaens ed. (2008), 50. 
294
 Murray Philomena, “Europe and Asia: Two Regions in Flux”, in Europe and Asia: Regions in Flux, 
Murray Philomena (ed) (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 11. 
115 
 
Agreement between the Member Countries of ASEAN and European Community was 
signed in 1980 to institutionalise these relations. Economic and development had been 
the key focus in ASEAN-EU interactions, which resulted in a donor-recipient 
relationship with the European side as donor from financial, developmental to 
assistance in regional institution building.
295
 In the early 1980s, common threat of the 
Soviet expansion brought the EC and ASEAN closer together politically to support 
each other’s position in Vietnam invasion of Cambodia and Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. Yet, in the early 1990s, such common threat disappeared after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Disputes on the treatment of Timor and Myanmar as 
well as the introduction of policy of conditionalities by the EC worsened the relations. 
Other than these group-to-group endeavours, not much interactions were developed 
between the EC and individual countries in Southeast Asia.
296
 By and large, in 
comparison to the EC’s engagement with other regions (such as Latin America and 
ACP as mentioned before), ASEAN was in low priority.
297
 
With SAARC, which was founded in 1985, the EC signed a memorandum of 
understanding in 1986 and started a dialogue in 1998. Most countries in SAARC were 
regarded as underdeveloped and in need of financial aid from Europe.
298
 Similar to 
the case of its Southeast Asian counterpart, SAARC and the EC were not at the top of 
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each other’s priority list.  
In terms of bilateral relations, between the 1960s and the 1980s, many Western 
European economies traded extensively with Japan, which had become a strong 
economy. However, due to a persistent trade surplus favouring Japan, the relations 
were dominated by trade disputes. At the regional level, as early as in 1959, Japan 
Ambassador to Belgium was accredited as Japan’s first representation to the European 
Community. The EC opened its delegation office to Tokyo in 1974 to manage 
relations with Japan. Notably, this was the first European Commission Delegation 
Office to Asia. The Joint Declaration on Relations between the European Community 
and its Member States and Japan was signed in 1991. In the same year, the bilateral 
EC-Japan annual summit began, making Japan the first Asian partner to hold annual 
summits with the Community. Still, relations between Japan and the EU as well as the 
EU member states have been considerably much weaker than the Japan-US special 
relations.  
After Tokyo, the European Commission only opened other delegation offices in Asia 
in the 1980s. Indeed, the first ever EC representative office, called ECSC information 
office, was already opened in 1954 in Washington. Shortly after this, the Community 
set up two liaison offices in Santiago and London in 1956, with the former one 
handling relations with Latin America. To maintain the diplomatic relations and 
development cooperation with the ACP states (African, Caribbean and Pacific), the 
EC established forty-one delegations of the Commission in the ACP in 1960s and 
1970s. It was not until 1976, when a new Asia and Latin America development 
budget came into force as well as the European Commission gained bigger 
responsibilities in external trade policy, that the EC opened more Delegation offices 
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in Asia.
299
 These offices differed from those in the ACP countries and adopted ‘a 
more classically diplomatic approach’.300 
The Delegation office of the Commission of the EC for South and Southeast Asia was 
opened in 1979 in Bangkok. It was responsible to manage relations with eleven 
countries including Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, 
the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand. In 1982, a Delegation office was 
established in Dhaka to cover the EC’s relations with Bangladesh. Similarly, in 1983, 
management of the relations with India, Bhutan and Nepal was taken over by a new 
Delegation office set up in Delhi. In 1985, the EC opened an office in Islamabad to 
foster ties with Pakistan. This office was upgraded to Delegation office in 1988. Also 
in 1988, a Delegation office was established in Jakarta to cover EC’s relations with 
Indonesia, Brunei and the ASEAN Secretariat. More Commission’s Delegation 
offices were opened in the 1990s and the early 2000s to manage bilateral relations 
between the EU and individual countries in South and Southeast Asia. 
In Northeast Asia, Japan’s World War II defeat brought an end to its colonial rule in 
Korea. The 1950-1953 Korea War resulted in the division of the country into North 
and South. South Korea, officially developed as the Republic of Korea, maintains a 
close tie with the West especially with the US. Official diplomatic ties between the 
EC and South Korea began in 1963. While South Korea developed into one of the 
Newly Industrialised Economies in the 1970s, trade and economy became the main 
area of its relations with the EC. In 1983, the two started regular ministerial meeting. 
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A Delegation office was opened in Seoul in 1989 to manage ties with both South and 
North Koreas. Yet, EC’s engagement with North Korea only became stronger since 
the mid-1990s through various assistance programmes.
301
 Similar to the Japanese 
case, two Koreas’ ties with the EC and its member states have been incomparable 
with their special relations with the US. 
With China, during the Cold War, Western European countries had rather distant 
relations due to the difference in ideology and China’s close-door policy. Although 
China’s relation with the Soviet Union deteriorated drastically in the 1960s, due to 
border disputes, China did not developed close tie with Western Europe but sought 
rapprochement with the US.  The EC only established diplomatic relation with China 
in 1975. The 1978 China’s ‘open-door’ policy connected China back with the rest of 
the world. The EEC-China Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement was signed 
in 1985. Delegation office to China was opened in Beijing in 1988. However, the 
relation was suspended in 1989 as a result of the EC and its member states’ 
disagreement on how the then Chinese government handled the Tiananmen Square 
incident. The EC-China relation was normalised in 1992, yet, the arm embargo 
imposed by the EC side remains active till now and has been a point of dispute 
between China and the EU. 
Generally speaking, relations between Asia and Europe were distant during the Cold 
War era. Following the collapse of the Soviet regime in 1991, the Cold War ended 
and triggered major changes in international relations. The removal of the security 
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threat allowed an upsurge of democratisation in the ex-communist states, 
globalisation and regionalism.  
Nevertheless, Asia and Europe did not move closer. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
meant that the common threat to the EC and its anti-communist alliance in Asia had 
vanished. Within Europe, West Germany entered into intensive preparation for the 
unification with East Germany. The EC was preoccupied with the completion of the 
single European market project and the institutional transformation into the European 
Union with two new pillars (Common Security and Foreign Policy as well as Justice 
and Home Affairs). The demand of intense concentration on internal affairs, together 
with the lack of geographical proximity and the gap in economic development, 
resulted in a low priority of Asia on the EC’s agenda.302 The increase in number of 
Commission Delegation offices in Asia (to the Philippines and to South Korea in 
1990, and a joint Delegation to Hong Kong and Macau in 1993) did not prevent the 
Community from falling into relative irrelevance in Asia when compare with the 
heavy roles played by the US and Japan. Meanwhile, Central and Eastern European 
countries were busy working on economic and political development after the end of 
decades of Soviet control. Little attention was diverted to Asia.  
4.2.3. Economic miracle in Asia During the 1980s and 1990s, many Asian 
economies were busy fuelling their dynamic growth and integration into the global 
economy. Strong Asian economies, especially Japan and the Newly Industrialised 
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Economies (NIEs)
303
 were seen by the Europeans as threats to their global economic 
dominance.
304
 Additionally, in November 1989, the majority of East Asian 
economies
305
 founded the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum with 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US, to boost the trans-Pacific economic ties. 
APEC was further strengthened when China, Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan joined, as 
three individual economies, in 1991; Vietnam joined in 1998. Notably, in 1993, the 
EU applied for an observer status in APEC but was rejected. 
Following the disappearance of the common security threat, the anti-communist allies 
in Asia and Europe lost their strategic importance. In the early 1990s, relations 
between member states in the EC and the Asian economies were dominated by 
competition and disputes in trade. Asian countries namely Japan, South Korea and 
other NIEs ran trade surplus with the EC economies. EC member states complained to 
their Asian trade partners about the slow progress in market liberalisation and the 
trade barriers on European products (such as high tariff, stringent standards and 
testing requirements). On the other side, Asian economies complained about the 
anti-dumping actions imposed by the EC. Asian countries also urged European 
countries to extend the transfer of advanced technology and know-how to Asia. In 
addition, after the Cold War, the ASEAN nations devoted time and energy in 
enlarging the Association to embrace the ex-communist neighbours. The accession of 
Myanmar to ASEAN and disputes over East Timor’s future further inhibited the 
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EC-ASEAN relationship. In South Asia, member states of the SAARC were busy 
developing their national economies, so little attention was paid to SAARC or 
SAARC-EC relations. The Asia-Europe relations did not revived until the mid-1990s. 
4.2.4. The U-turn in the mid-1990s 1994 marked a new era in Asia-Europe 
relationship because the European Union formulated its New Asia Strategy (NAS),
306
 
and the idea of an inter-regional cooperative framework between Asia and Europe was 
first raised. It is generally agreed that ASEM was the result of a series of 
developments that took place between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s.  
The first crucial change was the end of bipolarism which is already mentioned above. 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union left the world with only one superpower, the US, 
especially in security and military realms. As the unipolar domination lingered, other 
players on the international stage started worrying that the US would turn to 
unilateralism.
307
 Moreover, in both Asia and Europe, some countries were concerned 
that the US would withdraw the protection from their regions. Consequently, the idea 
of Asia-Europe cooperation in enhancing multilateralism so as to prevent the US from 
unilateralism arose. Furthermore, many Asian states started concerning about their 
overdependence on the US and wanted to reduce such dependence. One possible 
option was strengthening the tie with other powers including those from Europe. 
Diversification of external relations would also allow the Asian states to diversify 
their trading partners as well as source of foreign investment and technology. 
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Second, the 1980s witnessed drastic economic growth in Asia. Economies in 
Southeast Asia, China, Japan and South Korea made East Asia the most dynamic 
economic region in the world. However, compared with the US and Japan, the EU 
was slow to recognise such opportunity and has lagged behind them in trade and 
investment shares in East Asia.
308
 In average, by the mid-1980s, the US and Japan 
consumed 41% and 22% of the total exports from East Asia; while the EC countries 
accounted only for 14%.
309
 Regarding the share of East Asia imports, Japan was the 
largest source which accounted for 35%. The shares of US and the EC were 20% and 
13% respectively.
310
 The rising intra-regional trade and investment flows in East Asia 
further inhabited the EU’s already low percentage of East Asian trade and foreign 
investment from increasing. Between 1986 and 1994, intra-regional share of exports 
in East Asia grew from 29% to 49%, while that of imports increased from 42% to 
56%.
311
 In the mid-1990s, the EU had finished its single market project. It had more 
energy and diplomatic resources available to look outward, and finally became aware 
of the missed opportunities in Asia. In order to prevent itself from being marginalised, 
the EU, led by Germany and prompted by the business community, began to revise its 
relations towards Asia, and moved Asia up the EU’s priority list.312  
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Third, the 1993 Maastricht Treaty introduced the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) to the EU, equipping the Union to be an actor in international politics. 
Smith argued that this potential new role motivated the EU to engage with other 
regions, including East Asia.
313
 The Towards a New Asia Strategy was published by 
the European Commission in July 1994, which introduced a more strategic view 
towards Asia. 
By 1994, East Asia region as a whole had replaced Japan as one of the triadic 
economic engines in the world, as a result of the stagnation of the Japanese economy 
since the early 1990s, together with the rapid economic growth of the other East 
Asian economies. While the Single European Market was completed and the North 
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed, East Asia, Europe and North 
America became the three major global economies. The domination of these three 
regions in the world economy was generalised as ‘Triadisation’ 314  or 
‘Tripolarisation’315, while the three regions were referred to as the ‘Triads’. The 
Triads dominated the realms of trade, investment, finance and technological 
innovations.
316
 When they started interacting with other world regions, 
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inter-regionalism proliferated.
317
  
In the East Asia-Europe-North America triangle, the Eurasian link was much weaker 
than the trans-Atlantic or trans-Pacific ones. The former Singaporean Prime Minister 
Goh Chok Tong, who was also the founding-father of ASEM, pointed out, the 
‘trans-Atlantic alliance between the US and the EU is built on strong historical, 
cultural, political, economic and security links.’318 For the trans-Pacific ties, APEC 
was created in 1989 to promote economic ties across Asia Pacific. In 1992, the 
Clinton Administration adopted a proactive approach towards East Asia and initiated 
the ambitious attempt to create a Pacific Free Trade Area amongst APEC’s eighteen 
members by 2020. Hence, the need to ‘fill the missing link’ or to ‘strengthen the 
weak leg’ of the triadic relations emerged.319 A number of observers saw ASEM as a 
reaction of the EU to the upgrade of APEC in 1993 and to APEC’s rejection of its 
application for an observer status.
320
 Dent suggested, if ASEM did not exist, it would 
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have had to be invented anyway as a response to triadisation.
321
 
When the Single European Market was officially completed in the end of 1992, there 
was a fear of an inward-looking ‘Fortress Europe’ in East Asia.322 Indeed, many trade 
partners of the EC worried that their economic opportunities would be jeopardised. 
Moreover, thirteen Central and Eastern European countries applied to join the EU in 
the mid-1990s. This gave rise to potentially the biggest enlargement of the EU, in 
terms of number of new member states, population size and diversity. This further 
motivated economies in East Asia to foster their relations with the Union so as to 
sustain access to the European market as well as get access to new markets in Central 
and European Europe. 
As regionalism of ASEAN furthered, negotiation on membership with 
Myanmar/Burma, whose human right situation has provoked criticism in the EU and 
in its member states, began. The accession of Myanmar/Burma to ASEAN, 
conflicting views on the East Timor issue, together with the failure in revising the 
EU-ASEAN 1980 Cooperation Agreement brought EU-ASEAN relations to 
stagnation. The two regional organisations had to look for ‘a way out’, and the 
creation of ASEM appeared to be a timely option.
323
 
Additionally, Dent highlighted the post-colonial legacy as a further basis for the 
establishment of ASEM. He saw ASEM resting on a set of bilateral economic and 
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political relations that had been developed between the EU member states and the 
‘ASEAN+3’ states, especially between the former colonially linked countries.324 
Bilateral relations among individual ASEM partners are discussed in details in 
Chapter 7. 
Noteworthy, the ASEAN countries, Singapore in particular, had a vision of having 
ASEAN in the driver seat in Asia-Europe relations. In October 1994, during an 
official visit to the French European Council Presidency, former Singaporean Prime 
Minister Goh Chok Tong proposed to his French counterpart the idea of holding 
informal gatherings of the Heads of State/Government from Asia and Europe. Initially, 
the Europeans’ response was lukewarm.325 In March 1995, the ASEAN Senior 
Officials’ Meeting adopted a position paper to officially invite the EU to select the 
European participants for an inter-regional forum.
326
 This proposal was finally 
endorsed by the EU member states at the Council summit in June 1995 and it was 
decided that only the fifteen EU Member States at that time would be included. On 
the Asian side, ASEAN invited three of its Northeast Asian counterparts – China, 
Japan and South Korea – to join the inter-regional forum. Their first response was not 
enthusiastic either. Japan was concerned about the potential harm to its relations with 
the US.
327
 China worried about becoming a target of criticism for its human rights 
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and political situations.
328
 Subsequently, ASEAN assiduously persuaded the ‘plus 
three countries’ to participate in ASEM. Finally, in December 1995, China, Japan and 
South Korea joined the ASEAN countries as the ‘ASEAN+3’ group to prepare the 
Asian concept paper which gathered the views of the ‘Asian side’ for the first ASEM 
Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOMs) in Madrid. After these endeavours of ASEAN and 
its member states, twenty-five countries from Asia and Europe, together with the 
European Commission, convened in Bangkok in March 1996 for the inaugural ASEM 
summit. 
In sum, between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the mid-1990s, a number of 
significant developments affected the relations between the EU and East Asia: the 
completion of the Single European Market, the accession of Central and Eastern 
European countries to the EU, the creation of the CFSP, the new wave of regionalism 
in the world, the rise of triadisation, the Asian economic miracle and the stagnation of 
the EU-ASEAN inter-regional relationship. Subsequently, a quest for closer ties 
between the EU and East Asia developed. ASEM marked an effort of East Asia and 
the EU to get a foothold in each other’s markets.329  
The establishment of the ASEM process offered a key turning point for the distant 
Asia-Europe relations. Pan described ASEM as the ‘new silk road’ to connect Asia 
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and Europe.
330
 In the opening ceremony of the inaugural ASEM summit, the then 
Thai Prime Minister Banharn Silpa-Archa underscored that the ‘rediscovery’ between 
Asia and Europe would forge a meaningful partnership for the future.
331
 The then 
President of the European Commission, Jacques Santer, called ASEM ‘an historical 
turning point in our [EU-Asia] relations’. 332  Meetings between Heads of 
State/Government, the highest level, demonstrated the willingness of players in the 
two regions to engage with one another. The following section examines how such 
willingness was turned into reality. 
4.3. Highs and lows in ASEM’s first 17 years 
Over the past seventeen years, ASEM has experienced both highs and lows. The 
inaugural meeting was filled with euphoria and optimism. Pelkmans and Hiroko 
called it an ‘astonishing success’. 333  The leaders forged a new comprehensive 
Asia-Europe Partnership for Greater Growth which aimed at strengthening links 
between Asia and Europe, thereby contributing to peace, global stability and 
prosperity. The list of follow-up measures was regarded as impressive.
334
 The 
Chairman’s Statement concluded it as an ‘historic and momentous occasion.’335  
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However, just one year later, many East Asian economies were hit severely by the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis. ASEM2 in 1998 marked a reaffirmation of the 
partnership between Europe and Asia: Hänggi described it as a reassurance of the 
recognition of Asia as ‘an equal partner in the triadic relationship.336 The Asian 
partners reported their financial situation to their European counterparts. The 
Europeans responded by offering a $30 million Asian Trust Fund to be managed by 
the World Bank, sending a group of experts to Asia to give technical advice in 
reforming the financial sector, and reiterating the advantage of mirroring their own 
economic model. Yeo saw this as the ‘first test for ASEM which it passed with 
successful conduct’,337 whereas some other observers evaluated the EU’s response 
more negatively.
338
  
ASEM3 welcomed the recovery of the Asian economies. At the new Millennium, a 
breakthrough was made that discussions were extended to certain sensitive issues – 
human rights and the situation in East Timor – despite some Asian partners, such as 
China, preferred to remain focused solely on trade, business and culture 
cooperation.
339
 Furthermore, discussion on membership expansion was opened. On 
the other hand, participants started showing ‘summit fatigue’, exhibiting boredom at 
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counterparts who read out pre-written long speeches during the summits.
340
 The 
eleven-page Chairman’s Statement, with forty-five paragraphs and two extra pages of 
annex, was much longer than those of the previous two summits. This lengthiness 
matched criticism that ASEM3 was over-prepared and over-bureaucratised. Such 
over-preparation and over-bureaucratisation were blamed for jeopardising the 
informal and interactive nature of the summit.
341
 In addition, a so-called ‘Christmas 
tree syndrome’ emerged, in which ASEM partners competed with each other to put up 
new initiatives and offer to host ASEM-related events in their own soil. In response, 
the two immediate Foreign Ministers’ Meetings (FMM III and FMM IV) and their 
Senior Officials’ Meetings (SOM Lanzarote in April 2002 and SOM Madrid in June 
2002) devoted time to draft guidelines to ensure better interaction and informality of 
the summits.
342
 Subsequently, ASEM4 introduced a retreat session for the leaders to 
conduct candid dialogue behind closed door. The Chairman’s Statement was greatly 
reduced to just five pages. 
Taking place a year after the September 11 tragedy, the threat of terrorism 
unsurprisingly dominated the agenda of ASEM4. The first ever ASEM summit retreat 
session was devoted to the prevention of future cross-cultural conflicts under the title 
‘Dialogue on Cultures and Civilisations’. This close-door session and the informal 
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dinner before the summit were expected to facilitate candid interactions among the 
leaders, and hence to enhance the informality of the process.
343
  
The heavy concentration on counter-terrorism led to a significant reduction in 
attention to the economic and social-cultural pillars, demonstrating ASEM’s weakness 
in balancing its three pillars. Still, ASEM partners did not entirely forget the 
significance of their economic relations: the summiteers decided to create an 
action-oriented economic taskforce to draw recommendations on fostering the 
inter-regional economic partnership. It was the summiteers’ first demand for ‘concrete’ 
action. The summiteers also identified priority areas for more ‘concrete’ cooperation. 
Apart from lack of tangible results, ASEM partners were also concerned about the 
growing absentee rate. Nine EU countries (out of the fifteen) were represented by 
civil servants (who held non-ministerial positions) in ASEM4. This disregard of 
ASEM irritated the Asian partners, who always sent their Heads of State/Government 
to ASEM summits.
344
 
Between ASEM4 and ASEM5, the process faced further hindrances when many EU 
member states opposed to the accession of Myanmar to ASEM, sparked by the junta’s 
poor human rights record.
345
 Owing to this contingency, two ASEM ministerial 
meetings were cancelled in 2004 and the sixth Economic Ministers’ Meeting was 
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downgraded to a high-level officials’ meeting in 2005 (see Table 6.4 of Chapter 6).346 
The tense situation led to concern about whether the Hanoi summit could take place 
as scheduled.
347
 Finally, after agreeing that Myanmar would only be represented by 
below the head-of-state-level (i.e. the summit would be attended by minister instead 
of the head of state of Myanmar), ASEM partners attended the summit as scheduled.  
Unlike the previous summits, no landmark issue occupied the agenda of ASEM5. 
Inherited from ASEM4, three retreat sessions were organised in ASEM5. One session 
was devoted to each of ASEM’s three pillars. Besides, the leaders spent some time 
discussing the institutional mechanism of the process, stressing the importance of 
ASEM’s open, evolutionary and informal nature. Yet, no consensus was reached on 
whether to establish an ASEM Secretariat. Also inherited from ASEM4, ASEM5 
summiteers demanded more concrete actions and tangible results. Importantly, 
ASEM5 marked a significant step forward – ASEM’s first and largest (thus far) round 
of enlargement, to embrace the ten new Central and Eastern European countries who 
joined the EU in 2004 and the three new ASEAN member states (Cambodia, Laos and 
Myanmar). 
On ASEM’s tenth anniversary, the sixth summit was given an ambitious theme: 10 
Years of ASEM: Global Challenges-Joint Responses. The summit was conducted in a 
conflict-free atmosphere. New to the summit organisation (the previous summits each 
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consisted of three sessions, one devoted to one of the three pillars), a separate session 
was dedicated to sustainable development, environment and energy security. As 
environmental protection and climate change were given unprecedented attention, the 
summit produced the Declaration on Climate Change. Since then, environment and 
energy issues have grown in importance in ASEM. In addition, some time was spent 
discussing administrative issues, namely how to adjust the working methods to fit the 
bigger membership, whether a physical secretariat was necessary as well as further 
enlargement. ASEM6 concluded with reflection and celebration of ASEM’s first 
decade. 
ASEM7 welcomed India, Mongolia, Pakistan, the ASEAN Secretariat, Bulgaria and 
Romania (ASEM’s second round of enlargement). Notably, it was the first large-scale 
gathering of world leaders after the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers in September 
2008, which marked the outbreak of the 2008/09 global financial crisis. ASEM7 was 
expected to come up with rescue plans for the global economy. Much of the attention 
was given to the crisis and its related matters such as debt relief and sustainability for 
the least developed countries, the need for additional development finance and the 
fluctuation of commodity prices. The content of the Chairman’s Statement clearly 
reflected the domination of economic issues in ASEM7. The length of the ‘Advancing 
Economic Cooperation’ section was much longer than that devoted to other fields. 
Moreover, the leaders issued the Statement on the International Financial Situation. 
While facing pressure to address the global financial crisis, ASEM leaders still 
devoted time to exchange views on political issues, sustainable development and 
ASEM administration (including further enlargement). Subsequently, the Beijing 
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Declaration on Sustainable Development was endorsed, and the Issue-based 
Leadership mechanism was adopted.
348
 
Two years passed, ASEM8’s agenda remained dominated by the global economic 
downturn. The leaders discussed global economic and financial governance reform, in 
particular, the Asian partners demanded for heavier representation and weight in 
global governance. The summit was, to a certain extent, a preparation for the G20 in 
Seoul in November 2010. The China currency controversy was another central issue 
with the European partners urged for a faster appreciation of the renminbi. Political 
and environmental issues were also covered, but were given less attention. ASEM 
summiteers urged the Myanmar government to release political prisoners as well as to 
ensure free and fair elections. They also urged for a resumption of the long-stalled 
Six-Party talks on nuclear development and security in the Korean Peninsula, as well 
as reiterated their commitment to promote sustainable development.  
In addition, ASEM8 signified a new page for ASEM whose membership was 
extended to Australia, New Zealand and Russia, three countries whose regional 
identities remained controversial. The accession of these three members has reignited 
the question about how to define ‘Asia’ and ‘Europe’. While the EU side insisted on 
keeping the European membership of ASEM solely for its member states, some Asian 
partners were not convinced that Australia, New Zealand or Russia belonged to Asia. 
The temporary solution was the creation of a ‘temporary third category’ to shelter 
them. 
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In November 2012, ASEM9 took place in Vientiane. It was the largest and 
highest-level international event which Laos has even hosted. Laos was the first 
non-founding member of ASEM to host a summit, marking a step forwards by the 
newer members to assume active roles in the process. In addition, ASEM9 officially 
accepted Australia, New Zealand and Russia as full Asian members. (The SOM in 
March 2012 decided to dissolve the ‘temporary third category’ and merge the three 
countries into the Asia side.) The forth enlargement welcomed Bangladesh to the 
Asian side, as well as Norway and Switzerland to the European side. Remarkably, it 
was the first time that the EU side loosened its tight restriction on ASEM European 
membership to accept non-EU member states.  The impact of adding all these 
countries to the process, especially the impact on the concepts of ‘Asia’ and ‘Europe’ 
awaits future research. 
Despite the theme ‘Friends for Peace, Partners for Prosperity’ tried to balance 
between the political and economic partnership, ASEM9’s agenda was again topped 
by economic and financial issues as a result of the lingering eurozone debt crisis.
349
 
Territorial disputes between China and Japan, China and several ASEAN countries; 
as well as Japan and South Korea were expected to overshadow other topics. Lao as 
the summit chair, by emphasising that ASEM ought to focus on topics which 
concerned both Asia and Europe, largely prevented those bilateral conflicts from 
appearing in ASEM9 discussion table.
350
 Noteworthy, one-third of ASEM partners 
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did not send their Heads of State/Government to the Vientiane summit.
351
 Among the 
absentees found German Chancellor, UK Prime Minister and Indian Prime Minister. 
The growing absence rate, together with the enlarged memberships, decreasing 
volume in Asia-European trade and investment as well as the weak tie in security 
field are a few immediate challenges for today’s ASEM process. 
4.4. Conclusion 
The above overview of the contemporary history between Asia and Europe covered 
how countries from Asia and Europe shifted from rulers-colonies to donors-recipients 
to equal-partners under the ASEM framework. As emphasised by the European 
External Service Action (EEAS) in a recent publication, the Asia-Pacific is now 
central to the EU’s growth prospect.352 In 2011, ASEM Asian partners provided more 
than a third of the EU’s total import and received around two-fifth of the EU’s total 
exports.
353
 Asia has become the EU’s biggest external trading partner, in which 
China’s share has been the largest as a single nation. On the other hand, the EU has 
been among the top trading partners of each of ASEM Asian country.
354
 Moreover, 
the EEAS marked that ‘the EU cannot expect to address seriously any of the major 
global challenges – from climate change to terrorism – without strong cooperation 
with its Asian partners.’ 
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Since the fall of the Berlin Wall to the mid-1990s, there were several significant 
developments which built momentum for the establishment of ASEM. The 
completion of the Single European Market, the accession of Central and Eastern 
European countries to the EU, the creation of EU’s CFSP, the new wave of 
regionalism, triadisation, the Asian economic miracle and the stagnation of the 
EU-ASEAN inter-regional relationship all contributed to the quest for closer ties 
between the EU and East Asia. The creation of ASEM marked a key turning point in 
the relations between Asia and Europe. Since 1996, ASEM has experienced peaks and 
troughs. Still, the successive rounds of enlargement and regularity of the summits 
indicate the continuous support of the process from the partners. To further 
understand how the ASEM process contributes to the quality of the century-old 
Asia-Europe relations, the following three chapters explore the four tracks of the 
ASEM process (Track 1, Track 1.1, Track 2 and Track 3) in details. 
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Chapter Five 
ASEM’s institutional design: a state-centric hierarchy 
 
5.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, content analysis is used to examine the institutional design laid down 
by the founding members of ASEM. This includes the key guiding principles 
governing the new cooperative framework, the kind of actors concerned and 
empowered by the agreed rules, and the functions designated to the process by its 
founders. The tools assigned for the process to fulfil such functions are explored as 
well.  
The rules governing ASEM were agreed by the founding partners’ Heads of 
State/Government, and written down by their foreign ministers and senior officials. 
They were all national governmental actors, except the European Commission. 
Noteworthy, all ASEM official documents have to pass each ASEM partner’s 
examination, often word for word.
355
 Therefore, the final rules presumably reflect the 
lowest common denominator in views and expectations of the founders of ASEM. 
A full picture of ASEM’s institutional design is provided in the following documents: 
the ASEM’s handbook, Asia Europe Cooperation Framework 2000 (AECF 2000); its 
supplement Recommendations for ASEM Working Methods annexed to the Chairman’s 
Statement of ASEM5 and the Helsinki Declaration on the Future of ASEM. In addition, 
the official website of the ASEM process, ASEM Inforboard, provides more 
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information. The official documents published after each ASEM summit (the 
Chairmen’s Statements as well as the declarations/statements on special topics) also 
inform how ASEM functions. This chapter comprises a close reading of these sources 
of information in order to understand the blueprint laid down by ASEM’s founders to 
set the process to work. 
5.2. The guiding principles 
ASEM partners agreed on six key principles as fundamental to the design of the newly 
created framework ‒ equal partnership, open and evolutionary, enhancement of mutual 
understanding and awareness, multi-dimensionality, informality and dual-tracks 
system.
356
 These six principles are repeatedly affirmed in various official documents. 
Noteworthy, informality and equal partnership are perceived as an adoption of the 
‘Asia-way’ or the ‘ASEAN-way’ (which emphasises non-intervention in other states’ 
internal affairs and the basis of consensus). On the other hand, the inclusion of the 
political pillar (which makes ASEM more multi-sectoral) is seen as a concession by 
the Asians (except Japan), who prefer to focus on economic cooperation.
357
 
By equal partnership, ASEM partners mean to distinguish the new relation from some 
existing bilateral ones, such as the EU-ASEAN relation, in which the EU side has 
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always played the ex-colonial master role or aid-donor role.
358
 Apart from bringing 
the Asian side and European side into a balance position, ASEM is also designed as a 
platform where every participant has equal weight and equal say. On equal footing, the 
two sides emphasise their commitment to conduct discussion with mutual respect and 
mutual benefit. However, some observers criticise that this principle is not reflected in 
the reality. Robles stated that the EU side has been stronger and controlling the ASEM 
agenda, owing to its more advanced economic development.
359
 Gilson shared Robles’ 
view and added the disparate colonial legacies as another reason of the superiority of 
the EU side.
360
 Furthermore, she pointed out that the EU has represented a unified 
front for the European side while no similar regional regime exited among the ASEM 
Asian partners. Yet, such perceptions seemed deteriorating since ASEM7, when many 
Eurozone economies entered into financial crises. As the Asia Editor of the Financial 
Times commented, ‘the financial crisis has helped to even the relationship between 
Asia and the US on the one hand and Asia and Europe on the other.’361 
Openness refers to ASEM’s membership. It is expected that more and more countries 
in Asia and Europe will join the process. Yet, a few pre-conditions are stressed – 
‘enlargement should be conducted on the basis of consensus by the Heads of 
State/Government’;362 ‘enlargement should be conducted in a progressive stages’;363 
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and the two-key approach has to be followed. The two-key approach refers to ‘a final 
decision on new participants will be made by consensus among all partners only after 
a candidate has first got the support of its partners within its region’.364 Furthermore, 
there is no observer status created in ASEM thus far; all participants have to be full 
members. 
Until ASEM9, ASEM has undergone four rounds of enlargement (in 2004, 2008, 2010 
and 2012 respectively), expanding ASEM’s membership from twenty-six to fifty-one. 
Up till ASEM8, the membership of the European side has been strictly limited to the 
members of the EU. Russia’s application to join ASEM from the European side was 
rejected. Norway also expressed its interest to join the process when ASEM first 
established, but was not welcomed by the European side either. This unwritten rule 
about ASEM’s European membership is actually in contradiction with the ‘openness’. 
It also creates doubt about the representativeness of the EU for the whole Europe. 
Notably, the admission of Norway and Switzerland to the process in ASEM9 as full 
ASEM European members marked a breakthrough, giving ASEM a more solid ground 
to claim to be ‘open to all’ in Asia and Europe. 
Evolutionary means that ASEM will adapt its working mechanism and agenda when 
necessary. The first list of changes on working methods was proposed and adopted in 
ASEM5 (October 2004). The list of change focused chiefly on improving the 
coordination (especially on the Asian side), efficiency and ability to deliver tangible 
results of the ASEM process. The role of the SOMs was strengthened; the role of the 
regional coordinators was clarified; and an ASEM logo was endorsed. The second 
round of proposed changes came in ASEM 6 (September 2006), in the Helsinki 
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Declaration on the Future of ASEM. It introduced the Issue-based Leadership, 
established the ASEM Virtual Secretariat and strengthened the role of the hosts of the 
next summit and Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (FMM). Moreover, FMM10 (June 2011) 
agreed to establish an ASEM Chairman Support Group to improve ASEM’s 
effectiveness, continuity and visibility. 
Recognising the presence of misperception and stereotyping between the two regions, 
enhancement of mutual understanding and awareness has been a key objective of 
ASEM since inception. Facilitating continuous dialogue between the governments and 
increasing people-to-people contacts are identified as main tools, which are expected 
to cumulatively contribute to a better understanding between Asia and Europe. Thus 
far, no evaluation of the achievement of ASEM in this aspect is available, mainly due 
to the difficulties in gauging abstract ideas like ‘understanding’ and ‘perception’. In 
Chapter 8, this research attempts to assess ASEM’s achievement in this aspect with the 
aid of empirical data. 
Multi-dimensionality refers to ASEM’s three-pillar structure which comprises 
fostering political dialogue, reinforcing economic cooperation and promoting 
cooperation in other areas (science and technology cross-flows; environment; 
development co-operation; and cultural and educational exchanges). Some observers 
highlighted that the inclusion of the political dialogue was promoted by the European 
side while the Asians mainly saw ASEM in economic terms.
365
 The inclusion of 
non-economic aspects distinguishes ASEM from its close cousin APEC, which 
concentrates purely on economic cooperation. ASEM also differs from the ARF, 
which focuses solely on security.  
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Informality refers to the non-legal binding nature of the agreements and declarations 
produced under the ASEM framework (informality is also used in APEC and ASEAN). 
It is expected to encourage frank and truly interactive exchange of views between the 
partners. Similarly, informality is supposed to promote the development of personal 
contacts and mutual trust between the leaders who attend the meetings. As mentioned 
above, this format is seen as an Asian input.
366
 The implementation of any agreement 
and the organisation of related activities depend on the partners’ voluntary input. It is 
believed that the ‘peer influence’, or which Lim called ‘Gentleman’s agreements’,367 
will make ASEM partners implement the agreed policies.  
Informality also means that no comprehensive set of rules exist to govern the 
interaction. An informal atmosphere is specially created during the summits and 
ministerial meetings by requesting participants not to read out pre-written speech, 
keeping the meeting-room doors closed (especially to the media), and allowing the 
participants to sit comfortably on armchairs in a circle. Besides, the agenda and 
activities of ASEM are flexible, therefore, highly reactive to new developments in the 
international realm. 
In addition, institution-building and staffing are minimised. The idea of having a 
physical secretariat has been rejected a few times by the ASEM leaders. The sole 
exception is the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF), which was initiated by and 
physically sits in Singapore. ASEF is mandated to oversee ASEM’s social-cultural 
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pillar. Noteworthy, some observers thought that the informality has caused problems 
for ASEM in terms of coordination and communication, especially when the 
membership gets bigger and bigger.
368
 Some also doubted the feasibility of ASEM to 
be truly informal, especially when some of the Heads of State/Government or 
ministers prefer to read out prepared speech during meetings.
369
 
Last but not least, ASEM partners adopt a dual-tracks system in which interactions 
among governments become the first track (Track 1 in this dissertation) and 
interactions among private actors become the second track (Track 2 in this 
dissertation). This division depends on the actors involved. The private actors involved 
in Track 2 is made up mainly of academia, business community and other sectors from 
the civil society. Through Track 2, ASEM is expected to go beyond conventional 
government-to-government diplomacy and add another channel in Asia-Europe 
relations. 
ASEM partners sometimes find it difficult to conform to these principles. It has indeed 
failed to live up to some of the principles in the opinion of some observers. It is not the 
objective of this dissertation to assess the degree of which ASEM partners have 
complied with these principles. This dissertation treats these principles as norms set by 
the ASEM partners. The more important question for this dissertation is how these 
principles influence the actorness of the related actors in the ASEM process. Equal 
partnership, openness and evolutionary concern only the actors on Track 1, while 
multi-dimensionality and informality have no direct relation actorness. In contrast, the 
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dual-track approach and objective to foster mutual understanding and awareness of 
people involve the non-state actors in Asia-Europe relations directly, especially the 
general public. Whether these principles can eventually lead to an increase in 
actorness of the non-state actors is examined in the next three chapters. 
Apart from the six aforementioned key principles, the idea of ‘inter-regional’ also 
appears in ASEM official documents from time to time. Yet, the inter-regional nature 
of ASEM has been controversial. From the EU side, a region-to-region format is 
favoured, whereas the Asian states are more used to traditional bilateral relations and 
to act on their own behalf.
370
 Loewen argues that the Europeans prefer a 
region-to-region approach because their interests can be better articulated.
371
 He 
attributes the Asians’ dubiousness towards the region-to-region format as a result of 
the ‘lack of clear regional representation’ and ‘the negative experience with the 
accession of Myanmar to ASEM’.372 Yeo suggested that the rounds of enlargement 
have led to a loss of clarity of ASEM as an inter-regional dialogue.
373
 
Despite this lack of consensus, ASEM’s official documents frequently called the 
process inter-regional. For instance, the precedent version of AECF2000, AECF1998, 
stated ‘ASEM could anchor inter-regional economic growth by promoting economic 
interaction between the business sectors…’374 The Chairman’s Statement of ASEM4 
                                           
370
 Information given by an authority source from the EU side which chose to stay anonymous, 
interviewed conducted by author on 20 July 2011. Former European Commission for Foreign Relations 
Lord Chris Pattern also said the same in a brief interview on 28 October 2009.  
371
 Loewen, “ASEM’s Enlargement–state-to-state or region-to-region dialogue?” (2010), 35. 
372
 Ibid. 
373
 Lay Hwee Yeo, “Summary of Roundtable Discussions”, in The Asia-Europe Meeting, Engagement, 
Enlargement and Expectations, Yeo and Hofmeister eds. (2010), 109. 
374
 ACEF1998, 1998, paragraph 14. 
146 
 
remarked ‘leaders emphasised that the already existing constructive bi-regional 
discourse in ASEM should serve to promote unity in diversity.’375 The Chairman’s 
Statement of ASEM5 noted ‘the Leaders agreed on the need to reinforce multilateral 
dialogue and cooperation in ASEM as well as within regional and inter-regional 
frameworks…’376 ASEM7’s Chairman’s Statement urged ASEM governments to 
‘actively facilitate interfaith and intercultural dialogues, particularly at the regional 
and interregional levels, which is part of a much broader dialogue between Asia and 
Europe.’377  
In the official discourses, ASEM is also portrayed as an interaction between Asia on 
one side and Europe on the other. In the Chairman’s Statement of ASEM1, twenty-one 
such descriptions can be found. For example, paragraph 5 underlined ASEM’s 
objective to strengthen political dialogue between Asia and Europe; paragraph 9 
highlighted the potential for economic synergy between Asia and Europe; paragraph 
15 underscored the importance to intensify the science and technology cross-flows 
between Asia and Europe. In the Chairman’s Statement of ASEM8, paragraph 4 noted 
that ASEM ‘established common ground between Asia and Europe on topical issues of 
mutual interest to both regions’; paragraph 5 stated that ASEM ‘established common 
ground between Asia and Europe on topical issues of mutual interest of both regions. 
These discourses reflect a habit for the ASEM partners to perceive the framework as 
an inter-regional interaction between ‘Asia’ and ‘Europe’. 
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Noteworthy, the renewed version of the ASEM Infoboard in mid-2012, for the first 
time, introduces ASEM as ‘trans-regional’. On the front page of the updated website 
found ‘ASEM is an informal trans-regional platform for dialogue and cooperation 
between the two regions…’378 Whether the ASEM partners have changed their 
conceptual understanding of ASEM from inter-regionalism to trans-regionalism is 
explored in later chapters. For ASEM to be a truly region-to-region interaction, the 
actorness of ‘Asia’ and ‘Europe’ in the process has to be high, which does not seem to 
be the case in reality. How compatible ASEM’s approach is to inter-regionalism is 
examined in the following chapters. The rest of this chapter explores in details the 
actors and actions assigned to them in ASEM’s institutional design. 
5.3. Actors in ASEM’s design 
An analysis of the ASEM key documents (AECF2000, Recommendations for 
Organisational and Management Strategy and the Helsinki Declaration on the Future 
of ASEM) shows that a wide variety of actors are given a role in the ASEM process. 
The documents cover actors at different levels: international, inter/trans-regional, 
regional, national and domestic. Both state and non-state actors are mentioned. Figure 
5.1 and Figure 5.2 show that some thirty different entities are mentioned as actors in 
the analysed documents.  
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Figure 5.1: No. of time the following actors appeared in ASEM-institution design 
documents. (Total number = 214) 
Importantly, the significance of the mentioned actors varies greatly. As displayed in 
Figure 5.1, ‘ASEM leaders/ Head of State/Government’, ‘ASEM partners’, ‘ministers’ 
and ‘senior officials’ appear the most frequently. Other actors appear much less 
frequent than these governmental representatives. For a deeper analysis, the following 
sections compare the significance of different actors who are named in the analysed 
ASEM official documents. 
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Figure 5.2: Appearance of an actor mentioned in ASEM-institution design 
documents in percentage. (Total number = 214) 
5.3.1. Nation-states Until the ninth summit, the ASEM process embraced fifty-one 
partners, forty-nine nation-states and two communal institutions of existing regional 
organisations: the EU’s European Commission and the Secretariat of ASEAN. 
Nation-states make up the majority of ASEM members. Moreover, the enlargement 
process thus far recruited only nation-states as ASEM new members rather than 
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considering more regional or international organisation. The only exception was the 
admission of the ASEAN Secretariat in the second round of enlargement; new 
members have all been nation-states. 
In ASEM’s key documents, nation-states occupy both space and crucial roles in the 
process. The AECF2000 states that ASEM partners (among which a majority is 
nation-states) set the goals and agenda of the process, propose activities and adapt new 
initiatives.
379
 The partners also set the guidance and priorities of AECF.
380
 ASEM 
partner governments decide who to include and exclude in the process. Ministers and 
senior officials from various policy sectors convene upon the call of the Heads of 
State/Government.
381
 Moreover, all ASEM key documents have to be approved and 
adopted by the Heads of State/Government in consensus. Most of the ASEM 
initiatives are endorsed by the Heads of State/Government, while the ministers and 
senior officials also share such power.
382
 Paragraph 8 of AECF2000 states that 
ASEM’s ‘enlargement should be conducted on the basis of consensus by the Heads of 
State/Government’. The current ASEM members determine who to accept. By and 
large, the partner governments, which are represented by officials from various levels, 
control how the ASEM process progresses and develops. 
Concerning the executive part, ministers and their senior officials from ASEM partner 
governments (commissioners and their officials in the case of the European 
                                           
379
 ACEF2000, 2000, paragraph 5, 13, 25. 
380
 Ibid., paragraph20; Helsinki Declaration Annex, 2006, part I, point 1. 
381
 AECF2000, 2000, paragraph 21. 
382
 The SOM was granted this power in ASEM5, see Recommendations for ASEM Working Methods, 
annexed to Chairman’s Statement of ASEM5, 2004, points 2, 5. 
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Commission) take most of the real actions. All follow-up works are mandated to the 
governments of ASEM partners except in the social-cultural pillar which is delegated 
to ASEF. Due to the absence of a physical Secretariat, the day-to-day administration 
(including the preparation of the biennial summits and ministerial meetings) is 
mandated to the Foreign Affairs Ministry of each ASEM partner and the four regional 
coordinators.
383
 Each of the Foreign Affairs Ministry has at least one contact person 
to deal with ASEM-related work, namely circulation and sharing of ASEM-related 
information, communication with other ASEM partners concerning ASEM issues, 
preparation of ASEM official meetings, organisation of other ASEM activities, 
promotion of the awareness of ASEM and advancement of mutual understanding 
between Asia and Europe. 
Furthermore, the senior officials from various sectors are directly responsible for the 
ASEM initiatives related to their relevant policy fields. The SOMs are mandated to 
filter the proposal of new initiatives (submitted by ASEM members) as well as to 
review the progress of the endorsed initiatives (implemented by the volunteered 
ASEM members).
384
 They are also responsible for the overall coordination of ASEM 
activities. The Senior Official Meeting on Trade and Investment (SOMTI), for 
instance, ‘functions as an ASEM cornerstone and a well established coordinating 
mechanism’ in the economic pillar.385 The senior officials are indeed the actual 
executors of the ASEM process. Therefore, it is not surprising to see them mentioned 
again and again in the documents which lay down how the process ought to be run 
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(they represent 14% of the appearance of actors in the ASEM instructional design 
documents, see Figure 5.2). In addition, special eminent persons groups or taskforces 
are sometimes created to work on specific issues; they are always set to report to the 
senior official instead of to the Heads of State/Government directly. All things 
considered, ASEM’s working mechanism relies very much on the contribution of the 
partner governments, especially the senior officials. 
To facilitate the overseeing of ASEM’s everyday work, particularly in the years 
without any summit, the coordinator system was introduced. The functions and 
selection method of the ASEM Coordinators are first stated in AECF2000 (mentioned 
three times), then further specified in the Recommendations for ASEM Working 
Methods (one part of the five-part document) and in the Helsinki Declaration 
(mentioned eight times). Since the coordinator system was first established, the 
number and appointment method of the coordinators have not changed even though 
ASEM has enlarged several times. 
On the European side, the European Commission serves as a permanent coordinator. 
The EU member state holding the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU acts as 
the other coordinator. Consequently, the Commission has acted as the permanent 
memory of the ASEM process. In fact, it is not only for the European side, but the 
sole permanent memory for the whole process, as there is no permanent coordinator 
on the Asian side. However, neither the Commission nor the Presidency of the 
Council of the EU has replaced the EU member states in the ASEM meetings. The 
individual member states send their national delegations to ASEM discussions, speak 
and act for themselves.  
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After the Lisbon Treaty came in to effect, the rotating Presidency ought to be 
gradually replaced by the President of the Council of the EU and the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) in handling external relations. During ASEM8, the 
Commission, Belgian government (which was the host of the ASEM8 as it held the 
EU rotating Presidency between July and December 2010) together with the newly 
appointed Council President, Herman van Rumpuy, all acted as coordinators of the 
EU side. For the first time in ASEM history, it was a full-time President of the 
Council of the EU who chaired the ASEM summit, despites the opposition of some 
Asian member states who perceived such action as a moving ASEM towards a 
region-to-region basis.
386
  
In the ninth summit, van Rompuy and Barroso, the President of the European 
Commission, presented alongside the Head of State/Government of the individual EU 
member states. Noteworthy, the full-time President of the Council has not become 
another permanent coordinator. Instead, Cyprus which hosted the rotating Council 
Presidency in the second half of 2012 served as the European coordinator alongside 
the Commission. At present, the EEAS has taken over the Commission’s permanent 
coordinator role of ASEM for the European side. Apart from the post-Lisbon 
evolution of EU’s external relations representation, there is another problem to the 
selection of European coordinators after ASEM9: Norway and Switzerland became 
full ASEM members from the European side but they are not part of the EU. Whether 
and how these two non-EU countries will be included in the regional coordinator 
system is remained to be settled. 
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 Information given by Ambassador Bertrand de Crombrugghe, Head of the ASEM8 Task Force, in a 
public event EU for Asia Brussels Briefing: Asia-Europe Meeting: priorities and challenges, organised 
by the European Policy Centre, Brussels, 16 September 2010. 
154 
 
By the end of ASEM9, van Rompuy as the full-time President of the EU Council 
invited all ASEM partners to Brussels for ASEM10. However, the FMM11 in 
November 2013 (Delhi-NCR) announced that Italy would host ASEM10 in Milan. In 
this case, the effect of the implement of the Lisbon Treaty is unclear: would the future 
ASEM summits eventually be hosted by the full-time President instead of the member 
state who holds the rotating presidency is unknown. Furthermore, whether the two 
new non-EU ASEM members, Norway and Switzerland, are going to hold any ASEM 
summit is another interesting question. The answers to these questions indicate 
whether the EU can represent the European side of ASEM as a united front in the 
future, while the current situation seems more heading towards the opposite direction. 
On the Asian side, two coordinators are mandated to coordinate the Asian position, 
one ASEAN country (but not including the ASEAN Secretariat) and one non-ASEAN 
Asian country. These coordinators are put in a rotating system. The timeframes for the 
ASEAN Coordinator and the non-ASEAN Coordinator are three years and two years 
respectively. It is intriguing to compare the respective roles assigned to the European 
Commission and the ASEAN Secretariat as the latter has not become a permanent 
coordinator for the ASEAN countries. Indeed, the ASEAN Secretariat was not even 
included into the coordinator system, as the ASEAN member states have not 
designated competence to the Secretariat to act on behalf of them in external relations. 
At ASEM8, Australia, New Zealand and Russia were admitted. Although this time all 
three of them applied to join ASEM form the Asia side, certain ASEM Asian 
members did not accept them into the Asian group. The temporary solution reached in 
FMM9 was to create a ‘Temporary Third Category’ to shelter these three new 
partners. Yet, the coordination problem compounded as these three countries were not 
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included either in the EU or Asian side, hence missed those regional preparation 
meetings before ASEM8.
387
 Through their contact points and the technical 
coordination service provided by the organising Taskforce of the Belgian government, 
the ASEM8 Coordination Team (a special team employed and paid by the European 
Commission) and the Commission, the three governments were given all relevant 
information and documents. However, they did not have the chance to share the 
viewpoints and coordinate their positions in any regional context before ASEM8. The 
interviewed key informant from the Commission stated that such arrangements would 
not cause any disadvantage to the ‘third category countries’ as the Asian ASEM 
members had not really coordinated their position before any ASEM meeting. 
Moreover, FMM10 decided that Russia, Australia and New Zealand would send 
representatives to the coming ASEM coordinators’ meetings as “guests of the Chair”, 
without joining the EU group or the Asian group.
388
 Importantly, the SOM on 1-2 
March 2012 finally reached an agreement to put these three countries into the Asia 
side. Presumingly, they have then been included in the rotating coordination among 
the Asian non-ASEAN members. The same SOM announced the admission of 
Bangladesh to the Asian side in ASEM9, meaning the membership of the Asian 
non-ASEAN members expands to ten. 
Despite the existence of the coordinators and the network of ASEM contact points, 
the organisation of an ASEM meeting still depends heavily on the host country. The 
host country is responsible from agenda setting to physical logistic arrangement, 
deciding the list of participants, drafting of the Chairman’s Statement to the 
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 Information given by Ambassador Bertrand de Crombrugghe, who headed the ASEM8 Taskforce of 
Belgium, during a face-to-face interview with the author in Brussels on 16 September 2010. 
388
 Ibid. 
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organisation of the side-events. Such reliance on the host country means that ASEM 
meetings differ greatly from each other; hence, the outcomes of each meeting vary 
according to the host’s capability, preference and perception of ASEM. The annex to 
the Helsinki Declaration specially underscored the role of the hosts of the next ASEM 
summits: 
Taking into account the deepening and widening of the process, the central 
role of the hosts of the next summit and Foreign Ministers' Meeting should be 
recognised, while ensuring that the geographic balance of the Coordinators' 
group is maintained. Enhancing the function of the next host(s) can add 
continuity to the coordination, and facilitate and complement the leading role 
of the Coordinators' group. 
In general, the Heads of State/Government in ASEM summits set the direction of 
ASEM, decide on actions then instruct different executive arms to carry out the tasks. 
‘ASEM leaders’, ‘ministers’, ‘senior officials’ and ‘ASEM partners’, all representing 
individual ASEM partner governments, were the most crucial actors. In contrast, the 
non-state actors, namely civil society actors, international and regional organisations, 
were much less frequently referred to or were they entrusted with any major role. 
5.3.2. International and regional organisations At the international level, among 
the various multilateral institutions, ASEM’s attention is mainly devoted to four: the 
WTO in trade issues; the UN in the political field; the IMF and World Bank regarding 
international financial governance.
389
 These four international organisations are 
mentioned frequently in the Chairmen’s Statements and declarations issued by ASEM 
                                           
389
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summits and MMs. Nevertheless, ‘international organisation’ as a collective term and 
the aforementioned multilateral institutions are rarely mentioned in the documents on 
ASEM institutional designs. They are not seen as integral to ASEM, as none of these 
organisations is designated any role inside the ASEM process or granted a permanent 
seat in the official meetings. Their involvement in ASEM is passive: only the 
‘appropriate international organisations and institutions’ are invited to specific ASEM 
events if all ASEM partners agree.
390
 
At the regional level, ASEM membership overlaps with the membership of a number 
of regional or trans-regional organisations, namely the EU, ASEAN, SAARC, Pacific 
Islands Forum (PIF), East Asia Summit (EAS) of the ASEAN+3+3+2 states,
391
 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), NATO, Council of Europe and APEC. 
Except the EU (with the European Commission as an individual ASEM partner) and 
the ASEAN (with its Secretariat as an individual ASEM partner), none of these 
organisations is granted membership to ASEM. Hence, the roles of the Commission 
and the ASEAN Secretariat in the ASEM process are exceptional. As discussed above, 
the participations of these two regional institutions in the ASEM process differ 
significantly, reflecting an inter-regional imbalance. 
While the Commission has been an ASEM partner since inception, the ASEAN 
Secretariat waited for a decade (until 2006) for its membership. As a supranational 
institution, the Commission attends ASEM as an individual partner side by side with 
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 AECF2000, 2000, paragraph 25. 
391
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the member states of the EU and conceives of itself as an under-pinner of the 
process.
392
 In the official documents, the Commission and its President are frequently 
mentioned (three times in the Helsinki Declaration and in every summit Chairman’s 
Statement). On the other hand, the ASEAN Secretariat was largely invisible in both 
AECF2000 and the Helsinki Declaration and mentioned only in the Chairmen’s 
Statements of the three most recent summits. The ASEAN Secretariat is not mandated 
as a regional coordinator for the ASEAN ASEM member states. Despite gaining an 
individual seat in ASEM in 2006, the Secretariat has not replaced the rotating 
coordinator among ASEAN member states. Unlike the Commission, the role of the 
ASEAN Secretariat is rather invisible. 
Interestingly, ASEM partners are sometimes grouped together in regional context and 
referred to as two collective blocs. The terms ‘Asia’, ‘Europe’ and ‘regions’ are found 
being used as actors sometimes. AECF2000 writes ‘Asia and Europe, building a 
comprehensive and future-oriented partnership, should work together to address 
challenges and to translate them into common opportunities’393 and the Helsinki 
Declaration states ‘ASEM enables Asia and Europe to reap the benefits of 
globalisation’.394 In other ASEM documents, there are numerous similar references: 
‘Asia and Europe establish/foster their partnership’; ‘cooperation between the two 
regions’; ‘the dialogue between the two regions’; and ‘ASEM helps to raise mutual 
awareness and understanding between Asia and Europe’.  
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 European Commission, ASEM, <ec.europa.eu/external_relations/asem/index_en.htm> (accessed on 
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 AECF2000, 2000, paragraph 5. 
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Indeed, thus far, no ASEM document has defined ‘Asia’ or ‘Europe’. Are they 
corresponding only to the ASEM membership or embracing other non-ASEM 
countries? This lack of clarity provokes questions like ‘does “EU” equal “Europe”?’; 
‘does Russia belong to Europe/Asia?’; and ‘does “Asia” include only the ASEM Asian 
partners?’ As defined in Chapter 1, an actor should be able to identify itself from the 
others, therefore, unless ‘Asia’ and ‘Europe’ possess distinct identities, they can hardly 
constitute an independent international actor. 
5.3.3. Non-state actors Regarding the non-state actors, the Helsinki Declaration 
remarks that ‘a closer involvement of parliaments, academia and civil society in the 
broad sense will furthermore greatly contribute to a stronger feeling of ownership and 
enhance the visibility and awareness of ASEM among the wider public.’395 Yet, what 
does this ‘close involvement’ mean was not clearly elaborated? The document only 
reiterated the role of three existing ASEM initiatives ‒ ASEF, the Asia-Europe 
Parliamentary Partnership Meeting (ASEP) and the Asia-Europe Business Forum 
(AEBF) ‒ in ‘developing the outreach’.396 
Interestingly, parliamentary representatives are grouped together with other sectors of 
the civil society. Unlike the executive branch of the ASEM governments, the 
involvement of the legislators in ASEM is rather marginalised. Their presence is 
seldom found in ASEM official documents. It is indeed not surprising because ASEM 
has insisted in its informality and non-legal bindingness. Due to the huge variety of 
government structure amongst ASEM partners, the role of parliament differs greatly 
from one country to another. 
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The general public appears as a concern of the ASEM leaders. The official documents 
keep repeating the urgency to promote mutual awareness and understanding between 
the people in the two regions as well as the need to engage the general public in the 
ASEM process.
397
 The opening paragraph of the AECF2000 highlights ‘to build a 
greater understanding between the people of the two regions’ as one of the three main 
objectives of the process. One of the reasons behind the creation of the Asia-Europe 
Foundation was to foster people-to-people exchange between the two regions. ASEF’s 
work on promoting inter-regional people-to-people exchange has been praised in 
several of the summit Chairmen’s Statements. Moreover, the key documents have 
underscored the need to communicate with the public and to increase ASEM’s public 
awareness.
398
 These two goals have been further prioritised after ASEM entered its 
second decade. Nevertheless, these discourses have not been converted into a bigger 
role for the public in the process; actions involving the general public are limited to 
ad-hoc opportunities to ASEF activities. The general public has no role in the official 
ASEM meetings. 
ASEF is itself a non-state actor produced by the ASEM process. Established in 1997, 
it is the sole joint institution of ASEM and is mandated to oversee the process’s 
socio-cultural pillar. The Foundation is mentioned once in the ACEF2000, and five 
times in the Helsinki Declaration. Being a key institution in ASEM’s third pillar, 
ASEF is mentioned in the social-cultural part of all Chairmen’s Statements, in which 
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typically ASEM Heads of State/Government acknowledge its work and reaffirm their 
support to ASEF’s work.  
In sum, the gate-keeper power of ASEM partners’ governments is obvious. Civil 
society groups and trade unions have expressed their interest in officially joining the 
ASEM process even before ASEM1. However, thus far, they can only convene under 
their own initiatives – Asia-Europe People’s Forum (AEPF) and ASEM trade union 
conference – which are not officially part of ASEM’s Track 2. In contrast, the 
initiative which convenes the business community, Asia-Europe Business Forum, is 
proposed in the first summit and has been frequently acknowledged in the ASEM 
official discourses. AEPF is not mentioned at all in ASEM’s institution design 
documents. Only the Chairman’s Statement of ASEM1 and that of ASEM8 mentioned 
it in passing (once each). While the AEBF, ASEF and the Asia-Europe Parliamentary 
Partnership (ASEP) are listed under ‘ASEM in Society’ on the ASEM Infoboard (the 
version before March 2012), AEPF was not mentioned.
399
 These differences in 
treatment echoed to the critique of a ‘planned exclusion of the civil society interest’400 
which keeps community organisations and policy advocacy groups out of the 
process.
401
 The actual involvement of the various groups of non-state actors is 
examined in more detail in Chapter 8. 
In addition, many of the non-state actors draft recommendations to submit to the Head 
of State/Government summits, but no institutional mechanism thus far has been 
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created to guarantee that they reach the summits. Even though the recommendations 
from the AEBF and various ASEF-organised conferences are channelled to the 
summit, there is no guarantee that the Heads of State/Government would actually read 
them. 
All things considered, in ASEM’s institutional design various types of actors from 
different levels and different fields are embraced. The design of the process 
demonstrates the centrality of the partner governments, which are mainly nation-state 
governments. Notwithstanding the centrality of the nation-states, the co-existence of 
other non-traditional entities is acknowledged. Under the current design, involvement 
of the non-state actors, especially those from the civil society, is passive and 
insignificant (they are rarely allowed to take part in formal discussions, while their 
recommendations to the summit are largely ignored). Consequently, the differences in 
actorness between the nation-states and the other actors are huge. After identifying the 
key actors in ASEM’s institutional design, the next section examines what actions 
have ASEM founders designed to take under the process. 
5.4. Expected actions 
AECF2000 starts with the following clause which also appears frequently in other 
ASEM documents: 
all [ASEM] Participants agreed to work together to create a new Asia-Europe 
partnership, to build a greater understanding between the peoples of both 
regions and to establish a strengthened dialogue among equals. 
Other key goals highlighted repeatedly include fostering inter-regional political 
dialogue; reinforcing inter-regional economic cooperation; increasing inter-regional 
163 
 
trade and investment flows; promoting cooperation in other areas as well as enhancing 
mutual understanding and awareness between the two regions.
402
 These objectives are 
also listed in the ASEM Infoboard. 
For the political pillar, ASEM partners seek to strengthen inter-regional links and 
partnership so as to manage the complex interdependence amid growing globalisation. 
They repeatedly emphasise the need to work together to address global challenges 
such as the negative impacts of globalisation and weapons of mass destruction.  
The leaders have designated ASEM as a mean to rationalise multilateralism. 
AECF2000 highlights that ASEM can ‘stimulate and facilitate progress in other fora… 
thereby contribute positively to security, prosperity and sustainable development for 
the benefit of all and build a new international political and economic order’.403 It is 
entrusted as one of the platforms for its partners to identify common interest, on both 
regional and international issues. Eventually, the process is expected to enable its 
partners to enhance understanding on each other’s stands and opinions on different 
regional and international events. The founding partners expected ASEM to take 
forward their dialogue and cooperation on issues of common interest to relevant 
international institutions. For instance, ASEM leaders showed attempts in exchange 
views on issues like the UN reform, arms control and reform in global financial 
governance. Moreover, ASEM is supposed to support the rules of international law 
among the partners. 
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For the economic pillar, ASEM is designated to complement and reinforce the WTO’s 
efforts on strengthening an open and rule-based multilateral trading system. ASEM 
partners also expect the process to foster trade and investment flows between the two 
regions. The designated means include promoting dialogue and cooperation between 
the business sectors of the two regions as well as between government and the 
business sector. Accordingly, ASEM is expected to contribute to sustainable economic 
growth in both regions. 
In the social-cultural pillar, ASEM is entrusted to promote dialogue and cooperation 
between parliaments, civil society, education institutions, students, as well as the 
general public in Asia and Europe. More cooperation between the two regions to 
tackle global issues like public healthcare, food security, sustainable development and 
transnational crime is also listed as objectives.
404
 Increasing mutual awareness and 
understanding between the public in the two regions is repeatedly emphasised as a key 
motive. The list of prioritised areas for intensified cooperation in the social-cultural 
pillar includes: science and technology, human resources, development, the 
environment, the fight against illicit drug trade, money-laundering, terrorism and 
international organised crime, including the exploitation of illegal immigration and the 
strengthening of cultural links. 
Thus far, the goals listed in AECF1998, AECF2000 and ASEM Infoboard are rather 
modest and general. They can be understood as a lowest-common-denominator 
compromise among the twenty-six founding members of ASEM. Pereira pointed out 
that the ASEM partners possess divergence views on ASEM’s work, while the Asians 
‘regard[ed] dialogue in itself as an achievement and prefer to talk about 
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non-contentious issues’, the Europeans ‘tend[ed] to press for tangible results and are 
interested in taking up contentious issues in order to arrive at conclusions’.405 General 
aims, such as building mutual understanding and strengthening inter-regional links, 
which are easily accepted by all parties, became the lowest common denominator. 
Accordingly, there was no assignment for short/medium-term tangible delivery like 
free-trade-agreement or joint action in WTO or UN negotiations given to ASEM. 
On ASEM’s tenth anniversary, the European Commission published Ten Years of 
ASEM Global Challenges–Joint Response. The key objectives of ASEM were 
reiterated: to strengthen interaction and mutual understanding between the two regions; 
to foster the inter-regional relations so as to handle the complex interdependence and 
the challenges arose; to reinforce multilateralism both in political, economic and 
environmental fields; to stimulate and facilitates other bilateral or multilateral fora 
between Asia and Europe; to encourage inter-regional trade and investment flows; and 
to promote business-to-business as well as government-to-business links.
406
 Apart 
from the management of the complex interdependence and facilitation of other 
multilateral fora, many of the theoretically deduced functions listed in existing 
academic studies are absent in the “wish-list” designated to ASEM by the founders. 
In comparison, the theoretically-deduced functions are more specific (as discussed in 
Chapter 2). In the actual institutional design, ASEM is assigned modest and general 
tasks such as bringing the partners to dialogue, enhancing mutual understanding and 
exploring common ground between the two regions. Certainly, each ASEM partner 
would have an individual agenda when joining the process, among which provocative 
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aims such as counterbalancing the US, taming China or promoting the ASEAN as 
leader in East Asia regionalism would not be explicitly announced.  
Additionally, the actors concerned in the ASEM’s official discourses on functions also 
differ from those found in academic studies. While non-state entities are largely absent 
in the theoretical studies, the AECF2000 and ASEM Infoboard frequently address them. 
Bringing business communities, civil society as well as the general public to meet with 
and understand their inter-regional counterparts has been marked as a key function of 
the ASEM process. Apart from the gaps between the theoretically-deduced functions 
and the institutional design, the actual achievements of ASEM could differ from both 
the theoretically-deduced functions and the institutional design. The similarities and 
differences between the theoretically-deduced, officially-written and actual functions 
of ASEM are further discussed in Chapter 9. 
5.5. Tools equipped for action-taking 
After studying the ‘wish list’ of the ASEM founding partners when they first 
established the process, the question that follows is ‘how is ASEM equipped to 
accomplish the missions?’ From debut, ASEM has been designed to be informal and 
has avoided institutionalisation (a process to develop common rules to govern 
behaviours of involved actors, as defined in Chapter 1). Although being at the top of 
the hierarchy, the summitry is not designed for negotiations or decision-making. 
Instead, the Heads of State/Government gather biennially to exchange views and 
information. None of the official documents or discussion outcomes is legally-binding.  
Concerning the everyday administration, unlike other international organisations, 
ASEM has not established any secretariat or headquarters. There is no common 
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institution to follow up the discussions and agreements or to manage the everyday 
administration. According to AECF2000, the foreign ministers and their senior 
officials are responsible for the preparation of the biennial summits and the 
coordination of ASEM-related activities. As noted already, two ASEM coordinators 
from Europe and two from Asia are mandated to facilitate the coordination and 
communication among ASEM partners in their respective regions. 
The only physical institution, ASEF, is mandated to foster intellectual, 
people-to-people and cultural exchanges within ASEM. The Foundation depends on 
voluntary financial contributions from ASEM partners, which could be risky in times 
of economic hardship. ASEF is accountable and reports to the Board of Governors 
whose members are appointed by the ASEM partner governments. In terms of 
independent decision-making power, ASEF cannot be considered as an independent 
international actor as it has not yet been free to make independent decisions. All work 
of ASEF is governed under AECF2000 and Dublin Principles annexed to the 
Chairman’s Statement of ASEM5. 
According to the institutional design, the ASEM process can only deliver when its 
partners propose initiatives, particularly in the political and economic pillars. An 
ASEM initiative has to be raised by an ASEM partner and supported by all other 
counterparts.
407
 They can be proposed, discussed and adopted at the summits, 
ministerial meetings or senior officials’ meetings. The initiated activities need to 
involve partners from both regions and ensure a participation of as many partners as 
possible. There is no rule on the number of initiatives an ASEM participant needs to 
propose, or on the content of the proposal. However, the initiator of an event normally 
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becomes the one who finances, coordinates and hosts it. A collection of adopted 
initiatives forms a two-year work programme between two summits. 
This flexible arrangement has huge potential. If accepted by all partners, proposals like 
an ASEM Free-Trade Agreement, a united action to condemn a third-state, creation of 
a common currency in ASEM area or establishment of ASEM army for maritime 
safety covering all ASEM countries could be made. In practice, the initiatives adopted 
in the past seventeen years were modest, comprised mainly of ad-hoc activities and 
one-off seminars or conferences for views and information exchanges. Rather 
remarkably, ASEM has gathered ministers of thirteen different policy fields,
408
 these 
gatherings were once again just limited to information and views exchanges though. 
The ministers discuss issues and adopt initiatives in their relevant policy field; while 
the discussions are informal and participation in the initiative are voluntary. It is up to 
the individual partners to implement the initiatives. No rule is set to require a partner 
to take part in an initiated activity. There is no monitoring or follow-up mechanism on 
how an ASEM activity is conducted and received. Therefore, neither the quantity, 
quality nor the participation rate of the initiative is guaranteed. In practice, when 
ASEM partners have heavy workloads, it is unrealistic to expect them to dedicate a 
huge amount of time and human resources to ASEM activities, which are neither 
legally-binding nor offering any immediate rewards. 
After evaluations on the tenth anniversary, ASEM partners introduced the Issue-based 
Leadership mechanism so as to generate more tangible deliveries. Under the 
Issue-based Leadership, individual ASEM partner volunteers to lead (or be a shepherd 
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of) a sector or issue in which it has ‘a particular interest and expertise’.409 The 
leadership will be switched between Asia and Europe every two years, while each 
term would be four years in maximum. Other partners can volunteer as co-sponsors. 
This new mechanism also attempts to balance participation between ASEM partners. 
ASEM7 endorsed the first list of issue-leaders as described in Table 5.1: 
Table 5.1: List of Issue-based Leadership adopted in ASEM7 
Issues 
Interested Partners 
Asian European 
Development of SMEs China, Korea Germany 
Inter-cultural Dialogue Korea - 
Culture/Tourism China, Vietnam, Thailand - 
Education/Human Resources Vietnam Germany 
Pandemic Control 
China, Japan (Avian 
Influenza), Vietnam (HIV) 
UK (Avian 
Influenza) 
Transportation China Lithuania 
Labour/Employment - Germany 
Climate Change Japan Poland, Denmark 
Interfaith and Counter-Terrorism Indonesia, the Philippines Spain 
Energy Security/ Energy Efficiency Singapore, the Philippines - 
Food Security Thailand - 
International Migration the Philippines - 
Finance - Spain 
Life Long Learning - Denmark 
In the above list of Issue-based Leadership, the repetitive appearance of several 
partners (namely, China, the Philippines, Vietnam and Germany; which are followed 
by Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Denmark and Spain) is obvious. Other partners, 
especially the newer ones, seem inactive. The effectiveness of such mechanism to 
improve the balance of participation among ASEM partners remains questionable. 
Moreover, the actors volunteered to contribute to the Issue-based Leadership are all 
nation-states, reflecting again a state-centralism of ASEM. In ASEM9, the first term of 
the Issue-based Leadership completed the four-year mandate. There was no reviewing 
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or renewing the mandate in ASEM9 or the FMM followed ASEM9. Instead, the Chair 
of FMM11 (India) introduced another mechanism ‘Collated List of Interested ASEM 
Members for Tangible Cooperation’ (shown in Table 5.2 below). The content was 
indeed very similar to the Issue-based Leadership, in which the ‘like-mind members’ 
named the issue areas which they were interested in elaborating concrete cooperation. 
However, no timeframe or other details of this new initiative was given. 
In sum, ASEM has adopted a low-institutionalised and informal approach. There is no 
official platform to produce and store the written record of meetings and activities. 
The Chairman’s Statement is the sole regular written document produced after the 
summits and the MMs. They are prepared by the host of that particular ASEM meeting, 
hence, can be very different in format, style and content. Notably, the SOMs have not 
produced any public documents, with the exception of those from the Senior Officials’ 
Meetings on Trade and Investment. Chairs of the SOMs do take notes which are 
subsequently circulated among participants, but do not publish those documents. 
Instead of making ASEM an independent inter-regional institution with its own 
administrator, the founding members decided that the administration ought to be based 
on their governments. Introduction of the regional coordinator system, together with 
the admission of the European Commission and ASEAN Secretariat as full members, 
does give a regional accent to ASEM. However, the process remains more inter-state 
than inter-regional. 
171 
 
Table 5.2: The Collated List of Interested ASEM Members for Tangible 
Cooperation adopted in FMM11 
Areas of Tangible Cooperation 
Interested Partners 
Asian European 
Disaster Management and 
Mitigation, Building Rescue and 
Relief Capacities, Technologies 
and Innovation in Rescue 
Equipments & Techniques  
Australia, Bangladesh, 
China, India, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mongolia, 
New Zealand, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Vietnam  
Belgium, Greece, 
Luxembourg,  
Netherlands, 
Switzerland 
Efficient and Sustainable Water 
Management, Innovations in Water 
& Waste Management  
Bangladesh, China, 
India, Indonesia, 
Mongolia, Pakistan, 
Singapore Vietam 
Bulgaria, Denmark, 
Hungary, Malta, 
Romania,  
Slovakia, Spain, 
SME Cooperation 
Bangladesh, Brunei 
Darussalam, China, 
India, Indonesia, Lao 
PDR, Malaysia, 
Mongolia, Myanmar, 
Pakistan 
Greece, Hungary, 
Malta 
Renewable Energy: mitigation, 
adaptation, financing and 
technological innovations  
Brunei Darussalam, 
India, Mongolia, New 
Zealand, Pakistan, 
Philippines  
Greece, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Spain 
Energy Efficiency Technologies  
Brunei Darussalam, 
China, India, Mongolia, 
Pakistan  
Denmark, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Poland, 
Spain, 
Higher Education 
Brunei Darussalam, 
India, Indonesia, 
Philippines, Thailand,  
Ireland, Latvia, 
Poland, United 
Kingdom 
Vocational Training & Skills 
Development  
China, India, Malaysia, 
Vietnam  
Ireland, Netherlands, 
Latvia, United 
Kingdom 
Food Safety Issues, including 
training of Farmers  
China, Mongolia, New 
Zealand, Pakistan, 
Thailand  
Netherlands, 
Slovakia 
Education and Human Resources 
Development  
India, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Pakistan  
Greece, Hungary 
Waste Management: more efficient 
use of material resources, the waste 
sector as a central player in the 
economy with waste to energy & 
more efficient reuse & recycling 
models 
India, Singapore 
Denmark, Lithuania, 
Netherlands 
Promote Trade and 
Investment/Involve Private Sectors 
India, Lao PDR, 
Myanmar  
Poland 
Poverty Reduction  Lao PDR, Myanmar  Ireland, Poland 
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5.6. Conclusion 
ASEM’s design was articulated by its founding members, twenty-five nation-states 
plus the European Commission, in its early years. Six key principles were adopted as 
fundamental norms for the newly designed process: equal partnership, open and 
evolutionary, enhancement of mutual understanding and awareness, 
multi-dimensionality, informality, and dual-track system. Low-institutionalisation and 
informality have been emphasised. On one hand, these principles favour certain 
functions of the process and certain type of actors. On the other hand, some functions 
and actors are disabled. 
Although ASEM’s institutional design allows the presence of a wide range of actors 
from different levels, the driver seat is dominated by the nation-states. Apart from 
creating a new framework for different groups of actors to meet their inter-regional 
counterparts (e.g. Asian businessmen meet European businessmen, or Asian students 
meet European students), ASEM does not project the voice and influence of non-state 
actors to the international stage. In the institutional design, these actors are recognised 
and distinguished from each other but not engaged in decision-making (not even on 
when and how they convene) or action-taking. In other words, actorness of the 
non-state actors in international relations remains low. 
In terms of institutionalisation, ASEM was very much designed by its founders to be a 
views and information sharing platform. It was not tailored as a delivery process. 
ASEM has no independent decision-making mechanism or action execution ability 
(neither tool nor financial means). Seemingly, the ASEM founding members did not 
plan ambitiously or intend to relinquish any of their competence when establishing 
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ASEM, hence, did not equip the process with the means to act independently. These 
missing elements mean ASEM is different from other formal and legally-binding 
multilateral and regional regimes. The process serves mainly as a forum for gathering 
and view exchanges. Despite being members of many other formal multilateral 
regimes, the constituent members of ASEM have preferred to minimise 
institutionalisation in the building of ASEM. Up till ASEM9, further 
institutionalisation is still rejected. Unless there is a change in the institutional setting, 
ASEM cannot become an international actor in its own right. 
In the construction of a new cooperative framework, ASEM, the rule-setting power 
lies in the hand of the founding members. The summit-driven top-down nature affirms 
such arrangements. Instead of fully embracing inter-regionalism, ASEM’s principles 
are more state-centric. The nation-state remains the foundation unit of the official 
track (Track 1), they control who to include in Track 2 as well as how the non-state 
actors’ are involved: nation-states have not shared their power with the non-state 
actors. Neither do the ASEM partner governments show much willingness to establish 
ties with the non-state actors. Even though the business community is given higher 
priority in the process, the Heads of State/Government have still no intention to 
establish any regular channel of contact with them under the ASEM framework.  
From its institutional design, ASEM has developed as a state-centric forum, which 
serves as an additional tool for nation-states to sustain their centrality on the 
international stage. The nation-states have demonstrated their reluctance to transfer 
power to other actors or to unfold the role of the non-state actors. The presence of the 
European Commission in the rule-setting stage did not bring any breakthrough in this 
respect. Following the examination of institutional approach to illustrate how the 
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ASEM process ‘is designed to be’, the next three chapters determine what has 
happened in reality from an empirical approach. The empirical findings are then 
compared to the institutional design and also to the theoretical assumptions in the 
existing studies. 
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Chapter Six 
ASEM Track 1: a platform only for nation-states? 
 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter first reviews what has taken place in ASEM official track, or called 
Track 1, from ASEM1 to ASEM9. This overview serves as a summary of the 
development of ASEM since its inauguration. The period from 1996 (the first ASEM 
summit in Bangkok) to 2012 (the year when the ninth summit in Vientiane took place) 
are looked at, a much longer time than other studies have covered.
410
 Whilst existing 
academic literature on ASEM has mainly focused on the biennial summits, the 
recurring meetings held at other governmental levels (i.e. those in the form of 
ministerial and senior official meetings) have been largely neglected. Thereby, this 
chapter devotes to address this deficit by extending the study to cover these important 
but overlooked parts of ASEM. Subsequently, the different degrees of activity of the 
ASEM partners are distinguished. The active contributors to the process as well as the 
reasons behind their active engagement are identified. 
Official documents, including the Chairmen’s Statements, special statements and 
declarations published after the ASEM summits and MMs; as well as reports, public 
speeches and press-communications released by individual ASEM partners, are major 
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sources of information for this chapter. Notably, the official ASEM meetings strictly 
restrict the accessibility to the delegates of the partner governments. Non-members of 
these delegations, including journalists and academics, have never granted 
opportunity for direct observation. It is, thus, difficult to report and research the exact 
details during the official meetings from a third party’s viewpoint. This analysis has 
noted the limitations of having only the ASEM official documents as source of 
information, in particular, the complete course of the meetings is not recorded. Still, 
this content analysis provides valid and rich information on the topics discussed as 
well as the leaders’ common views on the covered issues. 
Technically, the drafts of the Chairmen’s Statements and joint declarations, together 
with the discussion agenda, are prepared in advance by the host government then 
circulated among the partners for comments. Usually, the SOMs discuss and finalise 
the discussion agenda before the summits and ministerial meetings. Moreover, a 
session of the plenary meeting is devoted to the final discussion/negotiation of the 
joint official documents. Consequently, the final version available publicly is 
carefully tailored, sometimes even negotiated word for word.
411
 Points which fail to 
gain consensus are reworded or deleted. As a result, some sensitive issues end up 
being removed from the final version of the summits’ official records. For instance, 
after ASEM2, the host of the London summit, the then British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair, stated in a press conference that human right issues were discussed during the 
summit.
412
 Yet, nothing about human right was found in the respective Chairman’s 
Statement. Therefore, this research treats these official documents as the lowest 
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common denominator amongst ASEM partners. This chapter uses them as general 
evidence on what topics are covered in the ASEM meetings. The details of the 
discussions, including the topics which failed to make to the final version of the 
official documents, or how consensus was reached go beyond the coverage of this 
research. Still, these official documents, as the main source of information, are able to 
provide a unique and valid list of most topics covered in the discussions. 
6.2. The summits 
In ASEM’s structure, the biennial heads-of-state summit tops the hierarchy. It is the 
most important form of ASEM consultation. Since 1996, nine summits took place, 
held in Asia and Europe alternatively (Table 6.1). Thus far, the regularity of the 
summits has been maintained, although certain partners have demonstrated their 
disinterest through abstaining from sending their heads to the summits. 
Table 6.1: ASEM summits’ host countries and dates 
Summit Host city Dates 
ASEM1 Bangkok 1-2 March 1996 
ASEM2 London 3-4 April, 1998 
ASEM3 Seoul 20-21 October, 2000 
ASEM4 Copenhagen 23-24 September, 2002 
ASEM5 Hanoi 8-9 October, 2004 
ASEM6 Helsinki 10-11 September, 2006 
ASEM7 Beijing 24-25 October, 2008 
ASEM8 Brussels 4-5 October 2010 
ASEM9 Vientiane 5-6 November 2012 
ASEM10 Milan to be held in the second half of 2014 
During these summits, the Head of State/Government are left alone, no minister or 
advisor is allowed to accompany their Heads (yet, some Head of State/Government 
would bring interpreters). In the beginning, partners from the EU side demanded the 
participation of their ministers in the summit, whereas the Asian side persisted in the 
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‘leader-only’ condition.413 The argument favouring the ‘leader-only’ setting was that 
it could generate an informal atmosphere for the leaders to freely and candidly 
exchange their viewpoints and to build personal connections. In the plenary room, the 
Heads of State/Government exchange information and views on various issues, set the 
general framework and agree on a list of activities for the following two years. These 
two-year programmes usually include a long list of events, both in official and 
unofficial tracks, making the ASEM process more than summitry. 
Corresponding to ASEM’s tri-pillared structure, discussions during the summits are 
conducted according to the three streams – political, economic and other areas. The 
Chairmen’s Statements, except that of ASEM8, have separate sections for each pillar, 
plus a section reviewing new regional developments in Asia and Europe and a section 
about the ‘future of ASEM’.414 Except the first two versions, each summit is given an 
overarching theme (Table 6.2). However, these themes reflect only a small part of the 
actual discussions, which always cover a wide range of topics. 
The key focus of a summit is usually reflected in the respective declaration/statement 
issued. Thus far, twelve thematic declarations were produced. As illustrated by Table 
6.2, the summits often have their agenda hijacked by pressing international issues.
415
 
For instance, ASEM2 was occupied by the 1997/8 Asian Financial Asian Crisis, and 
the Heads of State/Government issued the Financial Statement to demonstrate their 
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concerns with the crisis.
416
 ASEM3, which took place just after the historical first 
Inter-Korean Summit, was to a certain degree overshadowed by the peace process in 
the Korean Peninsula and the award of the Nobel peace prize to the then South 
Korean President Kim Dae Jung. The 2001 September 11 tragedy led to a domination 
of security issues in the Copenhagen summit, whereas the agenda of ASEM7 and 
ASEM8 were occupied by the global financial crisis and its aftermath. 
Table 6.2: Overarching theme and special issues of each ASEM summit 
Summit Overarching theme 
Dominant event 
that time 
Special Declaration/Statement 
ASEM1 
- 
- - 
ASEM2 
Asian Financial 
Crisis 
Financial Statement 
ASEM3 
Partnership for Prosperity 
and Stability in the New 
Millennium 
1
st
 Inter-Korean 
Summit 
Seoul Declaration for Peace on 
the Korean Peninsular 
ASEM4 
International situation in the 
aftermath of 11 September 
and new security issues 
9-11 Tragedy 
Political Declaration for Peace on 
the Korean Peninsular 
+ Declaration on Cooperation 
against International Terrorism 
ASEM5 
Further Revitalising and 
Substantiating the 
Asia-Europe Partnership 
- 
Hanoi Declaration on Closer 
ASEM Economic Partnership 
+ Hanoi Declaration on Dialogue 
among Cultures and Civilisations 
ASEM6 
10 Years of ASEM: Global 
Challenges - Joint 
Responses 
ASEM6 Declaration on Climate 
Change 
+ Helsinki Declaration on the 
Future of ASEM 
ASEM7 
Vision and Action: 
Towards a Win-Win 
Solution 
08/09 Global 
Financial Crisis 
Statement of ASEM7 on the 
International Financial Situation 
+ Beijing Declaration on 
Sustainable Development 
ASEM8 
Quality of life, achieving 
greater well-being and more 
dignity for all citizens 
aftermaths of the 
08/09 Global 
Financial Crisis  
Brussels Declaration on more 
Effective Global Economic 
Governance 
ASEM9 
Friends for Peace, Partners 
for Prosperity 
Financial 
situation in 
Eurozone 
Vientiane Declaration on 
Strengthening Partnership for 
Peace and Development 
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Thus far, ASEM’s agenda seems to be determined by international events instead of 
determining the agenda of multilateral discussions. Accordingly, it did not appear able 
to set agenda for multilateral fora (function deduced from liberal-institutionalism). On 
the other hand, ASEM serves its partners as an additional platform, sometime as the 
first or even the unique one, to exchange information and views on newly emerged 
international issues. For example, the Lehman Brothers collapsed in September 2008, 
which marked the beginning of the Global Financial Crisis; it was a month before the 
ASEM7, the Beijing summit became the first large-scale gathering of international 
leaders to discuss the outbreak of the crisis. The flexibility of the ASEM agenda is 
clear. It enables ASEM partners to exchange views on very timely issues. However, 
flexibility and rapid reaction to current events also mean that the discussions from 
summit to summit would be disrupted, thus, hampering the chance to explore issues at 
length and in depth. 
There were some exceptions: ASEM1, ASEM5 and ASEM6 did not encounter any 
landmark international issue. At the inauguration, ASEM1 was primarily devoted to 
discussions about the principles and working mechanisms for ASEM, as well as to 
allow the Heads of State/Government to familiarise with the new process and with 
each other. ASEM5 was described as a ‘transition summit’, with nothing to dominate 
the discussion.
417
 One highlight was the first round of enlargement of the process. 
The Helsinki summit marked the tenth anniversary of the process, and some time was 
devoted to explore ways to improve the working method of ASEM. Advocated by the 
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host (Finland), issues of climate change and sustainable development became the key 
focus in discussions. 
Importantly, the summits, which last typically one-and-a-half days, cover more than 
one topic. Table 6.3 summarises the topics recorded in the nine summit Chairmen’s 
Statements. The length of the list indicates that a wide range of issues are covered. 
Several topics constantly appear in the ASEM discussions: reform of the United 
Nations, counter-terrorism, security on the Korean Peninsula, new developments in 
regional integration/cooperation in Asia and Europe, and cooperation within the WTO. 
Furthermore, suggestions on how to foster interaction between the public in Asia and 
Europe, ASEF’s work and the need for more people-to-people contact are always 
found on the summit Chairmen’s Statements. Institutional matters like enlargement 
and working principles (such as whether to create a Secretariat or to amend the format 
of the discussion sessions) are discussed sometimes. Moreover, ASEM’s reactive 
nature brings a number of issues to the discussion agenda on ad-hoc basis, such as the 
war and state-building in Bosnia as well as the ‘Y2K’ computer problem discussed in 
ASEM2. Noteworthy, due to the unease of some Asian partners, sensitive issues like 
human rights, Myanmar and East Timor were excluded from both the official summit 
agendas and the Chairmen’s Statements in the early years of the process.418 
The number of issues discussed in ASEM1 was the least. As time passes, more and 
more issues appear on ASEM’s discussion table. The Seoul summit was the first one 
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to include more political issues. However, similar to the situation in the Bangkok 
summit, political issues were briefly touched upon in ASEM2 and ASEM3; no 
follow-up actions were initiated either. In contrast, ASEM4 was very concentrated on 
international security. The discussion agenda diversified again from ASEM5 onwards. 
Particularly, ASEM5 covered a wide variety of political issues at the expense of 
economic cooperation. In contrast, the following four summits concentrated much 
more on economic matters, especially ASEM7 in Beijing. The Beijing Summit was 
mostly concerned with the Global Financial Crisis and the possible solutions. Due to 
the severe impact of the 2008/09 Global Financial Crisis on the societies, ASEM8 
devoted time to issues like social cohesion, social safety nets and labour protection. In 
Addition, the growing importance of cooperation in sustainable development was 
reflected in the introduction of a separate section of the ASEM6 Chairman’s 
Statement. This was, then, inherited by the two successive summits. In the most 
recent summit, sustainable development was merged into field like economic growth, 
supply of food, energy and water, as well as natural disaster mitigation. Less attention 
was paid on environmental issues compared with the previous three summits. 
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 show that most of the issues discussed in ASEM summits are 
trans-national, many are international. None of the issues can be handled by a single 
ASEM partner alone. Accordingly, the summits offer ASEM partners a platform to 
seek information on unfamiliar international issues and to communicate with each 
other on international or regional issues. On the other side of the coin, the wide range 
of topics reflects a lack of focus and a lack of what Segal called ‘subsidiarity’ (what 
can be best done at the ASEM level).
419
 Thus far, the Heads of State/Government 
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have not showed much interest in progressing to any concrete negotiation or 
cooperation. The subsidiarity question does not seem to concern ASEM partners too 
much either. 
Table 6.3: Topics covered in ASEM summits listed in the Chairmen’s Statements. 
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ASEAN  √ √  √ √ √ √ √ 
East Asia regional cooperation  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
EU  √ √ √ √ √ √ √  
Afghanistan     √ √ √ √ √ 
East Timor   √   √    
Iran’s nuclear program      √ √ √ √ 
Iraq    √ √ √    
Korean Peninsular  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Kosovo  √ √       
Middle East   √ √ √ √  √ √ 
Myanmar     √ √ √ √  
Others  2
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Arms control & disarmament (including 
biological and chemical weapons) 
√ √ √   √   √ 
Energy security, supply and efficiency   √   √ √ √ √ 
Non-proliferation of WMD √ √ √  √ √  √ √ 
Piracy and marine security   √   √  √ √ 
Reduction of nuclear weapon √  √     √ √ 
Terrorism √  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
UN reforms √ √ √  √ √ √ √ √ 
Millennium Development Goals   √  √ √ √ √ √ 
  
E
co
n
o
m
ic
 p
il
la
r Domestic economic/financial reform   √  √     
Financial crises  √ √    √ √ √ 
Human resource development √ √ √ √  √ √  √ 
Information and Communication 
Technology 
  √ √   √ √ 
 
Intellectual Property Rights      √ √   
Involvement of business community √ √ √   √ √ √ √ 
                                           
420
 Bosnia and Cambodia 
421
 Aceh Monitoring Mission 
422
 North Africa 
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IPAP, TFAP  √ √ √  √ √ √ √ 
Need of more inter-regional trade and 
investment flows 
√  √    √  √ 
Oil prices   √  √  √   
Science and technology cooperation for 
economic benefits 
√ √ √ √  √ √  
 
WTO √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Others      1
423
    
  
so
ci
o
-c
u
lt
u
ra
l 
a
n
d
 o
th
er
 a
re
a
s 
ASEF’s work  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Consequences of globalisation   √ √ √ √    
Cultural diversity and civilisation     √ √ √  √ 
Development in general √ √      √  
Economic and social disparity   √  √  √   
Education & vocational training √ √ √ √  √  √ √ 
Food security and supply  √ √   √ √ √ √ 
Human rights   √    √ √ √ 
Illicit drug trade √ √ √     √ √ 
Labour and employment      √  √ √ 
Migrant (legal & illegal) √  √  √ √  √ √ 
Money laundering √ √ √       
Natural disaster response & management       √ √ √ 
People-to-people contacts √ √ √ √  √ √ √ √ 
Poverty alleviation √ √    √  √  
Public health care √ √ √  √  √   
Rights of women and children √ √ √       
Social Safety Net   √     √ √ 
 
Climate change √     √ √ √ √ 
Biodiversity √     √ √ √  
Deforestation √     √ √ √  
Kyoto/ post-Kyoto Protocol √ √ √ √ √   √  
Marine environment √     √ √   
Water resources management √      √ √ √ 
 Others 1
424
 1
425
      1
426
 1
427
 
   
 ASEM administration √ √   √ √ √ √ √ 
                                           
423
 IMF reform 
424
 Preservation of cultural heritages 
425
 Y2K computer problem 
426
 Social cohesion 
427
 Tourism 
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From the analysis of the Chairmen’s Statements, it is observed that ASEM partners 
always emphasise the co-existence of other multilateral fora. Regional or multilateral 
frameworks, such as the ARF, Six Party Talk, the WTO and the UN, are named as 
platforms for concrete cooperation. Nevertheless, these institutions are seldom 
featured as independent actors. They are referred to as clubs or cooperative 
mechanisms which bring various countries together to collaborate or carry out 
missions mandated by their member-states. Their effectiveness is delineated as 
dependent on the support of their members rather than on their own actorness. An 
exception is the UN, who is referred to as an independent international actor in a few 
ASEM official documents.
428
 
Is sum, the biennial summit has been a means of consultation among ASEM partners 
at the highest level. As a result of the informality and multi-dimensionality, a vast 
range of topics is discussed. As each partner has the right to put any issue on the 
discussion table, the agenda reflects the divergence of interests. This arrangement 
allows ASEM partners to easily shift attention when an unplanned event happens. 
From a positive angel, ASEM is equipped with great flexibly. On the other hand, it 
allows competitions between partners to put issues on the summit agenda, the 
so-called ‘laundry-list syndrome’, which lead to dilution of the attention to each issue. 
Furthermore, the summits do not generate any legal-binding agreement. They serve 
more as ‘catch-up’ gatherings for partners to update each other about their views and 
positions on various regional or international issues, especially the newly emerged 
ones. Collective actions listed in the summit Chairmen’s Statements and special 
                                           
428
 For example, Chairman’s Statement of ASEM4, 2002, paragraph 5; Chairman’s Statement of ASEM5, 
2004, paragraph 1.6, 1.9, 1.12; Chairman’s Statement of ASEM6, 2006, paragraph 12; Chairman’s 
Statement of ASEM6, 2008, paragraph 19. 
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declarations have been vague and intangible. Typical agreed actions include: ‘leaders 
affirmed or reaffirmed their commitment on’ a norm or value; ‘the Heads of 
State/Government stressed the importance of’ a norm or idea; ‘the leaders expressed 
their concerned on’ a situation; and ‘the Heads of State/Government shared the view’ 
on some general aspects. Only occasionally the leaders set more tangible goals: in 
ASEM4 they ‘tasked ASEM Coordinators to set up an action-oriented Taskforce’ to 
foster ASEM economic partnership;
429
 in ASEM7 they ‘tasked Senior Officials to 
further explore ways to achieve greater visibility of ASEM’;430 in ASEM8 they 
instructed the Ministers of Labour to further develop common strategic on labour 
standard, social safety net and labour market.
431
 However, tangible results remain 
limited thus far. 
6.3. The Ministerial and Senior Official Meetings 
Between two summits, ASEM partner governments’ ministers and senior officials 
(and the European Commissioners and their senior officials) responsible for different 
policy fields gather upon the request of the Heads of State/Government. The summits 
usually set guidance and direction as well as endorse initiatives undertaken in these 
second-tier level meetings. However, owing to their irregular occurrences, it is not 
easy to systematically review the content and achievement of these MMs and SOMs. 
Information provided by the ASEM Infoboard and ASEM official documents 
(including the Chairmen’s Statements and special thematic declarations issued from 
the MMs) is useful, but incomplete. Therefore, this research explores other available 
                                           
429
 Chairman’s Statement of ASEM4, 2002, paragraph 21. 
430
 Chairman’s Statement of ASEM7, 2008, paragraph 45. 
431
 Chairman’s Statement of ASEM8, 2010, paragraph 31. 
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sources, namely the official websites of ASEM partners’ Foreign Ministry, published 
academic works and media reportage, so as to create a complete list of all the MMs 
and SOMs between ASEM1 and ASEM9. In total, forty-nine ASEM MMs took place 
before ASEM9 (Table 6.4).  
Table 6.4: ASEM ministerial meetings from 1996 to 2012
432
 
Summit Host city Dates 
ASEM1 Bangkok 1-2 March 1996 
FMM1 Singapore  15 February 1997 
FinMM1 Bangkok 19 September 1997 
EMM1 Makuhari 27-28 September 1997 
ASEM2 London 3-4 April, 1998 
FinMM2 Frankfurt 15-16 January 1999 
FMM2 Berlin 28-29 March 1999 
EMM2 Berlin 9-10 October 1999 
Sci&TechMM1 Beijing 14-15 October 1999 
ASEM3 Seoul 20-21 October, 2000 
FinMM3 Kobe 13-14 January 2001 
FMM3 Beijing 24-25 May 2001 
EMM3 Hanoi 10-11 September 2001 
EnvMM1 Beijing 17 January 2002 
MigrantMM1 Lanzarote 5 April 2002 
FMM4 Madrid 6-7 June 2002 
FinMM4 Copenhagen 5-6 July 2002 
EMM4 Copenhagen 17-19 September 2002 
ASEM4 Copenhagen 23-24 September, 2002 
FinMM5 Bali 5-6 July 2003 
FMM5 Bali 23-24 July 2003 
EMM5 Dalian 23-24 July 2003 
EnvMM2 Lecce 13 October 2003 
CultureMM1 Beijing 3-4 December 2003 
FMM6 Kildare 17-18 April 2004 
FinMM7 (cancelled) Brussels 5 July 2004 
EMM6 (cancelled) Rotterdam 16-17 September 2004 
ASEM5 Hanoi 8-9 October, 2004 
                                           
432
 “FMM” refers to Foreign Ministers’ Meeting; “FinMM” refers to Finance Ministers’ Meeting; 
“EMM” refers to Economic Ministers’ Meeting; “Sci&TechMM” refers to Meeting of Ministers in 
charge of Science and Technology; “EnvMM” refers to Environment Ministers’ Meeting; 
“MigrantMM” refers to Migration Ministers’ Meeting; “CultureMM” refers to Culture Ministers’ 
Meeting; “LabourMM” refers to Labour Ministers’ Meeting; “ICTMM” refers to Meeting of Ministers 
in charge of Information and Communication Technology; “SMEMM” refers to Meeting of Ministers 
in charge of Small and Medium Enterprises; “EduMM” and “HighEduMM” refers to Education 
Ministers’ Meeting; “EnergyMM” refers to Energy Ministers’ Meeting; “TransportMM” refers to 
Transport Ministers’ Meeting. 
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FMM7 Kyoto 6-7 May 2005 
CultureMM2 Paris 7-8 June 2005 
FinMM6 Tianjin 25-26 June 2005 
High-level Economic 
Officials’ Meeting 
Rotterdam 16-17 September 2005 
FinMM7 Vienna 8-9 April 2006 
LabourMM1 Potsdam 3-5 September 2006 
ASEM6 Helsinki 10-11 September, 2006 
ICTMM1 Hanoi 30 November-1 December 2006 
EnvMM3 Copenhagen 24-26 April 2007 
FMM8 Hamburg 28-29 May 2007 
SMEMM Beijing October 2007 
CultureMM3 Kuala Lumpur 21-24 April 2008 
EduMM1 Berlin 5-6 May 2008 
FinMM8 Jeju Island 14-17 June 2008 
EMM7 (cancelled) Bali 10-11 July 2008 
LabourMM2 Bali 14-15 October 2008 
ASEM7 Beijing 24-25 October, 2008 
HighEduMM2 Hanoi 14-15 May 2009 
FMM9 Hanoi 25-26 May 2009 
EnergyMM1 Brussels 17-18 June 2009 
TransportMM1 Vilnius 19-20 October 2009 
FinMM9 Madrid 17-18 April 2010 
CultureMM4 Poznan 9-10 September 2010 
ASEM8 Brussels 4-5 October 2010 
LabourMM3 Leiden 12-14 December 2010 
EduMM3 Copenhagen 9-10 May 2011 
FMM10 Godollo 6-7 June 2011 
TransportMM2 Chengdu 24-26 October 2011 
EnvMM4 Ulaanbaatar 22-23 May 2012 
CultureMM5 Yogyakarta 18-19 September 2012 
FinMM10 Bangkok 15 October 2012 
LabourMM4 Hanoi 24-26 October 2012 
ASEM9 Vientiane 5-6 November 2012 
The three core MMs were that of Foreign Ministers, Finance Ministers and Economic 
Ministers. The ASEM process witnessed a proliferation of sectoral meetings, 
especially between ASEM3 and ASEM4. This rise in diversification makes the 
process truly multi-dimensional. Other sectors covered thus far include Culture, 
Environment, Information and Communication Technologies, Small and Medium 
Enterprises, Labour and Employment, Interior Affairs, Transport, as well as Energy 
Security. 
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Apart from the proliferation of sectors, the ASEM process has also increased in 
institutionalisation. Originally only the Foreign Ministers, Economic Ministers and 
Financial Ministers met regularly, while other ministers met on an ad-hoc basis. The 
FMM takes place every other year, usually in the non-summit year. The eighth 
Finance Ministers’ Meeting in 2008 started a ‘Finance Ministers’ Meeting process’ to 
fix the interval of the FinMM to be once every two year while requiring their deputies 
to meet annually. Nevertheless, since 2005, the Economic Ministers’ Meeting has 
halted. In 2007 and 2008, Indonesia attempted to resume the Economic Ministers’ 
Meeting but failed to secure enough participants. On the other hand, the second 
Culture Ministers’ Meeting in 2005 proposed to become regular, the proposal was 
approved by the Heads of State/Government in ASEM6. Upon the co-leadership of 
Germany and Vietnam (Issue-based Leadership adopted in ASEM7), the idea to 
convene the Education Ministers was well received among ASEM partners. The 
volunteer partners to host successive Education Ministers’ Meeting have lined up till 
2017 (that will be EduMM6 then). During their first meeting in 2009, ASEM 
Ministers of Transport agreed to convene every two year. As such, the Foreign, 
Finance, Culture, Education and Transport ministers are at present convening 
regularly under the ASEM framework. 
The ASEM MMs focus on their respective policy field, except the Foreign Ministers 
who are mandated to manage a wide range of issues and in charge of the preparation 
for the biennial summits. Similar to the summits, the MMs do not produce 
legally-binding agreements or obligatory plans of action. Ministers exchange views 
and experiences, develop mutual understanding and sometimes call for seminar and 
symposium on specific topics. Some MMs have come up with more concrete 
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action-plan. For instance, the FinMMs produced the Anti-money Laundering 
Initiative and a computerised communication network among ASEM Finance 
Ministries in 1997; ASEM Contingency Dialogue Mechanism for Emergent 
Economic and Financial Events was adopted by the FinMM in 2005 (as part of the 
Tianjin Initiative). ASEM EduMMs created the ASEM Education Secretariat and the 
ASEM Education and Research Hub for Lifelong Learning in 2009. Still, 
implementation of actions is subjected to individual partners’ voluntary contribution 
and political will. In practice, the ministers do not undertake any actual actions; they 
delegate their senior officials to do so.  
Before or between the MMs and summits, the relevant senior officials convene to 
prepare for the meetings. The Heads of State/Government and ministers sometimes 
demand special SOMs to work on technical sector-focus issues, such as the ASEM 
Customs Director-General Commissioner meetings since 1996 and ASEM 
Conferences of Director-General of Immigration. The SOMs report to their 
corresponding MMs. Table 6.5 lists the ASEM SOMs from 1995 to 2012. The table 
complies information from various ASEM partners’ foreign affairs ministry websites 
and ASEM Infoboard, but it probably does not cover all SOMs. The actual number of 
ASEM SOMs would be more than the eighty-eight listed here. Noteworthy, not only 
the SOMs’ occurrence is irregular, but their format varies. For instance, each SOMTI 
produces and publish a Chairman’s Statement, but the SOM of foreign affairs and 
finance deputies do not issue any public documents. 
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Table 6.5: ASEM SOMs from December 1995 to November 2012 
 SOM Host city Dates 
Foreign Affairs SOM 
SOM1 Madrid 19 December 1995 
SOM2 Dublin 20 December 1996 
SOM3 Luxembourg 30-31 October 1997 
SOM4 London 19-20 February 1998 
SOM5 Bangkok 27-28 October 1998 
SOM6 Rovaniemi 2-4 November 1999 
SOM7 Lisbon 2-3 May 2000 
SOM8 Seoul 19-20 September 2000 
SOM9 Stockholm 25-27 April 2001 
SOM10 Lanzarote 4-5 April 2002 
SOM11 Kildare 16 April 2004 
SOM12 Hanoi 6-7 October 2004 
SOM13 Jakarta 11-12 March 2005 
SOM14 Kyoto 5 May 2005 
SOM15 London 29-30 November 2005 
SOM16 Vienna 8 March 2006 
SOM17 Hameenlinna 18-19 June 2006 
SOM18 Helsinki 9 September 2006 
SOM19 Berlin 24-25 January 2007 
SOM20 Guilin City 29-30 October 2007 
SOM21 Ljubljana 2-3 March 2008 
SOM22 Beijing 29-30 June 2008 
SOM23 Beijing 22-23 October 2008 
SOM24 Hanoi 19-20 January 2009 
SOM25 Prague 2-3 February 2009 
SOM26 Hanoi 24 May 2009 
SOM27 Madrid 24 January 2010 
SOM28 Phnom Penh 5-6 May 2010 
SOM29 Brussels 13-15 July 2010 
SOM30 Brussels 3 October 2010 
SOM31 Copenhagen 27-28 January 2011 
SOM-(cancelled) Tokyo 28-29 March 2011 
SOM32 Budapest & Godollo 18-19 April 2011 
SOM33 Budapest & Godollo 5 June 2011 
SOM34 Tokyo 27-28 October 2011 
SOM35 Copenhagen 1-2 March 2012 
SOM36 Vientiane 12-13 September 2012 
SOM on Trade and Investment 
SOMTI1 Brussels 24-25 July 1996 
SOMTI2 Tokyo 6 June 1997 
SOMTI3 Brussels 5-6 February 1998 
SOMTI4 Singapore 12-13 February 1999 
SOMTI5 Brussels 7-8 July 1999 
SOMTI6 Seoul 12-13 May 2000 
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SOMTI7 Brussels 4-5 July 2001 
SOMTI8 Bali 17 July 2002 
SOMTI9 Paris 6 June 2003 
SOMTI10 Qingdao 18-19 July 2005 
SOMTI11 Maribor 15-16 April 2008 
SOMTI12 Brussels (informal) 15-16 February 2011 
Finance Deputies Meetings 
FinSOM1 London 5 February 1998 
FinSOM2 Vienna 18 December 1999 
FinSOM3 Paris 14 September 2000 
FinSOM4 Tokyo 15 December 2000 
FinSOM5 Bali 7-8 Jun 2003 
FinSOM6 Cork 1-2 Mar 2004 
FinSOM7 Xian 21-22 April 2005 
FinSOM8 Vienna 9-11 March 2006 
FinSOM9 Muju 14-15 May 2007 
FinSOM10 Jeju Island 15 Jun 2008 
FinSOM11 Madrid 19 Jun 2009 
FinSOM12 Bangkok 14 October 2012 
Customs DG-Commissioner meeting 
Custom DG1 Shenzhen 21 June 1996 
Custom DG2 Vienna 20-21 June 1997 
Custom DG3 Brussels 23 June 1999 
Custom DG4 Stockholm 2 July 2001 
Custom DG5 Hanoi 8-9 October 2004 
Custom DG6 Peebles 27-29 June 2005 
Custom DG7 Yokohama 12-13 November 2007 
Custom DG8 Herakleion 15-16 October 2009 
Custom DG9 Huan hin 11-12 October 2011 
Directors General Meeting on the Management of Migratory Flows 
DGs Migration1 Copenhagen 10-12 March 2003 
DGs Migration2 Beijing 12-13 November 2003 
DGs Migration3 The Hague 25-26 November 2004 
DGs Migration4 Bali 5-7 December 2005 
DGs Migration5 Kuopio 11-12 December 2006 
DGs Migration6 Seoul 19-20 November 2007 
DGs Migration7 Paris 17-18 November 2008 
DGs Migration8 Goa 1-2 December 2009 
DGs Migration9 Terhulpen 21-23 November 2010 
DGs Migration10 Ulan Bator 5-7 September 2011 
DGs Migration11 Nicosia 30-31 October 2012 
Conference on Counter-terrorism 
Counter-terrorism1 Beijing 22-23 September 2003 
Counter-terrorism2 Berlin 18-20 October 2004 
Counter-terrorism3 Semarang 14-15 November 2005 
Counter-terrorism4 Copenhagen 26-27 June 2006 
Counter-terrorism5 Tokyo 15-16 May 2007 
Counter-terrorism6 Madrid 3-4 April 2008 
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A picture of the hierarchy in the ASEM process is now visible. The summits set the 
priorities and directions, then, the ministers are mandated to have dialogue and to 
locate area for more concrete cooperation. The ministers, subsequently, task their 
senior officials to handle the technical works. The SOMs are the most technical; the 
senior officials convene also the most frequently. Yet again, none of the agreements 
reached has legal effect. Positively speaking, convening ministers and senior officials 
to share views and best practices can produce qualitative added-value: norms and 
good government practices diffuse beneath. Such diffusion is a long term process and 
requires continuous interactions between the partners. Therefore, MMs and SOMs 
which occur on an ad-hoc basis are less likely to provide such added-value. 
Whilst the national government remain the key unit, other non-state entities are found 
participating occasionally in the MMs and SOMs, especially in the former. Analysis 
of the Chairmen’s Statements of the past ASEM MMs revealed that meetings of the 
financial ministers and those of their deputies have frequently included high-level 
representatives from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the European 
Counter-terrorism7 Manila 22-23 June 2009 
Counter-terrorism8 Brussels 10-11 June 2010 
Other SOMs 
ScienceSOM1 Beijing November 1998 
ScienceSOM2 Brussels March 1999 
Prosecutors' General Shenzhen 9-12 December 2005 
ICT SOM1 Ha Long City 7-9 June 2006 
ICT SOM2 Brussels 4-5 December 2007 
LabourSOM1 Yogyakarta 11-13 September 2007 
LabourSOM2 Geneva 3-4 June 2008 
EduSOM1 Bonn 10-11 March 2008 
EduSOM2 Hanoi 19-20 January 2009 
EduSOM3 Copenhagen 24-25 January 2011 
CultureSOM1 Solo 15-17 April 2010 
CultureSOM2 Lombok 12-14 July 2011 
CultureSOM3 Yogyakarta 17 September 2012 
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Central Bank and the Asian Development Bank as guest participants. In the past five 
meetings among ASEM Cultural Ministers, the Director-General of UNESCO was 
invited to the second meeting in Paris, whereas the participants’ list of the third 
meeting included ‘civil society members’. Representatives from UNESCO’s office in 
Jakarta were invited to the Culture MM5. The fourth EMM invited the 
Director-General of the WTO as guest of Chair. The second Environment MMs had 
the Executive Director of the UN Environment Program as guest, whereas the 
Secretary General of the International Transport Forum was invited to the first ASEM 
Transport MM. Furthermore, representatives of the World Customs Organisation have 
been frequent guests at the ASEM Customs Director-Generals/Commissioner Meeting, 
while the conferences on counter-terrorism have always included organisations like 
Interpol, the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee and the UN Office of Drugs and 
Crime. On the other hand, the FMMs and a few ad-hoc MMs are limited only to 
officials from ASEM partners’ governments. 
Apart from certain international organisations, the business community has been 
invited to several of the economic related MMs and SOMs to report either on the 
preparation or the results of the Asia Europe Business Forum to ASEM 
economic/financial officials. During the London Summit, senior business 
representatives were invited to a direct dialogue session with ASEM Heads of 
State/Government. Besides, a group of senior business representatives were invited to 
have breakfast with the leaders during the Brussels summit. Other than these, direct 
interactions between the governments and the business community, the so-called 
government-to-business relations, are still limited in ASEM Track 1.  
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Some hosts of the MMs or SOMs have invited local academic or experts in relevant 
fields to give presentations. For example, Japan invited a professor from University of 
Tokyo to speak about the application of high technologies to counter terrorism in the 
seventh ASEM Customs Director-General/Commissioner Meeting held in Yokohama 
in 2007. In the same occasion, the Vice President of Nissan Motor was also invited to 
give Nissan’s view on global supply chain management and the need for international 
customs standards. In the recent CultureMM, Indonesia (the host) invited nine 
scholars/experts from various local institutes to share their expertise on the 
management of heritage cities. 
Occasionally, ASEM Heads of State/Government gather ‘eminent persons’ from their 
countries to form consultative groups on special topics. Examples include the call for 
the formation of Asia-Europe Vision Group by ASEM2 to explore institutional 
improvements for ASEM, and ASEM Task Force for Closer Economic Partnership 
established by ASEM4. These eminent persons are usually former senior government 
officials or research and academic experts. This forms an additional platform for 
public intellectuals to play a role in the relation among ASEM partners. They are 
asked to draft suggestions on special topics or issues. Nevertheless, empirical 
evidence indicates that recommendations submitted by the eminent persons groups 
have seldom been materialised. No substantial implementation could be seen thus 
far,
433
 hence, the actual consultative role of the eminent persons is questionable. 
Differ from the summits, ASEM MMs and SOMs are more open for non-state actors, 
ranging from international organisations to business community representatives, civil 
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 Asia-Europe Vision Group, For a Better Tomorrow: Asia-Europe Partnership in the 21st Century, 
(1999), i. 
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society organisations to academics. Yet, the participation of the non-state actors in 
ASEM Track 1 remains passive; they have to wait for invitation from the host 
government. In addition, their involvement depends on sectoral demands. This 
analysis shows that ASEM official meetings in economic field tend to include more 
international organisations, while those in political field are the least open for 
non-state actors. 
6.4.  Initiatives 
Apart from exchanging information and views, ASEM partners endorse initiatives for 
further joint actions during the summits, MMs as well as SOMs. Initiatives are 
proposed and filtered first by the senior officials, then by the ministers. An initiative 
has to be accepted by all ASEM partners in consensus. Originally, only the summits 
and MMs could adopt initiatives. In ASEM5, the SOMs were empowered to endorse 
initiatives so as to increase the efficiency of the process (as summits and most MMs 
only take place every two years). Still, the majority of initiatives are adopted in the 
summits.  
Prior to ASEM6, South Korea volunteered to review and evaluate the past initiatives, 
it then produced the List of ASEM Initiatives and Overview Report on ASEM 
Initiatives.
434
 It was an attempt to record the initiatives proposed, the follow-ups of 
the initiatives, the initiators and sponsors. This report also tried to identify the active 
contributors and the initiatives which were duplicated. However, it is found that some 
initiatives which were listed in other ASEM official documents were missing in this 
Korean report. For example, the study of integrating a trans-Asian railway network 
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 ASEM6 official website (accessed 10 November 2008) 
<www.asem6.fi/NEWS_AND_DOCUMENTS/EN_GB/NEWS_DOCUMENTS/INDEX.HTM>.  
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from ASEM1, the cooperation on environmental disaster preparedness from ASEM2, 
and the establishment of an ad hoc, informal consultative mechanism to confer 
expeditiously on significant international events from ASEM4 were not listed in the 
report.  
One the other hand, certain proposals listed in the Korean report were not recorded in 
any summit or MM Chairmen’s Statements, such as the Asia-Europe Parliamentary 
Partnership, the ASEM informal Seminar on Human Rights, and the Meeting of 
Environment Officials and Technology Transfer Centres in 1998 in Dusseldorf. 
Moreover, the Korea report only covered the period prior to ASEM6, leaving an 
information vacuum concerning initiatives after ASEM6. Therefore, this study uses 
the report prepared by the Korean government as a lead reference and extends the list 
of initiatives until ASEM9. 
Table 6.6 summarises the initiatives from the available official documents of 
respective ASEM summits (Chairmen’s Statements and special 
declaration/statements). One hundred and eight initiatives were endorsed by ASEM 
leaders in the past nine summits. This research also explores whether these initiatives 
have been followed up. It was found out that in average over 80% of them were 
carried out (this number is counted until ASEM8). Additionally, there are twenty-five 
proposals noted by the summiteers for further consideration, that is, they were not 
officially endorsed during the summits. Many of them were materialised eventually. 
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Table 6.6: Initiatives endorsed during ASEM summits 
 Initiatives Initiator(s) 
Follo
w-up
435
 
A
S
E
M
1
 
1.  Foreign Ministers’ Meeting n/a Yes 
2. Dialogue between ASEM representatives in New 
York on UN reform 
n/a Yes 
3. Economic Ministers’ Meeting Japan Yes 
4. Informal meeting of senior officials on promotion of 
Asia-Europe economic cooperation and WTO issues 
n/a Yes 
5. Investment Promotion Action Plan Thailand Yes 
6. Asia-Europe Business Forum France, Thailand Yes 
7. Study on the economic synergy between Asia and 
Europe 
Japan Yes 
8. Asia-Europe Environmental Technology Centre  Thailand Yes 
9. Study of integrating a trans-Asian railway network Malaysia Yes 
10. Asia-Europe Foundation Singapore, France Yes 
11. Asia-Europe University Program for students and 
scholars exchange 
Malaysia, Singapore Yes 
12. Seminars and symposia for intellectual exchanges Japan Yes 
13. Youth exchange program of mini ‘Davos-type’ Austria, Japan Yes 
A
S
E
M
2
 
1. Cooperation in combating illicit drugs UK No 
2. Asia-Europe SME conference Italy Yes 
3. ASEMconnect electronic resource network for SMEs Singapore Yes 
4. ASEM Trust Fund UK Yes 
5. European Financial Expertise Network European Commission Yes 
6. To strengthen cooperation on environmental issues, 
especially on fresh water, forestry, climate change and 
sustainable development 
n/a No 
7. To work in cooperation on environmental disaster 
preparedness 
UK No 
8. A meeting of experts on practical cooperation on 
child welfare issues 
The Philippines, UK Yes 
9. To enhance and expand educational links UK Yes 
10. Asia-Europe Vision Group to develop a medium to 
long term vision 
S.Korea Yes 
A
S
E
M
3
 1.  Roundtable on globalization S.Korea, Sweden Yes 
2. Symposium on law enforcement organs’ cooperation 
in combating transnational crimes 
China, Italy  Yes 
3. Anti-money laundering initiative Thailand, UK Yes 
4. Anti-corruption initiative China, UK No 
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 “No” means no follow-up was undertaken within the period between two summits. “?” means no 
available information could be found. 
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5. Ministerial Conference on cooperation for the 
Management of Migratory Flows 
China, Germany, Spain Yes 
6. Conference on E-commerce and Logistics 
Belgium, Finland, 
Singapore 
Yes 
7. Seminar on Asia-Europe Cooperation in SMEs Belgium, Thailand No 
8. WTO Trade Facilitation Conference 
European Commission, 
Malaysia 
Yes 
9. Environment Ministers’ Meeting China, Germany Yes 
10. Science and technology cooperation on forestry 
conservation and sustainable development 
China, Finland Yes 
11. Initiative to address the Digital Divide 
S.Korea, Japan, 
Singapore 
Yes 
12. Seminar on information and telecommunications 
technology 
European Commission, 
Thailand 
Yes 
13. Trans-Eurasia Information Network 
European Commission, 
Singapore, S.Korea 
Yes 
14. Initiative to combat trafficking in women and 
children 
The Philippines, 
Thailand 
Yes 
15. Initiative on HIV/AIDS Malaysia, UK No 
16. DUO Fellowship Program 
France, S.Korea, 
Singapore 
Yes 
A
S
E
M
4
 
1. ASEM Seminar on Anti-terrorism 
China, Denmark, 
Germany, Japan, Spain 
Yes 
2.  An ad hoc informal consultative mechanism to 
confer expeditiously on significant international events 
n/a Yes 
3.  Regular contacts between relevant regional and 
national agencies of ASEM partners to facilitate 
cooperation in the common fight against terrorism and 
transnational organised crime 
Singapore  ? 
4. Two rounds of consultations on the Doha 
Development Agenda by WTO experts 
European Commission Yes 
5. ASEM Symposium on multilateral and regional 
economic relations 
Germany, Japan, 
Singapore 
Yes 
6. ASEM High-Level Conference on agricultural 
cooperation 
China Yes 
7. Workshop on building market systems under 
globalisation 
Germany, Vietnam Yes 
8. An action-oriented Taskforce to explore ways for 
closer ASEM economic partnership 
Japan, Singapore, Spain Yes 
9. ASEM Workshop on the Future of Employment and 
the Quality of Labour 
China, Germany, Ireland, 
Spain 
Yes 
10. Asia-Europe Cooperation in promoting awareness in 
the young generation on the drug problem 
China, Thailand, UK Yes 
11. ASEM meeting on ARTIADE ATHENS 2004 
Olympic Games of the Visual Arts 
n/a Yes 
12. Study on connection between the annual European 
Capitals of Culture and Asian counterparts 
n/a No 
13. ASEM Seminar on Educational Exchange European Commission, Yes 
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Ireland, Japan, Singapore 
14. ASEM Conference on cultures and civilisations 
China, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Denmark, 
France 
Yes 
15. ASEM Youth Games Thailand Yes 
A
S
E
M
5
 
1. Asia-Europe Young Political Leaders Forum China, Denmark Yes 
2. Initiative for strengthening cyber security within the 
ASEM region 
S.Korea, Singapore, 
Portugal, Germany, 
Poland, the Philippines, 
China 
Yes 
3. ASEM Trade and Investment Exposition 
Austria, China, Germany, 
Thailand 
Yes 
4. ASEM Workshop on EU/ASIA S&T cooperation on 
clean technology 
European Commission, 
Vietnam 
Yes 
5. ASEM Cooperation in the applications of ICT in 
human resource development and capacity building 
Vietnam, Sweden, 
S.Korea, Brunei, Japan, 
Ireland 
Yes 
6. ASEM Cooperation on HIV/AIDS control 
Sweden, Vietnam, the 
Netherlands, the 
Philippines 
Yes 
7. ASEM DUO Fellowship Program Phase II 
S.Korea, Singapore, 
France, Denmark 
Yes 
8. Inter-faith Dialogue 
Indonesia, UK, European 
Commission 
Yes 
9. ASEM Education and Research Hub for Life Long 
Learning 
Denmark, Sweden, 
Thailand 
Yes 
A
S
E
M
6
4
3
6
 
1. Information exchange systems on natural disaster 
management 
n/a  ? 
2. Study the possibility of establishing early warning 
mechanisms 
n/a  ? 
A
S
E
M
7
 
1. Program for Training of Trainers in the Field of  
Border Management and Security 
Romania No 
2. ASEM Seminar on New Technologies for Demining 
and Human Security 
Italy Yes 
3. Meeting of Ministers of Interior on Irregular 
Migration 
Romania Yes 
4. Promoting Asia-Europe Trade Security and 
Facilitation 
China Yes 
5. ASEM Conference on the Role of Finance in 
Economic and Rural Development 
European Commission Yes 
6. ASEM Forum on the Green Growth and SMEs S.Korea Yes 
                                           
436
 Neither the Chairman’s Statement of ASEM6 nor the two Declarations issued had mentioned any 
initiative. The two initiatives listed were mentioned in the Beijing Declaration on Sustainable 
Development issued during ASEM7. 
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7. UN/ASEM UN-SPIDER Expert Meeting: the 
Contribution of Space-based Solutions to Sustainable 
Communities 
Austria No 
8. Workshop on the impact of Climate Change on the 
biodiversity of tropical rainforests 
Brunei Yes 
9. ASEM Eco-City Network China Yes 
10. ASEM Seminar on Energy Security and Climate 
Change 
Singapore Yes 
11. Energy Ministers' Meeting European Commission Yes 
12. ASEM Workshop on Sharing Experiences on 
Preparedness to Response to Global Climate Change 
and Emerging Diseases 
Vietnam No 
13. ASEM Cooperation on capacity building of disaster 
relief 
China Yes 
14. Eurasian Land Bridge Seminar Pakistan Yes 
15. ASEM Forum on Food Security Vietnam Yes 
16. ASEM Culture and Art Festival China Yes 
17. ASEM interfaith Cultural Youth Camp Project Thailand Yes 
18. Enhancement of ASEM visibility through cultural 
activities 
Vietnam Yes 
A
S
E
M
8
 
1. 9
th
 ASEM Conference of Directors General of 
Immigration 
Belgium Yes 
2. ASEM SMEs Eco Innovation Centre S.Korea Yes 
3. ASEM Water Resources Research and Development 
Centre 
China Yes 
4. Asia-Europe Seminar on Conservation of Timber and 
Lime Buildings 
Malaysia Yes 
5. ASEM Seminar on Harmonisation of Biofuels 
Standards and Application to Vehicle Technologies 
the Philippines Yes 
6. ASEM Green Growth Forum Vietnam Yes 
7. ASEM Symposium on Sustainable Forest 
Management to Address Climate Change 
China Yes 
8. UN/ASEM UN-SPIDER Expert Meeting: the 
Contribution of Space-based Solutions to Sustainable 
Communities 
Austria Yes 
9. Trans Eurasia Information Network Cooperation 
Centre 
S.Korea Yes 
10. ASEM Culture Ministers’ Meeting Indonesia Yes 
11. ASEM Symposium on Technical and Vocational 
Education 
China Yes 
12. ASEM Food Security Conference Thailand Yes 
13. ASEM Forum on Social Safety Nets for All Vietnam Yes 
14. Transport Development Forum China Yes 
15. 2
nd
 Transportation Ministers’ Meeting China Yes 
16. ASEM DUO Fellowship Program Third Phase S.Korea Yes 
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1. ASEM workshop ‘Challenges to Biodiversity 
Conservation in Tropical Ecosystems’ 
Brunei 
N
o
t 
ap
p
li
ca
b
le
 
2. ASEM High Level Meeting on Disaster Prevention 
and Relief Response to Climate Change 
Vietnam, Laos, 
Indonesia, Pakistan, 
European Commission, 
Denmark, Germany, 
Netherlands 
3. ASEM Seminar on ‘Water and River Basin 
Management – A Green Growth Approach’ 
Hungary, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Laos, 
Thailand, Vietnam 
4. ASEM Symposium on ‘Towards Peace and 
Prosperity in Asia and Europe: The Need of A 
Dynamic ASEM’ 
China, Laos, India, 
Poland, ASEF 
5. ASEM Model Project on Promoting Sustainable 
Forest Management 
China 
6. ASEM Network for Science, Technology and 
Innovation Cooperation in Water Resources 
China 
7. ASEM Seminar on nuclear safety China 
8. ASEM Workshop to foster Green Business of 
Small and Medium enterprises 
Indonesia 
9. Disaster Management Conference the Philippines 
 
10. ASEM-initiative of Sustainable Development 
Dialogue 
n/a  
 
This long list of initiatives is rather impressive, and may help to counter the critique 
of ASEM being a mere ‘talk-shop’. Nonetheless, a closer examination reveals that a 
majority of them are ad hoc seminars, conferences and workshops (still mainly 
‘talking’). Many initiated activities turn out to be simply one-off events and weak in 
creating added-value to the ASEM process. Overall, four-fifth of these initiatives are 
one-off gatherings. These ASEM’s symposia and conferences normally end up with a 
summary or a list of recommendations to submit to the ASEM summits or MMs. 
Owing to the absence of mechanism to secure these recommendations to reach or to 
be read by the ASEM leaders within the present ASEM design, the suggestions 
submitted are rarely turned into actual policies. The same happens to the initiatives in 
the form of study or research on a given topic. Accordingly, the added-value of 
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convening experts and academics to the policy-making in ASEM countries is highly 
questionable. 
Qualitatively, these symposia and conferences, which make up the majority of ASEM 
initiatives, are not totally meaningless. Convening the intellectuals from Asia and 
Europe can foster people-to-people contacts, especially between individuals who 
share similar professions or expertise. Individual participants can develop personal 
ties with each other; though the scale in the ASEM events has remained small 
(normally ranges from twenty to a hundred). Again, this added-value created by 
ASEM is long-term instead of immediate. 
The list of initiatives reflects ASEM’s dual-track approach and multidimensionality. 
The proportion of activities in Track 1 (involve governments only) and Track 2 
(involve non-state actors) are quite balanced. The initiatives cover various policy 
areas: a third of them are designated to the socio-cultural field, whereas proposals lie 
in economic field, environmental field and political field each represent around 
one-fifth of the total number of initiatives. Since ASEM6, the environment has 
become a key focus. From this list of initiatives, ASEM partners do not seem to be too 
‘business-oriented’, as labelled by some observers.437 Multi-dimensionality can be 
both an advantage and disadvantage of ASEM. When the boundaries between 
different policy fields diminish, an economic issue can have a huge environmental 
impact; similarly a social legislation can bring political impact. The multi-faceted 
nature allows ASEM to flexibly deal with these multi-sectoral issues. On the other 
hand, comparing with the G20 which focuses on the international financial crisis and 
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 Richards and Kirkpatrick, “Reorienting Inter-regional Co-operation” (1999): 698; Gilson, Asia Meets 
Europe: Inter-regionalism and the Asia-Europe Meeting (2002), 75. 
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the ARF who concentrates on security in Asia, ASEM lacks expertise on any aspect. 
The initiatives are replicated sometimes. For instance, there have been several similar 
initiatives on student and academia exchanges: ASEM2’s Asia-Europe University and 
mini ‘Davos-type’ youth exchange, ASEM4’s Seminar on Education Exchange and 
the three phases of ASEM DUO Fellowship Programme. Noteworthy, the promotion 
of intellectual exchanges has already been a main area of ASEF’s mandate. Another 
example is the duplication of the Asia Europe Business Conference (which was a 
one-off event) and the first AEBF. Unnecessary duplications waste resources and lead 
to missed opportunities to create added-value. Many ASEM partners and observers 
have recognised such problem and urged for improvement during the evaluation on 
ASEM’s tenth anniversary.438 Some partners argued that the absence of a central 
secretariat to record and coordinate the initiatives led to technical difficulty to add up 
the value of similar initiatives. Subsequently, ASEM6 created an ASEM Virtual 
Secretariat to facilitate coordination and information sharing among ASEM partners. 
However, the effectiveness of the Virtual Secretariat was described as minimal by 
three interviewed key informants.
439
 Indeed, none of the Chairmen’s Statement of 
ASEM7, ASEM8 or ASEM9 has mentioned this Virtual Secretariat. Instead, new 
administrative initiatives were created such as the establishment of the ASEM 
Chairman Support Group (endorsed in FMM10) and of the coordination mechanism 
‘from summit to summit’ (endorsed in ASEM8). The idea of the Virtual Secretariat 
                                           
438
 Korean government, Overview Report on ASEM initiatives- Evaluation and Recommendations for 
Future Improvements (2006), 3. 
439
 They were Wei Nian from the Technical Support team for the ASEM process set up by the European 
Commission between 1 January and 31 December 2010, Ambassador Bertrand de Crombrugghe who 
headed the ASEM8 Task Force set up by the Belgian Government and an anonymous senior official from 
the European Commission with extensive ASEM experience. 
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seemed to be abandoned. 
In addition, the Issue-based leadership mechanism was introduced in ASEM6 
(adopted in ASEM7) to better coordinate the initiatives. By ASEM9, the four-year 
term endorsed in ASEM7 completed. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of this 
mechanism, this research compares the list of Issue-based leadership (Table 5.1 in the 
previous chapter) to the initiatives adopted and the events taken place from ASEM7 
onwards. It is found that a majority of the volunteer ASEM partners had organised 
ASEM events in their respective ‘leading issues’. Encouragingly, several concrete 
commitments were resulted: the rotating ASEM Education Secretariat was established 
to coordinate ASEM educational activities,
440
 ASEM SMEs Eco Innovation Centre 
(ASEIC) opened in Seoul
441
 and ASEM Water Resources Research and Development 
Centre set up in China.
442
 In addition, the LabourMM4 (October 2012) adopted a list 
of ‘issue-based leadership’ to implement ‘technical projects’.443 
                                           
440
 It was established by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research and hosted by the 
German Academic Exchange Service. Germany is the current host of the Secretariat, while Indonesia 
offers to host the next term which begins in October 2013. For more information, see 
<www.asem-education-secretariat.org/en/12183/>. 
441
 ASEIC was established in Seoul in June 2011. It aims to promote green growth business 
opportunities for SMEs. For more information, see <www.aseic.org/main.do>. 
442
 This centre was established in Changsha in August 2011, to research on water resource development 
and create synergy among interested parties in ASEM to collaborate in water environment governance. 
For more information, see <www.asemwater.org>. 
443
 Chairman’s Statement of LabourMM4, 2012, paragraph 27. The list are:  
Issues 
Interested Partners 
Asian European 
Social Protection India the Netherlands 
Youth Employment Polices China Poland 
Health and Safety at Work Malaysia, S. Korea France 
Skill Development the Philippines Finland 
Social Dialogue on working conditions Indonesia Belgium 
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Nonetheless, it is found that some other ASEM partners have been taking their own 
actions regardless of the existence of the Issue-based leadership. For instance, 
Vietnam organised a forum on food security in July 2010 (co-sponsored by Denmark) 
while Thailand organised a separate conference on the same topic in May 2011. Being 
neither leader nor sponsor in International Migration, Romania was found active in 
proposing and organising events on border management and migration since ASEM7. 
On the other hand, Japan which had volunteered as leader in Pandemic Control and 
Climate Change did not contribute to any relevant ASEM events between ASEM7 and 
ASEM9. Seemingly, not all ASEM partners have taken the Issue-based leadership 
seriously; its non-binding nature would be one reason. When the first four-year term 
completes in ASEM9, ASEM partners have not evaluated the mechanism. In fact, 
there was no mention of the Issue-based leadership in the Chairman’s Statement of 
ASEM9. The aforementioned ‘labour-version’ issue-based leadership adopted by the 
LabourMM4 was not addressed either. 
It is rather nature that some initiatives would receive more attention, follow-ups and 
have more information available on them than others. They include namely the 
creation of ASEF and AEBF, Investment Promotion Action Plan (IPAP), Trade 
Facilitation Action Plan (TFAP), ASEM Trust Fund, ASEM Conference on 
Counter-terrorism, Trans-Eurasia Information Network (TEIN), ASEM DUO 
Fellowship, ASEM Eco-City Network, as well as the establishment of ASEIC and 
ASEM Water Resources Research and Development Centre. They illustrate that 
ASEM partners are able to put together something more substantial and sustainable 
than ah-hoc conferences and symposia. 
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Taking the TFAP as example, since ASEM2 it has been designated by ASEM partners 
as a platform to promote, facilitate and liberalise trade between ASEM member states, 
especially by reducing non-tariff barriers. Under the TFAP, officials from ASEM 
partner governments gathered as different working groups, not regularly though. 
These meetings are expected to foster the exchange of views and information, which 
are collected and then turned into lists of common priority and best practice. ASEM 
partners are encouraged to reduce non-tariffs barriers and increase transparency to 
promote trade on the prioritised areas. Every two year, they agree on a list of concrete 
deliverables to form a two-year programme, which are then submitted to the EMM, 
now to the FinMM due to the suspension of EMM, or summit for approval. Each 
partner is responsible for the implementation back in their home country and has to 
report their progress to the SOMTI and the co-facilitators (a volunteer ASEM partner) 
annually. SOMTI and the co-facilitators summarise the reports collected and present a 
list of achievements to all ASEM partners as well as the business community via the 
AEBF.  
Nonetheless, TFAP as well as its sibling IPAP are not negotiation fora or legal 
binding arrangements. ASEM partners voluntarily decide whether, how and when to 
undertake concrete actions. According to the reports published, the follow-ups on 
TFAP vary greatly among the ASEM partners. In fact, these evaluation reports are 
more like a summary of the most updated trade or investment-related policies 
imposed by the ASEM partners. There has been no assessment of the impacts of the 
action plans on the trade and investment flows between ASEM partners. There has 
been no attempt to check how many inter-regional business connections were 
established; how many non-tariff barriers were eliminated; or how useful or popular 
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are the two web-pages under the IPAP.
444
 There has been no academic research on 
these issues either. Understandably, the co-existence of many factors (including the 
APEC’s TFAP, bilateral trade deals and different financial crises) which can affect 
the economic relations between ASEM countries makes it difficult to assess the 
impact of ASEM’s TFAP and IPAP. 
Moving to the social-cultural pillar, TEIN and ASEM DUO Fellowship are two 
examples of more developed ASEM initiatives. While the former aims at facilitating 
research and virtual teaching cooperation between institutions from Asia and Europe, 
the later aims to facilitate the exchange of students and scholars of tertiary education 
institutions between the two continents. So far, four other ASEM partners (Belgium, 
Denmark, Sweden and Thailand) have joined France, Korea and Singapore to be 
contributors to the ASEM DUO Fellowship. Students and scholars from selected 
institutions in the contributing countries are paired up with ‘fellows’ from institutions 
of the other continent. The number of pairs awarded by each contributing country 
varies. A Secretariat for this initiative was set up in October 2001 in Seoul as a focal 
contact point and depository for information. A special website (www.asemduo.org) 
has been set up to attract and facilitate the applicants. 
TEIN has entered into its fourth phase in after ASEM8. From the first phase (began in 
December 2001), TEIN has bridged 8000 research and educational institutions across 
Asia and Europe.
445
 The high-capacity internet connection infrastructure facilitates 
cooperation among the research and educational institutions. The direct connectivity 
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 Virtual Information Exchange <www.asem.vie.net>, which was replaced later by ASEM Invest 
Online <www.europa.eu.int/aio>, and ASEMConnect <asemconnectvietnam.gov.vn>. 
445
 TEIN3 official website, <www.tein3.net/?PHPSESSID=2f60947213a1fb9c2baf5f9fce39fc74> 
(accessed 17 May 2011). 
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created is expected to eventually contribute to the inter-regional economic growth and 
understanding. In 2011, the TEIN Cooperation Centre was established by the Korean 
government as a non-profit foundation corporation to manage TEIN4. Notably, the 
coverage of TEIN overlaps partially with but not equals to ASEM membership. Some 
of the countries involved are not ASEM partners, while some of the ASEM partners 
are not covered. TEIN3 and TEIN4 membership, which remains the same, covers 
Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China India, Indonesia, Japan, South 
Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand and Vietnam. Three out of these eighteen countries are non-ASEM 
members. 
Concerning the initiatives adopted in the past MMs and SOMs, the records have been 
patchy. As mentioned above, many of the after-meeting records of the SOMs are not 
available to the public. Hence, it is especially difficult to construct a complete list of 
initiatives adopted in the SOMs. From the official documents available, at least 
eighty-four initiatives were endorsed by the MMs (Table 6.7), and at least ten were 
adopted by the SOMs
446
 (Table 6.8). 
Table 6.6: Initiatives endorsed during ASEM MMs 
MMs Initiatives 
FinMM1 
1. ASEM Discussion on the Euro and Its Implication on Global and 
Asian Financial Market 
2. ASEM Cooperation In Fighting Money Laundering 
3. Cooperation in Financial Supervision and Regulation 
4. Meetings of ASEM Finance Deputies to discuss international 
financial issues raised in other international monetary and financial fora 
5. work program of ASEM Customs Directors General and 
Commissioners 
6. A Computerised Communication Network among ASEM Finance 
Ministries 
                                           
446
 Source of information: official documents issued by the SOMs which took place after ASEM5. 
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EMM1 1. Trade Facilitation Action Plan 
FinMM2 
1. A list of priorities for each ASEM country requiring assistance in 
strengthening financial systems 
FMM2 
1. Role of State & Market: roles of public authorities and private actors 
in promotion of economic and social progress conference  
2. ASEM Expert Meeting on the Protection and Promotion of Cultural 
Heritage 
3. ASEM Education Hubs 
4. Seminar on Combination of  Traditional and Modern Medicine for 
Public Health Care 
5. Seminar on Labour Relations 
S&TMM 
1. An informal meeting of Science and Technology Ministers on 
‘Science and Society’ 
FMM3 
1. Kobe Research Project 
2. ASEM Public Debt Management Forum 
3. Lifelong Learning 
4. Seminar on Asia-Europe Cooperation on the Applications of 
Information Technology to Human Resources Development in the 
Mekong Sub-region 
5. ASEM SOM Information Exchange, Monitoring and Review 
Mechanism for ASEM Initiatives and Activities 
MigrantMM 
1. Network of contact points for coordination and preparation of 
meetings at expert level between partners and future ASEM meetings at 
Director-General level of Immigration services 
2. Study of the possibility of establishing a network of Immigration and 
Consular Liaison Officers 
FMM4 
1. Meeting between Directors-General of migration, establishment of a 
network of migration contact points would facilitate the preparation 
2. ASEM seminar on Water Resources Management 
FinMM4 
1. Symposium on combating underground banking and the need of 
supervising alternate remittance services in European and Asian 
countries 
EMM4 
1. Review of priorities and activities carried out under ASEM 
Economic pillar 
2. Two rounds of consultations in DDA, one in autumn in Asia and one 
in Europe back to back with SOMTI 
3. ASEM Symposium on multilateral and regional economic relations 
in spring in 2003 
4. ASEM high level conference on agricultural cooperation, with a 
preparation expert meeting 
5. A further stocktaking in the last quarter in 2003, after the Cancun 
ministerial 
FinMM5 1. The Bali Initiative 
FMM5 
1. Ad-hoc consultations amongst ASEM Permanent Representatives to 
the UN on special issues 
2. ASEM Seminar on the Management of Public Health Emergency 
3. Management Strategy for ASEF’s long term Financial Sustainability 
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4. Study ASEM information Board Phase II 
5. ASEM logo 
FMM6 
1. ASEM Symposium on an Iron-Silk Road 
2. ASEM Workshop on Urban Forestry 
FMM7 
1. ASEM Oceans Initiative 
2. ASEM Workshop on community-level actions for global 
environmental agenda 
3. ASEM Prosecutors-General Conference 
4. ASEM Workshop on strengthening human resources through 
vocational education and training 
5. ASEM Diplomatic Academies Network 
6. A review on the 10 years of ASEM 
CultureMM2 1. Action Plan of Culture Ministers 
FinMM6 1. The Tianjin Initiative 
High-level 
Economic 
Officials’ 
Meeting 
1. ASEM Seminar on Energy 
2. ASEM Forum and Exposition on Tourist Investment and 
Cooperation 
LabourMM1 1. ASEM Labour and Social Affairs Ministers’ meeting 
FinMM8 
1. ASEM Meeting of Transport Ministers 
2. The Jeju Initiative to enhance the mutual cooperation on PPP among 
ASEM member countries 
EduMM1 1. ASEM University-Business-Forum 
HighEduMM 
1. ASEM Dialogue on credits, learning outcomes, quality assurance and 
qualification 
2. Meetings for Quality Assurance Agencies in Asia and Europe 
3. Conferences on lifelong learning 
4. Link between the European Network for Quality Assurance in 
Vocational Education and Training and Asian initiatives on QA in VET 
5. Workshop on attractiveness and employability in Vocational 
Education and Training 
6. An EU-Asia portal providing information on jobs and learning 
opportunities in ASEM 
7. Biennial Asia-Europe Rectors' Conference 
8. A rotating ASEM Education Secretariat of four-year cycle to 
coordinate the ASEM Education Process 
FMM9 
1. ASEM Seminar on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights 
2. ASEM Conference on the Role of Finance in Economic and Rural 
Development 
3. ASEM Conference on Harmonisation of Competency Standards 
4. Asia-Europe Economic Cooperation and Development Forum 
5. ASEM Conference on the Sustainability of the Asian Growth Model 
6. ASEM Forum on Climate Change and Adaptation Measures 
7. ASEM Workshop for Empowering Local Community in the Use of 
ICT 
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8. Asia-Europe Forum on ICT Research and Development Cooperation 
9. ASEM Interfaith and Intercultural Retreat for Religious Leaders 
10. ASEM Seminar on Metropolitan Management 
FinMM9 
1. 2nd ASEM Development Conference 
2. ASEM Public Conference on EU-Asia Strategic Relations 
3. Employment Ministers' Meeting 
CultureMM5 
1. Establishment of an experts’ network on sustainable city 
management 
2. Establishment of Asia Europe creative city network 
3. Sharing experiences in heritage emergency response 
EduMM3 
1. Establishment of an ASEM pilot group of experts to explore the 
feasibility of setting up an ASEM convention on mutual recognition of 
degrees and study achievements 
2. Turn ASEM University-Business Forum into an annual event and 
link it to EU University-Business Forum 
3. Conference on qualifications framework 
4. An expert meeting on e-learning as a component of lifelong learning 
FMM10 
1. ASEM/ASEF Meeting on the Role of Space-based Information for 
Disaster Preparedness and Recovery in East and Southeast Asia: 
Lessons to Learn from the Recent Disasters 
2. Conference on Enhancement of Balanced Mobility between Asia and 
Europe 
3. ASEM Forum on Trade and Investment in Marine Fisheries 
4. ASEM Education Seminar on Quality Enhancement in Higher 
Education 
TransportMM2 
1. Action plan on Facilitation of Movement of Goods and People 
between Asia and Europe 
Table 6.8: Examples of initiatives endorsed during ASEM SOMs 
SOMs Initiatives 
SOMTI10  
1. Seminar on Tourism 
2. Forum on Tourism 
3. Seminar on Energy 
SOMTI11 1. ASEM Business Summit on Trade in Services 
DGCustom6 
1. Seoul Initiative Action Plan on simplifying customs procedures and on 
strengthening customs cooperation in East Asia 
DGCustom7 
1. Trade Facilitation Action Plan for 2006-2008 
2. Enforcement Working Group Enforcement Action Plan for 2007-2009 
DGCustom8 
 
1. ASEM Customs-Trade-Day 
2. Prepare a paper with an overview of ‘good practices’ of customs IPR 
enforcement 
3. Prepare a paper on ‘good practices’ and the role of customs in 
enforcing environmental law 
4. Prepare a paper on ‘good practices’ for setting up a dialogue with 
traders for consultation and information sharing 
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In sum, the political will of the partners determines the advancement of ASEM 
cooperation. While certain ASEM partners have been very active in proposing and 
organising ASEM events, some partners have been invisible in the sponsors’ lists. The 
difference in degree of commitment among the ASEM partners is explored in more 
details below. While the majority of the initiatives are one-off symposia and 
conferences, ASEM partners have demonstrated ability and willingness to establish 
more concrete and long-term cooperative projects namely TFAP, IPAP and TEIN. The 
number of tangible and long-term initiatives can serve as an indicator of the 
commitment of ASEM partners to the inter-regional relationship. 
6.5.  Regional organisations in ASEM Track 1 
As already mentioned, although the European Commission and the President of the 
Council of the EU sit at the ASEM discussion table, they do not speak for the EU 
member states. Each EU member state has individual seat and act for itself in the 
ASEM process. The few exceptional cases, in which the Commission served as a 
broker and regional coordinator who presented a common EU interest, have been 
WTO-related issues and the discussions on international trade liberalisation.
447
 
Since ASEM7, ASEAN Secretariat has had its own seat in ASEM. Similar to the 
European Commission’s case, ASEAN Secretariat does not speak for ASEAN 
member states in ASEM. Different from the European Commission, ASEAN 
Secretariat is excluded from the coordinator system. Its member states take turn as 
one of the two Asian rotating coordinators. The reality has not been matching the 
expectation of Soesastro and Wanandi that ASEAN would play a ‘core role beyond 
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 Dent, “ASEM and the ‘Cinderella Complex’ of EU-East Asia Economic Relations” (2001): 36-7. 
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Southeast Asia in fora like ASEM and APEC.’448 It is indeed the few core ASEAN 
member states (namely Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) who have played eminent 
role in the ASEM process. As Dent highlighted, ‘ASEAN member states were keen to 
present their own distinct ideas on ASEM.’449 The outspoken former Malaysian 
Prime Minister Mahathir confirmed such view in 1998 in saying ‘it [ASEM] was not 
an ASEAN-Europe meeting’ and ‘Malaysia will attend the upcoming ASEM in 
London as an individual participant and not as a member of a bloc.’450  
Involvement of the two regional institutions triggers confusion. While each EU 
member state has its own seat and delegation in ASEM, who does the European 
Commission represent? The same question applies to the Asian side after ASEAN 
Secretariat was admitted as an individual member. The ASEAN case is even more 
problematic because half of the Asian ASEM partners are not member of ASEAN. 
After the accession of Norway and Switzerland to the European side of ASEM, the 
same problem also applies to the representation of the EU.  
Interestingly, the founding partners and other participants of the ASEM process do 
not seem to concern much about the double representation of certain partner countries. 
One key reason could be the informality of ASEM. As no legally-binding decisions 
are made, ASEM partners do not have to calculate the weight or vote distribution as 
they do in multilateral institutions like the UN General Assembly. Subsequently, 
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ASEM can serve as a testing ground for the co-existence of a regional organisation 
and its constituent members both as individual participants in one international forum. 
Thus far, in ASEM’s Track 1, the ASEAN Secretariat has not done much except 
attending the meetings. In contrast, active participation of the European Commission 
as an independent ASEM partners provides this research with substances for the study 
of the co-existence of a regional institution and its component states in a multilateral 
institution. Until ASEM9, the Commission took part in ASEM just as another active 
partner. It hosted numerous MMs and SOMs; it proposed, funded and implemented 
initiatives; its involvement covered all three ASEM pillars. Moreover, the 
Commission’s membership has never been distinguished from other partners’, 
although it was the sole non-state partner when the process inaugurated. Practically, 
the European Commission’s membership has not been different from that of any 
ASEM country, while its legitimacy and representation did not seem matter too much 
to other ASEM partners. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the EU’s Lisbon Treaty is expected to bring some changes 
to the Union’s representation in ASEM. In ASEM8, the permanent Presidency of the 
EU Council was added alongside the European Commission and the rotating 
Presidency of the Council of Ministers. The President of the EU Council, van 
Rumpuy. The newly formed European External Action Service (EEAS) took the role 
of the Directorate-General for External Relations of the European Commission to 
represent the Commission in the FMM. Yet, until ASEM9, these changes did not 
appear to boost the coherence of European side much. Meanwhile, the entry of two 
non-EU countries to the European side may counter-balance the post-Lisbon 
measures. 
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Apart from the independent membership granted to the European Commission and the 
ASEAN Secretariat, the special roles of the EU and ASEAN in the ASEM process are 
also affirmed by the attention given to their respective developments. Time is given 
for updates of the respective integration progress in the two organisations in every 
ASEM summit, including the introduction of the Euro in 2002, development of the 
EU’s common foreign policy, the attempt of ASEAN to build an ASEAN Community, 
the singing and come-into-force of the ASEAN Charter as well as enlargements of the 
two organisations. In addition, two other regional groupings on the Asia side are 
mentioned repeatedly in the summits: ASEAN+3 and the ARF. ASEAN’s driver role 
in the establishment of these two regional groupings in East Asian regional integration 
has been acknowledged repeatedly.  
Noteworthy, the actions of these regional organisations and groups are limited to 
regional contexts, except that of the EU. The Union’s involvement in East Asia was 
mentioned seven times throughout the nine summits’ Chairmen’s Statements, namely 
EU’s participation in the Aceh Monitoring Mission, the EU-ASEAN Political 
Dialogue and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation between the two regional 
organisations. Remarkably, the global actorness of the EU was evaluated higher than 
that of the Asian regional groups. This was further confirmed when its involvement at 
international level was mentioned. The EU’s external involvements in various parts of 
the world were reported: the Middle-East (the Iranian nuclear crisis, war between 
Israel and the Hezbollah and war between Israel and Lebanon in 2006),
451
 Southeast 
Asia (the Aceh Monitoring Mission),
452
the UN (resource-funding for the United 
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Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change between 2010 and 2012).
453
 In 
contrast, the most developed Asian regional organisation, ASEAN, was not featured 
to have acted outside Southeast Asia. 
6.6.  International organisations in Track 1 
Certain international organisations are also found involved in ASEM’s Track 1. As 
mentioned above, they were invited to some MMs and SOMs. Moreover, their role in 
the international arena has been underscored in many ASEM official documents. The 
first intensive presence of an international organisation was in ASEM2’s Financial 
Statement, which was issued in response to the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997/8. The 
actorness and role of two multilateral financial institutions, the IMF and the World 
Bank, in managing global financial order were highlighted. Similarly, the significance 
of the international financial institutions was stressed in ASEM8’s Brussels 
Declaration on more Effective Global Economic Governance.  
The special agencies of the UN have been frequent guests in ASEM MMs. The UN 
and its agencies like the International Atomic Energy Agency and Food and 
Agriculture Organisation are mentioned when transnational problems arose, for 
example, the fight against terrorism with UN in lead; threats related to the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons; and concerns on 
food security. In the past summit Chairmen’s Statements, ASEM leaders highly 
commented on the UN’s role in dealing with unstable states like Afghanistan, East 
Timor, Myanmar and Iran. Moreover, ASEM leaders affirmed the significance of the 
UN and its special agencies in promoting multilateral cooperation.  
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The international organisations are mainly brought up when crises arise, reflecting the 
problem-solving role of these organisations in the mind of ASEM partners. 
Multilateral organisations such as the UN and the WTO are often referred to as 
platforms, mechanisms or fora for nation-states (which overlap with the ASEM 
membership) to interact, instead of acting on their own. Half of the time when the UN 
is featured, its dependence on the member states to implement its Charter, 
conventions and resolutions is underlined. Instead of imposing their rules and 
decisions on the members, the international organisations are depicted to be 
subordinate to the constituent nation-states. 
There were several attempts by the ASEM partners to pre-coordinate their position 
before a WTO or UN multilateral meeting. For instance, in ASEM1 the Heads of 
State/Government talked about the first WTO Ministerial Conference (held in 
December 1996, Singapore); in ASEM3 leaders discussed the UN Conference on the 
Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (held in 2001); and 
in ASEM4 the Heads of State/Government talked over the WTO Ministerial Meeting 
in Cancun (held in 2003). However, when assessing the results of these 
pre-coordination attempts, Dent concluded that ASEM has failed to reach its 
‘multilateral utility’.454 This doctoral research agrees with Dent’s conclusion and 
proposes the informality and non-legal binging nature of the process as two reasons, as 
they make obligatory actions of ASEM partners in the multilateral fora impossible. 
A picture of how ASEM partners envision the correlation between ASEM and other 
multilateral institutions emerges. They do not seek to alter the US-Europe built liberal 
international order established after the Second World War via ASEM. Instead, the 
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partners put ASEM within the WTO framework in trade affairs and within the UN 
framework in political and other affairs. The overlapping membership is important: 
ASEM partners are also members of these international organisations. Consequently, 
the UN and WTO-related issues become part of the common concerns of the ASEM 
partners. Regulations and agreements from international organisations are often 
adopted as guidance for actions among ASEM partners. ASEM partners have not 
isolated the ASEM process from the wider international arena or taken action outside 
the framework of the UN or the WTO. Besides, the international organisations are 
assigned the problem-solving role in managing international problems, while ASEM is 
not. Nevertheless, the actorness of these international actors is found fluctuating. They 
are seen as individual entity acting on their own only occasionally. Mostly, it is the 
member states of the international organisations who take the real actions. 
6.7.  Non-state actors in Track 1 
Shifting to the non-state actors, examination of ASEM Track 1 revealed that the 
‘business community’ is the most heavy-weighted private actor. ASEM official 
documents underscored numerous times the crucial role of the business community in 
the ASEM process.
455
 A special initiative, Asia Europe Business Forum, has been 
proposed and adopted in the inaugural summit to foster inter-regional 
business-to-business and government-to-business relations. The AEBF is then 
regarded as ‘important in shaping the agenda and improving interaction with the 
business sector through consultation.’456 No similar recognition or official channel for 
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communication is available to other types of non-state actors. However, the 
involvement of non-state actors on ASEM’s Track 1 reminds limited. Their 
participations in the process concentrate in Track 2, which are explored in details in 
Chapter 8. 
6.8.  Variation of commitment of different ASEM member states 
The above sections illustrate the dominance of nation-state as primary actor in 
ASEM’s Track 1. However, the commitments of the forty-nine member states vary. 
This section explores the degree of engagement of the individual nation-states, as well 
as that of the European Commission and the ASEAN Secretariat in ASEM’s Track 1. 
ASEM partners’ presence in the meetings and contribution of resources are examined 
so as to distinguish the active and indifferent partners.  
First, looking at the attendance in the ASEM meetings, absentee has been endemic on 
the European side, which has already irritated some of the Asian partners who always 
send representatives at the highest level to the ASEM meetings. FMM6 particularly 
highlighted that attendance to ASEM would reflect the degree of commitment of the 
partners to ASEM cooperation.
457
 A report published by University of Helsinki 
reviewed that absentee rates were the worst in ASEM5 in ASEM’s first decade.458 
Fifteen out of the then twenty-five member states of the EU did not send their Heads 
of state to ASEM5 in Hanoi, albeit the preparation FMM for ASEM5 reiterated the 
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importance of full attendance to the summit.
459
 
Thus far, only the first, seventh, eighth and ninth summit hosts published the official 
attendance lists. This research reconstructs a complete list of attendees by exploring 
other sources of information. With the help of online news archive FACTIVA, news 
about previous ASEM summits was traced. News items which mentioned the 
participation or absentee of the ASEM leaders as well as news with pictures of the 
summit participants were collected and analysed. Table 6.9 summarised the 
attendance of ASEM Heads of State/Government (‘╳’ refers to absence). 
Table 6.9: Attendance list of Head of State/Government in ASEM summits 
 Summits 1
st
 2
nd
 3
rd
 4
th
 5
th
 6
th
 7
th
 8
th
 9
th
 
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 s
id
e 
European Commission          
Austria  ╳       ╳ 
Belgium   ╳  ╳    ╳ 
Denmark ╳    ╳     
Finland          
France          
Germany    ╳     ╳ 
Greece ╳  ╳  ╳  ╳  ╳ 
Ireland         ╳ 
Italy     ╳   ╳  
Luxembourg          
The Netherlands     ╳    ╳ 
Portugal     ╳  ╳  ╳ 
Spain ╳    ╳    ╳ 
Sweden ╳     ╳  ╳ ╳ 
UK    ╳ ╳ ╳ ╳ ╳ ╳ 
Cyprus 
Not yet joined 
╳   ╳ ╳ 
Czech Republic ╳  ╳   
Estonia      
Hungary ╳ ╳ ╳  ╳ 
Latvia     ╳ 
Lithuania ╳  ╳  ╳ 
Malta ╳   ╳ ╳ 
Poland      
Slovakia ╳  ╳ ╳ ╳ 
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Slovenia ╳     
Bulgaria 
Not yet joined 
   
Romania ╳  ╳ 
Norway 
Not yet joined 
 
Switzerland  
A
si
a
n
 s
id
e 
China          
Japan          
South Korea          
Brunei          
Indonesia  ╳  ╳ ╳   ╳  
Malaysia          
The Philippines  ╳ ╳ ╳      
Singapore        ╳  
Thailand          
Vietnam   ╳       
Cambodia 
Not yet joined 
     
Laos      
Myanmar      
ASEAN Secretariat 
Not yet joined 
   
India  ╳ ╳ 
Mongolia    
Pakistan  ╳  
Australia 
Not yet joined 
  
New Zealand ╳ ╳ 
Russia ╳  
Bangladesh Not yet joined  
As Table 6.9 displays clearly, the absentee records of the European partners have 
been much more serious than that in the Asian side. The contrast has been particular 
big during the summits which are held in Asia (especially ASEM1, ASEM5, ASEM7 
and ASEM9). The absentee rates among the ASEM European partners were 58%, 
29% and 57% in ASEM5, ASEM7 and ASEM9 respectively. In contrast, the Asian 
partners showed full presence in ASEM1, ASEM6 and ASEM7. Interesting pattern of 
attendance is observed in the case of Greece, also for Lithuania who joined ASEM in 
2004. They are represented by their Heads of Government only in the ASEM summits 
took place in Europe. In the most recent summit in Vientiane, Greece only sent an 
ambassador, Malta and the Netherlands also did so. Lithuania, as well as Austria, 
Portugal and Romania, were represented only by officials of vice-ministerial level. 
223 
 
Overall, the most disinterested partners among ASEM founding partners on the 
European side are the UK and Greece, while Hungary and Slovakia demonstrated the 
least interest among the non-founding European partners. The case of the UK is 
noteworthy, from ASEM4 onward, it diminished the interest in ASEM, contrary to its 
enthusiasm in earlier years (it hosted many official meetings as well as proposed and 
funded a number of ASEM initiatives). One possible reason behind this change could 
be UK government’s opposition against the accession of Myanmar to ASEM. The 
need to discuss the accession of Myanmar (together with two other new members to 
ASEAN and ten new members to the EU) first arose in ASEM3,
460
 the last ASEM 
summit which was attended by a British prime minister. 
It is unfair to say that the Europeans are the only absentees. On the Asian side, 
Indonesia and the Philippines have sent delegations led by ministers to several ASEM 
summits. Similar to the Greek case, Indonesia showed indifference to summits which 
took place in Europe. Discouragingly, in ASEM8 two out of the three newly admitted 
members (New Zealand and Russia) chose not to send their heads to Brussels. New 
Zealand was again represented only by the Foreign Minister in ASEM9. This led to 
doubt about whether it is really interested in the process. 
On the other hand, there are partners who persist in sending their Heads of 
State/Government to every ASEM summits. Among the founding members, there are 
ten such partners: the European Commission, Finland, France, Luxembourg, China, 
Japan, South Korea, Brunei, Malaysia and Thailand. Regarding the partners who 
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accessed in 2004, Estonia, Poland, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar have sent their 
highest possible representatives to all ASEM summits they attended. For the partners 
who joined in the second round of enlargement, Bulgaria, Mongolia and the ASEAN 
Secretariat have always sent their heads. For the six new members from the two latest 
rounds of enlargement, it is rather too early to conclude their degree of commitment 
to ASEM (though the disinterest of New Zealand is already rather obvious). Apart 
from the attendance, this research examines the contribution made to ASEM by 
individual ASEM partners in terms of proposing and hosting ASEM activities (Tables 
6.10 and 6.11). 
Table 6.10: ASEM partners’ contribution to host ASEM official meetings from 
ASEM1 to ASEM9 
  
Sum
-mit 
MMs SOMs 
Issue-based 
leadership/ 
(agreed in 
LabourMM4) 
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 
European 
Commission 
 EnergyMM1 
SOM29, SOM30, 
SOMTI1, SOMTI3, 
SOMTI5, SOMTI7, 
SOMTI12, 
S&TSOM2, 
CustomDGM3, 
ICTSOM2 
 
Austria  FinMM7 
SOM16, FinSOM3, 
FinSOM8, Custom 
DG2 
 
Belgium 8
th
  
MigrationDGM9, 
TerrorismSOM8 
(Social Dialogue 
on working 
conditions) 
Denmark 4
th
 
FinMM4, 
EMM4, 
EnvirMM3, 
EduMM3 
SOM31, DGs 
Migration1, 
TerrorismSOM4, 
SOM35 
Climate Change, 
Life Long 
Learning 
Finland 6
th
  
SOM6, SOM18, 
MigrationDGM5 
(Skill 
Development) 
France  CultureMM2 
SOMTI9, FinSOM2, 
MigrationDGM7 
(Health and 
Safety at Work) 
Germany  
FinMM2, 
FMM2, EMM2, 
LabourMM1, 
SOM19, 
TerrorismSOM2 
Development of 
SMEs, 
Education/ 
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FMM8, 
EduMM1 
Human 
Resources, 
Labour/ 
Employment 
Greece   Custom DG8  
Ireland  FMM6 
SOM2, SOM11, 
FinSOM6 
 
Italy 9
th
 EnvMM2   
Luxembourg   SOM3  
the 
Netherlands 
 
(EMM6), 
LabourMM3 
MigrationDGM3 
(Social 
Protection) 
Portugal   SOM7  
Spain  
MigrantMM1, 
FinMM9 
SOM1, SOM10, 
SOM27, FinSOM11, 
TerrorismSOM6 
Interfaith and 
Counter-Terroris
m, Finance 
Sweden   
SOM9, SOM17, 
Custom DG4 
 
UK 2
nd
  
SOM4, SOM15, 
FinSOM1, Custom 
DG6 
Pandemic 
Control 
Cyprus   MigrationDGM11  
Czech 
Republic 
  SOM25  
Estonia  
Hungary  FMM10 SOM32, SOM33  
Latvia  
Lithuania  TransportMM1  Transportation 
Malta  
Poland  CulMM4  
Climate Change, 
(Youth 
Employment 
Polices) 
Slovakia  
Slovenia   SOM21, SOMTI11  
Bulgaria 
 
Romania 
Norway 
Switzerland 
A
si
a
n
 
China 7
th
 
Sci&TechMM1, 
FMM3, 
EnvMM1, 
EMM5, 
CulMM1, 
FinMM6, 
SMEMM1, 
TransportMM2 
SOM20, SOM22, 
SOM23, SOMTI10, 
FinSOM7, Custom 
DG1, 
MigrationDGM2, 
TerrorismSOM1, 
S&TSOM1, 
ProsecutorsSOM 
Development of 
SMEs, Culture/ 
Tourism, 
Pandemic 
Control, 
Transportation, 
(Youth 
Employment 
Polices) 
Japan  EMM1, SOM14, SOMTI2, Pandemic 
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FinMM3, 
FMM7 
FinSOM4, Custom 
DG7, TerrorismSOM5 
Control, Climate 
Change 
South Korea 3
rd
 FinMM8 
SOM8, SOMTI6, 
FinSOM9, 
FinSOM10, 
MigrationDGM6 
Development of 
SMEs, 
Inter-cultural 
Dialogue, 
(Health and 
Safety at Work) 
Brunei  
Indonesia  
FinMM5, 
FMM5, 
LabourMM2, 
CultureMM5 
SOM13, SOMTI8, 
FinSOM5, 
MigrationDGM4, 
TerrorismSOM3, 
LabourSOM1, 
CultureSOM2, 
CultureSOM3 
Interfaith and 
Counter-Terroris
m, (Social 
Dialogue on 
working 
conditions) 
Malaysia  CulMM3  
(Health and 
Safety at Work) 
The 
Philippines 
  TerrorismSOM7 
Interfaith and 
Counter-Terroris
m, Energy 
Security/ Energy 
Efficiency, 
International 
Migration, (Skill 
Development) 
Singapore  FMM1 SOMTI4 
Energy Security/ 
Energy 
Efficiency 
Thailand 1
st
 
FinMM1, 
FinMM10 
SOM5, Custom DG9, 
FinSOM12 
Culture/Tourism
, Food Security 
Vietnam 5
th
 
EMM3, 
ICTMM1, 
EduMM2, 
FMM9, 
LabourMM4 
SOM12, SOM24, 
SOM26, Custom 
DG5, ICTSOM1 
Culture/Tourism
, 
Education/Huma
n Resources, 
Pandemic 
Control 
Cambodia   SOM28  
Laos 9
th
  SOM36  
Myanmar  
India   MigrationDGM8 
(Social 
Protection) 
Mongolia  EnvMM4 MigrationDGM10  
Pakistan 
 
Australia 
New Zealand 
Russia 
Bangladesh 
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Table 6.11: ASEM partners whose initiatives were adopted in the summits 
 Summits 1
st
 2
nd
 3
rd
 4
th
 5
th
 6
th
 7
th
 8
th
 9
th
 
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 s
id
e 
European 
Commission 
 √ √ √ √  √  √ 
Austria √    √  √ √  
Belgium   √     √  
Denmark    √ √    √ 
Finland   √       
France √  √  √     
Germany   √ √ √    √ 
Greece          
Ireland    √ √     
Italy  √ √    √   
Luxembourg          
The Netherlands     √    √ 
Portugal     √     
Spain   √ √      
Sweden   √  √     
UK  √ √ √ √     
Cyprus 
Not yet joined 
     
Czech Republic      
Estonia      
Hungary     √ 
Latvia      
Lithuania      
Malta      
Poland √    √ 
Slovakia      
Slovenia      
Bulgaria 
Not yet joined 
  √ 
Romania √  √ 
Norway 
Not yet joined 
 
Switzerland  
A
si
a
n
 s
id
e 
China   √ √ √  √ √ √ 
Japan √   √ √     
South Korea  √ √  √  √ √  
Brunei     √  √  √ 
Indonesia     √   √ √ 
Malaysia √  √     √  
The Philippines  √ √  √   √ √ 
Singapore √ √ √ √ √  √   
Thailand √  √ √ √  √ √ √ 
Vietnam    √ √  √ √ √ 
Cambodia 
Not yet joined 
     
Laos     √ 
Myanmar*      
ASEAN Secretariat Not yet joined    
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India   √ 
Mongolia    
Pakistan √  √ 
Australia 
Not yet joined 
  
New Zealand   
Russia   
Bangladesh Not yet joined  
The older partners (the founding members) have contributed much more in terms of 
initiative proposal, sponsoring, implementation and holding MMs and SOMs. The key 
contributors on the Asian side include China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, 
Thailand and Vietnam. They actively propose and carry out initiatives as well as offer 
to host various ASEM official meetings. In comparison, Brunei and Malaysia, who 
always send their highest level leaders to attend ASEM meetings, have not hosted 
much of the ASEM official meetings or been responsible for much of the initiated 
activities. The commitments of Indonesia and the Philippines have been fluctuating. 
Indonesia was not active in proposing ASEM initiatives, but has hosted four MMs and 
eight SOMs. The Philippines proposed more initiatives than Indonesia, but merely 
held one SOM thus far. 
On the European side, among the founding members, the Commission, Denmark and 
Germany have been the most active partners in ASEM’s Track1. The second tier 
contains Austria, Finland, France, Ireland and Spain. Notably, the UK was very active 
in ASEM’s early years, but its degree of engagement diminished since ASEM5. On 
the third tier, Luxembourg and the Netherlands have high attendance in the ASEM 
meetings, but they were not active in terms of proposing and sponsoring activities, 
especially Luxembourg. In comparison, attendance records of Belgium and Sweden 
were not as high, but they offered to hold a few of the SOMs (Belgium, during its 
rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU, had held the ASEM8) and were 
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responsible for a few initiatives. Lastly, among the European founding partners of 
ASEM, Greece, Italy and Portugal have shown the lowest degree of interest in the 
process, especially Greece. 
Concerning the newer members, Cambodia, Laos, Pakistan and Mongolia on the Asian 
side have demonstrated their keenness through consistent presence in meetings, 
organising and hosting ASEM meetings. Among which, Laos offered to host the 
summit in 2012 and became the first non-founding partner to host a summit. 
Involvement of Myanmar is among the lowest. Unlike the European Commission 
which has been actively initiating and funding various ASEM activities, the ASEAN 
Secretariat’s ‘contribution list’ in this aspect is blank. 
Commitments of the new ASEM European partners are generally weak, with the 
exception of Poland. In particular, the Heads of Government of Hungary, Romania 
and Slovakia had merely shown up in one ASEM summit since their accession to the 
process. The three countries have not been active in proposing or hosting any 
initiatives either. Noteworthy, the few ASEM official meetings took place in Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Slovenia were results of the obligation to these countries’ term 
of the rotating Presidency of the EU Council. Camroux even called such duty for 
smaller EU member states ‘unfortunate obligation’.461 
Furthermore, some Asian partners volunteered to host and sponsor physical 
institutions which established under the ASEM framework. These include ASEF in 
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Singapore, Asia Europe Environmental Technology Centre in Thailand,
462
 Asia 
Europe Institute in Malaysia, ASEM SMEs Eco Innovation Centre as well as TEIN 
Cooperation Centre in Seoul and ASEM Water Resources Research and Development 
Centre in China. Besides, in ASEM5, the Philippines offered to host the physical 
ASEM secretariat if it would be created. Noteworthy, Japan and the European 
Commission have been major financial supporters for the ASEF. In addition, 
Singapore’s role as the ‘brain-father’ of the ASEM process should be acknowledged. 
On the European side, Germany volunteered to host the first mandate (2009-2012) of 
ASEM Education Secretariat. From October 2013, Indonesia will take over and host 
the second mandate (2013-2016). The partners who provide secondment of staff to the 
Education Secretariat include Belgium, China, Indonesia, Luxemburg and the 
Netherlands. In addition, the European Commission has created and funded an 
ASEM8 Coordination team to provide technical support to the administration of 
ASEM since 2010. 
The commitment of different ASEM partners to the process varies. China, the 
European Commission and Germany are found to be the most active contributors. 
They are followed by Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and 
Denmark (Denmark’s active engagement only commenced when it hosted the fourth 
summit). At the other end, Greece, followed by Italy, Portugal, Sweden and the UK, 
have shown indifference to the ASEM process. 
This list indeed differs from the expectation from other studies. For instance, Lim 
argued that France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK were the EU member states 
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who had major stake in Asia (mainly due to their economic interests), so would 
actively engage in the process.
463
 The top three most active EU partners on the list 
obtained above are Germany, the Commission and Denmark, who are not traditionally 
key stakeholders in Asia compare with former colonial powers like the UK, France 
and the Netherlands. Arguably, those traditional stakeholders have more established 
bilateral mechanism to deal with the Asia countries which they have key interests in, 
such as France with Cambodia and Vietnam; as well as the UK with India, Singapore 
and Malaysia. In contrast, other counterparts like Germany and the Commission are 
more reliance on ASEM as linkage to the Asian countries. Surely, there are many 
factors determining each ASEM partner’s activity in the process, namely historical 
legacy, economic interests, size and resources of the countries. It is believed that no 
single factor alone can explain all cases. Even within the EU member states, there are 
huge differences from external relation agenda to national capacity. Nor can this 
research generalise the behaviour of all fifty-one ASEM partners.  
6.9.  Conclusion 
Thus far, Track 1 of the ASEM process has been very much intergovernmental and 
state-centric. Nation-state, which makes up forty-nine out of fifty-one members of 
ASEM, remains the key acting unit in the summit, MMs and SOMs. The ASEM 
partner governments propose and endorse initiatives; they are also the executors to 
carry out the initiatives; and they decide who to include or exclude in the process. 
Moreover, the ASEM process began with a gathering among the Heads of 
State/Government. The whole process, then, develops around the summit. Despite 
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 Lim, “the unfolding Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process1: Issues for ASEM III” (2001): 2. 
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being called an ‘informal process’, ASEM has been rather formal as it involves 
mainly high level government officials. 
Apart from the state level actors’ meetings, ASEM events which assemble 
non-governmental actors also depend on the initiation of the ASEM partner 
governments. ‘How often’, ‘how long’ as well as ‘how’ these Track 2 meetings would 
be conducted are all determined by the ASEM partner governments, especially the 
countries who host the particular events. As mentioned above, the host countries 
sometimes invite international or regional organisations as guests to the Track 1 or 
Track 2 meetings. There is one occasion that an international organisation, the World 
Bank, was invited to administrate an ASEM initiative: the ASEM Trust Fund. 
Occasionally, business community, academic, media experts and civil society 
organisations are invited to the official meetings, while under what Richards called 
‘controlled inclusion’.464 Nonetheless, the ASEM’s institutional design dictates that 
the process remains largely state-centric in Track 1. 
Despite the centrality of the nation-states on Track 1, a closer look reveals the huge 
difference in activity between various members. In general, the founding partners of 
the process are more active compared with the newer ones. Among the former group, 
China, Germany and the European Commission have been the most active 
contributors in terms of attendance, initiative proposing, sponsoring and 
implementation as well as the holding of MMS and SOMs. They are followed by 
Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and Denmark. Yet, not all 
founding partners have actively engaged in the process. For instance, Greece, and to a 
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 Richards, “Challenging Asia-Europe relations from below?: Civil society and the politics of 
inclusion and opposition” (1999): 160-1. 
233 
 
lesser extent Italy, Portugal, Sweden and the UK, have shown indifference to the 
process. While size, capacity and historical linkage appear to be influencing the 
activity of the ASEM partners, this research believes that there is no ‘one-size fits all’ 
explanation to all partners’ behaviour. Still, several possible explanations, namely 
historical relations with the inter-regional counterparts and economic interests, are 
proposed above. 
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Chapter Seven 
ASEM Track 1.1: Competing or Complementing Track 1? 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
Apart from the scheduled summits, ministerial and senior officials’ meetings, ASEM 
partners conduct a significant number of ‘sideline’ meetings (i.e. additional meetings 
that the participants to the official meetings hold between themselves outside the 
plenary sessions). In particular, bilateral state-to-state meetings have been the most 
numerous. These meetings have been irregular and occasionally unscheduled. They 
are side-products of the ASEM process. These sideline meetings lie beyond ASEM’s 
Track 1 but involve ASEM partners’ officials. This research, hence, labels them as 
‘Track 1.1’ meetings.  
Thus far, the myriad of bilateralism that has proliferated on the sidelines of the ASEM 
process has received very little scholarly attention. In the few studies which have 
mentioned bilateralism in the ASEM process, it was addressed solely in a few 
sentences. Indeed, the irregular nature of these meetings poses challenge to the studies. 
No information about the sideline meetings is available from ASEM official sources; 
neither do the official sources from ASEM partners provide such information (the 
only exception is the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA Japan, which 
provides records of all Japan-related sideline meetings during ASEM summits). 
Despite such difficulty, this research attempts to fill this knowledge gap by exploring 
two different sources in order to systemically locate as many sideline meetings that 
have taken place in the past ASEM summits as possible: the press conference reports 
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published by the MOFA Japan and the news media in five ASEM Asian countries 
(China, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand). 
This research is aware that the two chosen sources cannot possibly provide 
comprehensive information related to what happens on the sidelines of ASEM – 
especially about those impromptu, informal or short talks take place between ASEM 
leaders in the corridors and hotel lobbies. Understandably, only part of the meetings 
of this kind is reported. However, the chosen sources are considered the most reliable 
and most complete sources of information about ASEM’s Track 1.1 which are 
available. Therefore, it is acknowledged that the findings presented here are selective 
snapshots rather than a full picture of everything that has happened on the sidelines of 
the ASEM summits. Importantly, this research is the first and unique attempt to 
generate empirical data of these sideline meetings. 
In the existing studies, scholars either described inter-regional interaction like ASEM 
as a facilitator of existing bilateral relations or conceived the two approaches as 
competing. This chapter first offers a systematic examination on the form and 
frequency of the sideline meeting of the ASEM process; subsequently, it determines 
the weight and influence of the Track 1.1 meetings to the official tracks of the ASEM 
process. 
7.2. ASEM’s Track 1.1 as reported in MOFA press releases 
The first source utilised in this chapter is the online reports of the press conferences 
published by MOFA Japan after each ASEM summit. The website of MOFA Japan is 
the only one among ASEM member states that provides a complete set of 
ASEM-related information from ASEM1. Helpfully, the information is available in 
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English. Other Asian ASEM partners’ official websites either do not contain any 
ASEM-related documents, provide patchy sets of documents covering a random 
selection of ASEM events (normally the more recent ones) or do not provide much 
information in English. For instance, official websites of the Thai and Vietnamese 
governments posted press releases about their leaders’ involvement in the two most 
recent ASEM summit in 2010 and 2012. These documents are consulted as 
supplementary sources for the examination of the sideline meetings during ASEM8 
and ASEM9. 
According to press conference reports after each of the nine ASEM summits 
published by MOFA Japan, Japanese Prime Ministers have always used the ASEM 
summit as an occasion to hold bilateral meetings with counterparts from other ASEM 
partners. As displayed in Table 7.1, on average Japanese Prime Ministers have held 
four informal bilateral meetings on the margin of each ASEM summit (ASEM3 was 
not included in the calculation due to the unavailability of any information about 
ASEM sideline meetings from MOFA Japan press conference report). These covered 
Japan’s ASEM partners from Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, the EU and also the 
countries in the ‘Temporary Third Category’ of ASEM8. The most frequently met 
counterparts were China, South Korea, Vietnam, France and Germany. Notably, 
ASEM has become one of the diplomatic tools for Japan to maintain its external 
relations with certain states, in which most are bigger players on the international 
stage. The biennial summits offer Japan a regular opportunity to meet other ASEM 
partners both inside and outside the plenary sessions. As the spokesman of MOFA 
Japan told the press after ASEM3 in Seoul,  
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whenever there is a leader-level meeting, the leaders not only talk to each other in 
the official meeting room, but they also meet over working lunches/dinners and 
bilateral meetings that provide an excellent opportunity for the various leaders to 
get to know each other personally as well as to learn about each other's respective 
issues and interests. In this sense, I think ASEM III provides an excellent setup for 
summit diplomacy, diplomacy actually conducted by individual leaders based 
upon personal contacts.
465
 
Such a view from MOFA Japan is translated into concrete efforts by the Japanese 
government which actively organises sideline meetings between the Japanese leaders 
and other ASEM partners. 
Table 7.1: Bilateral meetings between Japan and its ASEM partners on the fringe 
of ASEM summits 
 Non-EU side 
EU side 
 
Non-ASEAN 
countries 
ASEAN countries 
ASEM1 China, S. Korea Thailand (host) France, Germany, UK 
ASEM2 China, S. Korea 
Indonesia (between 
foreign ministers) 
- 
ASEM3 no information available from the press release 
ASEM4 China, S. Korea - France, EU 
ASEM5 - Vietnam (host) France 
ASEM6 - 
Vietnam, the 
Philippines 
Finland (host), Spain 
ASEM7 
China (host),  
S. Korea 
- France, Germany, Italy 
ASEM8 Australia, S. Korea Vietnam France, Germany, EU 
ASEM9 - 
Cambodia, Laos 
(host), the Philippines, 
Thailand, Vietnam 
Denmark, EU 
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 Report on press conference by the Press Secretary of Japan, Ryuichiro Yamazaki, on Japanese Prime 
Minister attendance to the ASEM summit in Seoul, 17 October 2000, available at 
<www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/2000/10/1017.html#3> (accessed 5 April 2008). 
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Apart from the press conference reports published by MOFA Japan, this research also 
studied the press releases published by the Thai and Vietnamese governments after 
their leaders attending ASEM8 and ASEM9. The noted bilateral meetings on the 
margins of ASEM 8 included: the then Thai Prime Minister met with President of the 
European Council, President of the European Commission, Prime Minister of Estonia, 
and Cambodian Prime Minister;
466
 Vietnamese Prime Ministe met counterparts from 
Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia, the UK, 
Australia, China and Japan.
467
 During ASEM9, Thai Prime Minister Yingluck 
Shinawatra and Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung made good use of the 
opportunity to conduct bilateral meetings.
468
 These sideline meetings are summarised 
in Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2: ASEM partners who had bilateral meetings with Japan, Thailand or 
Vietnam on the fringe of ASEM8 and ASEM9. 
 ASEM8 ASEM9 
Japan 
Australia, South Korea, Vietnam, 
EU, France, Germany 
Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines, 
Thailand, Vietnam, EU, Denmark 
Thailand EU, Estonia, Cambodia 
Japan, Laos, Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Finland 
Vietnam 
Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Slovenia, UK, Australia, China, 
Japan 
Indonesia, Bulgaria, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Slovenia, UK (with 
the foreign minister) 
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 Royal Thai Embassy in Singapore, official website, Press & Media, 
<www.thaiembassy.sg/press_media/news-highlights/prime-minister-abhisit-attends-asem-8-in-brussels
-discusses-bilateral-is> (accessed 8 October 2010). 
467
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, official website, News, 
<www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/nr040807105001/ns101006100656#G0FBNSMx4eyGVietna
m PM receives leaders to ASEM-8, accessed 2 November 2010> and 
<www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/nr040807105001/ns101006150149/view#KLcdR0p1axwi> 
(accessed 8 October 2010). 
468
 Royal Thai Embassy in Singapore, official website, Press & Media, 
<www.thaiembassy.sg/press_media/news-highlights/thailand%E2%80%99s-prime-minister-in-bilateral
-talks-with-5-nations-to-boost-tra> (accessed 3 January 2013); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, 
official website, News, <www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/nr040807105001/ns121106092925> 
(accessed 3 January 2013). 
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Notably, all ASEM states analysed here were found holding sideline meetings with 
other ASEM partners, while Vietnam made exclusive use of the sidelines of both 
ASEM8 and ASEM9 to conduct bilateral relations. In comparison, Thailand held less 
sideline meetings during the two summits. 
In order to verify the utility of the press releases from the foreign ministries of ASEM 
countries as sources of information, two pilot comparative experiments were 
conducted. Information on the sideline meetings found in the press releases published 
by MOFA Japan was compared with information from the Japan Times, the most 
widely-circulated English-language daily in Japan. Since publication before 2002 of 
the Japan Times was not availability on FACTIVA or the daily’s official website, the 
comparison was limited to data covering ASEM4 to ASEM9. Similarly, information 
given in the official press release on ASEM8 and ASEM9 issued by the Thai 
government was compare with ASEM8/ASEM9-related reportage in the Bangkok 
Post, the most widely-circulated English-language daily in Thailand. 
The findings first demonstrated the disinterest of the Japan Times towards ASEM. 
There were only fourteen ASEM-related news items found: ASEM4 and ASEM5 
were each featured in two news articles, ASEM6 was mentioned in four news items, 
while ASEM7 and ASEM8 were each reported in three news items; noteworthy, no 
coverage of ASEM9 was found in FACTIVA. This coverage of ASEM was very low 
compared with that of other English-language dailies monitored in this research 
(further details are given in the following section). From these fourteen news articles, 
the coverage of ASEM4 and ASEM7 did not mention any sideline meeting. From the 
reportage of ASEM5 and ASEM6, half of the news items highlighted the absence of 
sideline meeting between Japan and China or between Japan and South Korea. In the 
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three ASEM8-related news items, two featured the informal bilateral talk between the 
Japanese and Chinese Premiers. Basically, the information from the Japan Times 
seemed complementing those given in the press conference reports. While the official 
press conference reports listed the sideline meetings which occurred, the reportage of 
the Japan Times focused more on the meetings which could not happen, perhaps 
reflecting the ‘bad news is good news’ practice in news making. Restraints in 
publishing space, time and readers’ interests could be a few of the reasons that explain 
why the Japan Times did not list all the sideline meetings in which the Japanese 
leaders were involved. 
In the case of Thailand, the meetings between Thailand and EU as well as between 
Thailand and Cambodia on the fringes of ASEM8 were reported in both the Bangkok 
Post and the official press release. Whilst the Bangkok Post covered also the 
EU-China bilateral meeting and the meeting between foreign ministers from Thailand 
and Russia, the official press release featured the Thailand-Estonia bilateral meetings 
instead. In the ASEM8 sample, half of the information from the two sources 
overlapped. In the ASEM9 sample, the difference between the official sources and the 
media were even bigger. As listed in Table 7.2, Thai Prime Minister held bilateral 
meeting with her counterparts from Japan, Laos, Bulgaria, Estonia and Finland. On 
the other hand, the Bangkok Post reported bilateral meetings of Thai Prime Minister 
with leaders from Italy, Poland, Norway, Mongolia and Japan. The only sideline 
meeting covered by both source was the Thai-Japanese one. 
The results from the two pilot experiments showed that information from the ASEM 
partner governments and from news media do not always corresponded well to each 
other. Sometimes, the official press releases appeared more informative than the news 
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media in terms of information on sideline meetings. This is perhaps not surprising, as 
the foreign ministries who prepared these documents hold more information than the 
media. Moreover, official documents focus normally on what has been done (the 
meetings which the government had successful arranged), while the news media tends 
to be more critical and prefers to highlight the meetings which the government fail to 
arrange. This research keeps these differences in mind throughout the analysis of both 
sources. Although the news media cannot provide a full picture of everything that 
happens, it is still considered a valid source of data. In both Japanese and Thai cases, 
news media appears to be a complementary source to the official documents. In 
particular, the availability of official records on the sideline meetings remains limited 
and patchy, therefore, the news media serves as a reliable and necessary 
complementary source. 
7.3. ASEM Track 1.1 as reported in Asian news media 
The second source used for the identification of sideline talks or meetings between 
ASEM summiteers was the news media. Six reputable and widely circulated 
English-language dailies from five Asian ASEM countries were studied (Table 7.3). 
Data pertaining to ASEM6 was sourced directly from the EU in the eyes of 
Asia-Pacific 2006 dataset. News items portraying other ASEM summits were 
searched from the online news archive FACTIVA. Since the news from Korea Herald 
published before 1998 was not available on FACTIVA and the paper’s official online 
archive is not available in English, the analysis of the Korea Herald excludes the 
coverage of ASEM1. Table 7.3 lists the basic information of the monitored news 
outlets as well as information about the data collection from each outlet.  
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Table 7.3: Information of the monitored English-language dailies 
Locations Dailies chosen Founded Circulation 
Time- 
frame 
Sources of news 
Mainland 
China 
China Daily 1981 800 000 
ASEM1- 
ASEM9 
the EU in the 
eyes of 
Asia-Pacific for 
ASEM6; 
FACTIVA for 
other periods 
Hong 
Kong, 
China  
South China 
Morning Post 
1903 
107 080 
(2008) 
South 
Korea 
Korea Herald 1953 
50% market 
share 
ASEM2 
- ASEM9 
Singapore Strait Times 1845 365 800 
ASEM1 
- 
ASEM9 
Thailand Bangkok Post 1946 65 000 (2007) 
Indonesia 
 
Jakarta Post 1983 50 000 FACTIVA only 
 
As explained in Chapter 3, the timeframe for the data collection concentrated on the 
‘peak’ periods in ASEM’s media coverage – one month before an ASEM summit to 
one week after the one-and-a-half-day summit from 1996 to 2012. News outputs of 
the English-language newspapers for these periods were searched using the key 
phrases ‘Asia Europe Meeting’, ‘ASEM’ or ‘Asia Europe Summit’. A total of 904 
news items were collected and analysed. 
Table 7.4: Number of ASEM news collected in each monitored daily 
  
China 
Daily 
SCMP 
Korea 
Herald* 
Jakarta 
Post 
Straits 
Times 
Bangkok 
Post 
Total 
ASEM1 1 12 0 21 60 118 212 
ASEM2 0 24 21 9 47 21 122 
ASEM3 8 10 148 7 17 17 207 
ASEM4 7 7 14 2 8 15 53 
ASEM5 8 11 7 8 9 14 57 
ASEM6 12 4 4 5 18 9 52 
ASEM7 28 13 10 14 17 22 104 
ASEM8 6 3 9 3 6 8 35 
ASEM9 13 4 3 11 9 22 62 
Total  83 88 216 80 191 246 904 
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From the five English-language dailies monitored in the ‘ASEM1 period’ (the Korea 
Herald was not included), 212 pieces of news were found mentioning ASEM (Table 
7.4). For the ‘ASEM2 period’, 122 ASEM-related news items were identified in the 
six dailies studied (including the Korea Herald), 207 news items were found in the 
‘ASEM3 period’. 53 pieces of news for the ‘ASEM4 period’, 57 news items in the 
‘ASEM5 period’, 52 news items in the ‘ASEM6 period’, 104 pieces of news in 
‘ASEM7 period’, 35 news items in the ‘ASEM8 period’, and 62 pieces of news in 
‘ASEM9 period’ were collected. Notably, the volume of ASEM news varied across 
the Asian locations as well as across the years. As displayed in Figure 7.1, media 
attention given to the ASEM summit has witnessed a significant decline since 
ASEM4. The eighth summit in Brussels received the lowest media attention, with 
only thirty-five news items in total from the six dailies combined. This trend was 
shared in all monitored news outlets except the China Daily. The Chinese paper 
demonstrated no interest in covering ASEM before ASEM3.
469
 The volume of 
ASEM coverage then sustained between six to thirteen pieces, whilst the reportage of 
ASEM7 (held in Beijing) recorded a spike (increased from an average of 6 pieces of 
news, between ASEM1 and ASEM6, to 28 news items on ASEM).  
For the most recent summit in Vientiane, reportage in all monitored Asian dailies 
recorded an increase except in the Korean Herald. The three ASEM-related news 
items identified were indeed about the work of the ASEM SMEs Eco-Innovation 
Centre which located in Seoul. The Korean Herald did not cover ASEM9 at all! On 
the other hand, the other five monitored newspapers devoted more attention in 
                                           
469
 One news items on ASEM1, no reportage on ASEM2, eight news items on ASEM3, seven news 
items on ASEM4, eight news items on ASEM5, twelve news items on ASEM6, twenty-eight news items 
on ASEM7 and six news items on ASEM8. 
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covering ASEM9 than ASEM8. Indeed, this rise follows a seeming trend that Asian 
media tends to pay more attention to the ASEM meetings which took place in Asia. 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Volume of news reportage on each ASEM summit in the six 
monitored dailies. 
Comparing across the news outlets, cumulatively, the Bangkok Post from Thailand, 
the Korean Herald from South Korea and the Straits Times from Singapore rendered 
the highest overall attention to report on ASEM summits (Table 7.4 and Figure 7.2). 
On the other hand, coverage of the ASEM summits in the Jakarta Post, China Daily 
and South China Morning Post were much lower, even though the taking place of 
ASEM7 has boosted the coverage of ASEM in China (both mainland and Hong 
Kong). Noteworthy, the reportage in the Bangkok Post and the Korean Herald 
concentrated mainly on the specific summit their respective country hosted. The 
Bangkok Post recorded 118 pieces of news (out of a total of 246) on ASEM1, while 
148 news items (out of a total of 216) on ASEM3 were found in the Korean Herald. 
The visibility of ASEM in the China Daily did rise during ASEM7 (28 news items out 
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of 104), but was still low compared with the coverage of ASEM1 in the Bangkok Post 
or of ASEM3 in the Korean Herald. 
 
Figure 7.2: Volume of news reportage on ASEM in each of the six monitored 
dailies. 
Significantly, among the 904 news items collected, only a small portion was devoted 
to cover ASEM itself (just a quarter of the analysed news articles). In the majority of 
the reportage, news writers were more interested in other events, especially the 
sideline meetings that took place on the margins of the official summits. These 
comprised intra-regional meetings among Asian ASEM participants, asymmetric 
bilateral meetings between the EU and one Asian state, state-to-state meetings 
between two Asian ASEM states as well as between one Asian state and one 
European state. Bilateral state-to-state meetings were the most numerous. Whilst an 
ASEM summit lasts normally one-and-a-half days, the yield of sideline meetings was 
high (Tables 7.5–7.12). 
Looking into the details of the news reportage of ASEM1, 28 bilateral meetings on 
the margins of the first ASEM summit were noted. The then Chinese Premier Li Peng 
alone conducted bilateral meetings with seven of his Asian counterparts, three 
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
300 
China Daily SCMP Korea 
Herald* 
Jakarta Post Straits 
Times 
Bangkok 
Post 
n
o
. 
o
f 
n
ew
s 
it
em
s 
246 
 
European ones as well as the head of the European Commission. Besides, the Heads 
of state of Indonesia, Singapore and the hosting country, Thailand, were each 
involved in at least six bilateral meetings on the sidelines.  
Table 7.5: Sideline meetings in ASEM1 mentioned by the monitored dailies
470
 
ASEM1 
  SCMP Jakarta Post Straits Times Bangkok Post 
Asia-Asia 
bilateral 
Japan- S. Korea 
China-Japan China-Indonesia China-Japan   
  
  
China-S.Korea 
China-Thailand 
Singapore-Thailand 
China-Singapore Japan-Thailand 
Malaysia-Singapore Malaysia-Thailand 
China-Malaysia 
  
China-Vietnam 
S.Korea visited 
Singapore 
Asymmetric 
bilateral 
China-EU 
Asia-Europe 
bilateral 
Indonesia-Austria Singapore-Austria 
Indonesia-Denmark China-Germany 
Indonesia-France China-France Thailand-Italy 
Indonesia-Ireland Singapore-Ireland Thailand-UK 
Vietnam-UK Indonesia-Portugal Singapore-Germany  Indonesia-Portugal 
China-UK Korea-UK 
UK visited 
HK 
  
France visited Singapore 
  
Belgium visited 
Singapore, 
Vietnam   
the Netherlands 
visited Singapore 
 
In the news articles on ASEM1, the then British Prime Minister John Major was the 
most active European leader in terms of engagement in sideline meetings, followed by 
                                           
470
 The Korea Herald was excluded. The one ASEM-related news items collected from the China Daily 
during the ‘ASEM1 period’ did not mentioned any sideline meeting. 
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the then French President Jacques Chirac. Apart from holding bilateral talks during 
the ‘free time’ of ASEM1, Chirac paid a state visit to Singapore before flying to 
Bangkok, whereas Major visited Hong Kong after the Bangkok summit. Concerning 
official visits, Singapore emerged as a main beneficiary of ASEM1, with leaders from 
France, Belgium, the Netherlands and South Korea officially visited the city-state 
before or after the ASEM summit in Bangkok. 
Moving on to the reportage of ASEM2, less state visits were noted in the news media 
(the then Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji visited three EU member states and the then 
Indonesian President Soeharto visited Malaysia and Italy). Moreover, the number of 
sideline meetings reported decreased slightly to 26 (23 between the Heads of 
State/Government, two between foreign ministers and one among the Heads of States 
of the ASEAN+3 countries). Again, the Chinese leader was found to be the busiest on 
the fringes, followed by Indonesia and the hosting country, the UK. Remarkably, 
China and the EU launched their annual summit the day before ASEM2, which 
brought diplomatic relations between the Union and China to a new height. 
Table 7.6: Sideline meetings in ASEM2 mentioned by the monitored dailies
471
 
Note: (FMM) refers to foreign ministers’ meeting 
ASEM2 
  
Korea 
Herald 
SCMP Jakarta Post Straits Times Bangkok Post 
Intra-regi
onal  
ASEAN+3 
 
Asia-Asia 
bilateral 
China-S. Korea China-Indonesia 
 Japan-S. Korea Indonesia-Japan 
 
China- Singapore 
 
China- 
Singapore  
China- Thailand 
 
China- 
Thailand 
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 There was no ASEM-related news items found from the China Daily during the ‘ASEM2 period’. 
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Indonesia- 
Malaysia 
Malaysia- 
Singapore 
 
China- Vietnam 
 
Singapore- S. 
Korea (FMM) 
Indonesia visited Malaysia 
 
EU-Asian 
asymmetr
ic 
bilateral 
China-EU 
 
China-EU 
 
Singapore-EU 
(FMM) 
Asia-Eur
ope 
bilateral 
S.Korea- 
France 
China- Ireland Indonesia-France 
 
Thailand- 
France 
 
China-Italy 
 
Thailand-Italy 
China-Spain 
Indonesia- 
Germany 
 
China-UK   China-UK 
S.Korea- 
UK 
Japan-UK Indonesia-UK Thailand-UK 
  
China visited 
Finland 
Indonesia visited 
Italy 
  China visited France 
  
  
China visited 
Germany 
 
Two years later, during the Seoul Summit, the monitored media reported 39 sideline 
meetings – 28 between the Heads of State/Government, ten between ministers and 
one among the Heads of States of the ASEAN+3 countries. According to the figures 
given by the Seoul government, ASEM3 participants excluding itself as the host, held 
at least 68 rounds of bilateral summit and ministerial-level talks on the fringe.
472
 The 
organising team officials described the number as ‘astounding’.473 
                                           
472
 Cheong-mo Yoo, “ASEM guests hold 68 rounds of bilateral talks: To help effectively settle sticky 
outstanding issues in economy, trade and politics”, Korea Herald, 20 October 2000; Cheong-mo Yoo, 
“Bilateral talks expected to continue after summit, Korea Herald, 21 October 2000. 
473
 Ibid. 
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Table 7.7: Sideline meetings in ASEM3 mentioned by the monitored dailies
474
 
Note: (M) refers to ministerial-level meeting 
ASEM3 
  SCMP Korea Herald 
China 
Daily 
Jakarta 
Post 
Straits Times 
Intra-regio
nal 
 
ASEAN+3 
 
Asia-Asia 
bilateral 
China-S. Korea 
 
China-Indonesia Indonesia-Singapore 
Brunei-Japan 
 Brunei-S. Korea 
S. Korea-Malaysia 
 
Indonesia visited Malaysia 
S. Korea-Indonesia (M) Indonesia visited Singapore 
S. Korea-Thailand (M) 
 China-Japan (M) 
China visited Japan 
 
Singapore visited 
Japan 
 
China visited S. Korea   
EU-Asian 
asymmetric 
bilateral 
Patten 
visited 
HK 
S. Korea-EU   
Asia-Europ
e bilateral  
China-Germany 
  
  
China-Ireland 
China-Spain 
 
Indonesia-Portugal 
S. Korea-Denmark Singapore-Denmark 
S. Korea-Finland 
  
S. Korea-France 
S. Korea-Germany 
S. Korea-Ireland 
S. Korea-Italy 
S. Korea-Luxembourg 
S. Korea-Netherlands 
Singapore- 
Netherlands 
S. Korea-Portugal   
S. Korea-Spain Singapore-Spain 
S. Korea-Sweden 
  
S. Korea-UK Indonesia-UK 
China-Denmark (M) 
  
Indonesia-Germany (M) 
S. Korea-France (M) 
Singapore-France (M) 
Thailand-France (M) 
Philippines-UK (M) 
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 The seventeen ASEM-related news items collected from the Bangkok Post during the ‘ASEM3 
period’ did not mention any sideline meeting. 
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Vietnam-UK (M) 
Singapore-France 
France visited S. Korea 
 
Being the host, South Korean leaders (from the President to ministers of different 
portfolios) were preoccupied both with the official summit and on the sidelines. In 
addition, the delegates from China, Indonesia and Singapore were also found busy 
handling bilateral diplomatic relations on the sidelines. On the EU side, France and 
the UK engaged most actively in holding bilateral meetings with the Asian ASEM 
partners on the fringe. Furthermore, holding the ASEM summit brought Heads of 
State from China and France to pay state visits to South Korea. 
Starting from ASEM4, the process lost not only media attention, but the number of 
sideline meetings reported also dropped significantly (Table 7.8, Table 7.9 and Table 
7.10). From the collected news items, 16 bilateral meetings took place on the margins 
of ASEM4, 13 meetings were reported at ASEM5, and 19 meetings during ASEM6.  
Table 7.8: Sideline meetings in ASEM4 mentioned by the monitored dailies
475
 
ASEM 4 
 
Korea Herald SCMP China Daily Straits Times 
Bangkok 
Post 
Asia-Asia 
bilateral 
S.Korea-Japan China-Japan 
 
 
China- Thailand Singapore-Thailand 
China-Vietnam Singapore-Vietnam 
 
Asymmetric 
bilateral 
S.Korea-EU China-EU 
 
Asia- Europe 
bilateral 
S.Korea-Denmark 
 
China- Denmark Singapore-France 
S.Korea- 
Netherlands  
Singapore-Greece 
 
China visited Austria Singapore-Italy 
China visited 
Denmark 
Singapore- 
Luxembourg 
China visited France Singapore-Spain 
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 The two ASEM-related news items collected from the Jakarta Post during the ‘ASEM4 period’ did 
not mention any sideline meeting. 
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Table 7.97: Sideline meetings in ASEM5 mentioned by the monitored dailies.
476
 
ASEM 5 
  SCMP China Daily 
Korea 
Herald 
Straits Times 
Bangkok 
Post 
Asia-Asia 
bilateral 
China-Japan 
(FMM) 
China-S. Korea 
 
 
NO China-Japan   S.Korea 
visited 
Vietnam 
 China visited Vietnam 
Asymmet
ric 
bilateral 
China-EU (FMM)   
Thailand- 
EU 
Asia- 
Europe 
bilateral 
  China-Estonia 
S.Korea- 
Germany 
Singapore- Italy 
Thailand- 
France 
China-Finland 
  
  
Thailand- 
Latvia 
 
China-UK 
 
China-Luxembourg 
(FMM) 
Ireland visited 
Singapore 
China- Netherlands 
(FMM) 
France visited 
Vietnam 
France visited China 
France visited 
China 
France visited 
Singapore 
France visited 
Singapore 
In ASEM4, Singapore overtook China in terms of activity in bilateral meetings on the 
sideline of the Copenhagen summit. In the Hanoi and Helsinki summits, China 
resumed first place in popularity in the sideline meetings. In ASEM6 Indonesia, with 
the presence of its President, became active again on the sidelines of the summit, after 
being ‘silent’ in ASEM4 and ASEM5 (the then President Megawati did not attend any 
ASEM summit during her mandate). In addition, the EU and South Korea commenced 
their annual bilateral summit after the plenary summit in Copenhagen. 
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 The eight ASEM-related news items collected from the Jakarta Post during the ‘ASEM5 period’ did 
not mention any sideline meeting. 
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Table 7.10: Sideline meetings in ASEM6 mentioned by the monitored dailies. 
ASEM 6 
  Korea Herald SCMP China Daily Straits Times 
Bangkok 
Post 
Jakarta Post 
Intra- 
regional  
ASEAN+3 
ASEAN5
477
 
  
Asia-Asia 
bilateral 
NO Japan-China 
  
  
No Japan- 
S. Korea 
China- 
Vietnam 
 
No Japan- S.Korea 
 
 
Japan-Philippines 
Malaysia- 
Singapore 
Asymmet
ric 
bilateral 
EU-China EU-Indonesia 
 
EU- Singapore   
Asia- 
Europe 
bilateral 
China-Latvia 
 
Thailand-
France 
Indonesia- 
France 
China- 
Netherlands 
China- 
Denmark 
Thailand-
UK 
Indonesia- 
Germany 
China- 
Poland 
China- 
Slovakia 
 
Indonesia- 
Italy 
China visited UK 
Singapore visited 
UK 
Indonesia- 
Spain 
 S. Korea 
visited 
Romania 
 
China 
visited 
Finland 
 
Indonesia 
visited 
Norway 
 
China 
visited 
Germany 
Noteworthy, the analysis of ASEM6 reportage showed that Asian media, especially 
those from Northeast Asia, were fascinated by the interaction between the then 
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and his counterparts from China and 
South Korea. Whether Koizumi’s government would request Chinese Premier Wen 
Jiabao or the then South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun for bilateral meetings was 
the main focus, overshadowing the actual bilateral meetings which did take place. 
Similar to the number of sideline meetings, the number of state visits also decreased 
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 There was a meeting among Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia and Vietnam. 
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during ASEM4: only China was recorded as undertaking official visits (to Austria, 
Denmark and France). From the ASEM5 reportage, the Heads of state from China, 
South Korea and France paid official visits to Vietnam, with the French President also 
visited China and Singapore. The then Irish Prime Minister Ahern visited Singapore 
after attending the Hanoi ASEM summit. In 2006, China extended the trip to Helsinki 
to a three-state visit (to Finland, the UK and Germany). Similarly, Indonesian 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono extended his European trip to Norway. 
Furthermore, the then South Korea President Roh Moo-hyun visited Romania before 
attending ASEM6 in Helsinki, whereas Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong 
visited the UK before the summit. 
Noteworthy was that although thirteen new members joined ASEM in the fifth 
summit, very few of them appeared involved in the sideline activities according to the 
reportage of ASEM5 and ASEM6 – especially the newly joined ASEAN countries. 
Sideline meetings were concentrated on ASEM founding members even though two 
more rounds of enlargement, to another eight new countries and the ASEAN 
Secretariat, took place (see also Table 7.11 and Table 7.12). The dataset indicated that 
the older partners have been the main ‘users’ of the opportunity for conducting 
sideline businesses during ASEM summits. 
The 2008 ASEM summit in Beijing, the first large scale summit after the outbreak of 
the global financial crisis, attracted much more media attention than the two previous 
meetings. Its reportage in the six monitored newspapers doubled that of ASEM4, 
ASEM5 or ASEM6. At the same time, reports of sideline meetings also doubled, with 
35 sideline meetings recorded on the margins of ASEM7. Being the summit host, 
Chinese leaders were the busiest during ASEM7. After the summit, the then Chinese 
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Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi confirmed that there were more than forty bilateral 
meetings held between Chinese leaders and its ASEM counterparts on the fringe of 
the Beijing summit.
478
 In addition, the then South Korea President Lee Myung-bak 
demonstrated his activity in dealing with individual ASEM partners bilaterally on the 
sideline of ASEM7 and ASEM8. Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong also 
held a substantial number of bilateral meetings on the margin of ASEM7 (the day 
before ASEM8, he flew back from Brussels to Singapore as his mother passed away). 
During ASEM7, eleven ASEM partners extended their trip to Beijing into a state visit 
to China: Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, Denmark, 
Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland and Slovenia.
479
 Among them, the Heads 
of state from Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Germany and Ireland brought along 
to China their business and trade delegations. Apart from the composition of the 
official delegations, these official visits were different from those of the previous 
summits as the attention of ASEM partners concentrated solely on China. There was 
no report on any ASEM leaders visiting other Asian countries before or after 
attending the Beijing Summit. On the other hand, before and after ASEM8 in Brussels, 
China visited Greece, Italy and Turkey. From the monitored news items on ASEM8, 
there was no state visit of other ASEM countries. 
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 “Chinese foreign minister says ASEM summit was productive”, Xinhua News Agency news feed, 25 
October 2008, sourced from FACTIVA. 
479
 Information from news feeds of Xinhua News Agency in 2008, sourced from FACTIVA. 
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Table 7.11: Sideline meetings in ASEM7 mentioned by the monitored dailies. 
ASEM7 
  Korea Herald 
SC
MP 
China Daily Bangkok Post 
Straits 
Times 
Jakarta 
Post 
Intra- 
regional 
ASEAN+3 
  
ASEAN+3 
 
ASEAN5
480
 ASEAN 
Asia-Asia 
bilateral 
S.Korea- Japan China-Japan Thailand-Cambodia 
 
  
China- India 
China- 
Thailand 
China- 
Singapore 
China- 
Indonesia 
China- 
Cambodia 
  
Indonesia-Singapore 
  
Singapore- 
Thailand 
Indonesia- 
Thailand 
S.Korea- 
Vietnam 
  
Singapore- 
Vietnam 
Indonesia- 
Cambodia 
  
Singapore- 
Philippines  
EU-Asian 
asymmetric 
bilateral 
EU-Burma 
(SOM) 
  
EU- 
Indonesia 
EU-China EU- Thailand 
  Asia- 
Europe 
bilateral 
China-Germany 
  
  
China-Belgium 
S.Korea- 
Denmark 
China- 
Denmark 
  China-Finland 
S.Korea-France China-France 
Thailand- 
France(FMM) 
S.Korea-Poland China-Ireland 
  
Singapore- 
Poland 
  
China-Slovenia 
Singapore- 
Netherlands 
Germany, 
Ireland, 
Slovenia 
visited China 
 
Given that ASEM8 witnessed the lowest recorded media coverage, the numbers of 
sideline meetings and of state visits reported during ASEM8 were also meagre. Table 
7.12 listed 15 bilateral meetings took place on the margins of the Brussels summit. No 
intra-regional meeting was mentioned. On the other hand, similar to the hosts of the 
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 Meeting among Thailand, Cambodia, Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. 
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previous summits, Belgium benefited from having attendees of the ASEM summit at 
home. The number of bilateral meetings it held with the Asian leaders was higher than 
any of the previous ASEM summits. 
Table 7.12: Sideline meetings in ASEM8 mentioned by the monitored dailies. 
ASEM8 
 
Korea Herald 
SC
MP 
China Daily 
Straits 
Times 
Bangkok 
Post 
Jakarta 
Post 
Asia-Asia 
bilateral 
S. Korea- 
China 
China-Japan   
  
S. Korea- 
Japan 
  
  
  
  
Thailand- 
Cambodia 
EU-Asian 
asymmetric 
bilateral 
S. Korea-EU 
Singapore- 
EU 
Thailand- 
EU 
  China- EU   China-EU 
Asia-Europe 
bilateral 
S. Korea- 
Belgium 
China visited 
Belgium 
Singapore- 
Belgium 
  
S. Korea- 
Germany 
China visited 
Greece 
  
China- 
France 
S. Korea-UK 
China visited 
Italy 
  
Asia-non-EU 
bilateral 
S. Korea- 
Australia 
China visited 
Turkey 
Thailand- 
Russia 
 
Regarding the most recent ASEM summit, seventeen bilateral meetings were reported. 
Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong appeared to be the busiest ASEM leader 
on the fringe. Again, the non-happening of any bilateral meeting between China and 
Japan attracted attention of the media. Notably, Norway appeared to be the most 
active first time participant to ASEM in engaging into bilateral sideline meetings. 
Indeed, more new members (more precisely the non-founding members) are utilising 
the opportunities on the margins of ASEM summits to conduct sideline businesses. 
There were also more recorded state visits compared to the Brussels summit. 
Indonesia Prime Minister made his trip to Laos an official state visit. Leaders of the 
EU, van Rompuy and Barroso, extended their Vientiane trip to a list of other South 
East Asian states including Myanmar (Table 7.13). 
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Table 7.13: Sideline meetings in ASEM9 mentioned by the monitored dailies.
481
 
ASEM9 
  SCMP China Daily Straits Times Bangkok Post Jakarta Post 
Asia-Asia 
bilateral 
No China-Japan Thailand- Japan 
 
 
China-Laos 
 
 
Indonesia-Laos 
(also official visit) 
 
Thailand- 
Mongolia  
EU-Asian 
asymmetri
c bilateral 
EU visited 
East Timor, 
Indonesia, 
Myanmar, 
Thailand, 
Vietnam 
Singapore- 
EU 
EU visited 
Myanmar, 
Thailand 
EU visited 
Cambodia, 
Indonesia, 
Myanmar, 
Thailand, 
Vietnam 
Asia- 
Europe 
bilateral 
China- 
France 
Singapore- 
Czech 
 
Indonesia-France 
China-Italy 
Singapore- 
Denmark 
 
 
Singapore- 
Estonia 
Thailand- Italy 
Singapore- 
Finland 
Thailand- 
Poland 
China- 
Norway 
Singapore- 
Norway 
Thailand- 
Norway 
 
Singapore- 
Switzerland 
 
Luxembourg 
visited 
Singapore 
Indonesia visited 
UK 
 
In summary, the above snapshots showed that ASEM’s Track 1.1 has played a 
recurring part in the ASEM process, allowing participants to maximise diplomatic 
accomplishments and handle ‘private’ affairs in smaller groups, mostly bilaterally. 
For the five ASEM countries in which the monitored newspapers were based (China, 
South Korea, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand), all have contributed to the 
flourishing of Track 1.1. Yet, the degree of their involvement varies. Moreover, on the 
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 The three ASEM-related news items collected from the Korea Herald during the ‘ASEM9 period’ did 
not mention any sideline meeting. 
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sidelines of ASEM2, ASEM3, ASEM6 and ASEM7, the ASEAN+3 countries 
conducted intra-regional meetings. These additional opportunities for the ASEAN+3 
countries to meet can be seen as facilitating the group’s intra-regional cooperation, a 
potential function of inter-regionalism derived from liberal institutionalism. From the 
social constructivist perspective, these extra meetings help enhancing the regional 
coherence among the ASEAN+3 countries. 
Moreover, this media analysis indicated the different degree of activity of the ASEM 
partners outside the official summits (Table 7.14). Unsurprisingly, the sideline 
meetings have been centred on China – an emerging economic powerhouse. Indonesia 
and Singapore also actively included a heavy sideline working schedule to manage 
external relations with other ASEM partners. Notably, in these cases, an obvious 
pre-condition emerged – the attendance of the heads of state. There was no reported 
sideline meeting held by the Indonesian delegation during ASEM4, ASEM5 and 
ASEM8. In these three summits, Indonesia was represented by ministers (Foreign 
Minister in ASEM8, Coordinating Minister for the Economy in ASEM4 and ASEM5). 
Although the then Indonesian President was also absent at the London summit, the 
vice-President who led the Indonesia delegation, was still able to hold bilateral 
meetings with the heads of several ASEM partners. Whilst the level of representatives 
did not seem to affect participation in the plenary meeting of an ASEM member, it did 
matter for the sideline meetings, especially the bilateral ones. Similarly, the number of 
sideline meetings involving Singapore in ASEM8 and China in ASEM9 reduced 
significantly, supposedly as results of Singapore Prime Minister Lee’s absence in 
ASEM8 and China Premier Wen’s early leave from ASEM9. 
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Table 7.14: ASEM partners who held bilateral meetings with China, South Korea, 
Indonesia, Singapore or Thailand on the sidelines of ASEM summits reported in 
the news items analysed 
  China S. Korea Indonesia Singapore Thailand 
ASEM1 
Japan, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, S. 
Korea, Singapore, 
Thailand, 
Vietnam 
China, Japan, 
Singapore 
China 
China, 
Malaysia, 
Thailand 
China, Japan, 
Malaysia, 
Singapore 
European 
Commission, 
France, Germany, 
UK 
UK 
Austria, 
Denmark, 
France, 
Ireland, 
Portugal 
Austria, 
Belgium, 
France, 
Germany, 
Ireland, 
Netherlands 
Italy, UK 
ASEM2 
Indonesia, S. 
Korea, Singapore, 
Thailand, 
Vietnam 
China, Japan, 
Singapore 
China, 
Japan, 
Malaysia 
Malaysia, S. 
Korea 
China 
EU, Finland, 
France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, 
Spain, UK 
France, UK 
France, 
Germany, 
Italy, UK 
EU 
France, Italy, 
UK 
ASEM3 
Indonesia, Japan, 
S. Korea 
Brunei, China, 
Indonesia, 
Malaysia, 
Thailand 
China, 
Malaysia, 
Singapore 
Japan, 
Indonesia 
S. Korea 
Denmark, 
Germany, Ireland, 
Spain 
EU, Denmark, 
Finland, 
France, 
Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, 
Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, 
UK 
Germany, 
Portugal, 
UK 
Denmark, 
France, 
Netherlands, 
Spain 
France 
ASEM4 
Japan, Thailand, 
Vietnam 
Japan 
  
-  
Thailand, 
Vietnam 
China, 
Singapore 
EU, Austria, 
Denmark, France 
EU, Denmark, 
Netherlands 
France, 
Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, 
Spain 
-  
ASEM5 
Japan, S. Korea, 
Vietnam 
Vietnam 
- 
-  -  
EU, Estonia, 
Finland, France, 
Luxembourg, 
Netherlands 
Germany 
France, 
Ireland, Italy 
EU, France, 
Latvia 
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ASEM6 
Vietnam -  -  Malaysia -  
EU, Denmark, 
Finland, 
Germany, Latvia, 
Netherlands, 
Poland, Slovakia, 
UK 
(Romania) 
EU, France, 
Germany, 
Italy, Spain, 
(Norway) 
EU, UK France, UK 
ASEM7 
Cambodia, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, 
Singapore, 
Thailand 
Japan, Vietnam 
Cambodia, 
China, 
Singapore, 
Thailand 
China, 
Indonesia, 
Philippines, 
Thailand, 
Vietnam 
Cambodia, 
China, 
Indonesia, 
Singapore 
EU, Belgium, 
Denmark, 
Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, 
Slovenia 
Denmark, 
France, Poland 
EU 
Netherlands, 
Poland 
EU, France 
ASEM8 
Japan, S. Korea 
China, Japan, 
Australia 
-  
  
- 
Cambodia, 
Russia 
EU, Belgium, 
France, Greece, 
Italy, (Turkey) 
EU, Belgium, 
Germany, UK 
EU, Belgium EU 
ASEM9 
Laos 
- 
Laos - 
Japan, 
Mongolia 
France, Italy, 
Norway 
France, UK 
EU, Czech, 
Denmark, 
Estonia, 
Finland, 
Norway, 
Switzerland 
Italy, Poland, 
Norway 
From the European side, the most frequently seen ASEM partners involved in the 
bilateral meetings with leaders from the five monitored Asian countries were France, 
the UK, the EU itself (usually represented by the President of the European 
Commission and/or leaders of the member state who hold the Council rotating 
Presidency) and Germany. They were followed by Italy and Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Ireland. Among the newly-joined, Poland and Estonia were found to 
be the most active.  
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In addition, the findings clearly showed that the host countries of the ASEM summits 
could benefit from having all other ASEM partners on their soil. They were involved 
in more sideline meetings in the particular ASEM summit which they hosted, in 
comparison with other ASEM partners as well as compared to other summits. Apart 
from sideline meetings, some ASEM leaders have made good use of the opportunity 
of travelling to the summit venue and expanded the trip to state visits to neighbouring 
countries. For instance, Chinese leaders have regularly expanded the trip to ASEM 
summits to official visits to the host country and neighbouring countries of the 
summit hosts. French leaders have also done the same frequently. 
Significantly, Table 7.14 indicated that the five ASEM countries monitored have had 
more bilateral meetings with countries from Europe than with other Asian countries, 
with the difference increasing since ASEM4. Although no empirical research was 
conducted on the European ASEM members, it is assumed that they would not hold 
bilateral meeting with their EU counterparts on the sidelines of ASEM, as they have 
many meeting opportunities under the EU mechanism. Therefore, Track 1.1 favoured 
‘inter-regional’ state-to-state interactions more than ‘intra-regional’ ones. 
Confirming the prominence of these sideline meetings, ASEM8 and ASEM9 allocated 
one-and-a-half days (before the opening of the official plenary meeting) in the official 
programme for bilateral meetings, with meeting venues provided. This demonstrated 
that Track 1.1 had gained official recognition. In fact, gathering on the sideline is not 
a unique practice in ASEM – sideline meetings, especially bilateral ones, have been 
common in other inter-regional and multilateral top-level summits. For example, 
during the November 2011 APEC summit (in Hawaii), Chinese President Hu Jingtao 
had bilateral meetings with US President Barack Obama as well as leaders from 
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Canada, Vietnam and Japan.
482
 During the G20 summit in Cannes (November 2011), 
the then Japanese Prime Minister Noda had bilateral meetings with his counterparts 
from Germany, Britain as well as heads of the EU (Van Rompuy and Barroso).
483
 
The media analysis data presented here reflected the multitude of sideline bilateral 
contacts in ASEM. Yet, the potential limitations of this dataset are acknowledged. 
The statistics were generated from the press coverage in just five ASEM member 
countries. The membership of ASEM enlarged from twenty-six in ASEM1 to 
fifty-one in ASEM9. This research is well aware that it has not generated a complete 
list of all the bilateral meetings which may have taken place. For instance, the 
bilateral meeting between leaders from Thailand and Estonia on the fringe of ASEM8 
was not reported by any of the monitored newspapers. Also, some of the bilateral 
talks involving the Japanese leaders identified in the previous section (Table 7.1) were 
not mentioned in the news articles collected. 
Seemingly and unsurprisingly, the news outlets were mainly interested in sideline 
meetings which involved their own country. This could be explained from a news 
production perspective, as the newspaper could more easily ‘sell’ news stories with 
their respective state as a main actor to local readers who are more familiar with 
national affairs than the international ones. Owing to the national-focus of the selected 
newspapers, reportage of sideline meetings involving the five countries researched 
(China, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand) were likely to be higher 
                                           
482
 “France to return Korea’s royal books on lease”, Korea Herald, 13 November 2010; “Chinese 
president meets leaders on sidelines of G20 summit”, Xinhua News Agency news feed, 11 November 
2011; “雙邊會晤 胡總一日四場”, Mingpao, 14 November 2011. 
483
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “G20 Cannes Summit November 3-4 2011”, 
<www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/eu/meeting1111.html> (accessed 15 November 2011). 
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than that of other ASEM partners. Yet, this analysis still clearly illustrated the 
variation among the five monitored ASEM Asian partners. China has been involved 
in the largest number of sideline meetings thus far. After identifying the active actors 
and their actions in ASEM’s Track 1.1, the next section aims at comparing them to 
what happened in Track 1. Through such comparisons, this research explores the 
relations between the two tracks, and investigates whether they are competing or 
complementary. 
7.4. Difference inside and outside of the meeting room 
Whilst the official ASEM summits have been labelled as ‘talk-shop’ and criticised for 
lacking in substance, the meetings on Track 1.1 have provided an additional venue for 
more substantial exchanges. For instance, on the fringe of ASEM6, the then Japanese 
Prime Minister Koizumi and the then President of the Philippines Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo signed the Japan-Philippine Economic Partnership Agreement; an 
agreement was signed between the European Investment Bank and China on assisting 
China to cut energy use and greenhouse gas emissions; and the EU and South Korea 
met on ASEM’s margin for FTA negotiations.  
In Track 1.1 of ASEM7, an FTA was signed between China and Singapore. Moreover, 
China and Vietnam signed cooperative documents and a memorandum on bilateral 
economic and trade cooperation. They also agreed to establish a hotline between the 
two governments. Besides, China and Denmark signed two documents of 
cooperation – on technology innovation and fighting against climate change. Ireland 
and China also signed an array of agreements, aimed at enhancing cooperation 
between the two countries' regulatory bodies and creating new opportunities for 
greater trade and investment. Apart from bilateral agreements, ASEAN+3 countries 
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met on the fringe of ASEM7 and agreed to create an $80 billion joint fund for 
liquidity needs for partners who fall into financial crisis. During the Brussels summit 
in 2010, the EU and Malaysia began bilateral FTA negotiations. In addition, the 
EU-South Korea FTA was signed during the fifth EU-South Korea Summit which 
was scheduled back to back with ASEM8. 
Importantly, this research is not suggesting that ASEM can claim all the credit for the 
successful conclusions of the aforementioned agreements. Instead, it is aware that 
these agreements were results of many other meetings between the respective parties 
outside ASEM. ASEM biennial summits are far from being frequent enough to allow 
a complete development of a bilateral deal. Yet, ASEM’s Track 1.1 sometimes 
happens to be a convenient platform for pairs of partners to seal concrete deals.  
What this research is illustrating is that many ASEM partners do want to as well as 
are ready to adopt cooperation and concrete deals with each other. Yet, instead of 
seeking consensus among a vast number of members in the plenary sessions, ASEM 
partners take bilateralism for concrete cooperation. Reaching a deal between two 
partners is much easier. The fact that the EU had to abandon its FTA negotiations 
with ASEAN and shifted to separate negotiations with individual ASEAN member 
states (first Singapore, then Malaysia; Vietnam and the Philippines are in the pipeline) 
served as an example. While the bilateralism on the margins flourished, the ASEM 
process indirectly contributed to tangible deals which it was not designed to achieve. 
The large and heterogeneous membership made it practically difficult for all ASEM 
partners to reach a consensus for concrete action. In contrast, on Track 1.1, ASEM 
partners could make substantial deals in a small group - although it is unrealistic to 
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claim that the aforementioned agreements would not have be signed without the 
ASEM process. The findings here showed that the existence of Track 1.1 facilitated 
those bilateral deals. It was especially helpful in allowing potential pairs to meet up. 
Therefore, it is not entirely true to view the ASEM process merely as a talkfest, even 
though Track 1 is never designed to deliver. 
Another difference between meetings in Track 1 and those in Track 1.1 was the 
content of discussion. Sensitive issues such as human rights and territorial disputes 
have been avoided in the plenary meetings to sustain a harmonious atmosphere. Also, 
issues which concerned only a few partners did not normally enter the agenda of the 
summit. The existence of Track 1.1 allowed such issues to be discussed between 
interested partners during their trip to an ASEM summit.  
Occasionally, these sideline meetings offered related parties the unique chance for 
face-to-face meetings, especially when separate bilateral meetings could not be 
organised between conflicting parties (e.g. the hallway chat between Japan and China 
on the margin of ASEM8). For instance, in ASEM1, instead of putting the concerns 
about East Timor on the Track 1 discussion table, the then Portugal Prime Minister 
Guterres invited the then Indonesian President Suharto for a bilateral talk and only 
voiced his concerns bilaterally. This marked the first meeting between leaders of the 
two countries in twenty years. Also on the margin of the Bangkok summit, the Prime 
Minister of Japan exchanged standpoints on the ownership of the Diayu/Senkau 
Islands with his Chinese and South Korean counterparts in two separate sideline 
meetings. The same territory dispute appeared again in an impromptu Japan-China 
sideline meeting during ASEM8.  
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Another example was the bilateral meetings between leaders from Thailand and 
Cambodia on the margins of ASEM7 and ASEM8. Since 2008, relations between the 
two Southeast Asian countries have been tense due to border disputes as well as the 
appointment of the former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin as an economic adviser by 
the Cambodian government. ASEM did not only bring the Heads of government of 
the two countries to the same table but also gave them opportunity for bilateral 
discussions, which could not otherwise be organised. The editorial of the Thai Rath, 
Thailand’s most widely-circulated daily, described the sideline meeting as ‘a step 
forward’ in Thai-Cambodian relations.484 
The third aspect in which Track 1.1 differed from Track 1 was the regularity, and thus 
predictability. As illustrated by the empirical data, the sideline meetings were ad-hoc, 
unlike the ASEM summits and the major MMs which have kept regularity. Attendees 
of the summits could conduct as many sideline meetings outside the plenary room as 
they could physically sustain. In maximum terms, an Asian ASEM partner had a 
choice of fifty bilateral meetings. For an EU member state, its Head of 
State/Government could conduct at most twenty-three bilateral meetings on ASEM 
sidelines (with the ASEAN Secretariat, twenty Asian states and two non-EU 
European members). Yet, in practice, it was impossible and unnecessary to hold a 
bilateral meeting with every partner. Assuming each bilateral meeting takes half an 
hour, an Asian ASEM partner needs twenty-five hours to complete a round of 
individual meetings with all counterparts. Whilst the official summit lasts 
one-and-a-half days, free time between plenary sessions is rather limited. Government 
resources and priorities regarding foreign affairs also have limits. Therefore, the 
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 Translated and posted by Bangkok Post, “In Media – Thai Rath Editorial”, 28 October 2008. 
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choice of the bilateral meeting would be a combined result of a partner government’s 
foreign policies, resources availability and political willingness. 
Noteworthy, some of the bilateral meetings were unexpected. One example would be 
the impromptu meeting between the former Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan and 
the then Chinese Primer Wen Jiabao in the hallway after a session of ASEM8. 
Relations between the two Asian powers had been strained since September 2010, 
after the Japanese authority seized a Chinese fishing boat which collided with a 
Japanese coastguard vessel in a sea-zone which was claimed by both countries. 
Ministerial-level meetings and regular high-level exchanges between the two 
countries were halted. China also imposed a restriction on the export of rare earth 
minerals to Japan. The tension sustained even after the release of the captain of the 
Chinese fishing boat. The then Japanese Prime Minister Kan, who initially decided 
not to attend ASEM8, changed his mind in the hope of making contact with the 
Chinese Premier.
485
 There was speculation before ASEM8 that the Heads of the two 
countries would not manage to communicate bilaterally. Eventually, the Japanese 
Prime Minister managed to get his Chinese counterpart to sit down for a 25-minute 
talk to address the worsening relationship.  
An earlier example of diplomatic breakthrough facilitated by ASEM was the 
aforementioned meeting between the Portuguese and Indonesian leaders at ASEM1 – 
an event that came as a complete surprise to the observers. For the previous twenty 
years by then, the two countries had suspended diplomatic ties over the East Timor 
question. On the other hand, some bilateral meetings failed to take place as expected. 
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An example was found in ASEM6, it is anticipated that there would be meetings 
between the then Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi and his Chinese and South Korea 
counterparts on the sideline of the summit. But, finally, no such meetings took place. 
Significantly, the existence of Track 1.1 could be seen as a barometer of the relations 
between pairs of ASEM partners. 
Despite their differences, Track 1 and Track 1.1 of the ASEM process demonstrate 
similarities. The most active ASEM partners in Track 1 (as identified in the previous 
chapter) are also found to be active in Track 1.1. Among the Asian partners, China 
has been involved actively both inside and outside the ASEM plenary meetings. 
Indeed, Chinese leaders have always been the centre of attention in ASEM. The claim 
of the existence of ‘Sinocentrism’ by Camroux seems to be valid.486 However, his 
suggestion that the other Asian partners performed merely ‘the role of supporting 
actors to this symbolic consecration of China’487 is rather questionable. Certain Asian 
states like Japan and Singapore are found also very active in both Track 1 and Track 
1.1. On the European side, the media analysis shows that older member states of the 
EU engage more actively both on Track 1 and Track 1.1 than those who joined the 
Union and ASEM in/after 2004. Additionally, the host countries of the summit 
demonstrate extra activity during the summit they host. 
Apart from gathering in the plenary sessions, all ASEM partners enjoyed the access to 
sideline diplomacy. All the Asian states covered in the empirical analysis had held 
bilateral meetings with other ASEM partners on the margins of ASEM summits. On 
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the EU side, all the founding members of ASEM (the fifteen countries who joined EU 
before the 2004 enlargement) were found involved in sideline meetings with the 
Asian partners (see Table 7.14). Again, there were obvious differences in terms of 
activity. In Track 1.1 France has been the most active, followed by Germany and the 
UK. For the newer EU member states, only six (out of the twelve who joined the 
Union since 2004) were listed in Table 7.14.  
Generally speaking, Track 1.1 was open for all ASEM partners, whose respective 
resources and political willingness determined the level of their activity. Although 
Singapore and Thailand were smaller players (when compared with countries like 
Japan and China), they still enjoyed the access to Track 1.1 to extend their diplomatic 
contacts. In addition, pairings in the bilateral meetings were not limited to partners of 
an equivalent size – smaller partners like Singapore and Estonia had meetings with 
China; Latvia met Thailand and also China; medium-sized South Korea met France 
and Germany as well as Luxembourg and Sweden. 
7.5. Relations between Track 1 and Track 1.1 
The empirical evidence illustrated the added-value of Track 1.1 to the ASEM process 
as well as the differences between Track 1.1 and Track 1. The next question addressed 
by this conclusion is more provocative: is this extra track constructive or destructive 
to Track 1? From the existing discussions which mentioned the relationship between 
bilateralism and inter-regionalism, viewpoints were divided.  
Some ASEM partners, such as the European Commission and Japan, saw the sideline 
bilateral meetings as complementary to the official track.
488
 A senior official from the 
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Commission stated that ‘openness and flexibility of the ASEM agenda is enhanced by 
the bilateral meetings and discussions between Asians and Europeans which occur at 
the margins of plenary ASEM meetings.’489 The ASEM Infoboard wrote ‘ASEM 
complements rather than duplicates the work already being carried out in bilateral and 
multilateral fora.’ An observer, Gilson, saw bilateral relations complementing 
ASEM’s official track, while in return, ASEM provided the EU with the means to 
promote ‘a regional balance between the bilateral relations of Japan and China.’490 
Moreover, observers who saw bilateralism as beneficial to inter-regionalism also 
perceived that inter-regionalism enhanced bilateralism. Gilson argued that when 
inter-regional fora like ASEM handled more general issues, bilateral engagements 
could be more targeted and focused on specific topics.
491
 Roe, who was in charge of 
ASEM affairs in the European Commission, described ASEM as ‘a 
continent-to-continent wide diplomacy dialogue which complements and enhances 
other bilateral Asia-Europe ties and contributes to better understanding of each other’s 
position in other multilateral forums.’492 
On the other hand, some observers do not share the aforementioned view. Yeo saw 
bilateral relations, such as the EU-Japan and EU-China ones, as competitors of ASEM 
in terms of attention and resources.
493
 Breslin warned that the EU-China bilateral 
                                           
489
 Roe, “Towards the 8th Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and Beyond: Asia-Europe Cooperation in the 
21
st
 Century” (2010), 14. 
490
 Gilson, “New Interregionalism? The EU and East Asia” (2005): 318-19. 
491
 Ibid.: 312, 322. 
492
 Roe, “Towards the 8th Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and Beyond: Asia-Europe Cooperation in the 
21
st
 Century” (2010), 16. 
493
 Yeo, “The Inter-regional Dimension of EU-Asia Relations: EU-ASEAN and the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM) Process” (2005): 188. 
271 
 
relationship had loomed large and seemingly overshadowed the EU-Asia 
relationship.
494
 Fitriani argued that the competition among individual Asian countries 
to develop bilateral cooperation with the EU would jeopardise the inter-regional 
interaction between Asia as a united front and the EU.
495
 A Korea Herald article 
referred to ASEM as an ‘economic Olympics’ and an ‘arena of sales diplomacy’ 
while reporting on ASEM partners competing to secure business deals and to settle 
trade and investment disputes bilaterally during the Seoul Summit.
496
  
The empirical evidence demonstrated that arguments from both sides have their 
validity. Track 1.1 serves as an alternative for ASEM partners who seek more tangible 
cooperation and exchange, which Track 1 cannot offer as a result of a combination of 
conditions ‒ ASEM was not designed as a decision-making or legally-binding 
institution; ASEM’s membership and divergence in the members’ interests were huge; 
and the consensus-based approach meant that no action would be taken unless all 
partners agreed. Track 1.1 allows ASEM partners to go multi-speed, that is, partners 
could advance their cooperation according to their political situation and will. At the 
same time, the regularity of the official meetings provides ASEM partners with the 
opportunities to manage and even restore bilateral relations, especially when other 
bilateral exchanges have halted. The abovementioned China-Japan meeting during 
ASEM8 and Cambodia-Thailand meetings during ASEM7 and ASEM8 serve as good 
examples. 
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ASEM Track 1.1 and Track 1 do not only mutually complement each other, but also 
depend on the existence of each other. There will be no sidelines if the official 
summits are cancelled. On the other hand, the willingness of the Heads of 
State/Government to attend the ASEM summit increases when they can achieve more 
in external relations in one single trip.  
Frequently, the delegations which consist of hundreds of leaders and government 
officials do not just travel to an ASEM summit to attend a single event. Conducting 
bilateral state-to-state business on the sideline has become a usual task of many 
participating states. Consequently, time and travel costs can be spent more efficiently. 
The reduction of separate state-to-state visits decreases the number of foreign trips, 
hence the financial and environmental costs. Also, national leaders would minimise 
their length of absence from home. Too much travelling and absence may induce 
negative perceptions among the domestic public, especially when the trips are not 
rewarded with clear and concrete results. Concomitant sideline meetings create room 
for leaders to build up diplomatic and personal relations at a slower pace and the risk 
of igniting criticism at home based on a lack of concrete results would decrease. 
Arguably, when ASEM partners have to prepare for both the plenary and sideline 
meetings, attention and resources will inevitably be diluted. Within a government, 
human as well as financial resources for external activities have limits. Small-scale 
meetings, especially bilateral ones, which may offer more substantial fruits, can easily 
attract more investment from the governments. The competition for limited resources 
would be especially serious for governments who do not have, or are not willing to 
invest resources on external relations.  
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Notably, the empirical findings showed that smaller ASEM partners, namely 
Singapore and Thailand, did participate actively in both Track 1 and Track 1.1 of the 
ASEM process. This showed that as long as a government had the political will to 
invest enough resources, it could handle businesses both inside and outside the 
plenary meetings well. However, the empirical data also illustrated that bigger states 
such as China and Indonesia possessed ‘comparative advantage’, as more resources in 
absolute terms were available. The number of sideline meetings China and Indonesia 
held and the contribution they made on the official track were larger than that of 
Singapore and Thailand. Consequently, the restriction in resources could widen the 
gap between active and inactive participants. Partners with sufficient resources or 
willingness to invest the required resources could manage their external relations on 
both Track 1 and Track 1.1. Their choice of diplomatic tools, inter-regional, regional 
or bilateral, would be more diverse. 
On the EU side, in theory, the European Commission as a common institution could 
have represented its member states in ASEM both in the summit and on the sidelines, 
so that government resources of the member states could be greatly reduced. However, 
the EU has yet been given exclusive competence in foreign affairs and security policy. 
In the pre-Lisbon EU, external relations were largely managed nationally by the 
member states despite the ambitions of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
Before December 2009, the European Commission could not speak for its member 
states in ASEM, although it had a permanent seat in the process. The empirical 
findings showed that the EU member states which participated more actively on Track 
1.1 were those with more financial and human resources. Smaller EU member states 
were at a disadvantage compared with larger states like France and the UK in terms of 
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external relations. Despite the Lisbon Treaty coming into force in December 2009, the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) has not replaced the national diplomatic 
services of individual member states but only complements them. While the policy 
areas in external relations under shared competences between the EU and the member 
states has increased, the principle of unanimity in decision-making remained.  
In ASEM8 and ASEM9, although the Permanent President of the EU Council 
presented alongside the President of the European Commission, none of them have 
yet got the mandate to speak for the EU member states which were still represented 
by their own delegations. Furthermore, neither the office of the Permanent President 
of the EU Council nor the EEAS has taken over the role of ASEM regional 
coordinator from the rotating Presidency of the EU’s Council of Ministers. Thus far, 
the post-Lisbon EU does not seem to have improved in cohesion or effectiveness in 
ASEM, while the coming summit is fixed to be held in Milan by the Italian rotating 
EU Presidency. 
Notably, in Track 1.1, the work done by the EU and its member states sometimes 
overlapped. Many Asian ASEM partners held bilateral meetings separately with 
officials from the EU and those from the member states. For instance, during ASEM8, 
South Korea had bilateral meetings with Belgium, Germany, the UK as well as the 
EU. The then South Korea President Lee Lee Myung-bak discussed similar issues 
with leaders from the EU and the member states in bilateral meetings: ways to extend 
cooperation, promote trade and investment, the Seoul G20 Summit, climate change as 
well as regional issues concerning the Korean Peninsula.
497
 Also during the Brussels 
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summit, Japan held bilateral meetings with France and Germany in addition to its 
meeting with the EU leaders. Thailand had bilateral meetings with Estonia as well as 
with the President of the European Commission. The talk between the then Thai Prime 
Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and the Prime Minister of Estonia Andrus Ansip focused on 
economic exchanges. Tightening the economic ties with Thailand was a main focus in 
the discussion between the Thai Prime Minister and Barroso. For the EU, its member 
states as well as their Asian partners, time and human resources appeared to be wasted 
by these duplicated discussions. 
International trade negotiations are one of the exclusive competences of the EU. 
Further, member states have delegated competence to the EU in order to regulate the 
customs union, euro and common commercial policy. However, the above examples 
demonstrated that individual EU member states still attempt to promote national trade 
bilaterally with their Asia partners. On the other hand, while external relation is not an 
exclusive competence of the EU, officials from the Union frequently covered political 
issues in bilateral meetings with ASEM Asian partners. The same topics were 
addressed also in bilateral meetings between the EU member states and their Asian 
counterparts. Consequently, confusion could be created over the division of 
competences between the EU and its member states. It could also jeopardise the role 
of the EU as a representative of its member states, hence, weaken the regional 
organisation’s actorness. The less consistently the EU represents the EU side as a 
whole, the less possible it is for ASEM to be purely inter-regional. A better division 
of labour is required on the EU side; otherwise more resources will be wasted.  
Thus far, the interactions took place on ASEM’s Track 1.1 were predominantly 
state-to-state. Being the most advanced regional organisation, the EU originally 
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showed a preference in dealing with Asia in region-to-region format. It insisted that 
the membership of the European side ought to be limited to EU members (until 
ASEM9) as well as the participation of the European Commission as an independent 
ASEM partner. On the sidelines, representatives of the EU (President of the 
Commission, Commissioners and Head of government holding the EU Presidency) 
hold a considerable number of bilateral meetings with the Asian leaders. The 
EU-China summit and EU-South Korea summit were launched during ASEM2 and 
ASEM4 respectively. Additionally, the EU conducts negotiations with the individual 
ASEAN countries separately on the fringes of ASEM summits. The bilateralism in 
Track 1.1, on one hand, is complementary to the plenary discussions in Track 1; on 
the other hand, it is destructive to the pursuit of pure inter-regionalism. 
7.6. Conclusion 
The existence of Track 1.1 in the ASEM process was found to be real and significant. 
In this track, the nation-state remains the primary actor. All the analysed participating 
states (China, Japan, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and Vietnam) 
made use of the sidelines of ASEM summits to conduct external relations with other 
ASEM partners. Among these Asian states, China was the busiest on the sidelines 
managing bilateral diplomacy.  
Track 1.1 was found mutually complementary with ASEM’s Track 1. It provides an 
extra option for pairs of or smaller groups of ASEM partners to establish tangible 
cooperation. As a result, partners who are ready to move faster and closer will not be 
blocked from taking concrete actions. At the same time, the regularity of ASEM 
official meetings provides ASEM partners with the predictable opportunity to manage 
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bilateral relations, especially when other bilateral exchanges are impeded between 
two countries. For pairs of partners whose bilateral relations are already in good shape, 
platforms like ASEM increase the frequency of their encounter without involving 
extra human and financial resources. For some, ASEM is one of the few platforms 
that they can meet each other, hence, provides precious chance for relation-building. 
In sum, this extra track brings quantitative added-value to the wider international 
politics, which again complements the qualitative added-value brought by Track 1. 
However, Track 1.1 poses a risk of overshadowing the official track: resources are 
allocated to handle businesses on the sidelines, which are proved to be more fruitful 
than the plenary discussion. The limitation in resources widens the gap between the 
active participants and the inactive ones in terms of commitment to ASEM. Those 
states whose resources for external relations were less adequate can easily fall behind 
in their engagement with other ASEM partners. 
The empirical findings help revealing the content of the large-scale summits in 
today’s international arena. ASEM is not the only inter-regional gathering on the 
international stage. What has happened on the sidelines of other summits, namely G20, 
APEC, Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation, is similar. As one of the 
many platforms for the partners to meet on the sidelines, this added-value of ASEM is 
not unique. Indeed, such significance is diluted as more and more fora are established.  
While the number of summits and inter-regional fora proliferates, bilateralism has not 
lost its importance. Nation-states remained the key acting units in international 
relations, and they still manage most of the concrete business on a state-to-state basis. 
These multilateral or inter-regional fora serve as shelters for sideline bilateral 
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meetings. The handling of bilateral diplomacy on the sideline of a multilateral or 
inter-regional forum becomes a common practice in international relations. 
Subsequently, membership to these fora becomes essential: the states which are left 
outside will have one diplomatic tool less and miss out on opportunities to promote 
bilateral relations. This rationale helps explain the continuous enlargement of ASEM. 
Despite being perceived as a ‘talkfest’, ASEM still attracts newcomers who are 
unwilling to miss out on the opportunities the process provides. The activity of 
Norway in involving in bilateralism on the sidelines of ASEM9 serves as a good 
example. 
Although no official document has specified its existence, ASEM’s Track 1.1 has 
developed alongside the official meetings since ASEM’s inception and has 
contributed positively to enhance the relations between ASEM partners. After 
examining ASEM’s Track 1 and Track 1.1, this research moves on to consider the 
unofficial tracks of the process. The following chapter explores Track 2 and Track 3 
which comprise mainly of non-state actors. 
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Chapter Eight 
ASEM Track 2: empowering the non-state actors? 
 
 
8.1. Introduction 
After examining Track 1 and Track 1.1 of the ASEM process whose key actors are 
mainly nation-states, this chapter turn to the unofficial track, or called Track 2. Its 
main objective is to ‘build a greater understanding between the people of the two 
regions’498 and to engage non-state actors into the process, subsequently to add a 
bottom-up aspect to ASEM. It is expected that an increase in participation of members 
of the civil society will help ASEM to improve its public profile and awareness. 
Noteworthy, the ‘unofficial’ here means that the key participants in Track 2 are not 
from the government. In contrast to the state-centric official tracks, Track 2 
encompasses a range of non-state actors from business community to civil society 
organisations, academia, media, to the general public. In fact, most of the existing 
ASEM Track 2 activities are results from the Track 1 meetings, and they link to the 
official track in certain extent. Technically, they are semi-official rather than entirely 
unofficial. 
ASEM’s Track 2 can serve as an example of the ‘track-two diplomacy’, which refers 
to ‘an unofficial, yet officially acknowledged and employed level of meetings often 
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within institutionalised settings.’499 Freistein suggested that the track two processes 
‘encompass actors that share a common goal and choose a cooperative way to discuss 
issues; its main actors are academics from universities and think tanks.’500 She argued 
that such track could become almost autonomous (never completely though) from the 
governments and exert influence on government policies. The degree of impact relies 
on the structural conditions as well as on the ability of the ‘track-two actors’ to 
convey their ideas to the relevant decision makers.
501
 
When developing the concept of ‘new inter-regionalism’, Gilson suggested that new 
spaces were constructed in the ASEM process for the participation of non-state actors, 
who are not traditional actors in international relations.
502
 Stubbs shared this 
viewpoint and stated that ‘the participation of previously disparate and usually 
unheard non-state actors may proliferate within interregional fora and serve to give 
any East Asian model of region an emphasis on social, not legal obligations.’503 
Among various non-state actors, Gilson considered the business community and civil 
society organisations as the most important non-state actors in ASEM. She 
emphasised that the involvement hence the influence of different actors varied. To her, 
the participation of business communities was more welcomed and cherished by 
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ASEM partners because they held ‘the key to closer economic linkages between each 
region.’504 
Many existing studies on ASEM’s ‘track two diplomacy’ focused mainly on the civil 
society organisations (the non-business, non-academic charity organisations which are 
usually mistakenly referred to as the only type of civil society actors).
505
 They tended 
to exclude the business community from ‘civil society’, while equating ‘civil society’ 
to the community organisations. Only occasionally that academia and think tanks are 
covered in these studies on ‘civil society in ASEM’. Many of these research pointed 
to the problem that the community organisations had been excluded from the ASEM 
process. Some observers labelled ASEM as ‘too elitist’ and ‘too bureaucratic’, albeit 
that the Track 2 was established.
506
 In order to provide a more comprehensive 
analysis of ASEM’s engagement with the non-state actors, this chapter identifies all 
possible actors involved in Track 2. Furthermore, this chapter accesses the actorness 
of different type of non-state actors and determines whether ASEM is ‘too elitist’ and 
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‘too bureaucratic’ after endorsing ‘track-two diplomacy’ for nearly twenty years. 
Subsequently, this research explores whether the introduction of Track 2 could 
diversify the type of actors in ASEM, thus, on the international stage. 
8.2. Track 2: 1996-2012 
Thus far, officially, Track 2 of ASEM comprises the Asia-Europe Business Forum, 
the Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership Meeting, the Council for Asia-Europe 
Cooperation as well as a wide variety of activities organised by the Asia-Europe 
Foundation. An overview of each of these track-two activities is presented below. 
8.2.1. Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) Being the only permanent common 
institution established under the ASEM process, ASEF has a crucial role in ASEM. 
While no physical institution has been created to handle the Track 1 activities, ASEF 
was set up to promote inter-regional cultural, intellectual and people-to-people 
exchanges on Track 2. This section examines who are the actors engage to ASEM 
through ASEF and determines whether ASEF has helped the non-state actors to gain 
more weight in the ASEM process. 
Singapore proposed the creation of the Foundation at the first ASEM summit. It was 
expected to provide outreach to civil society and the wider public so as to complement 
the official tracks. Alongside its proposal, Singapore offered a US$1 million seed 
fund and the premise for the establishment of ASEF. The idea was welcomed by other 
ASEM partners and turned into reality promptly. ASEF was launched in February 
1997 with four program departments: Cultural Exchange, Intellectual Exchange, 
People-to-people Exchange and Public Affairs. Apart from the seed fund from 
Singapore, ASEF financially relies on voluntary contributions from ASEM partners. It 
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also welcomes private enterprises and other institutions to support its projects or 
co-organise new projects. A board of governors is formed to oversee ASEF’s work, 
which is in practice executed by some forty staff members in the Singapore-based 
office. Each ASEM partner appoints one governor from its country to the board. The 
partners always designate scholars, a serving or former senior government official as 
ASEF governors.
507
 The board of governors meets twice a year to review ASEF’s 
work and set policy direction. Institutionally, ASEF is intergovernmental; it works 
according to the mandate assigned by the ASEM partner governments. In terms of 
finance and decision-making, ASEF is not an independent actor; instead it serves as 
an executive arm to implement ASEM partner governments’ decisions in the 
social-cultural pillar.  
Since inception, ASEF attempts to ensure that ASEM reach beyond pure 
governmental interaction. According to the official record, between 1997 and 2012 
there were over 600 projects implemented by ASEF, bringing more than 17000 
people to direct inter-regional interaction.
508
 In 2010 alone, there were over forty 
activities managed by ASEF, bringing over 500 stakeholders into direct inter-regional 
interactions.
509
 In average, around forty inter-regional activities are organised by the 
Foundation every year. These projects mainly take the form of conferences, lecture 
tours, workshops, seminars and web-based platforms.
510
 In addition, ASEF was 
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mandated by FMM6 (2004) to manage the official website of ASEM, ASEM 
Infoboard. It also invites scholars from Asia and Europe to write on issues concern 
Asia-Europe relations so as to facilitate the exchange of ideas. The written 
contributions are published in ASEF-run academic journal Asia-Europe Journal (until 
2011 as ASEF had sold the journal to Springer after an in-depth evaluation in 2011) 
or ASEF’s published books. 
Regarding the types of actors, except the business community, ASEF consistently 
involves different parts of the civil society into its activities. Still, some community 
organisations criticised that ASEF’s participants were not pluralistic enough and 
questioned ASEF’s ability to facilitate their engagement to the ASEM process.511 In 
earlier years, some community organisations and trade unions, who deemed the 
Foundation as the representative of the ‘elite section of the civil society’, questioned 
ASEF’s legitimacy and authority to speak for the civil society in Asia and Europe.512 
In response to these critiques, ASEF launched its Connecting Civil Societies of Asia 
and Europe Conference series in 2004. As an attempt to systematically identify the 
actors involved in ASEF activities, this research constructs Table 8.1 with information 
obtained from ASEF’s official website on its recent projects.513 
Table 8.1 displays that a wide variety of actors, including states and non-state ones, 
are involved. Importantly, this research observes a discrepancy between the 
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interpretation of the concept of ‘civil society’ by ASEF and that by the community 
organisations. ASEF has demonstrated efforts to foster inter-regional interaction 
among the youth, artists, media and academia in Asia and Europe. In other words, the 
Foundation considers ‘civil society’ as a group of a wide range of non-state actors. In 
contrast, the community organisations seem limiting the group to only charity 
organisations, which differ from each other in terms of issue-area (they range from 
community organisations advocating children or women rights to environmental 
protection, charity organisations working on cultural minorities, animal welfare to 
farmers’ rights). Table 8.1 illustrates that these community organisations is indeed 
one part of ‘civil society’ to ASEF, but not the only part. 
Table 8.1: Target participants of recent ASEF projects 
ASEF programmes Key participants 
Artists' Network Art professionals 
ASEF Cultural Grants Art professionals 
ASEF Journalists' Colloquium Media professionals 
ASEF Lecture Academic, policymakers, students, media 
ASEF Youth Partnerships Youth organisations 
ASEM Education And Research Hub For Lifelong 
Learning  
Education institutions 
ASEM Education Hub Academic, students 
ASEM Rectors' Conference Education institutions 
ASEM Youth Dialogues Youth 
Asia-Europe Art Camp Art professionals 
Asia-Europe Comics Project Art professionals 
Asia-Europe Compendium of Cultural Policies Experts, policymakers 
Asia-Europe Cultural Partnership Initiatives: Film Art professionals 
Asia-Europe Cultural Partnership Initiatives: New 
Media 
Media professionals 
Asia-Europe Editors' Roundtable Media professionals 
Asia-Europe Education Workshops Education institutions 
Asia-Europe Environment Forum  
Academics, experts,  students, 
researchers, policymakers, community 
organisations cultural practitioners 
Asia-Europe Film Meeting Art professionals 
Asia-Europe Forestry Experts Exchange 
Programme 
Students 
Asia-Europe Forum For Young Photographers Art professionals 
Asia-Europe Journalists' Seminar Media professionals 
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Asia-Europe Lecture Tours Academic 
Asia-Europe Partnership In The Field Of Training Youth organisations 
Asia-Europe Press Forum Media professionals 
Asia-Europe Roundtable on Conflict Management Experts, civil society 
Asia-Europe Scientists of Tomorrow Programme Young Scientists 
Asia-Europe TV Documentary Programme TV professionals 
Asia-Europe Workshop Series Academic 
Asia-Europe Young Leaders Symposia Young leaders 
Asia-Europe Young Parliamentarians Meeting Young parliamentarians 
Asia-Europe Young Political Leaders Symposia Young political leaders 
Asia-Europe Young Volunteers Exchange Youth 
Asia-Europe Youth Camp Youth 
Asia-Europe Youth Co-operation Youth organisations 
Cinema Art professionals 
Conference Series 
Academics, international organisations, 
community organisations, policymakers 
Connect2Culture Experts, cultural leaders 
Corporate and Official Events Academic, experts, policymakers 
Creative Encounters: Cultural Partnerships 
between Asia and Europe 
Artists, arts and cultural organisations, 
cultural practitioners,  
Cultural Dialogue Community organisations, policymakers 
Cultural Heritage 
Academic, policymakers, experts, 
international organisations 
CulturE-ASEF All 
Database on Education Exchange Programmes Students 
Democratisation And Justice Series Community organisations, policymakers 
EMU Roadshow 
Academic, media, financial professionals, 
policymakers 
EU-Japan-Asia Journalists' Conference Media professionals 
Europe Asia Forum 
Academic, policymakers, business 
community, media 
I'mPULSE, Asia-Europe Music Camp Art professionals 
Informal ASEM Seminar On Human Rights 
Academics, community organisations, 
policymakers 
Pointe To Point, Asia-Europe Dance Forum Art professionals 
Publishing Programme Book publishers 
Regional Integration Series Academic, policymakers 
SEA-Images (Synergy Europe-Asia In The Field 
Of Cinema) 
Art professionals 
Talks on Hill 
Academics, community organisations, 
policymakers 
TV/Media programme TV professionals 
Visual Arts Art professionals 
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Officials from ASEM governments are involved in some ASEF programmes, 
allowing civil society actors to interact directly with the policymakers. However, 
these activities mostly bring policymakers together with academia and community 
organisations in the form of one-off conference, roundtable or seminar. Under 
ASEM’s non-legally-binding principle, these interactions can hardly generate any 
direct policy changes. Notwithstanding, they serve as an additional channel to link the 
governments up with non-state actors so that the later can express their concerns and 
views. The government side, in return, gains an extra source of information. Still, 
some observers pinpointed that such approach was lack of focus and lack of a clear 
status between the government and the civil society.
514
 
Many ASEF programmes indeed involve only a single type of non-state actors, such 
as the Art Camp for art professionals, Editors’ Roundtable for media professionals 
and Music Camp for musicians. These projects allow participants with same 
background or profession from different ASEM member countries to mangle. In the 
long-run, socialisation among the particular groups (be it film markers, journalists, 
academic, young scientists or musicians) can be strengthened, presumably inter- as 
well as intra-regionally. After observing ASEF in the first decade, Freistein concluded 
that the Foundation had fostered the socialisation among the participants.
515
 Yet, she 
warned that an ‘over-familiarity’ among the same group of professional might be built 
and cause ‘boredom and fatigue rather than productive curiosity and thirst for 
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knowledge.’516 She also notified the risk of a ‘quasi-monopoly of experts’ and the 
exclusion of other actors.
517
 Therefore, if a fixed group of individuals is gathered 
more than once, a collective identity may be built in long term; to trade off, this would 
limit the number of individuals involved given that financial and institutional 
resources of ASEF are limited.  
The former head of ASEF’s Intellectual Exchange Department, Miss Sol Iglesias who 
was interviewed as a key informant, explained that ASEF’s approach is to strike for a 
balance between ‘new’ and ‘old’ participants. On one hand, ASEF engages certain 
participants to take part in a number of different projects, allowing them to build up 
personal connections and ties with ASEF in long-terms. On the other hand, ASEF 
expands its outreach to involve ‘brand-new’ individuals in new projects. Noteworthy, 
Iglesias elaborated that the nature of a programme would determine the ratio of ‘new’ 
participants to the ‘old’ ones. For example, joint research programmes between Asian 
and European academic institutions bring the same groups of researchers and 
academia together to work for a certain period of time. Public events like musical 
performance or art exhibitions, on the contrary, accommodate mostly new audience. 
She estimated that generally more than 80% of the participations in ASEF programme 
each year are ‘new’. At present, there is no exact statistics on this. No statistics on the 
distribution of ASEF participants’ nationalities or professions is available either.518 It 
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is, hence, impossible to go into details about how diversify, both in terms of 
nationality and sectors, are the participants in ASEF’s activities. 
Through ASEF’s work, different types of unconventional non-state actors, including 
academia, civil society organisations, artists, news makers and youth, from ASEM 
partner countries can mingle and socialise with each other. These activities contribute 
to the building of inter-personal connections and increase in mutual awareness among 
members of civil society from Asia and Europe. Regarding the impact on the weight 
of non-state actors, additional communication opportunities between non-state actors 
and the governments are offered. ASEF helps channelling non-state actors’ opinions 
and recommendations to the governments. Therefore it can be seen as an ‘amplifier’ 
of the voice of the non-state actors on the international stage. 
The establishment and continuation of ASEF symbolise that ASEM partners intend to 
go beyond the government-to-government diplomacy and engage with non-traditional 
international actors. Nonetheless, engagements of the non-state actors remain passive 
since participants are selected by ASEF and the numbers of participants are relatively 
small compare with the population in ASEM’s forty-nine member states. Moreover, 
the Foundation itself has not developed into an independent international actor. It is 
initiated by ASEM’s Track 1 to carry out actions according to mandate given by the 
ASEM leaders.  
8.2.2.  Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership Meeting (ASEP) Unlike the 
executive branches of the ASEM partner governments which are major components 
of ASEM’s Track 1, the legislators are involved only in Track 2. The European 
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Parliament demanded for a bigger role in ASEM’s early years.519 Parliamentarians 
from both national and EU levels are brought together by the Asia-Europe 
Parliamentary Partnership Meeting (ASEP) for dialogue. Initially, the occurrence of 
ASEP was irregular. Its first meeting was held in Strasbourg in April 1996, while the 
second ASEP did not take place until August 2002 (held in Manila). From 2004 
onwards, it was made congruent with the official ASEM summits, and therefore is 
held biennially by the organising country of the respective summit. ASEP 3 took 
place in March 2004 in Hue city. ASEP 4 was held in Helsinki in May 2006. ASEP5 
was held in Beijing in 18-20 June 2008, whereas ASEP6 was organised in Brussels in 
September 2010. The latest meeting, ASEP7, was held in Vientiane on 3-4 October 
2012. Although being held in the same year and in the same country of the biennial 
ASEM summit, the ASEP has always been separated from the summit for weeks or 
even months.  
In general, fifty to one hundred legislators convene in each ASEP.
520
 The national 
representation in ASEP has been patchy, for instance, only four EU member states 
and the European Parliament sent their parliamentarians to the ASEP 2. During ASEP 
3, there was no legislator from Greece, Germany or the Netherlands.
521
 In ASEP 6 
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(2010 in Brussels), five of the ASEAN’s ten member states as well as fourteen of the 
EU’s twenty-seven member states had no parliamentary representatives present.522 
Among the participating parliaments, members from the European Parliament have 
been most active. It has sent delegations to each ASEP. Jokela and Gaens suggested 
that the European Parliament was the key drive behind the creation and promotion of 
ASEP.
523
 
Upon the decision of the host country, representatives from international 
organisations (namely the IMF and the UN), regional institutions (such as the ASEAN 
Secretariat and the European Commission), ASEM partner governments and AEPF 
are invited as guests to ASEP. Participants discuss various issues within the three 
pillars of ASEM, and sometimes produce declarations and recommendations. They 
also come up with suggestions for ASEM partners, however, their views and 
suggestions have not been transformed into real actions thus far. 
In addition, young legislators in ASEM countries had an extra channel to meet – 
Asia-Europe Young Parliamentarians’ Meeting (AEYPM) – one of the projects 
undertaken by ASEF. As its name suggested, AEYPM brought together younger 
legislators (who are under 40 year-old) of ASEM partner parliaments for a four-day 
meeting, allowing them to build up interpersonal ties as well as exchange views and 
knowledge on a wide range of issues. It began in 1998 (Cebu AEYPM1), until 2007, a 
total of six such meetings were organised by ASEF.
524
 The last AEYPM was the 
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sixth edition, after which the program seemed to be halted. The attendees took part in 
their personal capacity rather than representing their national parliaments (or the 
European Parliament) or political parties. AEYPM usually comprised of plenary 
sessions and working group discussions. Similar to ASEP, there is no official 
mechanism to connect the conclusions of the discussion reached in AEYPM to the 
official ASEM meetings. 
Significantly, the parliamentarians are treated differently from their colleagues in the 
executive branches and are involved in ASEM only in the unofficial track. Their 
gatherings cannot generate initiatives nor can they request ASEM partners to take 
obligatory actions. The involvement of the parliamentary members has been more 
about inter-personal connection building. Such arrangements signify that in foreign 
affairs, the role of parliaments is less significant than that of the executive branches. 
The differences in political system, hence the formation, composition and role of the 
parliament among the ASEM partners have to be noted. While parliament is a 
powerful monitor and balance to the executive bodies in some ASEM countries, 
especially in the more democratically developed ones, it has no real power in other 
countries. Moreover, ASEAN does not have an equivalent institution like the 
European Parliament to the EU. While the ASEM partners do not share a common 
view on the importance of the parliament, especially as representative of the general 
public, it is not likely to see a stronger role given to the parliamentarians.  
8.2.3.  Asia-Europe Business Forum (AEBF) AEBF was initiated at ASEM1 to 
encourage communication and cooperation between the business communities in Asia 
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and Europe, and eventually to increase inter-regional trade and investment. The forum 
is also designated for the promotion of business-to-government relations in ASEM. 
The business community received the proposal positively and enthusiastically held the 
first two gatherings in Paris (in October 1996, seven months after the Bangkok 
summit) then in Bangkok (November 1997).
525
 A core organising group member, Dr. 
Jacques Gravereau, described AEBF as ‘a private informal gathering of corporate 
leaders, economic decision-makers to strengthen the weak leg of the triangular 
relations’ which ‘focuses at economic and corporate interests’.526 Attempting to 
benefit as early-mover, Indonesia, in cooperation with Japan, organised an ASEM 
business conference in July 1997.
527
 The business conference duplicated the work of 
AEBF, and finally only AEBF was left to become a permanent part of the ASEM 
process.   
Between 1996 and 2004, AEBF took place every year, including during the 1997/8 
Asian Financial Crisis. Similar to the summits, AEBF is held in Asia and Europe 
alternatively, with the chairmanship being undertaken by the host country. The 
frequency of AEBF was reduced to bi-yearly after AEBF9 so as to bring the Business 
Forum in line with the official summit (Table 8.2). Subsequently, the host of the 
official summit also hosts and chairs the AEBF. The reduction of frequency was 
rather inevitable as enthusiasm of the business community diminished due to 
forum-fatigue (governments, relevant stakeholders as well as the general public 
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become indifferent to various multilateral fora as a result of the dramatic increase of 
their number in the past two decades) as well as disappointment by the lack of 
concrete delivery by ASEM.
528
 A core group was formed during AEBF10 to increase 
the Business Forum’s effectiveness to the ASEM process, aiming to make AEBF a 
Business Advisory Council
529
 to the ASEM leaders. 
Table 8.2: Occurrences of AEBF 
AEBF ASEM Summits Host city Dates 
AEBF1 ASEM1 Bangkok 
(1-2 March 1996) 
Paris 14-15 October 1996 
AEBF2 Bangkok 13-14 November 1997 
AEBF3 ASME2 London 
(3-4 April 1998) 
London 2-3 April 1998 
AEBF4 Seoul 29 September-1 October 1999 
AEBF5 ASEM3 Seoul 
(20-21 October 2000) 
Vienna 28-30 September 2000 
AEBF6 Singapore 7-9 October 2001 
AEBF7 ASEM4 Copenhagen 
(23-24 September 2002) 
Copenhagen 18-20 September 2002 
AEBF8 Seoul 27-29 October 2003 
AEBF9 
ASME5 Hanoi 
(8-9 October 2004) 
Hanoi 7-8 October 2004 
AEBF10 
ASME6 Helsinki 
(10-11 September 2006) 
Helsinki 10-11 September 2006 
AEBF11 
ASEM7 Beijing 
(24-25 October 2008) 
Beijing 21-23 October 2008 
AEBF12 
ASEM8 Brussels 
(4-5 October 2010) 
Brussels 4-5 October 2010 
AEBF13 
ASEM9 Vientiane 
(5-6 November 2012) 
Vientiane 3-5 October 2012 
Key participants in AEBF include national chambers of commerce, multinational 
corporations, small and medium-sizes enterprises (SMEs), economic experts as well 
as government officials from ASEM countries. When first designed, the Business 
Forum was supposed to include solely the prominent businessmen.
530
 Each ASEM 
partner government was asked to appoint three CEOs to the first AEBF in Paris. In the 
                                           
528
 Information from an authority source from the European Commission. See also Ibid. 
529
 The idea is borrowed from APEC. 
530
 “Asia-Europe Business Forum Is For CEOs Only”, Strait Times, 7 March 1996 
295 
 
successive fora, representatives of SMEs are also invited. The number of attendees 
has grown to a size between two to three hundreds, except in AEBF6 and AEBF11 
whose attendee number hit five hundreds and eight hundreds respectively. 
AEBF usually consists of two parts: plenary sessions with high profile business 
leaders and political figures giving speeches as well as working group discussions. 
Business leaders from Asia and Europe identify and discuss obstacles they face in 
common in inter-regional trading in different working groups. By the end of each 
AEBF, each working group comes up with a list of recommendations to submit to the 
ASEM leaders. Yet, the summiteers do not have obligation to response to or even to 
read the recommendations.  
Noteworthy, there are different opinions on the strength of the 
business-to-government relation in ASEM. The participants of AEBF, who always 
come up with long lists of recommendation for the ASEM governments to endorse, 
appear to have high expectation on ASEM to deliver concretely. A senior diplomat 
who participated in the ASEM process commented that the recommendations from 
the AEBF received little reaction and implementation from the governmental 
sector.
531
 Moreover, the Chairman’s Statement of AEBF10 highlighted the 
participants’ ‘concern about the lack of efficient implementation of AEBF 
recommendations’ and urged ASEM governments ‘to vigorously step up their actions 
to this end.’532 Also, AEBF has been requesting for an established communicated 
channel with the ASEM leaders, such demand is posed again in the Chairman’s 
Statement of AEBF13. 
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There are opposite opinions claiming that AEBF has been a key mover in ASEM’s 
economic pillar. In an issue-briefing, Corporate Europe Observatory stated that 
‘AEBF has been given a key role, for instance in the step-by-step process of rolling 
back government regulations seen as “obstacles” to investment.’533 Trade unions saw 
AEBF as one key contributor to the development of ASEM’s Investment Promotion 
and Trade Facilitation Action Plans. They noted that ‘the draft IPAP was first 
disseminated at the first meeting of the Business Forum, and then edited to reflect the 
forum’s views before being submitted to ASEM members.’534 Their background 
documents on ASEM also suggested that AEBF together with SOMTI were 
designated to develop TFAP.
535
 According to the chairman of AEBF7, Mr. Ib 
Christensen, ‘AEBF provides a unique opportunity to influence the political elite as 
the recommendations from AEBF are highly appreciated in the ASEM meetings.’536 
His colleague in the AEBF core group, Dr. Jacques Gravereau, added ‘experience 
before showed that recommendations of AEBF were “somehow” transferred to the 
ASEM leaders.’537 In addition, Dent argued that the European business community 
was one key pusher behind the EU’s acceptance to establish ASEM.538 Jokela and 
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Gaens called AEBF ‘a fully integrated part’ of the ASEM process.539 
To validate the reality, this research compares the documents published by AEBF and 
the ASEM’s official documents. Although the role of AEBF was repeatedly 
confirmed by the Heads of State/Government in eight out of the nine summit 
Chairmen’s Statements, their recommendations were not acknowledged until the fifth 
summit. ASEM5 Chairman’s Statement wrote ‘[Leaders] welcomed positive 
recommendations made by the 9th Asia-Europe Business Forum in this regard 
[strengthening of government-to-business interaction in a closer Asia-Europe 
economic partnership], and tasked Economic and Financial Ministers and their Senior 
Officials to study the applicability of these recommendations and report to 
ASEM6.’540 The following three Chairmen’s Statements simply wrote that ASEM 
leaders ‘welcomed’ the recommendations from the Business Forum.541 ASEM9’s 
Chairman Statement marked that ASEM leaders ‘encouraged ASEM business forum 
to proceed regularly’ and ‘welcomed the outcome’ of the AEBF13.542 
After comparing the initiatives endorsed by ASEM2 (3-4 April 1998) with the list of 
recommendations submitted by the two Business Fora before the London summit 
(AEBF2 on 13-14 November 1997 and AEBF3 on 2-3 April 1998), this research finds 
that a few suggestions from the business community were materialised, namely the 
establishment of the ASEMConnect website and more SME centres. Reading the 
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Chairmen’s Statements of ASEM3 (20-21 October 2000) side-by-side with the 
recommendations from AEBF4 (29 September-1 October 1999) and AEBF5 (28-30 
September 2000), several issues highlighted by the Business Forum, namely 
Information Technology and e-commerce, were added to the agenda of the summit. In 
this case, AEBF helps agenda-setting for the summit on economic pillar. Moreover, 
AEBF1 was presented the initial draft of the IPAP by the Thai government; the 
Business Forum was requested to add input to the action plan before it was presented 
to the second ASEM summit for endorsement. Furthermore, ASEM2 included the 
first direct dialogue between ASEM leaders and representatives from the Business 
Forum.
543
 Chairman of AEBF4 was invited to report the Forum’s recommendations 
to the EMM2, the ministers then asked the SOMTI to examine steps for 
implementation of the recommendations.
544
  
Additionally, a close tie has been developed between AEBF and the SOMTI. 
According the Chairmen’s Statements of the SOMTI, recommendations submitted by 
the Business Forum are reviewed and considered by the senior officials on Trade and 
Investment. At SOMTI4 (11-13 February 1999, Singapore), the AEBF-Government 
Sector Linkage was endorsed to identify contact points from AEBF to be involved in 
selected SOMTI and other ASEM economic activities; to enhance AEBF’s inputs on 
various ASEM economic initiatives; to bring SOMTI co-ordinators and contact points 
from AEBF together to exchange views on the AEBF’s recommendations and how to 
implement them; and to give an account to the AEBF on the progress of 
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implementation of their recommendations.
545
 
It has to be noted that the lists of recommendation from the Business Forum are 
always long, ranging from twenty to thirty-five recommendations grouped in five to 
eight different fields. Each AEBF gathers at least two hundreds participaants whose 
business interest and concerns vary. While a biennial ASEM summit in average 
adopts twelve initiatives (which cover all three pillars), it is not surprising that some 
AEBF participants would feel that their recommendations being ‘ignored’ by the 
ASEM leaders. Indeed, some of the recommendations of the AEBF went into the 
‘Major Generic Trade Barriers’ list of the TFAP.546 As the implementation of the 
benchmark measures is voluntary (non-legally binding). The same applied to the 
IPAP.  
Since ASEM2, the business-to-government relations have been given a boost with 
direct dialogue taking place between ASEM leaders and selected senior business 
representatives. As highlighted in the Chairman’s Statement of AEBF10, interaction 
between AEBF and the government sector became regular.
547
 Frequently, president 
or a group of representatives of the Business Forum are invited to a session of the 
ASEM summit to present the results of their meeting. In the Brussels summit, a 
delegation of senior representations was invited to have breakfast with the ASEM 
Heads of State/Government on the second day of the summit. Similarly, a number of 
business leaders from AEBF13 were invited to breakfast with six ASEM Headers of 
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State/Government on the first day of ASEM9. Although officials from ASEM 
governments are encouraged to join AEBF working group discussions, their 
participation is not guaranteed. The breakfast meetings between ASEM summiteers 
and AEBF participants remain ad-hoc in nature, moreover, it is up to the individual 
ASEM leaders to decide whether to join these breakfasts.  
All things considered, the role of the business community via AEBF was seemingly 
valued by the ASEM leaders. More opportunities are offered to the business 
community to express their concerns and opinions to the ASEM governments 
compare with other sectors in the civil society. Nevertheless, AEBF does not 
represent all businesses in Asia and Europe. For those who do not join the Business 
Forum, their role in and views on the international stage cannot be identified in this 
research. 
8.2.4.  Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation (CAEC) Concerning intellectuals 
and policy specialists involvement in the ASEM process, there was the CAEC, which 
actively engaged in ASEM’s Track 2 in the first decade. CAEC consisted of a 
network of twelve research institutes from Europe and Asia-Pacific.
548
 Its main 
objectives were to encourage and facilitate greater cooperation among intellectuals 
and policy specialists in the two regions as well as to stimulate more discussions 
about the future of Asia-Europe relations. Conferences and research projects were 
established, which frequently resulted in written reports or books published and 
submitted to ASEM partner governments. Noteworthy, what CAEC had contributed 
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seemed overlapping with the mandate of ASEF, especially the Intellectual Exchange 
department. However, after ASEM5, CAEC appeared to lose its momentum. No more 
conference or research project was held. CAEC’s website 
<http://www.caec-asiaeurope.org>, which recorded and updated the activities and task 
forces’ research results, was no longer accessible.  
As an initiative from the Japan government, the CAEC’s activities were driven and 
coordinated by a Japanese institution – the Japan Centre for International Exchange 
(JCIE), who also served as the Asian secretariat.
549
 The International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS) in London acted as the European secretariat of CAEC. The 
CAEC conducted its first plenary session in June 1996. Then it set up various task 
forces to examine issues of common concern for Asia and Europe. Many works done 
by these task forces were published. For instance, ASEM in its Tenth Year: Looking 
Back, Looking Forward provided a review on ASEM’s first decade. 550  The 
representation of CAEC for ASEM has been questioned in earlier years because an 
Australian institute was included before Australia became an ASEM partner, besides, 
some intellectuals from non-ASEM countries are invited to CAEC meetings. The 
rounds of enlargement to Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific, India and 
Pakistan in West Asia have basically solved this problem (if CAEC still exists). 
Thus far, there has been no visible example of ASEM leaders taking the CAEC as 
policy consultant, albeit many recommendations were submitted. CAEC appeared 
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mainly as a platform to foster linkage between intellectuals from Asia and Europe. As 
an attempt of scholars and research institutes to bring their voice closer to the ASEM 
policymakers, CAEC was not very successful, and this probably contributed to some 
extent to the discontinuity of it. It did not promote intellectuals (including academic, 
think tanks and research institutes) to be independent actor on the international stage. 
Yet, qualitatively, CAEC served to promote or even create inter-personal ties and 
intellectual synergy between the participating scholars. 
8.2.5. Added-value of Track 2 Following the trend to include an unofficial track to 
involve non-state actors in international fora,
551
 the ASEM process has developed a 
Track 2 which embraces ASEF, ASEP, AEBF and CAEC. Regarding the possible 
added-value of ASEM Track 2, Gilson saw it as a ‘soft channel of power, through 
which expertise is exchanged, ideas are tried out, information is gathered and political 
climate is judged’;552 while other suggested that the track-two level dialogue was able 
to handle ‘sensitive issues which was avoided in track one’.553  
In reality, the foregoing discussion indicated that ASEM’s Track 2 has brought 
together non-state actors who share similar background or professional interest, 
namely academic and think tanks in CAEC; parliament members in ASEP; and 
business community in AEBF. Participants benefited from the extra or unique 
opportunity provided by ASEM’s Track 2 to meet counterparts outside their country. 
Although ASEF is mandated to engage with as many sectors from the civil society, 
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the cross-interactions between different groups of actors remain little. Moreover, 
interactions between ASEM partner governments and the non-state actors have been 
loose and little, giving non-state actors no additional influence on Asia-Europe 
relations. In sum, ASEM Track 2 has contributed mainly to promote inter-personal 
connections among the limited number of individuals who are involved directly in the 
activities. This is undoubtedly a positive contribution of track-two diplomacy. 
However, the boundary between such Track 2 and the official high politics is clear, 
while non-state actors are engaged only on the former. In terms of policy field, the 
non-state actors have mainly been involved in ASEM’s socio-cultural pillar, except 
the business communities who fall naturally into the economic pillar. Demonstrating 
their discontent about ASEM’s Track 2, some civil society groups formed their own 
ASEM meetings.
554
 
8.3. An extra: Track 3 
Unlike the aforementioned Track 2 initiatives, Asia-Europe People’s Forum and 
ASEM Trade Union Forum are not part of ASEM’s official track two. The founding 
and running of these two fora have been truly unofficial in the ASEM process. They 
are bottom-up initiatives, as responses of the civil society organisations and trade 
unions to the official ASEM process which has left them behind (if not intentionally 
excluding or marginalising them).
555
 Noteworthy, they have not been listed as part of 
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‘ASEM in Society’ (which refers to ASEM’s Track 2) in ASEM Infoboard until the 
official website’s 2012 renovation. On the other hand, AEBF, ASEF and ASEP have 
been always included.
556
 While the content of ASEM Infoboard is controlled by the 
ASEM partner governments (ASEF just manage the website technically), such a long 
period of excluding AEPF and ASEM Trade Union Forum from ‘ASEM in Society’ 
reflected their outcast status in the perception of the governments. Therefore, this 
research finds it more appropriate to consider them as ‘Track 3’, a distinct track from 
ASEM’s Track 1 and Track 2. 
8.3.1 Asia-Europe People’s Forum (AEPF) The People’s Forum, which claims to 
truly belong to the ‘civil societies’, commenced in the form of Asia-Europe NGO 
conferences (27-29 February 1996) held in the same week of the first ASEM summit 
(1-2 March 1996), both in Bangkok. The conference was entitled ‘Beyond Geopolitics 
and Geo-economics: Towards a New Relationship between Asia and Europe’, 
convened over 350 people from a wide range of civil society organisations.
557
 The 
positive turnout and substantive dialogue gave the convenors a reason to continue 
organising similar forum. Since then, the gathering takes place biennially and in 
parallel to the official ASEM summit.  
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From the second gathering, it was named Asia-Europe People’s Forum. Thus far, 
there have been nine AEPFs,
558
 all taken place in the same cities of the corresponding 
official ASEM summits, although certain Asian summit host governments were rather 
reluctant to host the People’s Forum. Due to concerns about possible protests, 
Vietnam in 2004 and China in 2008 had moved AEPF5 and AEPF7 several weeks 
before the official summits. Similarly, the latest AEPF (the ninth one) took place on 
16-19 October 2012, two weeks ahead of ASEM9 in Vientiane. Apart from the 
biennial big meetings, AEPF sometimes organises cooperative campaigns directed at 
some national governments. 
AEPF defined itself as ‘an inter-regional network of civil society and social 
movements across Asia and Europe.’559 It represents a coalition of multiple interests, 
brings forwards topics and issues which are ignored by the official tracks of ASEM.
560
 
The organising chairman of AEPF1 stated ‘we want to establish a new relationship 
between the peoples of these two continents – this is too important to be left to mere 
governments who have a very narrow focus of attention.’561 AEPF aims at reminding 
ASEM leaders about the interests of the minorities, the grass-root and the in-need, 
which they believe are often shaded by the big ‘international’ or ‘regional’ interests. 
The People’s Forum is also concerned that the ASEM partners, especially the 
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European ones, would only take care of interests of the transnational corporations and 
financial institutions, hence ignore the issues which affected the peoples.
562
 
The scale of the People’s Forum has been rather huge. Whist AEPF1 was a 
350-people gathering, the following forum in London convened over 300 
representatives from more than 150 civil society groups. AEPF3 created a record with 
800 participants from thirty-three countries (ASEM consisted twenty-six countries at 
that time) attended. Starting from the fourth gathering in 2002, the attendance of the 
forum sustained between 450 and 600. Notably, the latest AEPF in Vientiane gathered 
over 1000 individuals from Asia and Europe. Although the trade unions decided to 
establish their own forum and left AEPF after the first two meetings, the scale of the 
People’s Forum was not affected negatively. Still, the two fora work closely with each 
other: they produce joint recommendation for the ASEM Head of State/Government, 
organise joint conference, and attend joint meeting with ASEM partner governments. 
An International Organising Committee (IOC)
563
 together with a National Organising 
Committee (NOC)
564
 are responsible for the coordination of the biennial AEPF. In 
the early years, the ‘People’s Vision Towards More Just, Equal and Sustainable 
World’ was endorsed (in the 1998 AEPF and then revised in 2000) as the guiding 
principle of the People’s Forum. In 2005, AEPF Charter of Principles was adopted 
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and became the guiding principle.
565
 The People’s Forum membership and 
participation are open to all non-government organisations, regardless of their 
originate countries (organisations from non-ASEM countries are welcomed).
566
 For 
instance, the first gathering in Bangkok involved community organisations from 
Burma and invited East Timorese resistance leader (who failed to get a travel-visa to 
enter Thailand eventually).
567
 Moreover, Ecuadorians and Bangladeshis were among 
the participants in AEPF8 in Brussels.
568
 This reflected the People’s Forum’s 
endeavour to turn the ASEM process from exclusive to ‘inclusive to all’. However, 
the legitimacy of the AEPF to represent the civil society in ASEM countries is, as a 
result, deemed even lower by the ASEM governments. 
Although AEPF has consistently requested a linkage between itself and the official 
ASEM meetings (which is supported by many European partners),
569
 there has yet 
been any regular meetings or consultations between the AEPF and ASEM partners’ 
officials. Recommendations from the People’s Forum have no regular channel to 
reach the ASEM leaders. As Yeo suggested, ‘governments are interested in financing 
the civil society but not dialogue with civil society.’570 Only occasionally that a small 
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group of officials from ASEM partner governments would attend AEPF or world 
meet with representatives of the People’s Forum. The arrangement depends mainly on 
the decision of the summit host country. For instance, at AEPF8, a number of officials 
from the European Commission and the European Parliament were invited as 
speakers for some sessions and to interact with AEPF participants. Moreover, a 
delegation of the People’s Forum had a one-hour dialogue with Belgian Prime 
Minister. In the most recent meeting, the final declaration (enclosed a long list of 
recommendations) was handed over to the Laos government, the host of ASEM9, who 
committed to share it with other ASEM partners during the Vientiane summit. 
Between ASEM6 and ASEM8, representatives from the People’s Forum are also 
invited to ASEF’s biennial Connecting Civil Societies in Asia and Europe Conference 
to communicate with other sectors of the civil society in ASEM. 
The situation was found remarkably harder under an Asian host, many of whom 
showed antagonist attitude towards community organisations. As mentioned before, 
AEPF5, AEPF7 and AEPF9 were pushed to weeks before the leaders’ summits. They 
were also located far away from the city centre to avoid potential confrontation or 
demonstrations there. Organisers of AEPF1 complained about Thai government’s act 
to prevent the first People’s Forum from taking place: the hotel booked by the 
organisers as venue for AEPF1 was asked by the government to decline the booking; 
and pressure was given to the organising group to call off or at least delay their 
meeting. Furthermore, the organisers found out that the Thai government had sent 
under-covered police to pretend as journalists to attend the forum.
571
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Since their first gathering in 1996, the People’s Forum has issued and sent their 
recommendations to ASEM leaders after every AEPF, but these recommendations 
have not been welcomed or channelled to the summits as those from the Business 
Forum have been. Only two among the nine Summit Chairmen’s Statements (ASEM8 
and ASEM9) acknowledged the recommendations. The fact that the two most recent 
summits have acknowledged the contributions of the People’s Forum indicated a 
change: a higher recognition of the community organisations as stakeholders in ASEM. 
Yet, the increase does not mean huge attention was then given to AFEP’s demands: 
ASEM8 Chairman’s Statement wrote that ‘Leaders reaffirmed that the parallel 
dialogues conducted within the Parliamentary partnership, the People’s Forum and the 
Business Forum play a valuable role in reaching ASEM’s objectives… Leaders took 
note of their recommendations and resolutions.’572 Chairman’s Statement of ASEM9 
stated that ASEM leaders ‘welcomed the successful outcomes of the ASEP7 held on 
3-5 October 2012 and AEPF9 held on 16-19 October 2012 in Vientiane. They took 
note of the recommendations submitted by the two fora…’573 
Apart from the distant relation with the governments, AEPF face also internal 
contentions. It embraces different community organisations which have different 
pursuits as each of them represents a special community; they come from different 
countries and different culture, differ in experience and in their financial power. AEPF 
is far from a single united front. The departure of the trade union from the People’s 
Forum was an example.  
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Although its work is ‘unnoticed’ to some, 574  AEPF has brought civil society 
organisations across the Asia and Europe together regularly. This contributes to 
establishment or strengthening of network among organisations in national, region and 
inter-regional level. In this regard, two empirical research have assessed AEPF’s first 
fifteen years achievements. The first research was found by the author of this 
dissertation during her participation observation to AEPF8. During the four-day 
meeting in Brussels, a questionnaire created by Max-Planck Institute for the Study of 
Societies was circulated among the participants. The nine questions posed included: 
basic information of the civil society organisation which is represented; engagements 
of the organisations in the ASEM process (not limited to AEPF); purposes of the 
organisations’ participation in AEPF; evaluation of the participants on the 
responsiveness of the ASEM process to civil society demands; and assessment of 
ASEM’s success and failure. Author of this dissertation had searched for the results of 
this survey, but nothing was found on the official website of Max-Planck Institute for 
the Study of Societies thus far. 
Another attempt was a research conducted by two scholars to undertake reflection and 
review AEPF’s first fifteen years on behalf of the People’s Forum IOC.575 Chenoy 
and Rutherford interviewed some forty key informants who associated with the AEPF 
in different capacities, including members from AEPF IOC and NOC, participants of 
previous AEFPs as well as officials of Ministries of Foreign Affairs of ASEM partner 
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countries and from the European Commission.
576
 These interviewees reviewed AEPF 
positively and insisted that it was relevant to Asia-Europe relations. A lack of financial 
resources and the institutional design were listed as key obstacles for the People’s 
Forum. The research concluded that ‘it is difficult to calculate AEPF’s contribution, 
but it is much more significant than it appears.’577 
These two research serve as starting point for more empirical study on the role and 
contributions of bottom-down initiatives like ASEP on the ASEM process as well as 
the Asia-Europe relation in general. The assessment of other Track 2 or Track 3 
initiatives will be a worthwhile topic for future research. 
8.3.2. Asia-Europe Trade Union Forum Apart from AEPF, ASEM’s Track 3 
encompasses also the Trade Union Forum. As mentioned above, the trade unions were 
part of the first two AEPFs. They left and created their own forum in 2000. Key 
organisers of the forum include International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU), the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), the World 
Confederation of Labour (WCL), the Brotherhood of Asian Trade Unions (BATU), as 
well as the ICFTU Asian and Pacific Regional Organisation (ICFTU/APRO). 
Non-ICFTU affiliated groups from China, Indonesia and Vietnam also join the Trade 
Union Forum. German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) has been a crucial supporter of 
the forum. It organises numerous conferences to convene trade unionists in ASEM 
countries as well as the ASEM partners’ officials who responsible for labour affairs. 
Apart from these conferences, officials from some ASEM partners would 
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occasionally meet with the representatives from the trade unionists under the 
framework of Asia-Europe Trade Union Forum. 
Sharing concerns with the AEPF, the Asia-Europe Trade Union Forum stresses the 
social aspect in the Asia-Europe relations. It focuses on labour rights and employment 
issues. A statement listing their concerns and recommendations is produced and 
presented to the ASEM summiteers after every forum. Examples of their demands are 
a restructure of ASEF to reflect a comprehensive social agenda, the inclusion of social 
and employment issues in the full agenda of ASEM, the establishment of a trade 
union and civil society consultative body (a ASEM Social Forum) within the ASEM 
process, and a creation of an ASEM cooperation framework to exchange information 
on decent work national plans. Yet, none of them was referenced in the summit 
Chairmen’s Statements or special statements issued.  
By and large, the initiatives on ASEM Track 3 have not been generating ampler space 
for the community organisations or trade unions to participate in the official 
interaction between ASEM partners. Despites their efforts, recommendations from the 
AEPF and Trade Union Conference failed to induce interests among the ASEM 
partner governments. Certain Asian ASEM states are still sceptic against these two 
groups. Their gatherings are not only excluded from the official Track 2, but also 
unwelcomed by certain ASEM partner states. Moreover, the legitimacy of AEPF and 
Trade Union Conference as representatives of the ASEM public is questioned. AEPF, 
similar to the ASEM summits and AEBF, are meetings of senior members of the 
organisations. As advocated by Junya Yimprasert of the Thai Labour Campaign, the 
AEPF ought to offer more opportunities and support for ordinary people to speak 
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up.
578
 Another AEPF partaker Tian Chua, director of the Labour Resource Centre in 
Malaysia, raised another issue, stated that some of the participants of the AEPF did 
not really understand the ASEM process.
579
 Until the AEPF and Trade Union 
Conference can resolve the problems mentioned in the ongoing discussion, their role 
in the ASEM process would unlikely be valued by the governments. 
In fact, the co-existence of Track 2 and Track 3 provokes competitions between 
different non-state actors to ‘get close’ to the leaders in Track 1, making the non-state 
actors too busy to challenge the central role of the governments. Community 
organisations and trade unions in Track 3 who speak for the grassroots stand in 
opposition to the elite groups (business leaders, parliamentarians, intellectuals, 
cultural leaders, arts and media professionals and etc) in ASEM’s Track 2. Thus far, 
little effort has been made to foster the inter-class (elite versus grassroots) and 
inter-sector (e.g. between AEBF and AEPF, or between the Trade Union Conference 
and ASEP) relations, except the four biennial Connecting Civil Societies in Asia and 
Europe Conference between 2004 and 2010. Existing endeavours mainly link up 
various non-state actors with the governments. This reflects the persistence of the 
central role of nation-state in coordinating interests of different groups in the 
societies.  
This research argues that not taking the AEPF and Trade Union Forum more serious 
would be a missed opportunity for the ASEM partners. The diverse interests 
represented by these civil society organisations and trade union could widen the 
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governments’ source of information (especially for agenda-setting in multilateral fora) 
as well as legitimacy. If ASEM wants to develop further, it should connect these 
outcast groups to the official tracks. 
8.4. The disengaged 
In ASEM’s Track 2 and Track 3, various groups of non-state actors are found, 
including business community, academia, art professionals, trade unionists, social 
movement organisations, media professionals and youth. There is a type of actor, 
although mentioned in the official discourses all the time, whose involvement in the 
ASEM process is limited thus far– the general public. In terms of population, ASEM 
now comprises 60% of the world’s total population. This section explores the findings 
of two transnational research projects, the EU in the eyes of Asia-Pacific and Asia in 
the eyes of Europe, to demonstrate that a large majority of ASEM countries’ public 
are still left out from the process. It is crucial to study the public awareness of ASEM 
because its official discourses have repeatedly emphasised the general public as one 
key component and stakeholder in the inter-regional interaction.  
Three rounds of public opinion surveys were conducted in seven ASEM Asian 
locations in 2008, 2010 and 2012. They all posed the question ‘Are you aware of the 
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Process?’ to randomly selected members of the Asian 
general public. In total, the dataset included 9448 completed surveys. The sample size 
in the 2008 and 2010 phases was 400 respondents per country, sustaining the margin 
of error at ±4.9% at a confidence level of 95%. The sample size for the 2012 round 
increased to 1000 respondents in each country, sustaining the margin of error at ±3% 
with the same confidence level of 95%.  
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Remarkably, a majority of the respondents were found unaware of ASEM (see Figure 
8.1; for example, 95% of respondents in the Philippines, 92% in Macau (China) and 
88% in Malaysia in 2010). Only in the countries who have been hosts of past ASEM 
summits (Thailand in 1996, South Korea in 2000, Vietnam in 2004, and China in 
2008) that the awareness of ASEM among the general public was higher (67% of the 
Thai respondents, 43% of Korean, 50% of Vietnamese and 70% of Chinese 
respondents said that they were aware of ASEM). Notably, in the two cases in which 
longitudinal comparison is feasible, Malaysia and India, the awareness of ASEM both 
increased by 18% between 2010 and 2012. More data have to be collected, both in 
terms of years and number of locations, in order to prove whether there is a wide 
spread rise of public awareness of ASEM as well as to identify the possible reasons 
for such increase. Nonetheless, an average of 68% of the public in the surveyed Asian 
countries remains unaware of the ASEM process after its existence for more than a 
decade. 
 
Figure 8.1: Percentage of Asian respondents who were NOT aware of the ASEM 
process. (n=9448) 
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This lack of public awareness of ASEM was echoed by the survey conducted in 2006 
by the Asia-Europe Meeting Research Team of the European Studies Centre, China 
Foreign Affairs University.
580
 The survey collected 970 questionnaires filled by 
students from four prestigious universities in Beijing. In total, 22% of the respondents 
admitted that they did not know ASEM at all; another 69% said that they were not 
familiar with the process although they had heard of it (Figure 8.2). Even among the 
students who majored in International Relations, 16% did not know about ASEM, 
whereas 64% has heard of it but were not familiar. In addition, the survey found out 
that most of the interviewed Chinese students did not know about ASEF either. From 
the answers to the six basic factual questions about ASEM,
581
 this survey showed that 
the students of the four prestigious Chinese universities knew very little about ASEM. 
 
Figure 8.2:  Answers from 970 university students 
in Beijing on question ‘Do you know ASEM?’ 
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On the European side, a round of public opinion survey was conducted in February 
2011, briefly after the occurance of ASEM8 in Brussels, in eight EU member states. 
In total, the dataset profiled 6115 completed interviews, while the sample sizes varied 
from country to country to reflect the population composition of the EU. The margin 
of error ranged from ±3% to ±7% at a confidence level of 95%. The public opinion 
survey of Asia in the eyes of Europe asked respondents ‘How familiar are you with 
the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)?’ In average, more than 90% of the respondents 
from the eight ASEM European countries were either ‘not very familiar’ or ‘not 
familiar at all’ with the ASEM process (Figure 8.3). An average of 58% of the 
interviewed European public stated that they are ‘not familiar at all’ with ASEM. 
Despite its existence for one-and-a-half decades, ASEM was far from its European 
public until 2011. 
Figure 8.3: Percentage of European respondents who were NOT familiar with 
the ASEM process. 
Noteworthy is that the questions posed in the three aforementioned research were 
different. Hence, their findings are not directly comparable. Still, results from these 
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public surveys all pointed to the same direction, illustrating how the general public 
has been disconnected from the ASEM process thus far. Although ‘enhancement of 
mutual understanding and awareness between the people from Asia and Europe’ has 
been emphasised as a key objective of ASEM, a majority of the interviewed publics 
did not know that the ASEM process existed, even though the process was created for 
more than a decade whilst those surveys were conducted.  
Regarding inter-regional connections, findings from the EU in the eyes of Asia-Pacific 
as well as Asia in the eyes of Europe indicated the weak influence of the ASEM 
process on bridging people from the two regions (Figures 8.4 and 8.5). In the two 
projects, public survey respondents were showed a list of ASEM European/Asian 
countries and asked to indicate which of those countries did they have ties with (both 
personal and professional). Then, they were asked what kind of connections was it.
582
  
Figure 8.4: Percentage of Asian respondents who had NO personal or 
professional tie with any EU member state. 
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Figure 8.5: Percentage of European respondents who had NO personal or 
professional tie with any ASEM Asian member state. 
After more than a decade of ASEM and ASEF existences, the inter-regional linkage at 
the general public level is far from strong. In the Asian locations monitored, an 
average of 78% of the respondents did not have any personal/professional tie with any 
of the EU countries. In the eight surveyed EU countries, the average was equally high. 
77% of the European respondents did not have personal/professional connection with 
any ASEM Asian countries. 
The results of Malaysia and India were also compared across time. Noteworthy, the 
number of Malaysian and Indian respondents who said to have tie with any of the EU 
countries dropped by 11% and 12% respectively. All things considered, the huge ‘lack 
of connections’ between the public in Asia and Europe revealed that ASEM and 
ASEF have a far way to go in improving the inter-regional ties at the public level. 
Although a large-scale longitudinal comparison is not feasible at present, the 
comparison of the perceptions of ASEM between the general public and elite levels is 
possible. In parallel to the public opinion survey, face-to-face in-depth interviews 
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were conducted in native language with the national elites in all locations covered 
above (the Philippines, Vietnam, India, Macau, Malaysia, China, Japan, Singapore, 
South Korea and Thailand). In total, there are 422 complete interviews in the sample 
obtained between 2008 and 2012.
583
  
Among the elites from political, business and civil society cohorts, an average of 47% 
of the Asian elites indicated that they knew about the ASEM process (Figure 8.6). The 
media elites demonstrated a higher awareness of ASEM, with an average of 58% 
knew about the process. ‘Know about ASEM’ here included also those elite who were 
not familiar with the process and those who said they merely heard of its name. 
Strikingly, among the 422 respondents, only ten (six from Malaysia, two from 
Thailand and two from Singapore) have first-hand participation in the ASEM process. 
 
 Figure 8.6: Percentage of interviewed Asian elites who knew the ASEM process. 
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 It could be ‘have travelled there’, ‘born there’, ‘ancestors born there’, ‘have friends there’, ‘have 
family there’, ‘know people from there in your country’, ‘have business/professional relations’ or 
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Importantly, Figure 8.6 displayed the variations from country to country. The 
interviewed elites in the 2012 sample recorded the highest awareness of ASEM. 
Noteworthy, as there is no data available for longitudinal comparison expect in the 
Indian case, it would be unsound to simply conclude that the awareness of ASEM has 
increased significantly between 2008 and 2012. If future research can use the same 
questions to interview national elites in the countries covered above, longitudinal 
comparisons will be feasible. 
In the earlier samples, Vietnam appeared to have a higher awareness of the ASEM 
process, similar to the findings from the Vietnamese public. With India being a late 
comer to the process, the majority of Indian elites (except the media elites interviewed 
in 2012) showed lower awareness of ASEM compared with their counterparts from 
the founding members of the process. Although Beijing hosted the ASEM summit in 
2008, it did not make the process more visible to the local elites. Yet, one should not 
forget that Beijing hosted also the Olympic Games in 2008, which was much more 
high profile and longer in time. With the growing number of international meetings 
held in Beijing, the one-and-a-half-day ASEM7 would be hard to stand out. 
Comparing Figure 8.6 to Figure 8.1, the degree of awareness of ASEM among the 
Asian elites was higher among than that among the Asian general public. These 
findings confirmed that ASEM has been closer to the elites than to the general public. 
In addition, the elites (except the media ones) were asked to list their professional as 
well as personal ties with the EU and Europe. Figure 8.7 shows that very few 
interviewees did not have any links with the EU and/or Europe. Compared to Figure 
8.4, the elites were much better connected, both professionally and personally, to the 
EU countries than the general public were. 
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Figure 8.7: Percentage of Asian elites who had NO personal or professional tie 
with any EU member states.
584
 
The above empirical findings show that the awareness of ASEM among the general 
public is worrying. The interviewed members of the public paid little attention on the 
process. ASEM seems to be no exception from Rüland’s arguement about ‘global and 
interregional forums are increasingly perceived by sections of the public as arcane 
circles of government specialists which have lost their connection with the 
grassroots.’585 ASEM has established limited opportunities to engage the general 
public directly. Among various Track 2 initiatives, ASEF is mandated to improve the 
mutual awareness and understanding between the people in Asia and Europe. 
Compare with ASEM’s huge population, the 17 000 individuals involved in the ASEF 
activities until 2011 was indeed a tiny proportion.  
Connections between the leaders on Track 1 are not parallel to the distant 
inter-regional relations between the people from Europe and Asia. The biennial 
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 These questions were not posed to media elites. 
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 Rüland, “Interregionalism: An unfinished agenda?” (2006), 313. 
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summit is held regularly; the number of sectoral meetings at ministerial and senior 
official levels keep increasing; and the membership of ASEM keeps expanding. At 
the public level, however, awareness of and interest in the process remain low. Differ 
from the claim in the official discourses, the public has not appeared to be the central 
part of the ASEM process. Government officials and elites maintain their unique 
access to high politics at international level. ASEM remains a top-down process 
where the general public does not play any decisive role. While ASEM are affecting 
the general public in various way (such as extra public holidays or road closure when 
their countries host an ASEM summit or MMs, use of the tax payers’ money to 
sponsor ASEM activities, and ad-hoc inter-regional exchanges opportunities for 
university students and academia), the public can hardly influence the activities at 
summit or ministerial levels. In comparision to the general public, the national elites 
are more involved in the ASEM process. However, the engagment is still limited to a 
small number of national elites. 
8.5. Conclusion 
Although the ASEM process encompassing unofficial tracks to involve non-state 
actors, it has not really promoted the role of the non-state actors in international 
relations. The inclusion of members from the civil society has been a controlled one. 
The comment made by Richards in 2004 that ‘while many ASEM member states do 
acknowledge that civil society has a role to play in interregional relations, most avoid 
the full implications of this for the deepending of civil participation’ still holds true.586 
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 Gareth A. Richards, “The Promise and Limits of Civil Society Engagement in Asia-Europe Relations,” 
ASEM Research Platform Newsbrief (2004), 8, cited in Bersick, “EU-Asia Relations: The Role of Civil 
Society in the ASEM Process” (2006), 193. 
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Applying Bersick’s termology, the ‘democratisation of inter-regional dialogue’ (a 
process that allows civil society to participate in the politics of inter-regional 
relations)
587
 within ASEM remains shollow. 
Among various kinds of non-state actors, the engagement with the business 
community was found more valued by ASEM leaders. Their importance is 
acknowledged in every ASEM summit Chairman’s Statement; AEBF’s 
recommendations are channelled to the officials, with some of the recommendations 
adopted; and groups of senior business leaders were invited to direct meeting with 
ASEM Heads of State/Government. In contrast, participations of other non-state 
actors like academics, media and social movement organisations appeared less valued. 
In particular, civil society organisations and trade unionists have been less concerned 
by the officially admitted Track 2. Subsequently, they formed the ‘Track 3’ of the 
ASEM process, a truly unofficial track. Such track offers the community 
organisations and trade unions across Asia and Europe to network and establish 
cooperation among themselves, albeit direct impact that they could exert on the 
policy-makers remain limited. 
Even in Track 2, direct influence of the engaged non-state actors on the 
policy-making of ASEM countries is limited. The linkage between these non-state 
actors and the ASEM official track is rather minimal. Adding the fact that ASEM is 
not a multilateral negotiation platform or delivery mechanism, the involvement of the 
non-state actors in Track 2 has not enabled them to be more influential on the 
international stage. 
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 Bersick, “EU-Asia Relations: The Role of Civil Society in the ASEM Process” (2006), 192-4. 
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The empirical data revealed that the general public has not been at the core of the 
relationship building among in the ASEM process. The actual actions taken by the 
ASEM partners did not promote a bottom-up approach or a mass involvement of the 
general public. The above findings correspond to the critique of ASEM of being elitist. 
It focuses on the government-to-government and business-to-government relations. 
Sectors from the civil society which gain access to the process are mostly the ‘elites’– 
senior business executives in the AEBF, academics and university students, think 
tanks, senior media professionals in ASEF’s activities and exchange programmes, 
law-makers in the ASEP, as well as research experts, academia and think tanks in 
CAEC and ASEF. The majority of the surveyed general public is not even aware of 
the existence of ASEM. The interaction in the ASEM process remains a reserved high 
politics in which the domestic public are largely irrelevant.  
All in all, ASEM’s Track 2 and Track 3 managed to include several types of non-state 
actors, but did not enable them with decisive powers in international relations. None 
of the abovementioned non-state groups exert direct influence on the action of the 
ASEM partner governments. The inclusion of these non-state actors can be more 
appropriately understood as a product from ASEM partner governments’ public 
diplomacy to increase legitimacy of the process. Track 2 initiatives namely AEBF and 
ASEF can serve the governments’ as new supporting networks. In the selection of 
‘supporters’, ASEM partners demonstrated their preference on the business 
community and the more elitist part of the civil society to the community 
organisations and trade unions. This differentiation of treatment to different groups of 
non-state actor has negative impacts. The legitimacy of both ASEM and its Track 2 is 
questioned. Also, antagonistic feeling among the outcast groups towards the 
governments and towards the groups of actors which are favoured inevitably grows. 
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To truly go beyond the governments and include all sector of the society in relation 
building between Asia and Europe, ASEM partners need to reconsider their 
engagement with the actors in Track 3. Also, interaction between different types of 
actor (namely between the business community and the community organisations, or 
between academic and parliamentarians) should also be better promoted. Last but not 
least, a bigger part of the general public should be involved directly if the 
inter-regional Asia-Europe relation wants to become truly substantial. 
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusion: True potential of ASEM 
 
9.1. Special and novel findings of this research 
This doctoral research determines how the rise of inter-regionalism influences the 
actors in the international arena and vice-versa. It is found that owing to a lack of 
attention to the type of actors involved, many existing studies failed to account 
accurately for the functions and development of inter-regionalism in general and 
ASEM in particular. Hence, this research redirects the focus to the correlation 
between the development of inter-regionalism, with ASEM serves as a case-study, 
and the types of international actors involved. By identifying the key actors in ASEM 
and examining how they utilise ASEM as one of their diplomatic tools, this research 
clarifies the misunderstandings and unrealistic expectations of the process, and hence 
of inter-regionalism. Subsequently, the true potential of ASEM and other 
inter-regional fora are illustrated. 
9.1.1. Beyond the dual-track approach As demonstrated in chapters 6, 7 and 8, 
the ASEM process is more comprehensive than many scholars have previously 
framed it: it is more than the biennial summits and more than two tracks. Since 1996, 
ASEM has grown in breadth as well as depth. In Track 1, the process has developed 
from the biennial summit to involve a great number of ministerial and senior officials’ 
meetings. The policy field have expanded to a wide range of sectors. Due to ASEM’s 
institutional design, the Track 1 meetings do not generate any legally-binding 
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obligation, yet, the sectoral MMs and SOMs allow ASEM partner governments to 
exchange governing experience, to share and explore best practices in the respective 
policy field. This state-centric Track 1 dominates the decision-making of ASEM. 
Thus far, ASEM member states have not given the process more influence in their 
domestic affairs but retain it mainly as an information exchange platform. 
On the fringes of the Track 1 meetings, an unplanned Track 1.1 has flourished and 
provided ASEM partners with an additional channel to maximise diplomatic 
accomplishments and handle ‘private’ affairs in smaller groups. The existence and 
added-value of this special track are overlooked by most observers. This research 
suggests that the Track 1.1, albeit being a by-product, has been one of ASEM’s most 
practical contributions to international relations. The empirical evidences show that in 
Asia-Europe relation, bilateral state-to-state interaction remains the most entrusted 
and familiar form of external relation management. Inter-regional fora like ASEM 
have not reduced the conventional dependence on bilateralism, especially those 
between the big states, which forms the basis of international relations. ASEM 
partners turn to bilateralism when more concrete cooperation or affairs have to be 
handled. In contrast, they do not regard the inter-regional plenary as a platform for 
tangible delivery. In the foreseeable future, inter-regionalism can hardly replace 
bilateralism, unless nation-states are willing to hangover their power in external 
relations to the regional institutions which they belong to; in other words, unless 
regional organisations obtain sufficient actorness.  
Unlike Track 1 in which each ASEM partner has an equal weight, Track 1.1 benefits 
the partners differently. The host country is always the largest beneficial. Also, 
partners who are richer in terms of resources in foreign affairs (regardless of the size 
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of the country) appear to be more capable to utilise such additional diplomatic 
platform. Notably, for states with limited diplomatic resources, it can be a unique 
opportunity to establish bilateral ties with certain partners.  
This research proved that ASEM Track 1.1 favoured ‘inter-regional’ state-to-state 
interactions more than ‘intra-regional’ ones. It is especially the case for the EU 
partners, whose intra-regional tie has been much closer and seem more interested in 
meeting partners from Asia. Additionally, this rationalisation of international 
relations contributes to the reduction of time, resources and carbon emission for the 
partner governments. Arguably, small states who have relatively less resource 
available for external relations and whose influence on international relations is 
relatively small, benefit more. They are brought to the same discussion table with the 
bigger powers. As the additional cost to hold a sideline bilateral state-to-state meeting 
is low, smaller countries gain opportunities to develop more bilateral relations, 
especially with other small states (for example, Singapore-Belgium, 
Singapore-Luxembourg, Thailand-Estonia and Thailand-Latvia meetings took place 
on the fringe of the official summits, Table 7.2 and Table 7.13). 
While Track 1 and Track 1.1 are mainly state-to-state interactions, the introduction of 
track-two diplomacy is expected to engage the non-state actors. When exploring the 
role of various types of non-state actors in ASEM, this research differs from other 
studies which feature only one unofficial track. It distinguishes between the Track 2 
which is recognised by the official ASEM process and a Track 3 which is not. Indeed, 
the different treatments towards different types of non-state actors illustrated by this 
research confirm that a controlled inclusion existed in ASEM’s track-two diplomacy. 
ASEM’s Track 2 and Track 3 have not fostered the role of the non-state actors or 
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given rise to any new international actor. Although the non-state actors attempt to 
project their voice to and influence the governments, ASEM remain very much a 
top-down process. Also, the empirical findings demonstrate that the general public 
has been largely detached from the process. Positively, the Track 2 and Track 3 
gatherings do provide individuals from ASEM countries to build people-to-people 
connection and exchange expertise, both intra-regionally and inter-regionally.  
Furthermore, the boundaries between these tracks are found to be rigid; 
communications between actors from different tracks or levels have been limited. 
This research suggests that the overlooked cross-track interaction can actually bring 
added-value to the ASEM process. 
9.1.2. Inter-regionalism not for regions but nation-states In sum, ASEM 
embraces four tracks to shelter various types of actors who interact differently. 
Nonetheless, the process has hardly contributed to the redistribution of power 
between state and non-state actors. The empirical data shows that little additional 
space was created for non-state actors to influence international relations. In Track 1, 
the state-centric hierarchy is obvious. The Head of State/Government summit gathers 
the top decision-makers, while the ministers and their senior officials act according to 
the instructions set by the summiteers. Occasionally, experts from special areas are 
invited to form taskforces of eminent persons to work on given topics. They then 
report their results to the corresponding SOMs. In Track 2 and Track 3, business 
community, parliamentarians, academics, research experts, think tanks and civil 
society organisations regularly submit their recommendations to the SOMs, MMs and 
summits via the Asia-Europe Business Forum, Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership, 
Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation, Asia-Europe Foundation, Asia-Europe People’s 
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Forum and Asia-Europe Trade Union Forum. These recommendations are filtered first 
by the SOMs, then by the MMs before reaching the summits. In this hierarchy, the 
non-state actors are left on the periphery, passively controlled by the states. They 
exert little influence on relation-building among ASEM partners. Although a new type 
of interaction, inter-regionalism, has been established, the primary actor in 
international relations remains the nation-state. 
Noteworthy, not every partner government has acted in the same way in ASEM. Both 
in the plenary meetings and bilateral meetings on the sideline, several partners are 
obviously more active than others. The list of these active ASEM partners in Track 1 
is identical to that of Track 1.1. China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand and 
Vietnam are found on the Asian side; while Germany, the European Commission and 
Denmark are on the EU side. This difference in activity actually mirrors wider 
international relations where certain states are more active and more capable in 
managing external relations. This research suggests that such differences are caused 
by a combination of factors including differences in national interest, preferences in 
diplomatic tools, the availability of diplomatic resources, and geopolitics. However, 
the degree of relevancy of each factor to each partner varies. Future research are 
encouraged to go beyond the findings here and determine how each of these causal 
factors influences ASEM partners’ activity in different ASEM tracks. 
Moreover, it is illustrated that ASEM will not become purely inter-regional in the 
foreseeable future; therefore, the process cannot deliver the functions expected for 
pure inter-regionalism, namely, power-balancing or bandwagoning between regions, 
formation of a layer of global governance, coordination of position between regions 
before multilateral fora and agenda-setting for multilateral fora. Thus far, ASEM has 
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not been a region-to-region interaction. The continuous rounds of enlargement already 
signify the incompleteness of ‘Asia’ and ‘Europe’ in ASEM. In particular, the 2010 
admission of Russia, Australia and New Zealand and the 2012 admission of Norway 
and Switzerland induce controversy over the definition of ‘Asia’ and ‘Europe’ as well 
as the legitimacy of the EU to represent ‘Europe’. Furthermore, neither the Asian nor 
the European side speaks or acts as one united bloc. The key acting agents are the 
nation-states, while the active participation of the European Commission (whose 
legitimacy to participate in ASEM remains questionable) is an exceptional case. The 
empirical analysis shows that no regional actor in ASEM possesses sufficient 
actorness to replace its constituent member states, although many aforementioned 
existing studies have taken regions or regional organisations as independent actors for 
granted. The current ‘Asia-Europe Meeting’ is better described as a meeting between 
a group of nation-states in Asia and a group of nation-states in Europe. 
ASEM was never designed to function as a delivery or decision-making mechanism. 
Lacking the institutional tool and willingness of the participants to commit bindingly, 
the process has not been producing most of the results predicted by other scholars 
who applied different IR theories. Thus far, no empirical finding was found to support 
the claims that ASEM could bring partners material gains, foster intra-regional 
institutional building or prevent unilateral behaviour of hegemons. On the other hand, 
the empirical analysis suggests that the key contributions of ASEM are information 
and views updates between participants in Track 1; provision of an additional venue, 
Track 1.1, for partners to conduct external relations; and bringing groups of non-state 
actors with similar interests together promoting socialisation in Tracks 2 and 3. 
According to the terminology used in the existing studies, the ASEM process has 
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facilitated mutual understanding, norms and concepts exchanging among participants. 
Also, it rationalise international relations, especially beneficial for bilateral 
state-to-state relation management. 
9.1.3. The actor-institution-function model Putting these special findings 
together generates the answer to a larger puzzle (Figure 9.1): how the institutional 
design of an inter-regional forum like ASEM and the actors involved mutually 
influence each other. This model illustrates how the institutional background set by 
the founders affects the engagement of actors, degree of inter-regionalism and 
functions of an inter-regional forum. The model suggests that inter-regionalism is both 
dependent and independent variables in contemporary international relations. Existing 
international actors affect the formation and development of inter-regional 
cooperative frameworks and vice-versa. 
Figure 9.1: Independent and dependent variables in an inter-regional forum 
Figure 9.2 illustrates how the above variables correlate to the case-study of this 
research: at the outset the founding members of ASEM designed the process as an 
informal and non-legally binding forum, they retained the power to control the types 
of actors included in the process and sustained state-centrism. The founding partners 
did not seem to be prepared to share their power with other actors; all major roles in 
the process were assigned to the governments. No supra-national body was created, 
Actors Functions 
Institutional 
design 
Degree of Inter-regionalism 
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while ASEF, the only common institution established, is intergovernmental and given 
a limited mandate to manage only one of ASEM’s three pillars. Neither is there any 
attempt to develop ASEM into an independent actor. 
All ASEM initiatives have to be endorsed by consensus and contain no binding power. 
Even if certain ASEM partners are eager to cooperate beyond national and regional 
borders, no significant delivery can be generated under the ASEM framework. 
Furthermore, none of the ASEM partners possesses enough power to dictate the 
process; together with the principle of consensus, the working method reflects the 
lowest common denominator accepted by every partner. 
Figure 9.2: Correlation between actors, institutional development and functions 
of ASEM 
Moreover, non-state actors’ engagements remain passive and controlled. Which type 
of civil society actors to invite to an ASEM event, as well as when, and in what form 
are all decided by the partner governments. Meanwhile, ASEM partners have 
demonstrated a preference towards the business community. Attempts of the non-state 
actors to use ASEM as an additional channel to influence the government policies 
have had minimal effect thus far. An inter-regional inter-governmental forum like 
ASEM remains largely a domain of high politics, in which the civil society and 
information & views 
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general public are largely peripheral. Although some elites from the civil society 
(namely business leaders, academics, university students and parliamentarians) are 
included in the ASEM’s unofficial track, the number of individuals who have directly 
participated in the ASEM process remains low. From a more cynical perspective, the 
controlled inclusion of a limited number of non-state actors can be seen as a symbolic 
attempt of ASEM governments to avoid the critique of being undemocratic. 
Arguably, the acceptance of two regional institutions (the European Commission and 
the ASEAN Secretariat) as full members in ASEM by nation-states can be attributed 
to the non-binding nature of the process. ASEM partners do not have to vote for 
obligatory actions as they do in institutions like the UN General Assembly or the 
WTO, so the ‘double-representation’ of the EU and ASEAN member states has not 
provoked any opposition. 
Owing to its state-centrism and non-binding nature, ASEM now serves primarily as 
one of the tools for its partner governments in external affairs. Many existing studies 
have either assumed that regions as independent actors or that states from the same 
region share united objectives. As these pre-conditions were not met at present, it is 
unrealistic to expect ASEM to perform functions like power balancing or bandwagon 
between regions, or the formation of an inter-regional level for global governance. 
Moreover, the ASEM case has revealed a huge divergence in interests and 
engagement among individual ASEM partners. Partners from the same region do not 
necessarily act collectively, instead, the states speak from their national perspective. 
In the ideal-type of pure inter-regionalism, there would be no differences between 
Chinese, Japanese, Thai, India or Mongolian views in the Asian bloc; and no EU 
member state would have to send its national leader but would be represented by a 
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communal EU official. The present reality is that each ASEM partner uses ASEM to 
project its own national voice on the international stage.  
Whilst ASEM is referred to as one of the most advanced models of inter-regionalism 
and involves the most advanced regional organisation in the world (the EU), the 
domination of state-centrism suggests that pure inter-regionalism is far from attainable 
at present. The EU’s actorness was found to be marginal in ASEM, whereas the EU 
member states are all individual members in the process and act for themselves. They 
also actively engage in bilateral state-to-state diplomacy on the sidelines of ASEM 
meetings. Given that the most advanced regionalism model failed to act as a single 
united front, it is even more unrealistic to expect other regions to do so. The empirical 
evidence suggests that pure region-to-region interaction is an ideal case. In practice, 
inter-regionalism would be more likely to remain interaction among states from two 
more or less distinct regions. This form of inter-regional interaction is commonly 
found on the international stage, namely the EU-Mercosur relation and FEALCA. 
This empirical analysis revealed that the present form of inter-regional fora do exert 
special added-value to international relations, albeit under various institutional 
constraints. They offer participants opportunities to exchange information and views, 
to share best experience and practices; for connection building, fostering mutual 
understanding, identifying potential partners for more concrete cooperation, as well as 
demonstrating good diplomatic gestures (as political symbolism). Each partner gains a 
platform to express their view on issues which concern them. This is especially 
important for smaller or weaker states, whose voices are easily overshadowed by the 
bigger counterparts. Furthermore, regular fora help narrowing the psychological 
distance between participants. In the long-run, this contributes to lessen 
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misunderstanding and misperception not only inter-regionally but also 
intra-regionally. 
In terms of diplomacy, a multilateral forum which occurs with a fixed time interval 
provides partners with regularly platform to manage foreign affairs with each other. 
The additional opportunities created for partners to conduct sideline meetings are 
particularly helpful. Certainly, each partner has more than one such platform to meet 
each other, to name a few there are the UN, the WTO and a number of inter-regional 
as well as regional fora. Some states have even more meeting opportunities if they are 
members of special groupings such as G8, BRICS and ARF. Therefore, ASEM is not 
the only venue where its partners can gather, but it does offer one regular platform for 
a substantial mass of simultaneous bilateral meetings to take place on the sidelines.  
In terms of qualitative contributions, the leaders can build up personal connections 
through meeting repeatedly. When accumulated, such inter-personal relations can turn 
into concrete diplomatic cooperation. The same applies to the non-state actors 
gathered in Track 2 and Track 3. Socialisation of individuals within the same group 
allows cross-cultural communications and may eventually facilitate norm diffusion. 
However, concepts such as norm diffusion and socialisation are very abstract to be 
gauged. Specific and carefully designed research will be needed for further study on 
such contribution of inter-regionalism. 
Notably, the continuous enlargements have transformed ASEM further away from 
pure inter-regionalism. Empirically, no visible impacts on the functions by this 
evolution are found in this research. The list of core members remains the same as 
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most of the new members are not active. The expansions bring more partners in the 
information sharing sessions and more options for sideline meetings.  
All things considered, with its low institutional cost, ASEM provides its partners with an 
additional channel for regular meetings in plenary sessions as well as ad-hoc meetings 
on the sidelines. The availability of such a cheap communication tool does no harm to 
the international relations. The puzzle behind new comers’ accession to ASEM albeit its 
lack of concrete delivery is, hence, revealed – gaining an extra channel to exchange 
information and experience with a large group of other countries, acquiring an additional 
platform to handle bilateral diplomacy, and demonstrating close relation with the 
respective regional group, although only symbolically, all without investing high 
institutional or diplomatic costs. 
The findings of this research support that of Hänggi who argued that ‘the importance of 
ASEM is based more on political symbolism than substance.’588 On the other side of the 
coin, the political and diplomatic cost will be high to terminate the process. A halt would 
be read as an indication of a very bad relationship between the partners. At the moment, 
financial and human resources are reasonably low to sustain the process, yet, if more 
partners choose to send lower level officials to future summits and MMs, ASEM will 
gradually lose momentum, and then fade away. Nonetheless, a total abolition of the 
entire process would involve a high cost in terms of political symbolism. One possible 
outcome of the growing disappointment and a decrease in interest can be calling off the 
summit. In such a scenario, ASEM can still be sustained by the MMs, SOMs and ad-hoc 
initiatives, whose frequency and coverage may be reduced. Still, such a ‘downgrading’ 
                                           
588
 Heiner Hänggi, “Small State as a Third State: Switzerland and Asia-Europe Interregionalism,” in 
Small States inside and outside the European Union: Interests and Policies, Goetschel Laurent ed. (the 
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), 88. 
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will inevitably be read as a stagnation in Asia-Europe relation, which the active ASEM 
partners would not like seeing. 
Back to the examination on inter-regionalism, it should not be fixed on an ideal case 
scenario, which can only be achieved when two highly unified supranational regional 
organisations interact and are willing to commit to legally-binding actions (Figure 
9.3). Otherwise, the true potential of actual inter-regionalism, which brings together 
nation-states from two regions, would be overlooked. 
Figure 9.3: Correlation between actors, institutional development and functions 
in ideal pure inter-regionalism 
9.2. The appropriate theoretical approach 
In this research, a post-positivist perspective, which suggests that no single theory can 
provide the full story of the complex and ever-changing international relations, is 
adopted. The applicability of theories varies in different issue areas and different time. 
This research suggests that the three grand theories, each having different accents, can 
complement each other in explaining the complicated and ever-changing international 
interaction. Although realists and liberal institutionalists perceive international 
relations differently, this thesis argues that they form two extreme ends of a spectrum. 
They are not mutually exclusive but mutually transferable, with the aid of social 
legally-binding, 
clear mandate, 
able to act 
independently 
Balancing and bandwagoning 
other regions; global governance 
and intra-regional institution 
building; streamline multilateral 
cooperation 
Two highly 
cohesive 
regions 
Pure inter-regionalism 
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constructivism. At the realist end, nation-states lack trust on each other and focus on 
maximising their own power so as to survive. At the liberal end, nation-states co-exist 
with non-state actors (such as multilateral or regional institutions, multinational 
businesses and civil society organisations); the actors cooperate to solve common 
problems and seek mutual gains. The reality, which is not static, can be any point on 
the spectrum. When the identity and mutual recognition between actors change, 
international relations can shift from power-struggle (the realist end) to cooperative 
global governance (the liberal end). 
In the case-study here, ASEM is interpreted as a pure inter-regional interaction by 
some existing studies. However, the national identity of the major actors was found 
consistently stronger than the regional one, retaining ASEM at the realist end of the 
spectrum. When setting the institutional design, ASEM founding partners preferred 
regulations which maintain state-centrism. During the actual interactions, constituent 
members of the EU as well as those of ASEAN mainly manage their external relations 
individually instead of as a united regional front. In contrast, when the regional 
identity increases and shared norms proliferate, regional organisations or regions will 
increase in actorness; subsequently, ASEM will move towards the ideal case of 
inter-regionalism at the liberal end.  
In the analysis of a non-static process like ASEM, the three IR schools complement 
each other in explanatory power and can be combined to elucidate different moments 
of international relations. The actor-institution-function model above is a combination 
of the accents of the three grand theoretical schools: ideational forces of 
constructivism, institution of liberal institutionalism and power distribution of realism. 
At present, behaviours of the majority of ASEM partners in the process are found 
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closer to the realist paradigm. When mutual trust, interdependence and the sense of 
partnership increase, nation-states will become more willing to cooperate with each 
other and less sceptical of other types of actors in international relations. In other 
words, when mutual perception improves and collective identity strengthens, 
interactions between ASEM partners can move towards the liberal paradigm. Notably, 
the movement along this realist-liberal spectrum is likely to be back and forth. 
Whether, and if yes where, an equilibrium point exists is a question for future studies 
in inter-regionalism. 
This theoretical conclusion is applicable to inter-regionalism as well as the wider 
international relations. For instance, in regionalism, when national identity and 
interest are on top of the regional ones, the cooperation remains intergovernmental. 
Cooperation only continues when the calculated gains satisfy the nation-states. On the 
contrary, when cohesiveness increases and the regional partners increasingly identify 
themselves as one, regionalism proceeds towards supranational. Taking the BRICS 
process as another example, since 2006 it has provided the BRIC(S) countries with a 
regular platform to communicate and cooperate. When more and more shared 
interests and norms are identified by the five emerging powers, the sense of 
collectiveness and interdependence ameliorate. The relation subsequently moves from 
the realist power fighting and balancing towards liberalist positive-sum cooperation. 
This combination model of realism, liberal institutionalism and social constructivism 
can also be utilised to explain war and peace, multilateral cooperation and 
international conflict management in international relations. 
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9.3. Taking the study of inter-regionalism further  
This research underscores the urgent need to alter the research direction on 
inter-regionalism from focusing on what it should offer to what it can offer. By 
demonstrating the persistent state-centrism in inter-regionalism and illustrating the 
lack of actorness of regions and regional organisations as independent actors, this 
research indicates why most of the theoretically-deduced functions failed to capture 
the reality. By focusing back to the true potential of inter-regionalism, observers and 
participants of inter-regional fora can invest their time and energy more appropriately 
on understanding and utilising platforms like ASEM. 
As mentioned in the foregoing discussion, future research on inter-regionalism can 
explore whether an equilibrium point exists between the realist and liberalist 
paradigms. Also, the significance of the various causal factors identified to determine 
different ASEM partners’ commitment in the process is worth further examination. 
This thesis emphasises chiefly on the endogenous factors in inter-regionalism, namely 
the type of actors involved, their identity and the institutional design they set. Further 
research on inter-regionalism can determine the exogenous factor such as influences 
from third players or from other similar fora. In the ASEM case, how the US’s 
‘returning to Asia-Pacific’ policy since late 2011, political instability in the Arab 
Springs, the East Asia Summit and ARF affect ASEM constitute worthy further 
research topics. 
Additionally, domestic factors can be explored in future research. In the ASEM case, 
the potential questions include: ‘how would the current reforms taken by the 
Myanmar government impact on its participation in ASEM?’; ‘how will other ASEM 
partners react to Myanmar’s reform?’; and, ‘how will the implementation of Lisbon 
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Treaty and the establishment of the European External Action Service influence 
ASEM?’. 
By focusing back to reality, instead of the normative case of inter-regionalism, the 
identity of the actors in international relations and hence how they can utilise those 
inter-regional fora can be better understand. Consequently, the potential added-value 
and subsidiarity of inter-regionalism can be maximised. 
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Appendixes 
I. Questionnaire prepared for the interviews with key informants 
1) In what way your office is involved with the ASEM summits? 
2) In your view, what is the biggest challenge does your country face when dealing 
with Asia/Europe? Does ASEM process help to overcome this challenge? If yes, 
in what way? If no, why? 
3) Among the ASEM partners (both Asian and European), which one/ones are the 
most important to your state: 
i. At present:                     ii. In the future:  
4) In ASEM6 and the Ministerial Meetings between ASEM6 and ASEM7, have your 
country/EC/ASEAN hold any bilateral meeting or talks with another ASEM 
member states? If yes, what were the main outcomes of those meetings?  
5) In ASEM7 and Ministerial Meetings between ASEM7 and ASEM8, have your 
held any bilateral meeting or talks with another ASEM member states? If yes, 
what were the main outcomes of those meetings?   
6) How would you describe the role of the European Commission in the ASEM 
process? 
7) On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means “very inert” and 5 means “very active”, 
how would you rate the involvement of the following actors with the ASEM 
process? 
i. Your own country 
ii. Any Asian ASEM countries you like to comment on 
iii. the European Commission 
iv. the EU rotating Presidency 
v. Any EU countries you would like to comment on 
vi. the ASEAN Secretariat 
vii. NGOs in your country 
viii. Business community in your country 
ix. Trade unions in your country            
8) On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means “open only for government” and 5 means 
“totally open to the public”, how would you rate the openness of ASEM process?  
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II. Questionnaire prepared for the interview with informant from ASEF 
1) Is there a proportion in the number of ‘new participants’ (who have never took 
part in any ASEF or ASEM activities before) versus ‘old participants’ (who have 
already took part in one or more ASEF/ASEM activities before) in each ASEF 
activity? 
2) Do you have any figure on the number of each type of civil society actor (NGOs, 
academic, art performers, media, government officials and etc) involved in ASEF 
activities (or in the Connecting Civil Society conferences)? 
3) At the moment, how many staffs are there at ASEF at present? How many ASEM 
countries they represent? 
4) From your observation, which ASEM partner governments are active in 
supporting ASEF’s work? 
5) Also which ASEM partner public are the most active in participating in ASEF 
activities? 
